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Preface
This study began in 1961 as a limited attempt to assess the impact
of science and modern technology on the negotiating process and
concepts of international organization, using the test ban negotiations then in progress as a case study. When the Moscow Treaty
was signed, however, it seemed wise to broaden the focus and to
capture as many of the details as we could that might help to
explain this first formal arms control agreement between East and
West in the nuclear age. Our analysis is clearly not definitive, but
hopefully, it will be a useful source, even after all relevant documents have been published. We hope also that the study will fulfill
something of its original purpose.
The principal written sources have been the records of the
negotiations and the memoirs thus far published. In addition, a
large number of the participants have been interviewed. These include President Eisenhower, all three of the Special Assistants to
the President for Science and Technology who were involved,
Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, Adrian S. Fisher, John J. McNaughton, various other officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and most of the American scientists
who took part, including Robert F. Bacher, Hans A. Bethe, James B.
Fisk, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, and Edward Teller. Several United
Nations and United Kingdom officials were also interviewed. For
obvious reasons, there are no citations for any of the material
gained through interviews.
The study was undertaken as part of The University of Michigan Law School's Atomic Energy Research Project. We are inc;lebted to the director of that project, Professor Samuel D. Estep,
for his assistance. We appreciate the financial support of the Ford
Foundation and The University of Michigan Phoenix Project which
made the study possible. We are especially grateful to the many
individuals who kindly submitted to our interviews.
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Agnes Cacamindin, Judith Lane, Lynne Edelstein, Helen Jussila, and Judith Rote all helped in the preparation of the book by
serving as research assistants, and the last named did the onerous
task of checking the notes. Alice J. Russell's invaluable contribution
was in editing the manuscript Eleanor Herp unflinchingly bore the
brunt of the typing. This book would not exist without their help.
Abraham Bargman, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Elisabeth Case, Inis
L. Claude, Jr., Philip J. Farley, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Warren
E. Hewitt, Fred C. Ikle, George M. Kavanagh, John H. Morse,
Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, E. Raymond Platig,
Marshall D. Shulman, Rudolph K. Skeete, J. David Singer, Ronald
I. Spiers, Jerome B. Wiesner, Christopher Wright, and Ciro Elliott
Zoppo all read part or all of the manuscript, and we and the book
have benefited greatly from their wisdom.
Of course, we alone are responsible for whatever errors of
commission and omission the study may contain.
HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON
ERIC STEIN

Ann Arbor, Michigan
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PART I

BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

The Nuclear Age, the United States,
and the Test Ban Negotiations
I

The Moscow Treaty: A Turning Point?
In Moscow, on July 25, 1963, representatives of the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, and the United States initialed the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under Water. Eleven days later, again in Moscow, the foreign
ministers of the three states signed the Treaty, which became the
first major formal arms control agreement between the two sides
in the Cold War. Moreover, the Treaty dealt-although in a very
limited fashion only-with the most awesome aspect of the competition between East and West, the nuclear-missile arms race.
Eighteen years earlier, almost to the day, on July 26, 1945, the
first test detonation of a nuclear device occurred at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, and the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in war
devastated Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. These events had introduced a new phase into mankind's existence. The two events in
Moscow in 1963, falling as they did, seemed to suggest, at the
least, a punctuation of this phase. More generally, they offered hope
that mankind had begun to take steps to control the destructive
potential of modem technology, of which the development of nuclear
weapons has been but one aspect. For the United States, which had
first developed nuclear weapons and had created the largest stockpile, and probably for most of the world, the Moscow Treaty represented the first concrete step toward a goal that had been sought
since the very outset of the nuclear age.
II

The United States and the Nuclear Age
The Changed International System
To begin to assess the significance of the Moscow Treaty, it is
necessary to recall that the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945
3
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fundamentally altered the international political system. Although
the full dimensions of this revolution were then and still remain
obscure, certain salient features were immediately apparent. Nuclear
weapons increased the potential human and physical costs of war
to such an extent that its traditional role as the ultima ratio in
international politics was brought sharply into question and a
search for new means for the peaceful adjustment of conflicts
appeared particularly urgent. Again, because of the enormous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons and the cost and complexity
of building a nuclear arsenal and appropriate delivery systems, the
distinction between those states which possessed such weapons and
those which did not seemed greater than any difference in the
power position of states that had previously existed. As a consequence of these developments, many of the traditional modes and
patterns of international politics appeared to be fundamentally altered. Alliances seemed not to mean the same thing that they had
prior to the summer of 1945. The tasks and techniques of diplomacy
seemed to acquire new dimensions. Concepts of international organization assumed new meanings. Some analysts even questioned
whether or not the territorial state continued to have relevance. 1
The changes in the international system bore especially heavily
on the United States as the state which had introduced nuclear
weapons and which, at first at any rate, would have the greatest
capacity to develop them. To compound the complexity, these
changes occurred at precisely the same time that the United States
was forced to abandon finally its isolationist stance and to accept
seemingly permanent and deep involvement in international affairs.
The balance of power in Europe which had helped to guarantee
America's secUrity in the nineteenth century probably ceased to
exist during the First World War and certainly was no longer
operative after the Second World War. 2 Instead of being able to
rely on the exertion of others to protect its security, the United
States now had to undertake that task itself. Moreover, it became
increasingly apparent that the security of a large number of other
lJohn H. Herz, for one. See his International Politics in the Atomic
Age (1959), p. 22.
2For an excellent analysis of these developments and their implications
for the United States see Hajo Holbom, The Political Collapse of Europe
(1951).
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states was dependent upon American efforts. Thus, in 1945, the
problems of· adjustment for the United States were piled one on top
of the other. The United States faced a changed world and faced
it from a new perspective.

Weapons Development versus Weapons Control: Two Conflicting
Strains in American Policy
From the outset, American attitudes and policies toward nuclear
weapons have been characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the
one hand, the United States has felt that for reasons of its security
it could not forego the development of nuclear weapons; yet at the
same time, it has found the development of these weapons and
dependence on them distasteful and has continually sought some
means of controlling them. Prominent among the sources of this
ambivalence has been the fact that nuclear weapons and other
aspects of modem military technology have enormously increased
the vulnerability of the United States. The relative predominance
of one or the other of the two conflicting strains-and the resulting
policy mixture-have, of course, varied with time, but both of these
strains have been constant components of American thought and
actions, causing important stresses and uncertainties in the policymaking process and in American negotiating postures.
The policy strain which caused the United States to develop
nuclear weapons-and which motivated the development of its
nuclear arsenal-was based upon the consideration that in the midtwentieth-century world of sovereign and often sharply clashing
states, American security depended first and foremost upon American power, particularly the national military establishment based
broadly upon the immense American industrial capacity and steadily
evolving technology. The initial decisions tu develop nuclear weapons
were made with the knowledge that Nazi Germany was also pursuing this goal and at least partly because of the fear that it might
succeed. 3 In addition, nuclear weapons were viewed as a possible
means of shortening the Second World War, and the President's
decision to employ them in Japan was basically motivated by this
SSee Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," in U.S.
Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Command
Decisions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 493518, at 494.
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purpose. These decisions were made in wartime secrecy, and despite
the wartime emergency, not without soul searching on the part of
those who made them. It is thus not surprising that American plans
for the control of nuclear weapons-reflecting the second policy
strain--began to evolve almost simultaneously with the initial use
of these weapons. But for a variety of reasons, negotiations to
establish international control foundered. 4 As the failure of these
negotiations emerged, so did the deep Soviet-American clash about
the nature of the post-war world. The United States came to perceive the Soviet Union as an expansionist power with virtually
unlimited objectives, the achievement of most of which would
seriously jeopardize fundamental American interests. In this situation, the build-up of the nuclear arsenal again seemed to offer an
important means of gaining security, particularly in view of Soviet
superiority in manpower and conventional weapons. Beyond that,
there was always the fear that the Soviet Union might make a technological breakthrough which it would then exploit for its purposes,
a fear which became particularly acute after the USSR's first detonation of a nuclear device in 1949, several years ahead of American
expectations. 5 As during the Nazi period, therefore, it was not even
necessary to face the issue of the value of nuclear weapons on its
merits in order to advocate their development; one could simply
argue the inexorable necessity of keeping ahead of the other side.
Although the tempo of the nuclear arms race quickened as the
years went by, the United States never completely abandoned the
quest for the control of these weapons. Moreover, several new
factors emerged bearing upon this issue. First and foremost was the
increase in Soviet nuclear power. As the USSR's nuclear stockpile
grew, and it became apparent that the Soviet Uriion could devastate
the United States just about as easily as the United States could
wreck the Soviet Union, the role that nuclear weapons could and
should play in American strategies was increasingly called into
4For accounts of the negotiations see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar
Negotiations /or Arms Control (1961), and Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy
Towards International Control of Atomic Energy (1961).
5How the Soviet detonation spurred the United States to develop its
nuclear capacity still further is shown in Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb
Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1. (March 1961), pp. 24-46.
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question. And if a world in which two states had large numbers of
nuclear weapons and ample means to deliver them seemed frightening, the prospect of a world in which this capacity was dispersed
among additional states was even more horrendous. Even if the
majority of Americans active in foreign policy did not see increased
prospects for the control of nuclear weapons, they certainly saw
increased need for such control.
Linking the Control of Nuclear Weapons with Improved World
Order: Another Source of Ambivalence
Another complicating element in the evolution of American
policy arose from the fact that the search for means of controlling
nuclear weapons inevitably became linked with one of the themes
which had characterized American foreign policy since the beginning of the twentieth century, the search for institutional means of
regulating the conduct of world politics. 6 One reason was that in
the American view, it was precisely the absence of effective international institutions that compelled the United States to rely primarily on national military power for its security and to develop
nuclear weapons as an essential component of that power. Another
reason was that it seemed to be difficult to seek control arrangements for one of the most crucial elements in the relations among
states without considering other relevant elements and the problem
of world order in general. The existence of the United Nations and
the tasks that it assumed in the field of regulation of armaments
was a further reason for the linkage.
Like the American attitude toward nuclear weapons, that toward
the problem of creating a more effective world order was also
characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand the
United States envisaged the image of a future world in which international institutions would have significant powers with a corresponding reduction in the powers of states; on the other, it was very
reluctant to see any derogation of its own sovereignty. From the
early days of the twentieth century, American policies concerning
6For a critical analysis of this strain see Roland N. Stromberg, Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations
to NATO (1963). How it affects contemporary American policy can be seen
in former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard N. Gardner's In Pursuit
of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations (1964).
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these matters were characterized by a series of compromises and
followed a zig-zag path. This was dramatized by the American
pressure for and subsequent rejection of the League of Nations.
Although the scale of oscillation appears to have narrowed after the
Second World War, the ambiguity has remained clearly discernible,
for instance in the American posture toward the United Nations.
Thus the linking of this strain of American foreign policy with
developing American attitudes and policies toward the control of
nuclear weapons tied the latter to a fairly well developed, yet complicated and sometimes conflicting, set of concepts.
The linkage had consequences for both components. On the
one hand, American thinking on the framework for the control of
nuclear weapons tended to be cast into predetermined molds. Universal international organizations, such as the United Nations and
the specialized agencies, were used as models, without much thought
being given to the relationship between the specific weapons control
functions to be performed and the nature of the organization required. On the other hand, as the United States began to grapple
with the problem of controlling nuclear weapons, it was forced to
reappraise certain of its views concerning international organization. For example, the question immediately arose as to whether or
not it would be possible to control nuclear weapons completely
without at the same time controlling all uses of nuclear energy. If
the answer was negative, what would be the impact on the traditional doctrine of domestic jurisdiction?
In the years after 1945 both the changes in the international
system wrought by the advent of nuclear weapons and the new
status of the United States within that system compelled a broader
reevaluation of American concepts of world order. Old concepts
generally were questioned and reformulated. What did security
mean in the new age? Under the circumstances, what would an
organized and orderly system for the conduct of international politics
be like? What was the relationship between the reconciliation of the
conflicting aims and ambitions of states and the control of violence?
Since these concepts originated within the international political
system, their development was inevitably and profoundly affected
by the conduct of other actors within this system and especially of
the state that the United States perceived as the principal threat,
the USSR. This interaction was characterized by a process of bargain-
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ing which went on formally and informally, explicitly and implicitly,
all of the time. 7 In the American view, the need for nuclear weapons,
the need for their control, and the requirements for that control
were all intimately related to Soviet behavior.
New Actors in the Security Policy Process, the Scientists
Just as the new age required a new conceptual understanding
of the changed world on the part of American policy-makers,
opinion leaders, and the informed segments of the public, it also
required adjustments in the processes for formulating and implementing security policy. One crucial new requirement was to bring
scientists into the policy process. 8 In the first place, they alone could
provide the knowledge which would be essential for rational policy
formulation with respect to many key issues. Again, many of those
scientists who had participated in unlocking the secret of the atom,
felt that they had a special responsibility concerning the use to
which their discoveries were put, and demanded a voice in policymaking. In an open society, and with a base of new-found prestige,
they were in a good position to realize their demands. Fmally,
scientists became involved in yet another role: the implementation
of certain policies, once formulated, also required the services of
scientists, including their participation in international negotiations.
The integration of scientists into the policy process had to take
account of the decentralization in the process of making security
policy within the United States which stems originally from the
constitutional division of power between the legislative and executive branches. The multiplication of executive agencies with responsibilities in security affairs after the Second World War further
fragmented the process. Given their nature as loose coalitions, in
which local interests tend to predominate except during Presidential
election years, American political parties have been able to make
7The best theoretical analysis of this process is: Thomas C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict (1960). For an excellent real world application of
this theoretical framework see Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate
(1964).
BFor general analyses of the introduction of scientists into the process
of formulating and implementing security policy see Robert Gilpin, American
Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (1962) and Robert Gilpin and
Christopher Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy Making (1964).
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at most a modest contribution as unifying forces. The fact that
different parties can control legislative and executive branches of
the federal government, as they did from 1946 through 1948 and
again from 1954 through 1960, adds to the fragmentation. As a
consequence of all of these factors, the formulation of security
policy within the United States is characterized by a process of
bargaining which is not totally unlike that which occurs among
sovereign states. To formulate a policy requires building a consensus
adequate to secure its adoption. 9 Depending on the nature of the
policy (for example, whether or not it requires funds for its implementation and the magnitude of the funds needed), the process of
building a consensus might be confined to an executive department
or even to a bureau within it, or it might extend far wider and
include several executive agencies, the legislative branch, and segments of the general public. Because of the nature of this process,
scientists could and would ha,ve to enter at a variety of points; and
they did.
Necessary though this development was, it brought with it
complicated problems. What would be the best formal arrangements within the structure of government to insure that technical
data and scientific advice would be available when needed and that
scientists would be heard and their voice would be accorded neither
too little nor too much weight alongside and in combination with
those of other expert and interested groups? On a different level,
would problems of communication arise between scientists and nonscientists; and, if they did, how could they be overcome, keeping in
mind that it would not always be easy or even possible to be aware
of comm~cation difficulties as they occur? Often only some later
event would make such difficulties apparent. The problem of communication obviously would affect the nature of the arrangements
made for the scientists in government. Finally, the way and the
extent to which scientists were brought into the process of formulating and implementing security policy were important not only from
DThis concept was first articulated and developed by Roger Hitsman.
See his excellent articles: "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign
Policy Consensus," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIT, No.
3 (September 1958), pp. 725-44; and, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An
Interim Research Report," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III, No.
4 (December 1959), pp. 361-82.
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the viewpoint of insuring that decisions were made as rationally
and efficiently as possible, but also from that of insuring that the
elected civilian leaders actually remained in control of the policy
processes and their output, since civilian control is one of the most
fundamental values embodied in the American constitutional system.
Thus, at the same time that the United States grappled with basic
problems concerning its position in the international political system,
it also struggled with important organizational problems concerning its own political system.
III

The Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations as a Case Study
The negotiations which culminated in the signature of the Moscow
Treaty extended over a period of five years, from the summer of
1958 through the summer of 1963. They were conducted principally
between the Soviet Union on one side and the United Kingdom
and the United States on the other, although almost all states
participated in one form or another. These negotiations provide
case study material which is both engrossing and instructive. They
illustrate--perhaps better than any other international negotiations
which have been conducted since the end of the Second World
War-how the United States has attempted to resolve the complicated issues relating to the formulation, implementation, and
substance of security policy stemming from the emergence of nuclear
weapons. They also offer sharp insights into the functioning of the
international political system in the nuclear era and possible future
developments.
First, with respect to the process of formulating and implementing American security policy, the negotiations provide another
opportunity to test the consensus-building model and to gain further
insights into the operation of this process. The negotiations also
demonstrate in a concrete fashion the practical arrangements which
have been made for bringing scientific data and scientists into the
policy process. They show how scientists have exercised their roles
within this process and the way in which they have interacted
with nonscientists. They contain evidence concerning the ease or
difficulty with which the two groups have been able to communicate.
The record, therefore, provides a suitable basis for evaluating the
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arrangements that have progressively evolved with respect to these
matters thus far and for suggesting possible alternatives.
Second, with respect to the substance of American security
p~Ucy, the nuclear test ban negotiations provide a focal point for
examining the development of American attitudes and policies
toward the problem of obtaining security in a nuclear-missile age.
They reveal the extent to which the United States was prepared for
serious negotiations concerning arms control or disarmament and
provide a basis for assessing the appropriateness of certain widely
held American concepts concerning the most effective means of
creating a less dangerous world.
Third, with respect to the working of the international political
system, the test ban negotiations illustrate in a graphic manner the
interaction between domestic events, national policies, and international occurrences. They offer a striking picture of diplomatic
intercourse between a totalitarian state with tightly sealed policymaking and close controls over its mass media on the one hand,
and two relatively open, pluralistic states on the other. The negotiations show the extent to which states which do not possess nuclear
weapons can influence the policies of the nuclear states, even
concerning nuclear weapons, and the modalities through which this
influence can be exercised. In this connection, they provide a
number of insights into the role of the United Nations in the contemporary international political system. They also provide a wealth
of data relevant to describing accurately the current state of the
conflict between East and West and possibly suggest the contours
of the future course of this struggle, which has been such an important and pervasive feature of the present period. Finally, the
negotiations show how far mankind has gone in its efforts to harness
the atom and illustrate clearly the difficulties which it faces in attempting to control the uses to which modem technology is put;
Hopefully, a study of the record may lead to suggestions which
could be useful in surmounting some of these difficulties.
Whether or not the Moscow Treaty will truly stand as a turning point in the nuclear age and more generally in the age of modem technology is dependent in varying degrees upon all of these
factors. Admittedly American policy is only one variable in the
equation, yet it is a crucially important variable. The substance of
American policy cannot help but have a profound influence on the
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course of the future, and the substance of that policy will be shaped
in important ways by the manner in which it is formulated and
implemented. Obviously American security policy can only be
conducted within the framework of the international system, and its
effectiveness will partly depend upon how appropriate it is for this
environment. For all these reasons, then, a detailed case study of
United States policy in the nuclear test ban negotiations should help
to determine if the Moscow Treaty should be regarded as, and can
be made, a genuine turning point.

PART III

THE PATH TO THE MOSCOW TREATY

Chapter X

The Negotiations Resume

I

The Context: Elements of Change and Continuity
Formal negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty resumed on March
14, 1962, with the opening session of the newly constituted EighteenNation Disarmament Committee, under conditions which were somewhat different from those which had prevailed during the closing
days of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests. Some of the changes were the result of events which occurred in the month and a half following January 29, the date of
the last meeting of the Geneva Conference. Others stemmed from
longer-range developments which either were beginning to come to
fruition or were perceived during this period.
The Shifting Military Balance: Toward Increased U.S. Power
One of the most important longer-run developments which
inevitably would have an effect on the nuclear test ban negotiations
was the shifting pattern of military power. Shortly after he became
President, John F. Kennedy requested a reappraisal of the entire
defense strategy, capacity, commitments, and needs of the United
States. On the basis of this reappraisal, and in response to a detefi:orating world situation, especially in Southeast Asia, and to a developing crisis over Berlin, on three separate occasions during the spring
and summer of 1961, March 28, May 25, and July 25, President
Kennedy requested additional appropriations for military purposes.
As a result, in August 1961 Congress finally passed a defense appropriation bill totaling $46,662,550,000, a figure which exceeded the
original request prepared by the Eisenhower Administration by more
than $3,750,000,000. The additional funds, plus certain savings,
were allocated both to increasing the United States' strategic power
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and to enlarging its capacity to deal with limited and guerrilla wars.
In addition, in the summer of 1961, in connection with the Berlin
crisis, Congress authorized the President to mobilize 250,000 reservists, and the first troops called up under this authority reported for
active duty on October 1, 1961. By the end of 1961 the effects of
these measures had begun to be felt and the trend of developments
was clear. The defense appropriation for fiscal year 1963 was even
greater, $48,136,247,000.
In the two years from the end of 1961 to the end of 1963
the United States would double the number of nuclear warheads in
its strategic alert forces, and more than double their total megatonnage. The number of American operational long-range missiles
would jump from forty-five to five hundred. The United States would
increase its combat-ready Army divisions by about forty-five percent,
from eleven to sixteen; the number of its tactical air squadrons by
thirty percent; and its airlift capacity by seventy-five percent. Ship
construction and conversion to modernize the fleet would be doubled.1
Of course these moves to increase United States power did
not pass unnoticed by the USSR. On July 9, 1961, Chairman
Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Defense Ministry had been
instructed temporarily to suspend the reduction of the armed forces
planned for 1961, and that the Soviet Government had decided to
increase defense spending in 1961 by 3,144,000,000 rubles, making
the total 12,399,000,000. The arms race had been stepped up considerably, and the USSR was determined to create the impression
that it would match or surpass the United States' military build-up.
However, when the test ban negotiations resumed in March 1962 it
was far from certain whether or not the Soviet Union could maintain
the pace set by the United States. By that time it was apparent that
instead of the USSR's having many more operational missiles than
1 These figures are taken from a speech delivered by Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Economic Club of New York on November 18,
1963. See "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States,"
the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16,
1963), pp. 914-21. They are substantially confirmed by the analyses prepared by the Institute of Strategic Studies. See The Communist Bloc and
the Western Alliances: The Military Balance, 1961-1962; (London: Institute
of Strategic Studies, 1961); and The Military Balance, 1963-1964 (London:
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1963).
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the United States, as several in the West had predicted and feared,
the balance was about even. By the end of 1963 the USSR would
have only about one-fifth as many long-range missiles as the United
States, and only about half as many long-range bombers. The USSR
would have quantitative superiority vis-a-vis the United States only
in intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles and in ground
forces. Moreover, the USSR's margin of superiority would disapear
if the comparison were broadened to include all NATO forces on
one side and all Warsaw Pact forces on the other. The .ground forces
of NATO would total 3,200,000, while those of the Warsaw Pact
would total only 3,000,000. NATO would have more ground forces
in Central Europe than the Warsaw Pact.
The test ban negotiations would resume then in the midst of a
quickening arms race from which the United States would emerge
within a relatively short time with an unquestioned net military
superiority, although each side would still be able to wreck horrendous damage on the other.
Exactly how this change in the distribution of military power
would affect the test ban negotiations could not be foretold. Some
American policy-makers predicted a favorable impact. They argued
that since the USSR respected strength, the increased American
military power should result in increased Soviet propensity to make
concessions. They also argued that the Soviet Union would feel the
costs of a spiraling arms race more than the United States, and
therefore would be more desirous of ending such a race and thus
more interested in a nuclear test ban. Other policy-makers, among
them Jerome B. Wiesner, maintained that the American military
build-up would have exactly the opposite effect, that it would make
the USSR more intransigent and decrease the chances of obtaining
a nuclear test ban.

The Results of the USSR's 1961 Tests: Superiority in High-Yield
Weapons
A second element in the changing context was the new situation
with respect to the development of nuclear weapons, resulting from
the USSR's surprise abrogation in August 1961 of the nearly threeyear-old moratorium on nuclear testing. The test series which the
USSR began then was elaborate and extensive. Approximately fifty
tests were conducted within three months. Some of these apparently
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related to the development of an anti-intercontinental ballistic missile. On October 30, 1961, the USSR tested a 58 megaton bomb,
the largest weapon ever detonated. Furthermore, had the fusion material comprising the core of the weapon been encased in a uranium
rather than a lead jacket, it is estimated that its yield would have
been 100 megatons or more. Several of the other Soviet tests had
yields of more than 10 megatons. As a result of these tests, the
USSR became technically more advanced than the United States in
the high-yield range. The Soviet Union's superior position related
both to the construction of such weapons and to understanding their
effects.
The largest weapon which the United States had ever tested
was the 1954 15 megaton Bravo shot. General Curtis E. LeMay, as
Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Air Command,
and the Air Force had recommended in that same year that the
United States should develop a 50 to 100 megaton yield weapon,
but this recommendation had not been accepted. The Eisenhower
Administration consciously chose not to pursue this development
because it felt that there was no military requirement for such highyield weapons.
As in the past, the results of the Soviet test series were evaluated by several United States governmental groups, including a panel
of scientists headed by Hans A. Bethe. In a statement published in
September 1962, Professor Bethe asserted that the kinds of weapons
which the USSR tested showed "that their laboratories had probably been working full speed during the whole moratorium on the
assumption that tests would at some time be resumed," and that
"it is very likely that they started specific preparations by March
1961 when the test ban conference reconvened in Geneva." 2 As
early as January 5, 1962, Professor Bethe stated in a public lecture
in Ithaca, that in his opinion a test ban as such was "no longer a
desirable goal to pursue. " 3 Although he was not concerned about
high-yield weapons and the effects of the USSR's superiority in this
area, he felt that the United States should test those designs which
2Hans A. Bethe, "Disarmament and Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. XVIII, No. 7 (September 1962), pp. 14-22, at 18.
3Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier inserted the text of his speech
in the Congressional Record, Vol. CVIII, Appendix, pp. A1397-99, A145051, at A1450.
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had been developed in its laboratories and which fitted its strategic
needs. On the other hand, he also thought that both sides had
relatively little more to learn about nuclear weapons.
In public at least, Professor Bethe did not say, as he very well
could have, that what he had predicted might happen had in fact
occurred. In 1958, in arguing for test ban negotiations, he had
warned that the only result of continued testing of nuclear weapons
would be to diminish the American superiority over the USSR in
this category of military technology.
Again, the effects of this new situation on the nuclear test ban
negotiations could not be foretold. Since the USSR now held a
definite lead in certain areas of nuclear weapons development, one
might have expected that it would try to freeze the situation to
preserve this lead, following the course which Professor Bethe had
urged for the United States in 1958. Conversely, one might have
expected that the United States would seek to recoup its lead, to
redress the balance, or to minimize the gap between its stage of
development and that of the USSR.

The Debate Within the United States: To Test or Not to Test in the
Atmosphere
Indeed, the most pressing issue posed by the Soviet test series
for the United States was whether or not it should resume atmospheric testing. When President Kennedy ordered the resumption of
nuclear tests on September 5, 1961, he confined his authorization to
tests which could be conducted in the laboratory and underground.
Actually, this was all that the United States was prepared to do. The
grounds at Eniwetok and Bikini had been allowed to run down, and
in view of their location within the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, there was some question about the political wisdom of using
them again. Certainly there would be an outcry in the United Nations if they were used. There appears to have been little preparation in the United States' weapons laboratories during the moratorium
for resumed atmospheric testing. Moreover, the skills and morale
of the laboratories appear to have deteriorated to some extent during
this period. 4 Even with respect to underground testing, which had
4See the testimony of Dr. John Foster, Jr., Director of the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Livermore, California, and
of Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory:
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been regarded as a more likely contingency during the moratorium,
Ameiican preparations were not extensive. For example, very few
holes had been prepared. As a consequence of all of these factors,
the United States conducted only nine underground nuclear explosions in 1961.
Pressure for the United States to engage in an extensive test
series and to test in the atmosphere began to mount immediately
after the Soviet Union broke the moratorium, and it increased in
intensity as the extensive nature of the Soviet test series became
apparent. As early as November 2, 1961, President Kennedy announced that preparations would be made for atmospheric tests so
that they could be undertaken should it be deemed necessary. 5 And
in the late fall of 1961 a special task force was formed under the
command of Major General Alfred D. Starbird to prepare for tests
in the atmosphere and at high altitudes, and $80,000,000 was allocated for this purpose. Ultimately the task force would include
11,800 individuals. However, President Kennedy made it clear to
the Pentagon that these preparations did not commit him actually
to conduct a testing program. 6
The President and Prime Minister Macmillan discussed these
matters at their meeting in Bermuda in late December. British concurrence with an American decision to resume atmospheric testing
would be helpful, and if the United States could use the facilities at
Christmas Island, a British possession in the Pacific, as well perhaps
as those at Johnston Island, an American possession, it would
obviate the necessity of again testing in the United States Trust
Territory. Macmillan made an eloquent plea for one more effort to
break the cycle of tests and counter-tests. aa He had a deep horror
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of
Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, 88th Congress, 1st Session
(1964), pp. 395-96, 405. See also New York Times, September 26, 1963,
p. 11. A popular account gives a somewhat more optimistic appraisal:
George Harris, "How Livermore Survived the Test Ban," Fortune, Vol.
LXV, No. 4 (April 1960), pp. 127, 236, 241.
5U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1961 (1962), p. 567.
6Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 621.
6aSee the account of the Bermuda meeting in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
A Thousand Days, pp. 489-90.
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of nuclear war and was determined to press for a test ban. He had
thought that a treaty could have been achieved in 1960 and was
sharply disappointed that it had not been. He had told Kennedy
that the failure "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession
and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site
inspections."6 b Eventually though, the Prime Minister seemed to agree
that if the situation did not change he would recommend to the
Cabinet that permission be given for the United States to utilize the
facilities at Christmas Island. On December 22, 1961 the two leaders
issued a communique which paralleled Kennedy's announcement of
November 2. 60
President Kennedy did not announce a final decision to resume
atmospheric testing until March 2, 1962. Meanwhile, a bitter debate
raged within the American Administration, and the British continued
to play a role in this debate, via letters to the President from Macmillan and other means. The debate concerned not only whether or
not to resume atmospheric testing, but also, if such a decision were
taken, the number and yield of the weapons to be tested. The division
within the government paralleled many of those which had previously
existed concerning issues involving the nuclear ban negotiations.
Those opposed to the resumption of testing included Dr. Jerome B.
Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Adlai E. Stevenson, chief United States delegate to the United
Nations; the Department of State; and the United States Information
Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the resumption of testing.
As early as October, they had called for a resumption of atmospheric
testing in November. The Department of Di!fense took a similar
position. It was Secretary McNamara who had asked the President to
authorize development and effect tests in the atmosphere. Still, at a
lunch with Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy shortly before the
actual tests began, he suggested "that they were not really necessary."6d The Atomic Energy Commission argued for atmospheric
testing, but it felt that there should be limitations on the types of
tests. Several powerful members of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy also favored the resumption of atmospheric testing. As
6b[bid., p. 452.
6cU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1961 (1962), p. 743.
6dTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 622.
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in the past, this intra-governmental argument both spilled over
into and reflected a similar debate within the public arena. And
also as in the past, the American scientific community was deeply
divided.
Those favoring the resumption of atmospheric testing argued
that such action was necessary because of the advances which the
Soviet Union had made. Starting from this common ground the
argumentation advanced by those on this side differed with the
sophistication, background, and interests of the advocate. Perhaps
Edward Teller developed the most elaborate rationale. He set forth
his views in a book, The Legacy of Hiroshima, which was published on March 2, 1962. 7 Excerpts from this book were published
as three serial articles in the Saturday Evening Post, starting February 3, 1962. Professor Teller argued that the problem of radioactive
fallout "was not worth worrying about,'' 8 and that because of the
difficulty of policing underground tests, a nuclear test ban was a
chimera. He maintained that further nuclear experiments were essential to United States's security in several ways. The most im:eortant reason, he felt, was so that the weight of nuclear warheads
could be reduced in order to make the total weapons system more
mobile and effective. This was necessary, in his view, to insure that
the American retaliatory force could survive an enemy attack. In
addition, he held out the possibility of a fission-free weapon.
Those on the other side of the argument took a much more
serious view of the harm caused by the radioactive fallout resulting
from nuclear weapons tests. There was little divergence between the
scientific analysis of the issue by this group and that of those who
minimized the problem of radioactive fallout; the difference between
the two groups was in their moral evaluation of the consequences of
fallout for mankind. President Kennedy himself was deeply troubled
about the problem of fallout. sa The group opposing the resumption of
atmospheric testing also raised broader moral arguments against the
resumption of atmospheric tests. In general, they were more concerned
about the widespread public opposition to nuclear testing both within
the United States and abroad and the effects of the expression of this
7Edward Teller & Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (1962).
8Jbid., p. 180.
sasee Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 455, and Theodore
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 621-22.
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opposition in such forums as the United Nations. They feared that if
the United States were to resume atmospheric testing, increased tension would result and that this would diminish the prospects for
achieving measures of arms control and disarmament, measures which
they considered vital. So far as the military argument was concerned,
they felt that the United States had sufficient nuclear weapons to
devastate the Soviet Union, and that this was all that was required.
They were sceptical of the need for further testing and felt that
only marginal advantages would be gained. President Kennedy shared
this appraisal, and according to one of his closest advisers, "talk
about a neutron bomb which destroyed only people, not buildings,
struck him as foolish in the extreme." 8b
Eventually, despite a final and moving plea by Prime Minister
Macmillan, who even proposed convening a summit meeting, the
advocates of the resumption of atmospheric tests carried the day.
Apparently a clinching argument was one which William C. Foster,
Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
articulated privately and in public. This was that the United States
could not afford to allow the Soviet Union to engage in another test
series without having itself tested; that in such circumstances a
second test series might give the USSR an important advantage. He
felt that if these conditions were to develop it would be difficult for
the United States to continue to negotiate for a test ban treaty,
among other reasons because it would be unlikely that the Senate
would consent to ratification. 9 The President found the argument
persuasive.
At his Press Conference on February 7, 1962, President Kennedy stated that a final decision on whether or not the United States
would resume atmospheric testing would be taken within a month.
The following day the White House issued a statement concerning
the British decision to allow the United States government to use its
facilities at Christmas Island if atmospheric testing were resumed.
Finally, on Friday, March 2, 1962, in a special radio-television
broadcast President Kennedy announced that he had that day authorized the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of
Defense to conduct a series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere as
Sb"fheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 621.
9See his letter to Washington Post, February 10, 1962.
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soon as preparations were completed, which would be sometime in
April. 1 o Kennedy had originally planned to give his talk on March 1,
but he agreed to postpone it for twenty-four hours in response to
Prime Minister Macmillan's request for further delay. 10a By March 2
the House of Commons would be recessed for the weekend. Although
the President did not announce this, the test series would also
include some high altitude shots. President Kennedy said that his
decision was based on the unanimous recommendation of pertinent
Department and Agency heads.
This unanimity had been achieved by way of a compromise. Although the President authorized the resumption of atmospheric tests,
he ordered that the series should be limited only to those tests which
were absolutely necessary and could not be conducted underground,
and that they should be conducted so as to restrict radioactive fallout
to the minimum. Partly for these reasons, no high-yield tests were
planned; the 1954 15 megaton Bravo shot would stand as the largest
ever detonated by the United States. Another factor responsible for
this was the continuing view of the Administration that there were no
over-riding military requirements for such high-yield weapons. Moreover, because of this reason, and because they had anticipated being
able to conduct only underground tests which necessarily would be
relatively small, American nuclear scientists had not prepared any designs for high-yield weapons. During the actual test series, the President kept careful control to make certain that his directives were
executed.
Another element of the compromise in the recommendation
which President Kennedy accepted was the caveat that the decision
to resume atmospheric tests would not be executed if the Soviet Union
would in the meantime agree to a nuclear test ban treaty. This last
feature was designed to satisfy Prime Minister Macmillan as well
as elements within the American Administration. Apparently the
actual proposal came first from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a former
Harvard history professor serving as Special Assistant to the President.l0b Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the British Labour Party, also
lOSee U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 19,
Documents on Disarmament, 1962, 2 vols. (1963), Vol. I, pp. 66-75.
lOaArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 495, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 623.
lObArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 491-92.
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made a similar suggestion to Kennedy. Some within the American
Administration, including Assistant Secretary of Defense John J.
McNaughton, had argued that the offer be made conditional on
Soviet acceptance of an atmospheric ban, policed by national detection systems, and such a proposal had even been included in an early
draft of the President's 1962 State of the Union message. However,
the Departments of Defense and State had objected, and when the
offer not to resume atmospheric tests was finally made, they insisted
that it be tied to a comprehensive ban.
The President's address was notable for its quality of reluctance
and of being forced by Soviet actions into an unpalatable situation.
He gave a candid appraisal of the results of the recent Soviet test
series-as the United States understood them-and the course of
the nuclear test ban negotiations. He found the primary reasons for
the United States' decision in these events. However, he also asserted that if the United States were to refrain from atmospheric
testing, the leaders of the Soviet Union would
. . . chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of willnot to our confidence in Western superiority, but to our
fear of world opinion, the very world opinion for which
they showed such contempt.
He continued this line of argumentation by asserting that the Soviet
Union- would never agree to a "true test ban or mutual disarmament" if the West were in a position of weakness.

The Summit Correspondence: A Western Preemptive Gambit
During the same time that consensus was being achieved within
the American government on resuming atmospheric testing, there
was a flurry of correspondence between Western and Soviet leaders.
It was inaugurated on February 7, 1962, by a letter from President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev
in which they proposed that to facilitate progress on disarmament
the three governments should be represented at the opening of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by their Foreign Ministers,
and that the Foreign Ministers should express their willingness to
return to the negotiations as progress achieved by the permanent
representatives warranted. 11 One of the reasons for this proposal
11Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 25-26.
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was to forestall a suggestion, which the two Western leaders knew
Chairman Khrushchev would make, that the member states of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be represented
by their heads of government or chiefs of state. Macmillan originally
would have been willing to accept this proposal. Indeed, he had made
a similar suggestion to Kennedy in early January. Obviously, however,
if such a course were to be chosen, Chairman Khrushchev would have
an excellent platform from which, among other things, to denounce
the Western resumption of atmospheric tests, if this decision were
taken, and at that point it seemed likely that it would be. The proposal of the Western leaders reflected their continuing sensitivity to
public opinion. Although their preemptive move did not prevent
Chairman Khrushchev from making his proposal, it made it easier for
the Western leaders to refuse his suggestion.
In all, there were three exchanges of correspondence. 12 It was
not until his final letter of March 3, 1962, to President Kennedy
that Chairman Khrushchev abandoned his proposal that heads of
state represent their governments and accepted the Western suggestion that Foreign Ministers do this. In this letter, which was dated
the same day that President Kennedy announced the United States
decision to resume atmospheric testing, Chairman Khrushchev also
condemned this decision, and asserted that if it were executed, the
USSR would "inevitably be forced to meet this challenge too by
carrying out its own series of new tests. " 13 In the course of his letter
he pointed out that the United States had been the first to test and
to use nuclear weapons and that the West had conducted many more
tests over the years than the USSR. He then asserted the right of the
Soviet Union to "be the last side to complete nuclear weapons
tests."
When the formal negotiations for a nuclear test ban reopened,
both sides would therefore be more or less committed to another
round of tests. And since each side declared that its move was a
reaction to the actions of the other, it appeared as if they were
engaged in an endless spiral.
At the same time that he aired his suggestion for representation
by heads of states with President Kennedy and Prime Minister
12

See Ibid. pp. 25-26, 32-36, 36-38, 49-57, 61-63, 64-66, and 75-81.
I3Jbid., p. 80.
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Macmillan, Chairman Khrushchev also raised it in an exchange of
correspondence with General de Gaulle. 14 This not only elicited the
negative reaction that it had produced in the other Western capitals,
but also the clear statement that France would not participate in
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee because disarmament
was a matter which the French felt should be handled exclusively by
the nuclear or near nuclear powers. 15 France also reiterated its determination to proceed with its program to develop an independent
nuclear capacity unless and until the nuclear powers agreed to ban
the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to destroy those in existence.
The Detection of Underground Tests: Continuing Ambivalence
While these developments, and especially the imminent round
of tests, cast a shadow over the resumption of negotiations for a
test ban, there were also some apparently favorable occurrences that
came to public attention during the recess in the negotiations. These
related to the detection of underground nuclear explosions. On
December 10, 1961, as a part of its Project Plowshare, exploring
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the United States detonated a 5
kiloton nuclear device near Carlsbad, New Mexico, in a salt cavern
1,200 feet beneath the surface of the earth. This detonation, which
was named Project Gnome, was not a decoupled shot. 16 However,
on the basis of the Project Cowboy experiments, it had been estimated that a tamped shot (one where the device is tightly packed
in the surrounding medium) in salt, which was what the Gnome
shot was, would give a seismic signal smaller by a factor of two
and one-half than the seismic signal of a shot tamped in tuff, which
is what all of the previous United States detonations had been. Contrary to this prediction, the Gnome shot gave a signal several times
greater than Logan, the 5 kiloton tamped-in-tuff shot detonated on
October 16, 1958. The Logan shot, it will be recalled, had been
one of the principal sources of information for the United States'
14Jbid., pp. 64-66.

15See de Gaulle's letter and the statement of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: ibid., pp. 48-49, p. 81.
16See A. Latter, R. Latter, and W. McMillan, The Irrelevance of the
Gnome Shot to Decoupling (The RAND Corp., 1962: Memorandum RM3005-PR).
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reevaluation of the effectiveness of the control system suggested by
the Conference of Experts. By mid-December 1961, it became known
that the Gnome shot had been detected at stations as far away as
Sweden, Finland, and J apanP In itself, this was an encouraging
development, and many exaggerated its significance by assuming
that the evidence disproved the decoupling theory, which in fact, it
did not. The reason for this erroneous interpretation apparently was
that much of the discussion concerning decoupling was framed in
terms of nuclear shots conducted in large underground cavities in
salt. The test did, however, indicate something about the effects of
various media on the transmission of seismic signals from underground nuclear explosions; to wit, a shot tamped in salt would yield
a larger signal than one of identical yield tamped in tuff.
The Gnome shot also produced some rather discouraging data,
but this aspect was much less widely known and publicized. The
Gnome shot made it quite apparent that because of unknown anomalies, seismic signals did not travel through the crust of the earth
at uniform speeds, and, as a consequence, it was much more difficult
to estimate accurately the epicenter of seismic events from distant
seismic stations than had been assumed. This would greatly complicate the problem of on-site inspection of unidentified events. In
fact, American scientists discovered that, applying the then current
American negotiating position, the actual site of the Gnome shot
would have been outside of the area which they would have picked
as being legally open to on-site inspection. Moreover, on the basis
of the seismic signals they estimated the depth of the shot as 80
miles rather than the actual 1,200 feet. Had they not known the
actual facts, they would have concluded that the signals must have
been generated by an earthquake rather than an explosion, since no
one thought that explosions could be conducted that deep. 18 The
reason that distant stations did not reach this conclusion was that
the time, location, and yield of the shot had been announced in
advance. These somewhat more technical qualifications, however,
were overlooked in the public debate.
A second development which sparked public optimism concerning the problem of detecting underground explosions was that
1

7See New York Times, December 19, 1961, p. 1.
lSEarl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 492.
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on February 2, 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission announced
that the Soviet Union had apparently set off an underground nuclear
explosion earlier that day. 19 So far as was publicly known in the
West, this was the first time that the USSR had detonated a nuclear
device underground. The announcement stated only that "the yield
was well above the threshold of detectability." This vague statement allowed various interpretations. Some experts commented that
this meant more than 20 kilotons, but other interpretations were
possible. Only later did the United States point out that the Soviet
test took place in a normally aseismic area in Central Siberia, near
to a fairly well-known weapons proving ground and apparently had
a yield of from 40 to 50 kilotons. Had all of these facts been publicized, no one would have doubted that it could have been detected.

The Progress of the Vela Program: Toward a Worldwide
Seismological Network
Actually, at this point American scientists felt that the state of
'technology with respect to the detection of underground nuclear explosions had improved very little. The United States Vela Program
had not yet produced significant results, although it had inaugurated
a vast number of projects. During fiscal years 1960 and 1961,
$51,438,000 had been appropriated for the project, and the estimated budget for fiscal year 1962 was $59,0000,000. The research
inaugurated under the Vela Program was both basic and applied.
As a consequence, among other results, the Vela Program would
have an enormous leavening effect on the science of seismology.
Under one aspect of the program the United States Coast and
Geodetic Survey undertook to construct a worldwide seismological
network. It offered to supply modem calibrated and standardized
instrumentation to seismological stations throughout the world, the
only conditions being that copies of the records be made available
to the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The program envisaged supplying instrumentation for 125 stations, most of which would be outside of the United States. Some of these stations were to be operated
by governments, others by private groups, such as universities. Three
million, three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars was pro19See

New York Times, February 3, 1962, p. 1.
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vided for this purpose in fiscal years 1960 and 1961, and $1,175,000
was budgeted for fiscal year 1962. Although Vela Program officials
went out of their way to assert that the purpose of this worldwide
network was not to detect nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union,
but rather to collect earthquake statistics, obviously within the relevant technological limitations, the stations would record all underground seismic events, including nuclear explosions. Data from the
initial elements of this worldwide network would become available
in quantity in the spring and summer of 1962.
Another part of the Vela Program envisaged the construction
of seven seismological stations in the United States designed explicitly to detect nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, and an
analysis center, resembling in some ways the center which, according to American plans, would be established at the headquarters of
the control system in Vienna. The first of the seismological stations, a prototype of the stations recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts, was constructed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and
became operational in October 1960. As early as July 1961 it was
reported that this station appeared to be capable of detecting most
seismic events of down to magnitude 4 at distances of 2,000 miles
and more. At that time, American scientists thought that this meant
that with this station they could locate events as small as about 1
kiloton from distances greater than 2,000 miles, but they could not
begin to identify such events until they began to approach 5 kilotons. 20 Nonetheless, the capabilities of the station exceeded American expectations. The reason for this was the demonstration of the
possibility of detection and identification of seismic events in what
is called the "third zone"; that is, the zone at very large distances
beyond "the shadow" or second zone in which detection is very difficult. Eventually the possibility would be completely substantiated.
Three more seismological stations would become operational during
1962, and a fifth in April 1963. These stations would have the
equipment recommended by the Conference of Experts, and would
also incorporate improvements in seismological techniques developed
20See the testimony of Dr. Carl Romney, Assistant Director, Air Force
Technical Applications Center: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings: Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification
of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test Ban Negotiations, 87th Congress, 1st Session (1962), pp. 123-24.
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since that time. These improvements were also subsequently added
to the Fort Sill Station.
Research with respect to decoupling proved to be the slowest
in getting underway. The so-called Dribble experimental program to
test the theory of decoupling was established by the Atomic Energy
Commission in early 1960. The program envisaged a series of six
events, involving both tamped and decoupled shots. In early 1962,
because of lack of funds, the program had to be suspended. At that
point only certain exploratory drilling and engineering work had
been completed. When the program was resumed in September
1962, then being supported by the Department of Defense, the
earliest possible date for a decoupled shot would be June 1963.
Construction for the first cavity for the Dribble series, a cavity
which would accommodate a 100 ton detonation, would ultimately
cost $3,200,000 and would require almost a year. 21 By rnid-1964
more than that had been spent and construction had not yet started
for this cavity. As of September 1965 a nuclear decoupled shot had
not yet been fired.
Much of the work conducted under the Vela Program operated
under one basic constraint. It was generally felt that it would be
impossible to achieve more access to the Soviet Union than would
be allowed under the control system which had been recommended
in the report of the Conference of Experts. Thus the research was
always designed to find improvements which might be applied within
the framework of that system, rather than those which might require a major political reorientation. At least some scientists felt
that this constraint was a major handicap. 22
Another constraint-perhaps felt more universally among the
scientists participating in the program-was the prohibition prior
to September 1961 on conducting any further underground nuclear
explosions. This meant that all of the directly relevant work had to
be done on the basis of theoretical calculations, and on the basis
of the scanty empirical data gathered prior to 1959. When the
21See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings:
Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear
Weapons Tests, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), p. 312.
22See the testimony of Dr. Richard Latter, Hearings: Developments
in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions, supra
note 20, p. 19.
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United States resumed underground testing in the fall of 1961,
after the Soviet abrogation of the moratorium, this situation changed
radically. The United States conducted nine underground tests in the
fall of 1961. By mid-1962 this total would be increased to fortythree. Thus a relatively vast amount of new empirical data would
become available simultaneously with improved instrumentation at
seismological stations throughout the world. Theoretical enquiries
launched under Vela were also beginning to bear fruit at about this
time.
II

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
A New Forum
The Composition of the Committee: Enter the New Eight
All of these factors came into play when the formal negotiations on
a nuclear test ban resumed on March 11, 1962, with the opening
session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC).
This Committee had been created as a result of bilateral talks
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the summer and
fall of 1961, and its composition had been endorsed in General
Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI). In the same resolution, the
Assembly requested that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should
report to it, and directed the Secretary General to facilitate the
Committee's work by supplying the necessary services. The Eighteen-Nation Committee therefore met, as the Conference on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests had previously, in the
Palais des Nations, in Geneva. By virtue of Assembly Resolution
1722 (XVI), however, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had a somewhat more definite link with the United Nations than the previous
conference, and this was underscored during the subsequent negotiations.
Reaching agreement on the composition of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee had been the most difficult aspect of the bilateral
negotiations. Negotiations on this point were complicated not only
because of differences between the USSR and the United States, but
also because of controversies among the other members of the
United Nations who wished or did not wish to serve on the Committee. In the end, what was agreed to was an expansion of the
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old Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, by adding eight countries
belonging neither to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nor to
the Warsaw Pact. The Ten-Nation Committee bad consisted of
Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States
on one side and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and
the USSR on the other. The eight states which were added to make
the new Committee were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico,
Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.
The question of expanding the membership of the Ten-Nation
Committee bad actually been under consideration almost since the
collapse of the negotiations on general disarmament in the summer
of 1960, when the five Communist states withdrew from the
Committee. 23 As early as September 1960, Chairman Khrushchev,
acting as the bead of the Soviet Union's delegation to the United
Nations, had suggested that the Committee should be enlarged by
adding: Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Arab
Republic. 24 The Western powers rejected this suggestion, principally
because adding five nonaligned nations would give the appearance of
accepting t.'le Soviet "troika" concept. The following year, however,
in bilateral discussions with the USSR in June and July, the United
States proposed as alternatives adding either a chairman and two
vice-chairmen or ten new members. In either case the new members
would be chosen from the group of UN Member States that did
not belong to NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union responded by repeating its suggestion of a fifteen-member committee.
These moves to expand the Ten-Nation Committee were given
added impetus in September 1961 when the Conference of Heads
of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries meeting in Belgrade recommended that the nonaligned states should be represented
in all disarmament talks. 25 The final agreement on the composition
of the new Committee was not achieved, however, until December
1961.
The figure of eighteen and the specific countries named were
23For an account of the collapse of the negotiations within the TenNation Committee see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for
Arms Control, pp. 551-52.
24UN Document A/ 4509.
25See the declaration and communique, Documents on Disarmament,
1961, supra note 5, pp. 374-83, at 381.
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both clearly compromises. Since the membership of the new Committee could not be divided into equal thirds, the West felt that it
had avoided creating a precedent in favor of the "troika" principle.
On the other hand, the Committee did consist of the three groups
which figured in that principle. The eight new members of the
Committee included three of the five originally suggested by Chairman Khrushchev: India, Mexico, and the United Arab Republic.
They also included one European state, Sweden, following a United
States suggestion. As the United States insisted, Latin America was
given more representation than it had in the original Soviet
proposal in that Brazil was added, along with Mexico, which had
figured in the Soviet suggestion. Burma, Ethiopia, and Nigeria comprised the final element of the compromise. They were less antiWestern than Indonesia and Ghana, the other two states originally
proposed by the USSR.
The composition of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meant, among other things, that when the test ban negotiations were resumed within the framework of the Committee, for the
first time states would be intimately involved which did not possess
nuclear weapons themselves and which were not aligned with any
of the nuclear powers. This experience would be quite different
from the fleeting exposure of the annual General Assembly debates.
Conceivably it could have an impact both on the policies of these
states-for it could be a significant learning experience-and on
the course of the negotiations.
The Views of the New Members
Significantly, all of the eight countries which were added to the
Committee had voted for General Assembly Resolution 1648
(XVI) urging the states concerned to refrain from further nuclear
weapons tests pending the conclusion of an international agreement
banning such tests. All five members of the Warsaw Pact represented on the Eighteen-Nation Committee had voted against this
resolution, as had France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Canada, in contrast, had voted for the resolution,
and during the sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1962
and early 1963 it often took a position closer to that of the eight
new members than to that of its NATO partners.26 Since France
boycotted the Eighteen-Nation Committee, this meant that NATO
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representation was effectively reduced to three. On the other hand,
the five members of the Warsaw Pact acted as a solid unit.
Consisting of two states each from Latin America and Asia,
three from Africa, and one from the neutral states of Europe, the
eight new members of the committee roughly reflected the membership of the United Nations exclusive of those states belonging to
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although this was never explicitly
stated, it was widely assumed, both within the Eighteen-Nation
Committee and in the United Nations, that the eight would represent
this broad group of the UN's membership. In any case, by the
nature of the situation, by their own inclination, and by the actions
of East and West, the eight would introduce a new and independent
element into the negotiations, and they would become, as it were,
critics of the positions advanced by the two sides. 27 Beyond that,
they could also obviously perform the range of functions traditionally performed by third parties in pacific settlement.
Of the eight, Sweden was the only state to have technical
advisers continuously attached to its delegation. It was the most
advanced state of the new members in terms of technological
development and the only one which had figured in the various projections of possible nuclear powers in the foreseeable future.
Whether or not Sweden should seek to acquire nuclear capability
had been a matter of political discussion within the country.
Throughout the negotiations on a nuclear test ban the Swedish
delegation included two technical advisers. It also included military
advisers. One of the technical advisers was a specialist in the
mechanical effects of nuclear explosions, the other was a specialist
in nuclear chemistry. Both of them were research organizers in
26Jn his account of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the former Indian
representative has noted that Canada "is jokingly referred to at Geneva as
the ninth nonaligned country." (Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament:
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference: The First Two Years, 19621964 (1964), p. 12.) Sir Michael Wright expressed the same view when he
wrote that some of the moves which the Diefenbaker government made in
the nuclear field served only to cause "embarrassment to Canadian delegates,
disarray within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in their negotiations
with others, and irritation in Washington." (Disarm and Verify, p. 132).
27See the interesting self-analysis of the role of the eight by a representative of one of the states, M. Samir Ahmed, "The Role of the Neutrals
in the Geneva Negotiations," Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. I, No.
2 (Summer 1963), pp. 20-32.
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their own fields for the Defense Research Organization in Stockholm. In addition, the Swedish delegation relied heavily on advice
from the seismological station at Uppsala University. Because of
its technical competence, the Swedish delegation played a special
role among the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee.
It should perhaps also be noted that one of the Swedish specialists
on disarmament, Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, who worked in Stockholm, was arrested in June 1963 on a charge of spying for the
Soviet Union and was subsequently convicted.
Several of the delegations of the other new members included
diplomats who had had considerable experience in the United
Nations, and even some who had participated in past disarmament
negotiations. Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico was the
delegate who had had the most experience of this nature. He had
also been President of the General Assembly. James Barrington of
Burma was another diplomat who had represented his country in the
United Nations for several years, as had Arthur S. Lall of India.

The Opening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee
For the first few days of the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee, because of the acceptance of the Western
proposal, most of the states were represented at the Ministerial
level. In all instances but one, this meant that the delegation was
temporarily headed by the foreign minister. The Indian delegation,
however, was headed by V. K. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defense.
This reflected the unique role Krishna Menon played for India
flowing from his personal relationship with Nehru.
At the second meeting of the Committee on March 15, 1962,
the Soviet Union sought to gain the initiative by tabling an entire draft
treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. A month would
elapse before the United States would take similar action. Tabling
this draft treaty could be viewed as a tactic designed to show the
reasonableness of Soviet policy; Chairman Khrushchev underscored
Soviet power the following day. In a widely publicized address at
a Moscow election rally on March 16, he asserted that Soviet
scientists had created a new "global" intercontinental missile, which
was "invulnerable to antimissile weapons." 2 8 He claimed that
2BDocuments on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, p. 152.
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United States warning systems were now worthless because this
missile could approach the United States from altogether different
directions than those toward which these systems were aimed. The
implication in his view was "that the most realistic way to prevent
mass extermination of people in flames of a nuclear war is an
agreement on disarmament. . . . " He laid the failure to achieve
disarmament solely and squarely to the West. He repeated his
threat that if the United States resumed testing nuclear weapons in
the atmosphere, the Soviet Union would be forced to respond in
kind.
With respect to the test ban negotiations, Chairman Khrushchev
asserted, as Foreign Minister Gromyko had the day before in Geneva, that national means of detection provided an adequate basis
for a treaty. He said:
. . . what secret tests of nuclear weapons can one speak
about when each one's explosions are practically under the
control not only of the two countries but also of other
states, including neutral ones, many of which also possess
equipment for detection of nuclear explosions?29
In the past the USSR had only argued that tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space, and underwater could be detected by national systems. Now Chairman Khrushchev extended that claim to cover underground tests as well. The inclusion of the detection capabilities
of neutral states was also an interesting and perhaps significant deviation from past Soviet pronouncements on this matter.
To substantiate his point that national detection systems were
adequate, Chairman Khrushchev mentioned the detection and announcement of the Soviet underground test of February 2, 1962, by
the United States government. He declared that this test had been
conducted to trap the United States into disproving its contention that
underground tests could not be detected by national systems. Soviet
negotiators would recount this incident often in the subsequent negotiations.
The American opening gambits in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee were much less dramatic. On the same day that
Foreign Minister Gromyko tabled the Soviet draft treaty on General
29Jbid., p. 155.

362

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

and Complete Disarmament, Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined
a number of proposals-which the United States would advance in
the coming negotiations in concrete form-relating to general and
complete disarmament and to partial measures. Somewhat later that
day in a private conversation among the United States, United
Kingdom, and USSR representatives, Ambassador Dean presented
an aide memoire to Ambassador Tsarapkin proposing modifications
in the Western position with respect to a test ban. The aide memoire
proposed four modifications to the basic Western position as expressed in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of April
18, 1961, and the three amendments of May 29, 1961 and August
30, 1961.30
The first modification concerned provisions for safeguarding
other states against a surprise abrogation. Two specific measures
were envisaged: periodic declarations on the part of heads of state
that there were no preparations for testing; and provision for limited
and agreed rights to inspect declared test sites a certain number of
times each year.
The second modification related to shortening the time spent
before the inauguration of the inspection process. This involved principally the functioning of the Preparatory Commission and the
scheduling of the establishment of control posts.
The third revision was more designed to appeal to the Soviet
Union. The Western powers were willing to eliminate the 4.75 seismic
magnitude threshold from the outset and to make the treaty comprehensive. Ambassador Dean, Jerome B. Wiesner, and others had long
urged that the threshold be dropped. They felt that given the uncertainty about the determination of seismic magnitude there would be
endless arguments about whether or not an underground event had
generated a seismic sigral that was over the threshold. Moreover,
since in previous Westen proposals there could be no inspections beneath the threshold, they were convinced that the USSR would have
a magnificent opportunity to engage in clandestine testing. British
policy-makers also shared these views. 31 Finally, Secretary Rusk and
President Kennedy were persuaded and the threshold was dropped.
30U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962,
pp. 200-201.
31Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 471.
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The final modification was also designed as a compromise to
the USSR. According to it, the Western powers were willing to contemplate, within the framework of an overall quota on on-site inspections, a further limitation on the number of inspections in normally aseismic areas. Thus the greater number of inspections in the
Soviet Union would be confined to an extremely limited area, mainly
in East Siberia and South Central Siberia, and only a few would be
allowed in the heart of the country.
In the informal meeting, the Soviet Union rejected these proposals immediately. The United States offered as an alternative suggestion the possibility of immediately signing the United StatesUnited Kingdom draft treaty of April18, 1961, with the three amendments. This was also unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Deadlock in the Subcommittee
Obviously the two sides were no nearer agreement, and perhaps
were even farther apart, than they had been when the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests ended on January 29, 1962. This became glaringly apparent in the meetings of
the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests. The Eighteen-Nation Committee created this Subcommittee, consisting of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and
the United States, on March 21. The fact that the negotiations on a
nuclear test ban were resumed under physical arrangements which
were practically identical to those which had previously existed-the
representatives of the three states met in private again in the Palais
des Nations-should not obscure the important psychological difference. The three representatives now comprised a Subcommittee,
responsible to the larger ENDC. As a consequence of this, new pressures would become operative, even though they were not immediately
apparent.
In the first meeting of the Subcommittee, on March 21, the
United States formally presented the new Western proposals, and
the Soviet Union in tum formally rejected them. Mr. Tsarapkin
bluntly asserted that no agreement would be possible "on such an
utterly discredited basis."32 He went on to assert that the USSR
would only agree to a test ban which would rely solely on national
32ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 1, p. 9.
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systems for control. He argued that the only reason for the Western
insistence on international control was the desire to obtain opportunities to engage in espionage. The Western powers, on the other
hand, maintained that they could only have confidence that a treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests was being fulfilled if there were an
international control mechanism. They were, however, willing to
consider various possibilities: their new proposals, the draft treaty
of April 18, 1961, with amendments, or any suggestion that the
Soviet Union might offer as long as it met their criterion of effective
control.
The Soviet position, as developed in this meeting and the next,
was that it was common knowledge that all atmospheric tests could
be detected by national systems. Mr. Tsarapkin cited as evidence
the offer which President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan
made on September 3, 1961. He argued that national systems were:
. . . equally if not more applicable in the case of nuclear
explosions set off underwater or at high altitudes. And now
that the techniques of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions have made considerable progress, they are also
applicable to underground nuclear explosions. 33
Nevertheless, he continued to stand by the Soviet proposal of November 28, 1961, which implied that some international control measures
would ultimately be established for monitoring underground tests.
The Western position did not distinguish the problems of detecting nuclear weapons tests in the various environments, but merely
asserted that the report of the Conference of Experts had demonstrated the necessity for an international control system. Thus the
situation was almost the reverse of what it had previously been when
the Soviet Union had argued that the negotiations had to be based
on the report of the Conference of Experts and the Western powers
had maintained that new information had to be introduced. Ambassador Dean stated that the proposal to eliminate the threshold in the
treaty was advanced despite the fact that the United States did not
think that there had been "any great advance in the ability to detect
events underground below 4.75."34 Curiously, in the plenary session
33ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 2, p. 10.
84Jbid., p. 22.
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the following day Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the proposal to eliminate the threshold was based on "increased experience
and increased scientific knowledge."85
The confusion which could result from these conflicting pronouncements and from the Western failure to specify the problems
of detection in the various environments was exacerbated by frequent statements of Western scientists, which were widely reported
in the Western press, concerning the problems of detecting nuclear
weapons tests. Many of these claimed that the problems were not as
difficult as the diplomats of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed. The Soviet Union used these statements to buttress its
case in the Subcommittee. But other than such statements, it could
offer little proof that the scientific situation had in fact changed. The
position of both sides, therefore, looked somewhat murky.
In addition to stating their respective positions concerning what
arrangements for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would
be acceptable to them, the two sides engaged in a bitter debate about
the Western decision to resume atmospheric tests and the Soviet
abrogation of the moratorium. Each blamed the other for increased
tensions.

The Debate in the Full Committee
After two fruitless sessions, the Subcommittee reported the
impasse to the full Eighteen-Nation Committee. This occasioned a
full dress debate. By and large the foreign ministers of the three
nuclear powers merely reiterated the positions which their representatives had voiced in the Subcommittee. There was, however, one important exception. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests
would only be possible if it were signed by "the Governments of all
the nuclear Powers. " 36 He then made it clear that this meant that
France would have to sign a test ban treaty.
The only representative of the new members of the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee to offer a positive suggestion at this
meeting was F. C. de San Thiago Dantas of Brazil. He said:
35ENDC/PV. 8, p. 17.
36Jbid., p. 25.
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It is very obvious that all inspection depends, in the
first place, on very accurate knowledge of the technical
means available for verifying the implementation of the
clauses of a treaty. An exchange of scientific information is
essential, in order that States may have the same stock of
knowledge and technical means for verifying the implementation of the agreements concluded. At the same time, it is
clear that means of inspection must be provided, insofar
as our common need requires. 37

Although in some ways this statement could be considered an endorsement of the Western position, it also reflected the doubts among
the new members about the arguments advanced by both sides caused
by the conflicting claims with respect to the technical possibilities of
detection. Several of them alluded to this in earlier discussions.
Prior to this debate, several of the members of the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee, including many of the new members, had from time to time discussed the question of the test ban
negotiations in the plenary sessions. All of the Communist countries
and all eight of the new members and Canada had expressed their
opposition to nuclear tests. Many of them referred to General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI) requesting states to refrain from
further testing of nuclear weapons, and several expressed the hope
that the United States would not conduct the planned series of
atmospheric explosions. In the view of all of the members of the
Committee, the imminence of this test series made the problem of
achieving an agreed treaty especially urgent. President Kennedy,
after all, had pledged not to conduct the tests if an agreement could
be achieved.
In addition to expressing their opposition to nuclear tests in
general and to the forthcoming American series in particular, some
of the eight new members introduced, always in a most tentative
fashion, a number of new ideas in these early discussions. As early
as the third session, F. C. de San Thiago Dantas of Brazil argued
that since it was generally agreed that nuclear weapons tests underwater and in the atmosphere and in the biosphere could be detected
and identified without on-site inspection or the establishment of an
37Jbid., p. 33.
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elaborate control mechanism, these tests should be suspended immediately.38
Two sessions later, V. K. Krishna Menon made the same point
and added that tests in the atmosphere and biosphere were the main
tests that people were worried about at the moment.39 He also argued
that, short of the establishment of a world state, all that could be
done in the event of a violation of an arms control agreement would
be to establish proof of the violation. In his view, in the case of an
atmospheric test such proof could easily be obtained. Finally, the
Indian Defense Minister pointed out that several stations for data
collection, for instance, for measuring radiation, already existed in
the world, and using these stations as an example, he suggested the
possibility of establishing other "scientific detection stations" by both
national and international efforts. As he put it, ''The more people
who watch, the less avoidance there will be." 40 In many ways his
suggestion built upon a resolution which the General Assembly had
adopted the previous fall, 1629 (XVI), which had urged the collaboration of national efforts and those of the World Meteorological
Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency in ex-·
tending the present meteorological reporting system to include measurement of atmospheric radioactivity.
Ato Ketema Yifru, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, introduced a
final new idea at the sixth session. He asked whether or not it would
be possible "to devise an international scientific system of verification
where an appeal could be lodged to resolve differences in results of
national detection systems?"41
At this point, however, these were only isolated individual 'suggestions. They were not advanced as proposals, and they did not
appear to elicit any significant response. They did, though, constitute
a nucleus around which proposals could be formulated. They also set
a precedent, and a pattern was established in these early talks which
was to prevail throughout 1962. It was a pattern of parallel talks.
Specific negotiations would be conducted in the Subcommittee of the
three nuclear powers. Meanwhile, the other members of the EighteenNation Committee would scrutinize the record of these detailed talks
38ENDC/PV. 3, p. 9.
39ENDC/PV. 5, p. 39.
40Jbid., p. 40.
41ENDC/PV. 6, p. 20.
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and raise questions and introduce suggestions in the plenary sessions.
These parallel talks would be punctuated by periodic reports from
the Subcommittee to the full Committee and full dress debates. Simultaneously with these talks on the record, there would also be a
series of informal discussions, both among the three nuclear powers
and the entire membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

The Subcommittee Resumes and American Scientists Return
to Geneva
On March 28, the tripartite Subcommittee resumed its negotiations. The two sides clung adamantly to their positions. The Soviet
Union continued to insist that it would only agree to a treaty based
on national detection systems, while the Western powers, on the
other hand, insisted that an international control system would be
necessary.
Both sides elaborated the technical situation as they understood
it. The Soviet Union repeated and expanded the arguments that it
had developed in the first two sessions of the Subcommittee. Ambassador Tsarapkin boasted that the predictions of the Soviet scientists
in 1958 had been borne out, that the situation with respect to the
detection of nuclear weapons tests had improved, even more than
had been expected. 42 However, he continued to differentiate slightly
between the situation with respect to nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space, underwater, and those underground. 43
He asserted that tests in all environments could be detected by
national systems, but was somewhat less positive in the latter instance.
To prove his point about underground tests, he cited those which had
been detected, and claimed that the detection of the Gnome shot by
distant stations had disproved the decoupling theory. 44
The two Western powers took much greater care to refute the
Soviet arguments than they had during the opening sessions of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee. This effort started when the interim
report of the Subcommittee was presented to the full Eighteen-Nation
Committee. At that time, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology, and other American
scientists came to Geneva and made themselves available-especially
42ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 8.
43See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 8, pp. 22-23.
44ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, pp. 4-5.
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to the eight new members of the Committee-to explain the technical
situation as the United States understood it. Dr. Wiesner, in particular, was widely known among the representatives of the neutral
nations and greatly respected. He and the other American scientists
came to play an important teaching role in the Conference.
In the Subcommittee and in plenary sessions both Ambassador
Dean and Mr. Godber developed the Western position for the record.
Now they began to distinguish between the various environments and
to acknowledge that most, or as they sometimes put it, "the larger,"
tests in the atmosphere could be detected by national systems. They
maintained that although it was conceivable that tests in outer space
and underwater could be detected by national systems, at present no
national systems for such purposes were in existence. 45
The Western representatives stated that they felt that the majority of underground events could be detected, but that in many cases
it would be difficult to distinguish whether they were caused by earthquakes or nuclear explosions, and that in any case, the only way
positively to identify an underground nuclear explosion was through
obtaining radioactive debris by means of an on-site inspection. At a
news conference in Washington, President Kennedy also sought to
establish the difference between the detection and identification of
underground events. 46 It was difficult to get many of the delegates
of the eight new members of the Committee to make this distinction.
Even the Swedish scientists, including those at Uppsala, were somewhat careless in this respect.
To illustrate the limitations on the distant detection of underground nuclear explosions, Ambassador Dean pointed out that of
the current United States series of underground tests the Gnome shot
had been the only one to be detected in Sweden. He also said that
during the moratorium on nuclear testing, from the late fall of 1958
until its abrogation by the Soviet Union in 1961, United States
scientists had recorded "hundreds of seismic or acoustic signals ...
and some of them may have looked as if they could have been caused
by a secret underground nuclear detonation." 47 The United States
did not raise questions because of its fear of upsetting the negotiations.
45ENDC/PV. 19, p. 38, and ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 8, p. 6.
46See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp.
215-17.
47ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 23.
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Concerning the Gnome shot, Ambassador Dean agreed that it
had confounded the predictions of American scientists with respect to
the effects of various media on the transmission of seismic signals. 48
However, he pointed out that since it was tamped the Gnome shot
was irrelevant to the question of decoupling.
It was not long before the presence in Geneva of the American
scientists began to have an impact. As early as April 2, the Swedish
delegate, R. Edberg, stated that to the best of his knowledge there
was "no real or marked discrepancy between the view of American
scientists and our own as to the detectability and possibility of
identifying seismic events." 49 The Western representatives sought to
press this advantage by suggesting that there should be a meeting of
scientists from East and West to go over the technical situation. The
Soviet rebuttal was to cast aspersions on the motives of the scientists
that the Western governments had sent to Geneva in the past. 50
Simultaneously with their efforts concerning the technical situation, the Western representatives sought to prove that the Soviet fears
with respect to espionage were groundless. They pointed out the
elaborate safeguards that they were willing to have the host country
establish and the minute portion of the Soviet Union which would be
subjected to on-site inspection in any year.
The Eight-Nation Memorandum: A Synthesis with Deliberate
Ambiguity
Despite the fact that the West might have had the better of
the oral presentations during this period, it was the side that was
about to open a series of atmospheric tests, and thus was in many
ways the more vulnerable to criticism. Even as early as the interim
report of the Subcommittee, though, it was apparent to many that
the Soviet Union was at least equally, if not more, determined than
the West to hold another round of atmospheric tests. 51 In the plenary
sessions, several of the delegates of the eight new members stated
their belief that both East and West were determined to carry out
new series of atmospheric tests. Since the American tests were imminent (and perhaps for other reasons as well), however, they con48ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 6, p. 18.
49ENDC/PV. 13, p. 47.
50See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 4, p. 32.
51New York Times, March 25, 1962, p. 1.
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centrated their pressure on the United States. On April 12, Ambassador Lall of India, on the instruction of his government, appealed
to the governments of the nuclear powers "not to resume nuclear
tests during the pendency of this Conference. . . ." 52 It should be
noted parenthetically that on this occasion and on each subsequent
occasion when he asked the nuclear powers to forego testing, he
stressed the "nth country" problem as a primary reason, arguing
that if the nuclear powers continued to test, other powers would do
so also. Obviously India was perturbed by a particular "nth country"
problem, the People's Republic of China. In October of 1962 heavy
fighting would break out on the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet
response to Ambassador Lall's appeal was to reiterate its stand that
it would pledge not to conduct tests during the meetings of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee if the Western powers did also. 53 The
Western powers retorted that they could not again agree to an onpoliced moratorium; they would only agree to forego their planned
tests if a treaty with effective control were sigued in the interim. 54
An exchange of statements and correspondence between Prime
Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy on the one hand and
Chairman Khrushchev on the other produced virtually the same result. 55 It also gave Chairman Khrushchev an opportunity to restate
his threat that the Soviet Union would resume testing if the United
States inaugurated its planned atmospheric series.
As the days went by, the eight new members of the Committee
became increasingly concerned about the imminence of resumed atmospheric testing. Several of them thought that they should break
off the Conference if the United States executed its plans, and some
members of the United Nations Secretariat who were providing the
supporting services for the Conference also took this position.
Meanwhile, in the discussions in the plenary sessions, individual
representatives of the eight had added their suggestions to those which
some of them had already made. James Barrington, of Burma, suggested the creation of an international scientific commission, though
not as elaborate as the organization envisaged in the Western plans,
52ENDC/PV. 19, p. 7.
53Jbid., p. 21.
54Jbid., pp. 21-23.
55Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 292-94,
318-28.
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which could settle disputes which might arise from conflicting interpretations of data derived from national detection systems. 56 He
thought that such a commission would probably have to have the
right to conduct an agreed number of on-site inspections. Other delegates further developed this and the previous suggestions.
Eventually, the delegations of the eight nations decided that
they should combine their efforts in a concerted attempt to break the
deadlock in the negotiations. Actually, the origins of this move can
be traced to the reactions of some of the eight delegates to the initial
report of the Subcommittee, which made the impasse plainly apparent. Sweden and India played a leading role in formulating the
concerted action for the eight. India mainly contributed ideas of a
constitutional and legal character. The Swedish delegation brought
to the task considerable technical knowledge, as well as definite
ideas about the political and legal arrangements that could be implemented in an arms control agreement. Swedish scientists were
convinced that the chances of an on-site inspection's actually obtaining
radioactive debris were not very great and this diminished the importance of such inspections in their view. (As time went on, American scientists would increasingly share this pessimism with respect
to the results of on-site inspections.) Moreover, the Indian and the
Swedish delegations concluded that in the event of a violation of
a nuclear test ban agreement, the only recourse and sanction would
be for the other side to resume testing. Finally, the Swedish delegation felt that control mechanisms should be constructed as far as
possible as appendages to other more normal activities of scientific
installations. 57 The Swedish delegation thought that General Assembly Resolution 1629 (XVI) which dealt with increasing the
capacity of the existing world meteorological network to measure
radioactivity was an example of the kind of thing that should be done.
In developing this notion, the Swedish delegation was in close touch
with the head of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.
This group was actively promoting the creation of an international
center for seismology, and international cooperation in this field was
56ENDC/PV. 13, p. 7.
57Many of these thoughts are summarized in a speech given by R.
Edberg on April 2, 1962: ENDC/PV. 13, pp. 47-49.
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an item on the agenda of the United Nations Economic and Social
Council in 1962.
After considerable deliberation, the representatives of the eight
new members of the Committee ultimately formulated a memorandum, a process which took several weeks. Many of the speeches of
the representatives of the eight, mentioned above, in which suggestions were tentatively broached, reflected this process. The actual
drafting of the memorandum was done by the representatives of
Ethiopia, India, and Sweden, and the Indian delegate, Arthur S. Lall,
was particularly influential in preparing the final version of the proposal. 58 In the American view Ambassador Lall's influence was not
helpful; it resulted in a "less intelligent document." Ambassador Lall
himself, who was particularly close to Krishna Menon and resigned
his post after Mr. Menon resigned as Defense Minister, felt that his
contribution was to make the proposal more equidistant between the
positions of East and West.
The Eight-Nation Memorandum was presented to the plenary
meeting on April 16, ten days before the United States atmospheric
tests were scheduled to begin. It was, however, shown to the Soviet
and American representatives prior to its formal presentation, and
had been shown to the Canadian delegation even earlier. The memorandum was an amalgam of the views of the eight, especially
those of India and Sweden. In this memorandum, the eight urged the
nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to achieve a test ban treaty. 59
After noting that despite the differences that existed among the nuclear powers concerning a test ban treaty there were "also certain
areas of agreement," the memorandum proclaimed their belief that
"possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and
nonpolitical basis."
Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing
posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if
necessary, with new posts established by agreement. The
existing networks already include in their scientific en58Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament, pp. 20-21.
59£NDC/28. The following quotations are taken from that document.
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deavors the detection and identification of man-made explosions. Improvements could no doubt be achieved by
furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation.
In addition, the memorandum suggested that "the feasibility of constituting an International Commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries
together with the appropriate staff might be considered." It then went
on to outline the functions of such a commission.
This Commission should be entrusted with the tasks of
processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion
or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective
examination of all the available data. All parties to the treaty
should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission
with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the
parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit
their territories and/ or the site of the event the nature of
which was in doubt.
5. Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach
a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so
inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred,
and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent
clarification seemed necessary. The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the
assessment. The party concerned would, in accordance with
its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy
and full cooperation to facilitate the assessment.
After the International Commission had made a full examination of
the facts, according to the Eight-Nation Memorandum, it would inform all of the parties of the treaty of the circumstances of the case
and of its assessment. The parties to the treaty would be free to
determine their reaction after receiving this report. The eight nations
offered their suggestions, in their words, "so as to save humanity
from the evil of further nuclear tests."
As would soon become apparent, the two paragraphs quoted
above could be subject to varying interpretations. An earlier draft
had more clearly stated an obligation to accept on-site inspections,
but this had been obfuscated at the insistence of Ambassador Lall.
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The Response to the Eight-Nation Memorandum
The nuclear powers responded to the Eight-Nation Memorandum in rather different ways. The day after it was presented, both the
American and the British representatives raised a series of detailed
questions, seeking clarification so that they could better inform their
governments. 60 Essentially these questions were designed to probe
the scientific, technical, and political implications of the general
propositions in the memorandum. One of the most important was
whether on-site inspections would be obligatory or voluntary. The
delegates of the eight nations did not give an immediate answer, but
the Burmese delegate did suggest that the question should be submitted in writing. 61 Two days later, speaking for the eight, P. Sahlou
stated that the memorandum would have to stand by itself; they
would not interpret it. 62 He said that the memorandum had been put
forward in the hope of facilitating a new approach and that only the
nuclear powers themselves could negotiate a treaty. Mr. Sahlou
added, though, that the eight nations would be willing to cooperate
with the nuclear powers in any or all aspects of the new negotiations
and that they were prepared to offer whatever scientific collaboration they could. In addition some of the eight did discuss their views
in private.
There were several reasons for the eight taking the position that
they did. In the first place, Ambassador Lall was adamant that they
should. Secondly, the memorandum represented several compromises
among the eight. To eliminate the ambiguities and to elaborate the
general provisions would have risked destroying these compromises.
It probably would have been impossible to draft a joint explanation,
and individual explanations would have been divergent. Thirdly, had
the eight been more explicit in their memorandum, they would have
been drawn into the heart of the controversy between the two nuclear
sides. The eight were firmly convinced that a test ban treaty could
only be achieved by agreement among the nuclear powers, and that
they would not facilitate such an agreement by seeming to favor one
or the other side. Finally, several of the delegates of the eight states
felt that if they were to be more explicit than they had been in the
60See ENDC/PV. 22, pp. 20-26.
61Jbid., p. 26.

62ENDC/PV. 24, pp. 5-7.
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memorandum, they would risk going far beyond their technical
depth.
Immediately after Mr. Sahlou spoke, Ambassador Zorin read
a prepared statement which praised the memorandum and stated that
the Soviet Government accepted it as a basis for the continuing negotiations. 63 Ambassador Dean was more cautious. 64 Although he declared that his delegation was prepared and willing "to give the most
serious consideration" to the Eight-Nation Memorandum, he said that
he was concerned that there was an element of voluntariness with
respect to on-site inspections. He stated that the United States could
not sign a treaty in which there was any ambiguity about the commitment of each party to agree to effective international control and to
objective, scientific on-site inspection's taking place under certain specified conditions. He went on to say that the United States never
expected that an inspection team could force its way onto the territory of a state where an unidentified event had occurred to conduct
an inspection, but that the United States wanted it to be clear which
side was guilty of breaking international law. If a state legitimately
could refuse an on-site inspection, then the onus of breaking a treaty
would fall, not on the state which might have violated the treaty, but
on the other side.
Continued Deadlock: An Exercise in Exegesis
From that point until the Eighteen-Nation Committee recessed
on June 14, 1962, the Eight-Nation Memorandum in fact became
the basis for the negotiations. All of the discussions in the tripartite
Subcommittee were based on it, and it served as the focal point in
those plenary meetings when the nuclear test ban issue was discussed.
Despite this new element, however, the negotiations continued to
flounder.
Since the eight new members of the Committee refused to interpret their memorandum, each side was free to place whatever
construction it chose on the document. Both tended to interpret it in
terms of their past proposals. 65 As early as April 24, 1962, the
Western powers were arguing that the Eight-Nation Memorandum
63Jbid., pp. 7-11.
64Jbid., pp. 15-21.
65See,

for example, the speeches of Dean and Tsarapkin: ENDC/SC.
1/PV. 10, pp. 12-19, and ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 12, pp. 3-6.

The Negotiations Resume

377

provided for obligatory on-site inspection. The Soviet Union, of
course, staunchly denied this. Of all the points of difference, this was
the most crucial. As the days wore on, the speeches of the two sides
became increasingly complicated by divergent exegeses of the memorandum.
From the outset, the United States had suggested that it might
be helpful to have one or more of the eight nations sponsoring the
memorandum participate in the work of the Subcommittee. 66 But
the USSR rebuffed this suggestion, arguing that the matter should
either be discussed among the states principally concerned, that is
the nuclear powers, or in the full Committee. Since this was the original pattern, no change in organizational structure was made. When
the test ban was discussed in the meetings of the plenary Committee,
the eight nations continually refused to be drawn into an interpretation of their memorandum to resolve the conflicting interpretations
that had developed. 67 Thus the schism grew in the fashion of medieval
theological controversies.
III

The Sign and Poignance of Failure
The United States Resumes Atmospheric Testing
Meanwhile, on April 26, 1962, the United States resumed atmospheric testing. Two days previously, Ambassador Lall, on behalf
of the government of India, had made a last minute appeal to the
nuclear powers "not to undertake any testing of nuclear weapons"
during the period that the Eight-Nation Memorandum was being
considered. 68 That same day, President Kennedy authorized the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to
proceed with the planned tests. 69
On the day of the United States' resumption of atmospheric testing, only the delegates of Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United
States supported the American action in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. All of the other delegates expressed regret, and
varying degrees of sorrow, dismay, and recrimination. The fact that
66ENDC/PV. 24, p. 15.
67ENDC/PV. 34, p. 5.
68ENDC/PV. 26, p. 14.
69New York Times, April 25, 1962, p. 1.
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as recently as April 24 the Soviet Union had proclaimed its intention
to reply in kind, 70 increased the distress of many of the delegates, but
also made some of them slightly less harsh in their criticisms of the
West.
Within the United States, even after the decision to resume
atmospheric testing was a foregone conclusion, the debate about this
policy continued. Now it was phrased exclusively in terms of the
extent to which the test series should be limited. 71 The Department of
Defense wanted the series to be enlarged to include proof testing of
existing weapons systems in the American stockpile to test their
actual effectiveness as systems and to measure the extent of deterioration. 72 This was opposed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the
President's science advisers who wanted to minimize the number of
tests. Although the President ultimately allowed some proof tests, he
insisted that the overall number of tests and their yield should be
kept to an absolute minimum. As a consequence, the total series had
a yield of approximately twenty megatons. The Soviet series in the
fall of 1961 had had a yield of almost ten times as much. When the
Soviet, American and British, and French test programs were totaled,
more nuclear weapons had been tested in 1962 than in any other
year, and the megatonnage of the tests conducted from September
1961 until December 1962 surpassed that of all previous years.
Efforts to Break the Stalemate
Several members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee vainly
sought to break the stalemate. Some of these efforts again sought to
use science and scientists as a means of achieving agreement. At a
very early stage, Italy suggested convening a meeting of scientists
from the three nuclear powers and the eight new members of the
Committee to go over the implications of the Eight-Nation Memorandum.73 Somewhat later, in the Subcommittee, the United Kingdom suggested the convocation of a meeting of technical experts to
70See the speech of Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet,
Documents on Disarmament, 1962, supra note 10, Vol. I, pp. 423-46.
71See New York Times, April 17, 1962, pp. 1, 2, and May 1, 1962,
pp. 1, 20.
72£arl H. Voss has stated that the repeated false starts in the 1962
program appeared to confirm the need for proof testing (Nuclear Ambush,
p. 474).
73£NDC/PV. 27, p. 37.
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assess national systems of detection so that their adequacy could be
evaluated and the extent to which they needed to be supplemented
could be estimated. 74 As the prompt and cursory rebuff which the
Soviet Union gave these proposals indicated, they were partially
designed to embarrass the USSR. At the same time, they also seem
to have stemmed from a genuine belief that there must be a "scientific" and objective solution to these problems. This is attested to
by the fact that one of the eight new members of the Committee,
Sweden, suggested that a scientific inventory of the existing facilities
and a blueprint of how they might be brought into more effective
cooperation would be useful as a starting point for more fruitful
negotiations. 75
As another way of attempting to induce agreement, Ambassador
Padilla Nervo of Mexico suggested the establishment of a cut-off
date for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. 76 As he explained it, this would be a way of ending the seemingly endless spiral
of tests and answering tests and it would also be a means of putting
some pressure on the negotiators. After making these comments, he
went on to single out atmospheric tests as being "the greatest stimulus
to the arms race" and also the most harmful to public health. They
also could "be recorded and identified without any doubt." Therefore, in his view, these tests especially should obviously be discontinued. Sweden backed the Mexican suggestion in a later public meeting, and several other of the eight new members also did so in private.
In the Subcommittee, the United Kingdom sought to indicate
flexibility-a tactic which occasionally caused some concern within
the United States delegation and in broader American circles-and
to emphasize areas of agreement. Some among the eight new members of the Committee also stressed the extent of agreement. By
June the delegates of Sweden and India proclaimed that the gap between the sides had been narrowed somewhat. 77

Despondency Among the Eight
Ambassador Padilla Nervo, on the other hand, felt that the nuclear powers were no nearer to agreement than they had been in
74ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 14, p. 6.
75ENDC/PV. 52, p. 29.
76ENDC/PV. 34, pp. 13-19.
77See ENDC/PV. 52, pp. 27-29; and ENDC/PV. 53, pp. 15-18.
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March when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee opened. 78
He spoke bitterly of the continued nuclear testing, especially the plans
to conduct shots in outer space, an environment which he felt was res
communis. In his view this demonstrated how the nuclear powers
ignored the wishes and interests of other states. The Brazilian delegate echoed his sentiments:
There is an understanding between the two great powers
that they will use their power, their strength, their determination, and their will to carry out these tests, taking advantage of their technical abilities in order to use universal
property, the property of all the peoples of the worldspace, the seas and all the possibilities of nature-and that
in the exercise of this will and taking advantage of this
property, they will commit acts which are obviously in
their own interest, but are against the interests of all the
other Powers. 79
He, and others from the delegations of the eight new members of
the Committee, protested but with a sense of futility. He feared the
historical situation would not be favorable for a resumption of real
negotiations on a nuclear test ban until the end of the following year,
after both sides had conducted tests, and the results had been collected, examined, and studied.
Perhaps history would prove the correctness of his views. Meanwhile, transferring the test ban negotiations to a new forum and interjecting the views of the non-nuclear powers appeared to have had no
effect toward advancing an agreement.

78ENDC/PV. 53, pp. 23-26.
79Jbid., p. 28.

Chapter XI

Another New Western Position

I

A Reformulation in Washington
Even though it was not immediately visible in Geneva, the West was
again in the process of reformulating its position. This began formally
in late April when an ad hoc committee was formed within the United
States Administration. The Committee was sponsored by the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which had been established in September 1961. The Committee was chaired either by
ACDA's Deputy Director, Adrian S. Fisher, or by Franklin Long,
the Assistant Director, who was in charge of the Bureau of Science
and Technology. The other agencies represented were the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Department of State, the Executive Office
of the President, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This group
met periodically during the succeeding two months; its last regular
meeting was held on July 3, 1962. By that time a tentative version
of a new United States position had been evolved.
Contributing Factors
Several factors contributed to the reformulation of the American
position. Perhaps what did most to trigger the reexamination was the
reaction in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, among world leaders,
and within the United States to the resumption of atmospheric testing. The widespread opposition to atmospheric testing made American leaders hesitant to order its resumption and also compelled them
to search for ways of avoiding such action in the future.
A related point was the fact that during the spring of 1962, as a
consequence of the Soviet and American test series, the level of radio-
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activity resulting from fallout increased significantly. 1 Later that year
it would reach its highest levels. Some scientists felt that the concentration of certain elements, especially Iodine 131, reached dangerous heights, and suggested that, if atmospheric testing continued
at existing rates, some protective measures might have to be taken
to guard against contaminated foodstuffs, particularly milk for children.
Simultaneously with these developments, American strategic
doctrine was changing. The United States was, to some extent, becoming disenchanted with nuclear weapons. This was partly a product of their very abundance. Since 1958 the United States' stockpile
of nuclear weapons had increased tremendously, so that by 1962
nuclear weapons were readily available not only for American strategic forces, but also down to the company level in ground formations. This proliferation of nuclear weapons caused serious problems
of command and control and led to deep concern about the triggering
of accidental war. In addition, the Kennedy Administration was
much less sanguine than its predecessor had been about the possibilities of fighting limited nuclear war and of using nuclear weapons
in tactical situations. Moreover, it became increasingly clear to the
Administration that a neutron bomb was still technologically a long
way off and that arguments for it were dubious; that a pure radiation
weapon would have very little value in tactical situations involving
close engagements. And as the situation in Southeast Asia demonstrated, limited and guerrilla actions seemed to be those which the
United States would be most likely to face, and for which it was
least adequately prepared. The changing pattern of strategic thought
was reflected in President Kennedy's ordering the Department of
Defense in the spring of 1962 to cut back its orders for nuclear warheads by several thousand. 2
Secretary of Defense Robert S. MeNamara sought to develop
some aspects of this new strategic doctrine in his commencement
address at The University of Michigan on June 16, 1962.3 Review1 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on
Research, Development, and Radiation, Hearings: Radiation Standards, Including Fallout, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1962).
2New York Times, May 4, 1962, p. 1.
S"Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community," U.S.
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1202 (July 9, 1962), pp.
64-69.
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ing the defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he stressed the necessity of building up NATO's conventional
forces so that the Alliance would be capable of action other than
simply a nuclear response in the event of a limited attack. He pointed
out that the United States had taken steps to build up its conventional forces and that it expected its NATO allies to follow a similar
course.
In the event of a general nuclear war, Mr. McNamara said that
the Administration had concluded that basic military strategy:
... should be approached in much the same way that more
conventional military operations have been regarded in the
past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the
event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the
alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military
forces, not of his civilian population. 4
The implications of this statement for nuclear weapons policy were
far-reaching. It meant that the Administration rejected the notion of
a "finite deterrent" According to this doctrine, a state could deter
possible opponents by merely having sufficient nuclear capacity to
inflict serious harm on them. Presumably, with such a doctrine
centers of population would be the major targets. By choosing other
targets, the Administration hoped to give an opponent a strong
incentive to refrain from attacking American cities. Under the evolving Administration doctrine, the number of nuclear weapons which
the United States would require would be related to the numbers of
enemy military installations rather than to the more constant number
of population centers. Another implication of such a strategic doctrine was that extremely high-yield weapons would have relatively
little attraction since they could be used most effectively against
population centers. Moreover, such weapons went against the whole
trend of the new doctrine, which was that only the minimum force
necessary to achieve the stated military objectives should be used.
While the new doctrine therefore required more nuclear weapons
than would be needed under the ''finite deterrent" concept, since it
was essentially responsive in character, and since the Administration
recognized that there was no feasible way that the United States
4fbid., p. 67.
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could prevent an opponent from causing serious harm to American
society, the Administration did not see an unlimited, or infinite need
for more and more nuclear weapons. The number required could be
gauged by the situation at hand. Because of the build-up of American
strategic power then in progress, the Kennedy Administration was
beginning to feel that American nuclear strength was adequate.
Therefore, as a consequence both of changes in its strategic
doctrine and the shifting military balance, the United States was already becoming much less interested in the possible gains that it
could achieve from further nuclear testing.
A final element entering into the reformulation of the American position was the changing appreciation of the difficulty of the
problem of detecting underground nuclear explosions. This was partly
attributable to the fact that the research of the Vela project was beginning to produce results. It was also attributable to a fortuitous
circumstance, which will be dealt with first since it served as a focal
point.
On May 1, 1962, France carried out an underground nuclear
explosion with an estimated yield of about 30 to 50 kilotons in a
desolate region of Algeria in the Sahara near the Haggar Mountains.
Although it was not announced immediately, this shot was detected
in the United States and also by a number of seismological stations
throughout the world which had been equipped by the Coast and
Geodetic Survey. 5 It was the first relatively low-yield shot conducted
at a long distance from the United States and detected in the United
States, and consequently drew attention to the possibilities of longrange detection, underscoring again the possibility of detection in the
so-called "third zone."
The Vela Program was also beginning to produce significant
results at about this time. Although, as is often the case, the increased knowledge pointed in several directions, the overall effect
was to make the problem of the detection of underground nuclear
explosions seem easier.
First, it was discovered that the number of shallow earthquakes
in the Soviet Union was substantially less than American scientists
had previously thought. The previous estimate had been that there
would be about 100 shallow earthquakes above seismic magnitude
5See New York Times, July 24, 1962, p. 1.

Another New Western Position

385

4.75, or the presumed equivalent of a 19 kiloton nuclear explosion
in tufi, and about 600 above seismic magnitude 4.00, or the equivalent of a 2 kiloton nuclear explosion in tuff. Now it was estimated
that there would be only 40 shallow earthquakes above seismic magnitude 4.75 and 170 above seismic magnitude 4.00. 6 Previously the
United States had based its calculations of the number of earthquakes
in the Soviet Union on extrapolations from records collected in 1932
and 1936. With more recent and a greater total supply of data, the
earlier estimates proved to be much too large.
Secondly, it was discovered that the sensitivity of seismographs
could be increased by a factor of five or ten by placing them in deep
holes rather than at the surface. 7 In addition, on the basis of experimentation with surface arrays of seismic instruments, it was discovered that improvements greater than previously considered possible
could be obtained through the use of special filtering techniques.
Also, some useful experimentation was being done with ocean-bottom
seismometers, which offered promise of increased capabilities. All of
these developments indicated that the capability for the detection of
underground seismic events was better than had previously been
estimated.
On the other hand, certain data indicated unforeseen difficulties.
The problem of travel time anomalies first discovered as a result of
the Gnome experiments has already been mentioned. It was also
discovered, on the basis of the Gnome and subsequent experiments,
that there were pronounced differences in the strength of seismic
signals when measured in different directions from an underground
explosion. Having conducted underground nuclear explosions in a
variety of mediums, American scientists had now learned that the
size of the seismic signal depended greatly upon the medium and that
a shot conducted in alluvium would generate a signal about 7 times
6See the testimony of William C. Foster, Director of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Renewed
Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1963), p. 12.
Mr. Foster testified on July 25, 1962; however, the hearings were not published until the following year.
7See "Department of Defense Statement on Project Vela, July 7, 1962,"
in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Publication 9), International
Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September
1962, pp. 246-48.
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smaller than it would have had it been conducted in tuff, or 14 times
smaller than if it had been conducted in granite. 8 It was also discovered, however, that underground shots in alluvium were likely to
produce a cavity on the surface of the ground which could be seen.
In the spring of 1962, for the first time, the United States was
beginning to have adequate technical information on which to base
its negotiating position. On balance this information indicated that
the task of detecting underground nuclear explosions would be somewhat easier than most American scientists had thought in 1958, and
certainly easier than they had thought from early 1959 through rnid1962. Simultaneously with this development, the Administration had
become less interested in the further development of nuclear weapons
and more concerned about the general reaction against continued nuclear testing, particularly in the atmosphere. It was the confluence of
these factors that produced the new Western proposals.

The Range of Choices
In formulating these proposals, the ad hoc group explored in
depth four possible courses. 9 The first course which they considered
was that of continuing to advance the Anglo-American draft treaty of
April 18, 1961, and refusing to make any changes in that proposal.
The Administration concluded that this course was unsatisfactory first
because standing firm would do little to increase the prospects of
obtaining a treaty since the Soviet Union obviously would not accept
the 1961 draft. Standing firm would also make the United States
seem unresponsive to the Eight-Nation Memorandum. Finally, it
would make the United States seem to ignore the progress of science.
The second course considered was that of presenting a simplified
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, and also in
outer space and underwater. Such a treaty would not necessitate control posts or on-site inspections on Soviet territory. As has been
mentioned earlier, Ambassador Thompson, John McNaughton, and
others within the Administration had argued for this course for some
time, and Arthur Dean had become converted to their view, after
initially opposing it. Of course others, for example Senator Gore, had
8Hearings: Renewed Geneva Negotiations, supra note 6, p. 11.
9See the testimony of William C. Foster before the Subcommittee on
Disarmament: Hearings: Renewed Geneva Negotiations, supra note 6, pp.
2-38.

Another New Western Position

387

proposed that the United States take such action as early as 1958.
William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, explained the situation with respect to detection under such
a treaty to the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament in this manner:
Except for small atmospheric tests, tests in the atmosphere
can be detected from outside the territory of the Soviet
Union. Underwater tests are also reasonably easy to detect.
Tests in outer space are difficult to detect at some altitudes,
but an inspection system on Soviet territory increases the
capability of detection in outer space only modestly over
that of a U.S. unilateral system. 10
Such a treaty would stop those tests which produced radioactive
fallout and caused the greatest public concern, and in the view of
ACDA, this would be an important achievement. It would also do
something to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the
non-nuclear powers and to slow down the nuclear arms race. It
would be a simple treaty and would not require the t:stablishment of
an elaborate and expensive international control system. It would
also permit the United States to continue testing and thereby to make
advances in its weapons program. Furthermore, since the weapons
laboratories would be kept active, the United States "would be in a
better position to resume full-scale testing should the Soviets breach
or abrogate the treaty and begin testing themselves." 11
On the other hand, the Arms Control Agency also felt that a
partial ban would have serious disadvantages. As it would not stop
all nuclear weapons tests, it would not be as effective a restraint on
the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities as a comprehensive
ban. A second disadvantage in ACDA's view was that it "would
make very little, if any, advance in the principle of inspection and
control." 12 Also, ACDA felt that to propose a partial treaty might
result in a failure to take full advantage of the technological improvements that had been made. The Agency also feared that the
USSR would attack the proposal as a device to insure that the United
States could continue testing, and that the Soviet Union would insist
that such a treaty be accompanied by an unpoliced moratorium on
lOJbid., p. 5.
llfbid., p. 6.
12Jbid.

388

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

underground testing. Finally, the Agency thought that the eight new
members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee would feel that the
United States had ignored their efforts to find a compromise basis
for a comprehensive test ban.
The third course considered was for the United States to propose
a modified comprehensive treaty responding "as closely as technical
knowledge will permit to the eight-nation proposal of April 16."18
Such a proposal would continue to insist on the necessity of some onsite inspections on the territory of the USSR, but it would rely on
"internationally coordinated and standardized national control posts."
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that a system
based on national seismic stations would be able to detect seismic
events equivalent to nuclear explosions of down to 1 kiloton in
granite, 2 kilotons in tuff, and 14 kilotons in alluvium. Such a system
would obviously cost much less than it would to establish an international system de novo. It could also begin operations immediately.
In the view of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, an important reason for making such a proposal would be that it "would
continue to place pressure on the Soviet Union to agree to open up
its territory to some inspection and control." 14 The Arms Control
Agency admitted that a country that was willing to run the risk of
detection might be able to violate the treaty clandestinely and to
do some weapons development by testing underground devices with
yields in the low kiloton range.
A fourth course considered was simply for the United States to
present to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a technical evaluation of
the capability of the system provided for in the eight-nation proposal,
and not to present any new draft treaty. The rationale for doing this
would be that it was a way of being responsive to the Eight-Nation
Memorandum. The United States could explain its unwillingness to
offer a new draft treaty on the ground that the Soviet Union had rejected out of hand suggestions reported in the press that the United
States might modify its position.
These four possibilities were discussed in the ad hoc committee
and preliminary draft treaties were prepared to implement the second
and third possible courses of action. After the final meeting of this
13fbid., p. 10.
14fbid.

Another New Western Position

3&9

group on July 3, the two drafts were sent to the relevant agencies for
formal comment. On July 20, the Committee of Deputies (composed
of deputies to the members of the Committee of Principals) met to
discuss the formal comments. Following this meeting two new drafts
were prepared, and these were submitted to the Committee of Principals on July 26. This Committee met that day with the President,
and it also met with the President again the following day, on July 30,
and on August 1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanied the Department of Defense Representative at each of the
four sessions. Ambassador Dean was recalled from Geneva to participate in these meetings of the Committee of Principals; and two
members of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John J. McCloy and Mr. Robert
Lovett, also took part. After these meetings some consultations continued on a lower level and additional drafts were circulated for comment. There were also meetings with key members of Congress, including members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The
result of this intragovernmental consultation was that on August 27,
1962, the United States submitted two new draft treaties to the
ENDC.
II

A Preview in Geneva
While these deliberations were in progress in Washington, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee had reconvened in Geneva. As a
consequence of this simultaneity, the negotiations in Geneva had some
impact on the reformulation that was going on in Washington, and
the new Western position was revealed in a piecemeal and somewhat
confusing fashion.

Initial Confusion
Some of the confusion surrounding the introduction of the new
Western position probably could have been averted. Returning from
Washington to Geneva on July 14, 1962, two days before the Conference resumed, Ambassador Dean stated, at a press conference
held at the airport, that because of new scientific discoveries the
United States might be able to modify its position with respect to a
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nuclear test ban.U; He said that it might be possible for the United
States to accept a system of nationally manned, internationally supervised control posts, and that control posts in the Soviet Union might
not be necessary. However, he declared that on-site inspections would
still be needed. Two days previously, also at a news conference, Secretary of State Rusk had said that he did not think that the new
scientific information would make it possible to do without control
posts in large countries such as the Soviet Union.l 6 Immediately after
word of Ambassador Dean's remarks reached Washington, the Department of State felt compelled to issue a statement asserting that
the results of the Vela Program did "not demonstrate the possibility
of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine
the precise nature of suspicious events." 17 Although the Department
of State statement was issued as a denial of Ambassador Dean's
comments, and was treated as such by the press, 18 it of course was
not, since no one had talked about the possibility of doing away
with control posts altogether or with on-site inspections. It was not
until August 1 that President Kennedy announced-again at a press
conference-that the United States could accept internationally supervised, nationally manned control stations. 19 His remarks were prefaced by a negative response to a question concerning whether or
not the United States position had changed.
Both the delegates in Geneva, who carefully analyzed pronouncements from officials of the nuclear powers, and readers of the
world press were befuddled by this succession of statements. The problem was partly attributable to the personality traits of the individuals
involved. In a more general sense it was attributable to the pressure
placed on busy officials by an inquiring and insistent press corps.
This pressure forced policy-makers to speak for the public record
when their own minds may have been made up, but official United
States policy had not yet been determined. Dean may also have
15See the transcript of the Press Conference: Hearing: Renewed Geneva
Negotiations, supra note 6, pp. 22-23.
16International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, pp. 249-50.
17Hearing: Renewed Geneva Disarmament Negotiations, supra note 6,
p. 25.
18See New York Times, July 16, 1962, p. 1; and July 17, 1962, p. 1.
1 9Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 709-13.
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attempted to use his press conferences to force a decision within the
Administration. The press corps further exacerbated the problem by
reading their own meaning into the statements and exaggerating their
differences.
Another aspect of the problem was the fact that the Administration had to explain the change in its policy to several different audiences. When dealing with the world at large and particularly with the
representatives of the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee, the Administration wished to emphasize its flexibility, the
extent to which its policy had changed, and the ways in which it had
been responsive to new suggestions. At home, when facing critics of
its policies and those who feared that the Administration might make
concessions which could endanger United States' security, the Administration sought to emphasize continuity and to underplay the
changes. Thus different things were said to different groups. Since
the statements to each group were almost immediately available to
the other, however, the differences in emphasis were apparent to all
and both confusion and cynicism were the result.
Another complication arose from the fact that the new scientific
information appeared to support the opponents of the American
position rather than that position. A final difficulty was that the
Administration, following the rules of careful bargaining, did not
wish fully to reveal the extent of the concessions which it might
offer until it had time to judge its opponent's intentions.
Vela Data and Changes in Western Position Introduced
At the first meeting of the resumed session on July 16, Ambassador Dean introduced the Department of Defense announcement outlining the results of the Vela Program, and said that the United States
would develop these findings in detail in the near future. Interestingly,
he said that the United States did "not envisage the establishment of
a technical working group in the pattern of those previously established, nor any formal report of recommendations and conclusions
on the scientific aspects of the question." 20 As he put it, the Committee's negotiating time and efforts should be devoted toward agreement on a nuclear test ban, not scientific conclusions.
This position was in sharp contrast to that which the Western
20£NDC/PV. 57, p. 13.
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powers had taken during the winter of 1958-59 when the question
of new data had first arisen. There were several explanations for
this change in attitude, which went farther in the case of the
United States than that of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom,
as a matter of principle, continued to look with favor upon meetings
of technical experts, and its delegates to the Geneva talks continued
to suggest from time to time that experts from all sides should meet
together. The United States, on the other hand, had become rather
disenchanted with the idea of separate meetings of scientists. The
experience of Technical Working Group II had left a profound
impact in Washington, and American policy-makers now seriously
doubted that scientists could function apolitically in a highly political
situation. They were also aware of the costs of forcing scientists to
become public participants in political conflicts. The Administration
decided that what was essential was first to have a clear understanding of the technical situation within the American government itself,
and then to convince others of the correctness of the United States'
position. The Administration felt that the best way to achieve the
latter goal was again to bring distinguished American scientists to
Geneva to explain the technical situation as it was now understood
in the light of the results of the Vela Program to all interested
listeners at informal sessions. And this is what was done. Finally, it
should be recalled that an important reason for the United States'
preference for technical meetings during the Eisenhower Administration was that this was a neutral device to which both those who
favored and opposed a test ban treaty could agree. The Kennedy
Administration was not plagued with this division of opinion; it was
much more unanimously in favor of a test ban treaty.
In this particular instance, both the United States and the
United Kingdom recognized that the Soviet Union would not be
likely to agree to the er.tablishment of another technical working
group. The experience of the Seismic Research Program Advisory
Group wherein Soviet diplomats had had to retract positions taken
by Soviet scientists had proved especially embarrassing for the
USSR. Moreover, Western policy-makers reasoned that if the Soviet
Union felt that its scientists could effectively support its negotiating
position, it would have brought them to Geneva to attempt to convince the eight new members of the Committee, as the United States
had done. The two Western powers also realized that the representa-
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tives of the eight nations generally felt that the problem of obtaining
a nuclear test ban was preeminently political and were somewhat impatient with the Western emphasis on the technical aspects of the
question.
The Soviet Union and other Communist states on the EighteenNation Committee greeted the introduction of the results of the Vela
Program with derision. A number of delegates representing the eight
new members of the Committee also expressed scepticism. 21 Gradually, however, in the six weeks between the resumption of the Conference and August 27, the day that the United States introduced
the two new draft treaties, it was able to win the confidence of this
latter group. The presentations by the American and British scientists, including Dr. Wiesner, who returned to Geneva, were quite
effective. The Western case was also helped by the fact that on July
21, 1962, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume nuclear
tests. The first blast in the new series was detonated on August 5.
With an estimated yield of 30 megatons, it was the second largest
nuclear explosion, the Soviet Union having detonated the largest the
previous fall. Although the Soviet action was not criticized in the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee nearly as much as the
American decision to resume atmospheric testing earlier in 1962
had been, it made it impossible for pressure to be directed solely
against the United States.
On August 5, immediately after his return from a hasty trip
to Washington to participate in the meetings of the Committee of Principals, Ambassador Dean began to outline in more specific terms
what changes might be forthcoming in the Western position. He did
this in an informal meeting with Ambassador Zorin that day, in a
meeting of the tripartite subcommittee four days later, and before
the plenary sessions of the ENDC several days after that. 22 Ambassador Dean stated that the United States felt that the new scientific
developments did not eliminate the necessity of on-site inspections.
On the other hand, they would make it possible for the United States
to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections and also
to consider a network of detection stations that would be considerably smaller than that which had previously been envisaged and which
21See for example Ambassador Lall's comments: ENDC/ 58, pp. 29-30.
22See ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 23, pp. 3-30, and ENDC/PV. 69, pp. 6-21.
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would be nationally manned, though internationally supervised, rather
than internationally operated. If such changes were made, the area
open to an on-site inspection might have to be increased. Negotiation
on these issues, he explained, would be contingent on the USSR's
acceptance of the principle of obligatory on-site inspection.
The Soviet Union's reaction, expressed each time Ambassador
Dean outlined the new Western position, was that it represented no
change. The chief factor cited to support this charge was the fact that
the West still continued to insist on obligatory on-site inspection.
Soviet representatives dismissed the offer to reduce the number of
on-site inspections and to have a smaller number of control stations
which would be manned by national rather than international personnel as mere details. They also asserted that by continuing to demand
obligatory on-site inspections the Western powers were ignoring the
Eight-Nation Memorandum.

Suggestions of the Eight Nations
Representatives of the eight new members of the Committee were
more impressed with Ambassador Dean's presentations, and by this
time the work of the American scientists in Geneva had had an important effect. However, it was also apparent to the delegations of
the eight nations that the nuclear powers continued to be at loggerheads. They therefore continued their efforts to break the impasse.
For some, this meant hortatory appeals to both East and West. Others
attempted to achieve the desired results by going over the remarks of
the representatives of the nuclear powers and giving glosses on
them, which in their view proved that the two sides were moving
closer together.
In the realm of practical suggestions, on July 25, the Brazilian
delegate noted that the divergencies between the two nuclear sides
concerned underground tests, and that the control required for atmospheric and outer space tests did not appear to present as many
difficulties. 23 He therefore suggested that the Committee might concentrate its efforts on stopping tests in the latter two environments,
which he said "are the most dangerous, actually and potentially,
and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and
nerves." This notion of a partial ban had been mentioned previously,
23ENDC/PV. 61, p. 36.
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and after its reintroduction by Brazil, several other delegations from
the eight nations supported it. By early August all of the eight had,
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, given their support to the idea
of a partial ban, and on August 15, Italy did this also. 24 Some felt
that a partial ban should cover atmospheric tests. Others added those
in outer space and underwater as well. In most cases, approval of a
partial ban was coupled with approval of the Mexican suggestion for
a cut-off date on nuclear testing. Gradually there came to be a consensus among the eight that this date should be January 1, 1963.
Another practical attempt to break the stalemate was made by
Sweden on August 1, 1962. Mrs. Myrdal presented a fairly detailed
analysis of the existing facilities for meteorological and seismological
observation, which could be used for the detection of nuclear detonations, and the present extent of international collaboration among
them. She suggested that the nuclear powers carry this inventory
further, and that they make plans for the immediate creation of the
international commission which would be responsible for processing
the data from the observation stations, and that they also make plans
for sharing the financial burdens associated with exchanging the
data. 25
Even her rather superficial inventory was impressive. The
Swedish delegation had discovered from public sources that there
were 7,800 land stations making meteorological observations and 12
anchored weather ships. In addition some 3,000 ships had agreed
to make observations while crossing the oceans. At that time the
United States also had at least two satellites in orbit making meteorological observations. Under arrangements for the transmission of
data then in effect, data gathered at one of the stations would be
available throughout the world in about one hour. Not all of the
stations were equipped to monitor nuclear tests, but such equipment could be provided at a modest cost. The General Assembly
of the United Nations had asked the World Meteorological Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to
study the feasibility of such a move. 2 6
24ENDC/PV. 70, p. 20.
25ENDC/PV. 64, pp. 5-18.
26General Assembly Resolution 1629 (XVI).
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So far as seismology was concerned, the Swedish delegation had
discovered that there were approximately 800 stations in operation
and that about half of them had participated actively in the International Geophysical Year in 1957. Mrs. Myrdal mentioned the collaboration of many of the stations with the United States Coast and
Geodetic Survey and stated that 65 nations throughout the world
bad reported the French underground nuclear test of May 1 to the
Coast and Geodetic Survey within six weeks of its occurrence. She
singled out twenty-four countries or territories, stations in which had
reported most rapidly. These were Bolivia, Canada, the Congo,
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Eastern Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iran, Israel,
Italy, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Puerto Rico, Spain, Sweden, Southern
Rhodesia, Turkey, the United States, and Yugoslavia. The combination of countries, representing East and West as well as North and
South was indeed impressive. Mrs. Myrdal's broad point was that a
substantial measure of international collaboration already existed in
these matters.
In the course of her presentation, Mrs. Myrdal gave what to her
was the most imperative reason for preferring to utilize existing observation stations rather than creating a new international network.
She felt that only in this way could one be certain "that scientists,
attracted as they are by the full freedom of research, being subservient to nothing but truth will feel a lasting propensity for playing
an additional role in this international scheme for promoting peacemaking."27 Under such circumstances scientists would be free to
continue their normal work. On the other band, Mrs. Myrdal doubted
that scientists would have much enthusiasm for participating in a
system which had as its exclusive task policing a nuclear test ban.
She also emphasized how much less expensive it would be to rely on
existing stations.
As the month of August passed by and September 18, the date
of the opening of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly,
drew near, the pleas of eight new members of the Disarmament Committee became increasingly urgent. They strongly desired to be able
to present some tangible evidence of progress to the General Assembly, which the previous fall bad sanctioned their participation.
21Jbid., p. 15.
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They seemed to be encouraged by the knowledge that a new Western
position would be forthcoming, but at the same time it was fairly
obvious from the Western outline of the changes and the USSR's
advance reaction to them that the deadlock would remain.
III

The Two Draft Treaties of August 27, 1962
Partly because of the anticipated Soviet rejection, and partly because
so much of its contents had been foretold, the new draft comprehensive treaty which the United Kingdom and the United States
tabled on August 27, 1962, did not receive much acclaim in Geneva.
However, the United Kingdom and the United States also tabled, at
the same time, a draft partial treaty outlawing nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. This treaty did not
require the creation of any international control features. Prior to late
August, the Western powers had given no indication that they would
make such a move, although the United States had not reacted adversely when Italy endorsed the Brazilian suggestion for a partial
ban. 28 Actually, the Italian delegate had seen Ambassador Dean's
instructions.
As mentioned previously, the idea of proposing a partial ban
had been under consideration in Washington for some time. The
draft treaty for a partial ban had been approved in the meetings of
the Committee of Principals during the last days of July and August
1. It was approved then, though only as a fall-back position. The
decision to introduce it on the same day as the new comprehensive
treaty was tabled was based on the negative Soviet reaction to the
outline of what the new Western position would be and on the positive endorsement of the idea of a partial ban by the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee. Because it was unexpected
(except for the indiscretion of the Italian delegate) , and because it
fitted in with the developing current of thought in the ENDC, the
draft partial treaty received more attention in the Committee than
the draft comprehensive treaty. Before considering this reaction,
however, the main features of the two new draft treaties should be
analyzed.
28See New York Times, August 19, 1962, p. 1; August 22, 1962, p. 3;
and August 26, 1962, p. 1.
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The Draft Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Obligations and Organs
Although the new draft comprehensive treaty was considerably
shorter than that which the United Kingdom and the United States had
tabled more than a year before on April 18, 1961, it was still a
complicated document. 29 Essentially, the new draft treaty was a
simplified version of the earlier one, modified in the light of the
Eight-Nation Memorandum and the new appraisal of the technical
situation.
The first article stated the obligations of signatories. It was taken
directly from the first article of the 1961 draft. According to it,
signatory states would undertake:
(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear
weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or controi; and
(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon
test explosions anywhere.
As in the previous proposal, all of the surveillance machinery provided for in the treaty was designed to check compliance with the
first obligation; there was no machinery to oversee the second.
The surveillance machinery consisted of these elements: an International Scientific Commission, an International Staff, and a
Verification System.
The International Scientific Commission was the principal organ. This body would consist of fifteen members. The USSR, the
United Kingdom, and the United States would be permanent members. The other twelve members would be elected for three-year
terms by a majority vote in a conference of all of the signatories. Of
the twelve, three would have to be elected from among states, parties
to the treaty, nominated by the Soviet Union, two from states nominated jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the
remaining seven, from states nominated jointly by the three nuclear
powers. The division of the Commission among East, West, and
nonaligned states therefore presumably would be four-four-seven.
The 1961 draft treaty had provided for an eleven-member commis29For the text see International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon
Tests, September /96/-September 1962, supra note 7, pp . 286-97. The draft
was circulated as document ENDC/ 58.
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sion, with a presumed distribution of 4-4-3. The eight new members
of the Disarmament Committee had raised the possibility that all
members of the Commission might come from nonaligned states.
Although the Western powers were willing to increase the representation of this group, they strongly felt that the nuclear powers must
have permanent representation on an organ dealing with such a
vital matter as compliance with a test ban. The eight new members
had also suggested that the Commission should be composed of
scientists. The Western powers virtually disregarded this suggestion,
except for the inclusion of the word "scientific" in the title of the
organization. Their draft provided for membership by states, not
individuals, and there were no restrictions in the draft on the right
of states to select their own representatives. By taking this position,
the Western powers clearly indicated their feeling that the issues
which would come before the International Scientific Commission
would be political and diplomatic, not technical.
According to the new draft comprehensive treaty, the Commission would be organized so that it could meet on twenty-four hours'
notice. Each state would have one vote, and all except a few specified
decisions would be by majority vote. Those specified decisions which
would require the concurring votes of the permanent members were
essentially the same as in the 1961 draft treaty and will be treated
topically in the appropriate section of the following description.
The Commission would be the keystone of the organization. It
would approve the total amount of the annual budget, and it would
also appoint the Executive Officer, who would recruit, organize, and
oversee the functioning of the International Staff. As in the earlier
draft treaty, both of these decisions would require the concurring
votes of the permanent members.
The Commission would supervise all elements of the Verification System. In fulfilling this function it would "establish and monitor
adherence to standards for the operation, calibration, and coordination of all elements of the [Verification] System." Since the performance of this function was not one of the stated exceptions to the
normal voting procedure, standards would be established by a simple
majority vote. These would then be imposed on the various elements
of the Verification System, including the nationally owned and nationally manned stations. In this sense the rights of the nuclear powers
were less than they had been in the previous draft, for there the
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nature of the international Verification System. was specified in the
draft treaty and by reference to the reports of the Conference of
Experts and the various technical working groups, and changes in
these specifications would have required the concurring votes of the
nuclear powers. The new draft treaty stated that:
The Commission shall arrange for observers to be permanently stationed at, and to make periodic visits to, elements of the System in order to ensure that established
procedures for the rapid, coordinated and reliable collection
of data are being followed.
In many ways this resembled the old Soviet proposal for controllers,
except that the nationality of the permanent observers was not
specified.
The Commission could consult with parties to the treaty concerning the nature of unidentified events reported to it by the Staff
and it could issue reports to all parties to the treaty concerning the
nature and origins of such events.
The Commission would also be charged with the responsibility
of establishing such laboratories as might be necessary and of facilitating the participation of the International Staff in research. Until the
first elections to the Commission, the three nuclear powers, acting by
unanimous agreement, would exercise the functions of the Commission.
The new draft, as the previous one, provided for a conference
of all of the parties; however, its status and functions were considerably reduced. It would meet only triennially, rather than annually, and on the call of the Commission. Its sole functions would
be to elect members of the Commission, "discuss matters pertaining
to the treaty," and "examine the facts and assess the significance of
the situation" in a special session in the event of a party's desiring
to withdraw from the treaty.
Similarly, the Executive Officer was a somewhat shrunken
version of the Chief Executive Officer or Administrator of the 1961
draft treaty. In the earlier version he was listed as one of the principal
elements of the control system, but in the new version he was not
given this status. The Executive Officer's functions were reduced
because international elements of the Verification System were substantially diluted as compared with the earlier Detection and Identi-

Another New Western Position

401

fication System. Other than differences necessitated by this, the provisions of the two treaties were virtually identical. The new draft
treaty also contained a provision, similar to the amendment which
Ambassador Dean had tabled on August 30, 1961, for the removal
of the Executive Officer. Such a decision would require the affirmative votes of eleven members of the Commission; in other words, all
of the members of one side and all of the nonaligned members.
(The amendment which Ambassador Dean tabled on August 30
would have required seven affirmative votes, which, with the composition of the Commission then envisaged, would have bad the same
political effect.) Under the new draft the Executive Officer would
serve for a term of four years, one year longer than provided in the
1961 draft.
The functions of the International Staff would be to man such
elements of the system as might be established by the Commission
and to analyze the data collected by the Verification System. The
Executive Officer and the International Staff would be international
civil servants and the new draft treaty contained the usual provision
found in the constitutions of international organizations attempting
to insure their independence from national governments and policies.
Unlike the 1961 version, the new draft treaty contained no provisions
specifying the nationality distribution of the International Staff.

The Verification System
The biggest difference between the old and new draft concerned
the Verification System. In the earlier treaty the Detection and Identification System was patterned on the rather elaborate recommendations of the Conference of Experts and the various technical working
groups, and all elements would be established and operated on an
international basis. In the new draft the Verification System would
consist of three elements:
1) Stations constructed at sites listed in an annex to the treaty.
Although the Commission would finance the construction of these
stations and would train the personnel to operate them, they would
be maintained and manned by nationals of the state or the territory
on which they were located. These stations would have observers
from the International Commission.
2) Existing stations provided, maintained and manned by signatories to the treaty.
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3) "Stations to be constructed, maintained and manned by the
Commission in agreement with individual Parties if the Commission
deems such stations desirable." Ambassador Dean explained that this
last category would apply principally to states which felt that they
could not afford to maintain and operate stations themselves or
which felt that they did not have sufficient trained manpower for
this purpose.
Stations in the first category would have to be in operation
within twelve months from the entry into force of the treaty and
those in the second category, within six months.
Although these provisions showed considerable movement in
the direction of the suggestions embodied in the Eight-Nation Memorandum, the Western powers obviously were much less confident
of the facilities of existing stations than the eight were. The Western
powers wanted new stations so that they would be spaced appropriate
distances apart, so that they would be located on sites with relatively
low background noise, and so that they would have the most modern
equipment. The requirement for an observer from the Commission
was designed as a means of checking on the operation of the stations
and the prompt and complete transmission of data to the international
headquarters. No figures were listed for the numbers of such new
stations, although the Western representatives indicated that they
would be willing to accept fewer than the 19 previously envisaged for
the USSR. In one oral presentation, Mr. Godber mentioned the
figure of "only a handful."ao
The new treaty gave the Commission broad freedom to include
in the Verification System any detection instruments that it desired
in outer space, on and beneath the surface of the earth, and underwater. These could either be provided, maintained, and manned by
the Commission or by signatories to the treaty, the choice being
left to the Commission. The treaty did not include any provision for
routine or special air sampling flights.
On-Site Inspections
The criteria stated in the new draft for determining eligibility for
on-site inspection were the same as those which had been contained in
the 1961 draft, except that the 4.75 seismic magnitude threshold
30ENDC/PV. 75, p. 23.
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was eliminated. As a special safeguard, the new draft stated that data
from stations on the territory of the state in which the unidentified
event occurred could not be used to render an event ineligible for
inspection, but could be used to establish its eligibility. The Executive Officer would certify the unidentified events which according to
the standards specified in the treaty would be eligible for on-site
inspection. As in the case of the earlier draft, quotas for on-site
inspections on the territory of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and
the United States would be fixed in the treaty, and they would be
identical. Incorporating the proposal which the Western powers
made at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, only a limited percentage of this quota-the specific figure was
left open to negotiation--could be applied to the aseismic areas of
the nuclear powers, thus there would be very few inspections in
European Russia. Also as in the earlier version, the United States or
the United Kingdom would have the right to select which of the
unidentified events in the Soviet Union should be inspected and the
Soviet Union would have the right to select which of the unidentified
events in the United Kingdom and the United States should be inspected.
Although the quota number for the nuclear powers was left
blank, subject to negotiations, both the American and British delegates said that it would be less than the 12 to 20 previously requested, and in one speech Mr. Godber said it would be "a double
handful at most. " 31 If there were no unidentified events, there would
be no on-site inspections. Ambassador Dean stated that the United
States now estimated that there would be from 50 to 75 unidentified
events each year in the Soviet Union, most of which would be
concentrated in a small area of the USSR, the area of Kamchatka
Peninsula. 32
Previously the United States had thought that there would be
roughly two and a half times as many unidentified seismic events in
the Soviet Union. However, until the opening of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee in March 1962, the United States' position
had been that only those events which generated a seismic signal of
4.75 or more would have been eligible for on-site inspection. No one
31ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 24, p. 16.
32ENDC/PV. 71, p. 18.
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knew exactly how many unidentified events there would have been in
the USSR above this threshold; the usual estimate was from 60 to
100. On the basis of the Vela Program American scientists discovered
that the figure probably would be from 10 to 15. 33 It is to this figure
that the pre-March 1962 quota proposal of 12 to 20 on-site inspections would have been applied.
Ambassador Dean admitted that the number of unidentified
seismic events in the United States would be somewhat larger than
in the Soviet Union;34 however, the provision contained in both the
new and old Western draft treaties was that the quota for the United
States and the Soviet Union should be equal. Of course, the United
Kingdom would also be subject to an equal number of on-site inspections, and this quota could be used in any territory under that
country's jurisdiction or control.
The new draft treaty provided that the maximum number of
inspections annually on the territory of states other than the USSR,
the United Kingdom, and the United States would be three "or such
higher number as the Commission, after consultation with the Party,
may determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting."
In the 1961 draft the Commission's prerogatives were the same; however, the standard quota figure was two unless the signatory had
more than 1 ,000,000 square kilometers of territory under its jurisdiction, in which case there would be one inspection for each
500,000 square kilometers or fraction thereof. The Western Powers
decided that two was too small a number to constitute a practical
safeguard. In cases involving inspections on the territories of states
other than the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
the Commission would decide whether or not to exercise the option
of an on-site inspection. In the 1961 draft, the Commission could
only take such a decision if it were requested by a party to the
treaty.
The new draft treaty differed from the previous Western proposal in that the Executive Officer was given complete freedom in
staffing on-site inspection teams, except that nationals of the state
which was being inspected could not be included. Thus the previous
33See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing: Test Ban Negotiations and Disarmament, 88th Congress, 1st Session
(1963)' p. 15.
34£NDC/PV. 71, p. 18.
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requirement that in the case of on-site inspections involving the
nuclear powers or permanent members of the Commission the team
should be comprised of nationals of the other nuclear side was
dropped. Such individuals could or could not be included as the
Executive Officer chose.
The area to be subject to on-site inspection was left blank in
the new draft treaty, reflecting the Western desire to have a larger
area eligible than had been provided for in the 1961 draft. The area
normally eligible for on-site inspection under that treaty would have
been 200 square kilometers. In certain instances, however, it would
have been 500 square kilometers.

Other Modifications
The August 27, 1962, draft treaty allowed nuclear detonations
for peaceful purposes only if the permanent members of the Commission unanimously agreed, or if they were carried out in accordance
with provisions to be specified in an annex. This annex was not tabled.
As will be recalled, the 1961 draft treaty contained an elaborate
series of safeguards for peaceful detonations.
Unlike its predecessor, the new Western draft treaty provided
that the Commission could make appropriate arrangements for the
Commission, the International Staff, and the Verification System "to
become part of, or to enter into an appropriate relationship with, an
international disarmament organization, or any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties
to this Treaty to supervise disarmament or related measures."
The earlier version of the article on finance had stated that the
financial contributions of the Soviet Union and the United States
should be equal. In the new draft the contributions for the three
permanent members would be fixed in percentages, as they would
for all signatories, but the specific figures were left for negotiation.
The amendment procedure differed somewhat in the new draft
treaty in that the consent of the three permanent members of the
Commission was necessary to approve an amendment as well as for
its entry into force.
The new draft stated that all parties to the treaty would have
the right to inspect the data gathered by the Verification System and
reports prepared on these data by the International Staff. The absence
of such a provision in the 1961 draft had been felt to be a weakness

406

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

by some Western analysts on the ground that vital information might
be withheld.35
The new draft treaty also contained a provision in which a date
could be inserted specifying when the treaty would come into effect.
The Western powers asserted that this provision was included in
response to the Mexican suggestion for a cut-off date on which
nuclear testing would cease.

The Withdrawal Article
The withdrawal article-which must be compared with the dura
tion article of the 1961 draft-was a final and important modification.
The duration article had stated that the treaty would remain in
force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of parties to with
draw if the provisions of the treaty, including those relating to the
installation of the Detection and Identification System, were not
being fulfilled. This provision would have meant that the failure of
certain states such as France and Communist China to cooperate
with the control system would have constituted grounds for with
drawal. The new draft treaty contained a complicated withdrawal
provision. The first step was the determination by a signatory that

( 1 ) another signatory had violated its obligations under the treaty;
(2) another signatory was not fulfilling its obligations under the
treaty including those relating to on-site inspection and that such
nonfulfillment might jeopardize the national security of the determin
ing party; (3) nuclear explosions had been conducted by a state
not a signatory to the treaty under circumstances which might
jeopardize the national security of the determining party; or ( 4)
nuclear explosions had been conducted under circumstances in which
it was not possible to determine the responsible state and that such
explosions would either constitute a violation of the treaty if con
ducted by a signatory or if conducted by a state not a party to the
treaty might jeopardize the national security of the determining party.
After a state had made such a determination, it could request a
conference of all of the parties to the treaty. The conference would
take into account the evidence and "examine the facts and assess the
significance of the situation." After the conclusion of the conference
35See Fred C. Ikle and others, A lternative Approaches to the Inter
national Organization of Disarmament, pp. 36-37.
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or after sixty days from the date of the request for the conference,
whichever was earlier, the state concerned could give notice of with
drawal from the treaty, if it decided this course was necessary for
its national security. The withdrawal would take effect on a date
specified in the notice, which in any event could not be sooner than
sixty days from the receipt of the notice by the Depositary Govern
ment.
Under the procedure outlined in the treaty, to withdraw legally
would probably take from ninety to a maximum of one hundred and
twenty days. Western policy-makers assumed that it would take
approximately this long to ready the most likely sanction that a state
might choose to invoke, a retaliatory testing program.
The withdrawal procedure represented an effort to devise a
response to a violation within the limitations of the present world
order, including three types of sanctions: ( 1 ) world publicity of the
violation through the conference debate, hopefully with an authori
tative political determination of the facts and consequent public
opinion pressures upon the violator; (2) termination of the agree
ment by the opposite nuclear power which would regain freedom of
action; and (3) prompt retaliatory testing by such power which
could not be delayed by procedural maneuvers at the conference
beyond the minimum time which would be required for the prepara
tion for testing.
The Americans who prepared the draft sought to make the
withdrawal procedure as "sticky" as possible, and yet to retain a
high incentive for a signatory state to withdraw legally. They wanted
the Soviet Union to have practice in and to develop the habit of
complying with international accords.
It is very possible, however, that the procedure would have
seriously complicated American and Western policy in the con
tingency which most concerned American policy-makers; that is, the
situation which would result if the Soviet Union were to engage in a
clandestine testing program but the West could produce at best
ambiguous evidence of a treaty violation. In such an instance, hav
ing to prove a violation before an audience of all of the signatory
states, many of whom might be more interested in preserving the
framework of the treaty than in Western security, might have been
both embarrassing and cumbersome.
Whil.;! the new Western draft comprehensive treaty may not
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have been much of a concession to the Eight-Nation Memorandum,
it did reflect a much greater willingness to have nonaligned states
participate in the control system and greater confidence in their im
partiality. This can be seen in the increased number of seats on the
Commission allotted to this group; in the acceptance of national staff
ing of control posts; and in the dropping of the requirement that the
nuclear powers participate in on-site inspections. In this sense, the
Western powers moved away from the reciprocal inspection features
that had been built into the April 1 8, 1 96 1 , draft as a result of the
negotiating process and back toward their original concept of an
impartial system.
Some of the changes in the new draft treaty were obviously
designed to eliminate perceived faults in the previous treaty and to
make the proposed control system more effective from the Western
point of view. Thus it is difficult to describe the entire draft as a con
cession to the Soviet point of view, although it certainly contained
important compromises in this direction.

The Capability of the New System
Shortly after the new Western comprehensive treaty was tabled,
Paul H. Nitze, who at that time was Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, attempted to evaluate for the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services the capability of the system which the Western
powers had just proposed. He estimated that the system would be
capable of detecting underground nuclear explosions down to from

10 to 20 kilotons if the shots were in alluvium. 36 The system's
capability with respect to underground explosions in tuff and granite
would be respectively seven and fourteen times greater. There are
only two small areas in the Soviet Union where deep deposits of dry
alluvium are known to exist. Both are near the Aral Sea, one close
to the border of Iran and the other about 500 miles inland. Mr.
Nitze said that such a detection system would permit "clandestine
shots up to 2 or 3 kilotons with some confidence that they will not
be detected by seismic means. " 37 This of course assumed that such
36U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, Hearings: Arms Control and Disarmament,
87th Congress, 2d Session ( 1 962 ) , p. 1 3 .
37fbid.
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shots were conducted in alluvium. If the shots were decoupled by
being detonated in a large cavity, Mr. Nitze estimated that this
"would allow yields well in excess of 10 kilotons to take place below
the detection threshold. "38 Earlier he had stated that "most of the
important scientific principles can be effectively studied below 3
kilotons including what, if anything, might be done about all fusion
weapons; and development of improved weapons of greater efficiency
and lowered cost are attainable under this 3-kiloton threshold."39
By compa�ison, in the light of the new scientific information, he
appraised the capability of the system proposed in the 1961 draft
treaty as 7 kilotons in alluvium. Again this system's capability with
respect to underground explosions in tuff and granite would have
been respectively seven and fourteen times greater.
On balance, the new draft comprehensive treaty was probably
influenced more by the new scientific information than it was by
the Eight-Nation Memorandum. The new draft treaty reflected in
creased confidence in the ability to detect underground explosions at
long distances rather than a new appraisal of the utility of using
existing national seismic stations. Since the capability of the new
system was roughly what the capability of the old system had been
estimated to be prior to the reappraisal of the technical situation
resulting from the Vela Project, it meant that the Western powers
were willing to accept virtually the same risks that they thought they
were taking in March 1 962 when they announced their willingness
to drop the threshold from the 1961 draft treaty. Had the West stuck
to its earlier negotiating position it would have faced even less risk
than it had thought in 1 958 that it would face with the system recom
mended by the Conference of Experts. The system proposed in the
1 96 1 draft treaty would have been able to detect underground explo
sions down to 1 kiloton in tuff. The Experts, on the other hand, had
felt that the system which they proposed (the same system) would
have been relatively ineffective in the range from 1 to 5 kilotons in
tuff.
The Draft Partial Test Ban Treaty
The draft partial treaty which the Western powers also tabled
on August 27, 1 962, was much simpler than the alternative com88[bid.
89[bid.
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prehensive proposal. 40 It was brief, consisting merely of a preamble
and six articles. It did not involve the creation of an international
organization or control system.
The preamble was like that of the draft comprehensive treaty,
except that it expressed confidence that a partial test ban would
facilitate progress toward a comprehensive agreement. The obliga
tions of the treaty were also identical with those of the other draft
treaty except that they were confined to tests:
(a) in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, or in terri
torial or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial
limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control
such explosion is conducted.
In accepting these obligations states would agree not to conduct
tests in the prohibited environments at any place under their juris
diction or control and also "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or
in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon
test explosion anywhere" in the prohibited environments. Subsection
(b) was phrased as it was for several reasons. One was that, in the
absence of any provision for aircraft sampling flights over the ter
ritories of signatory states, nuclear weapons tests could only reliably
be detected and identified if radioactive debris escaped beyond the
territorial limits of the state where the tests were conducted. Sec
ondly, this subsection was designed to prevent a state from throwing
a shovelful of dirt over a nuclear device and saying that it was
underground. Finally, it took account of the fact that many nuclear
devices which were completely sealed underground caused some
venting when they were detonated; for example, this had occurred
with the Gnome shot.
The article on peaceful explosions was like that in the compre
hensive draft except that the obligation was limited to the prohibited
environments. The withdrawal articles in the two treaties were iden40For the text of the treaty see International Negotiations on Ending
Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, pp.
297-300. The draft was circulated as document ENDC/ 59.
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tical, as were the articles on signature, ratification and entry into
force, and authentic texts. The basic process for amending the two
treaties was the same: an amendment would require the approval
and ratification of two-thirds of the signatories including the USSR,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, since there
was no provision in the draft partial treaty for regular meetings of a
conference of all of the parties, if a state desired to propose an
amendment it would circulate it to all of the signatories; and then,
if one-third or more of the parties so requested, a conference would
be convened.
In presenting the draft treaty for a partial ban, Ambassador
Dean asserted that such a treaty could and should be accepted im
mediately.41 He argued such a treaty would exercise something of a
brake on the arms race, would to some extent inhibit non-nuclear
powers from attempting to develop independent nuclear capacities,
and would stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, outer
space, and the oceans. He emphasized, however, that the United
States could not agree that a partial ban should be accompanied by
a moratorium on underground testing, and his British colleague un
derscored this position.42 In the latter's words, "Once bitten, twice
shy." With a moratorium, of course, the draft treaty for a partial
test ban would be almost equivalent to the USSR's proposal of
November 28, 1 9 6 1 .
I n discussing the draft treaty for a partial test ban, before both
domestic and international audiences, Administration officials em
phasized that the West had twice before suggested such a move; in
President Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of April 1 3,
1 959, and in the joint offer which President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan made on September 3 , 1 96 1 . There were, how
ever, some important differences between these proposals and the
draft treaty. The partial ban suggested by President Eisenhower
would have applied only to tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kil
ometers. This ban would have been the first step in the phased
achievement of a comprehensive treaty, and there would have been
some international control features. The offer made by President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan would not have involved
4 1See his remarks: ENDC/PV. 75, pp. 1 0-1 8.
42See ibid., p. 26.
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any international control features. Like President Eisenhower's sug
gestion, however, it was confined to tests in the atmosphere.
Interestingly, neither new draft treaty contained provisions
attempting to prevent the signatories from preparing to engage in
nuclear weapon tests, a provision which President Kennedy had
demanded immediately after the Soviet Union broke the moratorium
in the fall of 1 9 6 1 . Indeed, Ambassador Dean proclaimed that the
United States intended to keep itself in a state of readiness.43 The
Administration had decided that being ready to respond quickly with
a retaliatory series of tests would be a better deterrent to a violation
than any formal treaty provisions.
The Capability Under the Partial Treaty
In the same hearing before the Preparedness Investigating Sub
committee in which Paul Nitze appraised the capability of the new
draft comprehensive treaty, he and other officials also appraised the
capability of the partial treaty. Since the draft treaty would rely
exclusively on national detection systems, this was essentially an
appraisal of the United States' unilateral detection system. Mr. Nitze
stated that the United States had "a very limited and unevaluated
capability of detecting nuclear explosions in outer space," but that
it had a program to further develop this capacity.44 This program was
the Vela Hotel Program. The first detection satellites developed under
this program would not be launched until the fall of 1 963. Mean
while, Mr. Nitze admitted that the United States had no way of
knowing whether or not the USSR was testing in deep outer space.
Dr. Franklin Long, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency in charge of the Bureau of Science and Tech
nology, stated that the United States had a reasonable ability to
detect underwater tests by its seismic system, but that on the basis
of an evaluation of the likelihood of underwater tests by the USSR
and of the cost of a hydrophone system, which would be the best
for detecting and locating underwater tests, the United States had
decided not to install such a system.45 Thus for the present, the
United States' ability to detect and identify underwater tests was also
43Jbid., p. 1 6.
44Hearings: Arms Control and Disarmament, supra note 36, p. 27.
45Jbid., p. 6 1 , also, pp. 62-63.
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limited. So far a s tests in inland waters were concerned, there would
be no means for the United States to establish positive identification
through the collection of radioactive debris short of an on-site in
spection. Since there was no provision for on-site inspections in the
partial ban there was no way of enforcing this particular prohibition.
However, it was decided that since the United States itself would not
wish to test nuclear weapons in any of its inland waters such as Lake
Michigan this environment might just as well be included in the
proposal in the hope that the USSR would abide by the treaty and
feel constrained. No one questioned the capability of the United
States' system to detect atmospheric tests; however, it was clear
that small atmospheric tests in the USSR-those with yields less
than 1 kiloton-could not be detected without monitoring stations in
that country.
IV

The Response to the Western Draft Treaties
Soviet Rejection
In Geneva, the Soviet Union immediately gave a firm negative
reaction to both of the new Western draft proposals.46 The USSR
rejected the comprehensive treaty, alleging that it was merely a re
statement of the previous Western position and that it contained no
qualitative changes. As could be expected, the feature to which the
Soviet Union objected most was that concerning obligatory on-site
inspection. Soviet delegates repeated their contention that national
instruments were adequate for the detection of underground nuclear
explosions, and that the only reason for the Western powers' insist
ence on obligatory on-site inspection was their desire to obtain
military and especially targeting information concerning the USSR.
Although the Western delegates did not change the USSR's position,
they at least scored a debating point in the Eighteen-Nation Com
mittee when they pointed out that under the new proposals inspection
teams could consist exclusively of nationals of nonaligned states.
The Western powers balked, however, when Ambassador Bar
rington of Burma carried this line of reasoning a step further and
suggested that the Commission should be entrusted with the decision
46For samples of the Soviet reaction, see ENDC/PV. 76, pp. 1 4-23,
and ENDC/ SC. 1 / PV. 24, pp. 1 8-25.
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as to which unidentified events on the territories of the nuclear
powers should be investigated. 7
4 This increase in the Commission's
authority at the expense of the nuclear powers would strengthen
the "impartial" features of the system at the expense of its reciprocal
aspects. But the Western powers insisted that for maximum deter
rent effects, this choice would have to be left to the opposite nu
clear side. Obviously they were counting on using their unilateral
intelligence as a fundamental aid in the selection of the events for
inspection within their quota.
The USSR rejected the partial treaty because it was not compre
hensive, or, as Soviet delegates put it, because it "legalized" under
ground nuclear tests. The USSR's representatives denied that a par
tial ban would do much to stop the proliferation of independent
nuclear capabilities or that it would put a brake on weapons de
velopment. With repect to the Western argument that a partial ban
would end the peril of radioactive fallout, Soviet delegates took
the line that nuclear war was a far more dangerous and serious
threat than fallout and that a partial ban would be likely to increase
the threat of nuclear war because it would lead to an intensification
of the arms race. Mr. Kuznetsov alleged that in proposing a partial
ban the United Kingdom and the United States were
. . . striving to retain for themselves a loophole for the pur
pose of continuing the nuclear weapon race and at the
same time they want to pinion the arms of the Soviet Union
in regard to ensuring its own defensive capacity, although
they attempt to hide this fact, and, of course, deny it. In
such circumstances the Soviet Union would be compelled to
conduct nuclear tests likewise in order to improve its weap
ons and create new types. 48
He seemed to be saying that, if the Western powers were to con
tinue testing underground, the Soviet Union would continue atmos
pheric tests.
The Reaction of the Eight Nations
The reaction of the eight new members of the Disarmament
47ENDC/ PV. 78, p. 9.
48ENDC/ SC. 1 / PV. 24, p. 22.

Another New Western Position

415

Committee was n o doubt colored b y the Soviet Union's quick and
blunt rejection. In view of this, and committed as they were to main
taining a neutral position between the two nuclear sides, they could
not have been overly enthusiastic even if they had wanted to be.
All of those that spoke, like the Western powers, asserted that their
real goal was a comprehensive test ban, but having said this, they
expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for a partial ban as an
initial step.
The representatives of the eight new members continued to
try to find ways of bringing the two nuclear sides together. For the
most part, their efforts consisted of attempts to link a moratorium on
underground testing with the Western proposal for a partial ban so
as to bring the proposal closer to the Soviet position. In deference
to the Western position, however, they avoided the word morato
rium, using such euphemisms as "a voluntary restraint." They also
groped for safeguards which might accompany a moratorium, such
as declarations by heads of states, the immediate establishment of
an international scientific commission, and fixing time limits for
the duration of the moratorium. The Western powers, though, were
adamant. Some of the representatives of the eight new members
themselves were troubled by the idea of a moratorium. Ambassador
Barrington of Burma spoke of it as a "double-edged weapon."49
After acknowledging that a moratorium might facilitate-and even
be a necessary component of-an agreement, he expressed the con
cern that a moratorium which did not last· would lead to the failure
of the treaty and expressed doubt that in the present tensions a
moratorium would last.
January 1 , 1 963, continued to receive prominent mention as the
target date for a cut-off for nuclear weapon tests. Soviet delegates
mentioned this date, saying that it deserved consideration; then, on
August 29, at his news conference, President Kennedy said that the
United States would regard this "as a reasonable target date."110 He
added, however, that the negotiations would have to proceed quickly
so that the Senate would have time to ratify a treaty containing such
a date.
49ENDC/PV. 78, p. 7.
IIO[nternational Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, Septem
ber 1961-September 1962, supra note 7, p. 3 12.
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On September 7, 1 962, when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee recessed for the seventeenth session of the General As
sembly, it was debatable whether after seven months of discussions
in a new forum and all of the efforts of the eight new members the
positions of the two nuclear powers were in reality any closer to
gether. In one of the final sessions of the Committee, Mexican
Ambassador Padilla Nervo expressed some of the frustrations of
the new members when he said that although on the surface the
explanation for the lack of progress seemed to be the difference
between the two sides concerning on-site inspection, this was not
the basic explanation. He continued by saying that:
The cause is complex and many-sided. It seems to consist
of considerations of internal politics and international pres
tige which for the moment the Powers cannot or do not
know how to overcome. It also consists of suspicion and
the tempting dream of obtaining, by further nuclear tests,
some military advantage or an important lead from possible
discoveries in that field. 51
Accepting this analysis, the representatives of several of the eight
new members of the Committee were frustrated because they felt
that at the Conference table in Geneva they could only deal with
the apparent and surface sources of disagreement. Thus many of them
were not unhappy to move to New York, where in the widely
publicized meetings of the General Assembly they might have a
better instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the nuclear
powers.
Meanwhile, in response to an American proposal, the tripartite
Subcommittee would continue to meet in Geneva. No one, though,
predicted success. A test ban agreement seemed as distant as it
had before the tabling of the new Western proposals.

51ENDC/PV. 80, p. 33.

Chapter XII

False Hopes

I

A Debate, an Inventory, a Showdown, a Schism
The next period in the nuclear test ban negotiations brought certain
significant changes. Although it started inauspiciously, suddenly both
sides-but particularly the Soviet Union-demonstrated greater flexi
bility, and some observers felt that an agreement might be in sight.
Hopes soared, but by the end of the period this optimism had been
dashed.

The Seventeenth General Assembly
While the Subcommittee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee continued to meet in Geneva-an American suggestion
which the USSR reluctantly accepted-the spotlight of attention
turned to New York and the United Nations General Assembly,
where all three groups within the ENDC hoped to gain support for
their positions. The Soviet Union, though, may well have had certain
special expectations. Soviet leaders may have expected that the series
of nuclear tests which the USSR was then conducting could be
completed in sufficient time to enable them to make some dramatic
move, such as announcing another unilateral suspension. Making
such a move during the Assembly session would put great pressure
on the Western states to take similar action. The USSR's assertions
that the date set for the reopening of the full Eighteen-Nation Com
mittee, November 12, could easily be adjusted and set back so that
there need be no deadline on the Assembly's deliberations and its
insistence that the subcommittee's sessions in Geneva should not in
any way inhibit the Assembly,! support the suspicion that Soviet
leaders may have considered such a move.
The item, "The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and
thermonuclear tests," had been placed on the Assembly's agenda at
lENDC/SC. 1 / PV. 26, p. 24.
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the request of India. When the Assembly opened, the First Commit
tee decided to make it the first order of business. The debate in the
Committee lasted from October 10 through November 5, and the two
resolutions recommended by the Committee were adopted on Novem
ber 6. For the most part the debate consisted of an expanded version
of that which had occurred previously in the ENDC. The addition of
ninety-three more states to the debate brought little that was quali
tatively new.
The introduction of so many states which had not had previous
detailed contact with the negotiations, however, complicated the
Western position. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee the United States
and the United Kingdom had attempted to build an elaborate tech
nical case to substantiate their position, and had devoted considerable
effort to explaining their views to the eight new members of the
Committee.
To undertake a comparable effort in the Assembly would have
been impossible. Immediately after the debate opened in the First
Committee, the United States submitted two memoranda: the first
outlining the technical aspects of the detection and identification of
underground nuclear explosions and the second explaining the find
ings of the Vela Program as they related to a nuclear test ban.2 Ob
viously, though, these memoranda were not as effective as the briefings
with top Western scientists held in Geneva. Nevertheless the Soviet
Union, for the first time in 1 962, felt constrained to issue a technical
reply, though it did not do so until November 1 1 after the Assembly
debate on a nuclear test ban had been concluded, and did so then
only in the form of an article by three Russian scientists in Izvestia.3
Subsequently the Soviet article was circulated as a document of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.4
During the course of the debate, speakers from several Latin
American states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru), states
belonging to the Western alliance system (Australia, Canada, China,
Denmark, Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and
2UN Document A/C. l / 873.
3For the text of the article, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962,
Vol. II, pp. 1 042-46. The article was signed by Mikhail A. Sadovsky, V.
Keilis-Borok, and N. Kondorskaya. The first two individuals had participated
in some of the meetings of scientists connected with the Conference on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.
4£NDC/ 67
.
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the Philippines), a s well a s from the Federation o f Malaya, Spain,
Ireland, and Somalia, supported the idea of a partial test ban treaty
as a first step toward a comprehensive ban. On the other hand,
spokesmen from Communist states (Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech
oslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR), certain
African and Asian states (Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon,
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria) and Austria emphasized the importance of hav
ing a test ban treaty apply to all environments.
Two draft resolutions were introduced, both on October 19.
The first was proposed by thirty African, Asian, and Latin American
states, including the eight new members of the Disarmament Com•
rnittee. 5 Seven other states from the same geographic regions later
became additional cosponsors. The other resolution was proposed by
the United Kingdom and the United States. 6
The thirty-seven power resolution condemned all nuclear tests,
asked that all such tests should cease immediately and in any event
not later than January 1 , 1963, endorsed the Eight-Nation Memo
randum "as a basis for negotiations," called upon the parties con
cerned "to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession
in order to reach agreement urgently," and asked the ENDC to
pursue the matter and to report to the General Assembly on or be
fore December 10, 1 962. With the exception of certain preambular
paragraphs, the Soviet Union supported this proposal.
The Western resolution urged the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee to work toward the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty
"with effective and prompt international verification," but asserted
that if this proved impossible, the ENDC should
. . . seek the conclusion of an interim treaty prohibiting
nuclear weapon tests in those environments where radio
active fall-out is a matter of international concern and
where nuclear weapon tests can be detected and identified
without international controls, namely, the atmosphere, the
oceans, and space.
It also urged the negotiating powers to agree on a date on which a
treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests should enter into force, noted
5UN Document A/C. 1 / L. 3 1 0.
6UN Document A/ C. 1 / L. 3 1 1 .
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the reports of the Committee, and requested the Secretary General
to bring the records of the Assembly debate to the attention of the
Committee. Essentially, it was an endorsement of the Western posi
tion.
Canada submitted a number of amendments to the thirty-seven
power proposal. 7 The most important of these involved the addition
of a paragraph recommending that if agreement were not reached on
a comprehensive ban by January 1 , 1 963, the parties concerned
should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. Subsequently, Can
ada modified this, incorporating a Ghanian subamendment, so that
the paragraph recommended that a partial ban be accompanied by
an interim arrangement, limited in time, suspending underground
tests, on the basis of the Eight-Nation Memorandum.8 The United
States and the United Kingdom proposed to add to this:
Such limited interim agreement shall include adequate
assurances for effective detection and identification of
seismic events by an international scientific commission. 9
At the suggestion of Ambassador Arthur Lall of India, who again
as on many previous occasions manifested concern for the position
of the USSR, the two Western powers agreed to delete the word
"limited." As revised, the United Kingdom and United States sub
amendment was adopted by a vote of 65 to 1 1 , with 28 abstentions.
The Soviet bloc states and Cuba voted against the proposal. All of
the eight new members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee except the
United Arab Republic, which abstained, voted affirmatively. The
alignment on the vote on the paragraph as a whole was similar, al
though there were minor differences. The vote was 62 to 1 1 , with 3 1
abstentions.
The First Committee then turned to the thirty-seven power
resolution itself.10 The condemnation of all nuclear tests in the first
operative paragraph was adopted by 8 1 votes to 0, with 25 absten
tions. The major states of both East and West abstained. The second
7UN Document A/C. 1 / L. 3 1 3.
SFor the Ghanian subamendment, see UN Document A/C. 1 / L. 314.
9UN Document A/C. 1 / L. 3 1 6.
lOFor the record of the voting see UN, General Assembly, First Com
mittee, Official Records, 1 7th Session, pp. 1 1 0- 1 3 .
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operative paragraph establishing the cut-off date of January 1 , 1 963,
was adopted, 8 8 to 1 0, with 8 abstentions. Only Australia, Belgium,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United King
dom, and the United States voted against the paragraph. China,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the
Philippines, and Thailand abstained. The states voting for the para
graph even included three members of NATO, Canada, Denmark,
and Iceland. The disarray within the ranks of the Western alliance
demonstrated, among other things, the strength of support for an
immediate, unconditional cessation of nuclear testing.
The thirty-seven power resolution as a whole was adopted in
the First Committee by a vote of 8 1 to 0, with 25 abstentions, and
in the plenary session, 75 to 0, with 2 1 abstentions.11 The major
states of both East and West abstained, though as can be seen from
the votes on the parts of the resolution, for different reasons: those
from the East because of the condemnation of all nuclear tests and
those from the West for the same reason and also because of the
cut-off date.
Just before the vote on their resolution, the United States and
the United Kingdom dropped the paragraph endorsing a partial ban.
With this change, the resolution was adopted in the First Committee
by a vote of 50 to 12, with 42 abstentions, and later in the plenary
session, 5 1 to 1 0, with 40 abstentions.12 In the Committee vote, Mali
and Cuba joined the Soviet bloc in opposing the resolution. In the
plenary session, Mali did not participate and Cuba was absent. The
eight new members of the Disarmament Committee split evenly:
Brazil, India, Mexico, and Sweden voted for the resolution; and
Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic abstained.
The results of the General Assembly's consideration of the
nuclear test ban issue were therefore somewhat contradictory. Be
cause of the adoption of their resolution, the Western powers could
claim something of a victory, although in their efforts to muster a
majority they had had to abandon the idea of obtaining an endorse
ment for their partial ban proposal. Even after this concession was
made, less than half of the UN's membership had actually voted for
their resolution. The Soviet Union was pleased with the establishment
llGeneral Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII ) .
12General Assembly Resolution 1762 B (XVII) .
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of the cut-off date and the endorsement of the Eight-Nation Memo
randum in the thirty-seven power resolution which had been adopted
by substantial majority of all members. However, the USSR strongly
opposed the Canadian amendment referring to verification arrange
ments. The meaning of this amendment as it was finally adopted was
not very clear. The Western powers would have to exercise their
interpretative skills to see it as supporting their position. Those who
fared best in the Assembly were the eight new members of the Dis
armament Committee, to the extent that their Memorandum was
endorsed without qualification. Perhaps this could be explained by
the very ambiguity of the Memorandum! In any case, the two As
sembly resolutions constituted a charge of sorts for the ENDC,
which now had to report back to the Assembly by December 10,

1 962.
The other actions of the General Assembly at its seventeenth
session with respect to disarmament and arms control were also
rather ambiguous. It decided not to take any decision on the sug
gestion of certain Latin American states that Latin America should
be established as a denuclearized zone. It also did not take a decision
on the Soviet-sponsored item relating to propaganda favoring preven
tive nuclear war, accepting instead the Soviet recommendation that
the matter be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com
mittee. The resolution which the Assembly adopted on General and
Complete Disarmament was procedural and hortatory. It was adopted
unanimously, except for the vote of France, which abstained. In an
other resolution, the Assembly postponed the question of convening
a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons by asking the Secretary General to carry on
further consultations with the governments of Member States. At
that point, 59 states had replied to the Secretary General's inquiries.
Thirty-three, including the USSR had favored the convocation of such
a conference, and 26, including the United States and the United
Kingdom, had expressed negative views or doubts.

Continued Testing
Although the General Assembly debate and the resolutions
which were adopted may have had some influence on the nuclear
test ban negotiations, events which occurred outside the meeting halls
in Geneva and New York had a much more significant impact.
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Both sides continued their test programs. The Kennedy Admin
istration authorized an extension of the United States atmospheric
and high

altitude testing program,

so that the series,

originally

scheduled to end in July, was continued into the fall. The extension
was made partly to allow shots which had originally been scheduled,
but for various reasons had not been conducted. It was also made to
allow American scientists to follow up leads gained during the spring
and summer. Finally, on November 4, President Kennedy announced
that the atmospheric and high altitude series had been concluded.
Underground shots, however, would continue in Nevada. By the end
of the year, including both series, the United States would have con
ducted over ninety tests.
The Soviet series, which started in early August, was in full
operation during the Assembly debate. Both within and outside of
the United Nations, Soviet officials continued to assert the right of
the USSR to test last. On November 7, Chairman Khrushchev pre
dicted that the current Soviet test series would end on November 20.
By the end of the year, the Soviet Union would have conducted some

40 explosions. In all there would have been more nuclear detonations
in 1962 than in any other year.
What was perhaps more significant than the conclusion--or
prospective conclusion--of the two test series was the fact that both
sides appeared to be losing interest in testing nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere, at high altitudes, and in outer space. Even when the de
cision to start the 1962 series of tests was taken that spring, there was
some discussion in the United States that that series would be the last
in these environments. In their 1962 test series, both sides appeared
to be approaching the theoretical limits of development which had
been postulated by nuclear scientists. This meant that there was less
and less to learn through further testing, and also that each gain be
came more and more difficult. The two sides, though, appear to have
emphasized and to have learned different things. The Soviet Union
had detonated more high-yield weapons and appeared to know more
in this area, while the United States had detonated a larger number
of lower yield weapons and seemed to have the lead here.

Military Crises
Another event, or series of events, external to the negotiations
which would have an important impact on them was the Cuban crisis,
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which came to a climax in late October 1962. In this crisis, the United
States and the USSR faced the grim possibility of nuclear war more
directly than ever before. Apparently this had a profound impact on
the leadership of both states, and led them to seek a detente. Most
analysts think that this crisis was an important-if not the most im
portant-factor explaining the subsequent change in Soviet policy
which ultimately led to the signature of the Moscow Treaty.18 In
withdrawing its nuclear tipped missiles from Cuba, the USSR ac
cepted a resounding defeat and also abandoned the hopes that it
seemed to have harbored of overcoming or at least counterbalancing
American strategic superiority through this move.14 Moreover, in the
process the USSR accepted the idea of international verification,
though not on Soviet soil. Finally, Soviet actions in this instance
added fuel to the already smouldering Sino-Soviet dispute.
Almost simultaneously with the Cuban crisis, heavy fighting
broke out on the Chinese-Indian border. As a result, India was
forced to explore the possibility of obtaining defense assistance from
the West, and its entire relationship with the major Western powers
became more cordial. One repercussion of this development was the
dismissal of Krishna Menon as the Indian Minister of Defense and
this in tum led to the replacement in Geneva of Arthur Lall, who
left the diplomatic service. The Sino-Indian dispute created a dilemma
for the Soviet Union. Allied with China, but also interested in re
taining good relations with India, the USSR was forced to choose
between the two. By seeking to avoid this choice, it weakened its
ties with both parties.
While these important events were taking place and the As
sembly debate was in progress representatives of the three nuclear
powers continued to meet in the tripartite Subcommittee in Geneva.
Yet their instructions obviously were unchanged, for their efforts in
eighteen sessions were repetitive and sterile. Outside events were
hardly mentioned.
1 3See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman's testimony: U.S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
88th Congress, 1 st Session ( 1 963), pp. 792-8 1 3 .
1 4For an excellent analysis i n these terms see Arnold L . Horelick,
"The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Be
havior," World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April 1 964 ) , pp. 363-89.
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Will the Deadlock Dissolve or Endure?
Signs of Change
The pace of the negotiations, however, would soon quicken. In
one of the final exchanges of correspondence between Chairman
Khrushchev and President Kennedy relating to the Cuban crisis, both
leaders expressed the hope that the nuclear test ban issue could be
solved.15 In early November there were hints in New York, Moscow,
and Geneva that the USSR might change its position.16 Specifically, it
was indicated that the USSR might propose the adoption of a sug
gestion which had been raised by three American and three Soviet
scientists at the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World
Affairs, which had been held in London in early September. In a
signed published statement, the six scientists suggested that the use
of sealed, automatic recording stations, later dubbed "black boxes,"
might provide a way out of the test ban impasse.17 The scientists
concluded their statement by saying that a system designed along the
lines they suggested would produce enough objective data so that an
International Control Commission would "need to request very few
on-site inspections." They thereby implicitly acknowledged that some
on-site inspections would be necessary. In private conversations dur
ing the Pugwash meetings some American scientists suggested that
they thought that the West would be satisfied with very few on-site
inspections.
At the same time that there were indications that the Soviet
position might change, the West began to make new efforts. For
the first time since the revelation of the new data it disclosed the
number of on-site inspections and control stations in the USSR that
it would be willing to accept. In a private meeting in New York on
November 7, the day after the General Assembly adopted the two
15See Chairman Khrushchev's Jetter of October 27 and President Ken
nedy's letter of October 28, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp.
99 1 -94, 1000- 1 00 1 .
16See New York Times, November 2, 1 962; November 1 1 , 1 962; and
ENDC/SC. 1 / PV. 43, pp. 1 7-3 1 .
1 7For the text o f their statement, see Documents o n Disarmament,
1962, Vol. II, pp. 863-65. The statement was signed by D. R. Inglis, R. S.
Leghorn, and A. Rich of the United States and L. A. Artsimovitcb, Y. V.
Riznichenko, and I. Y. Tamm of the Soviet Union.
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resolutions concerning a nuclear test ban, Ambassador Dean re
vealed to Ambassador Kuznetsov that the United States might be
willing to accept as few as from 8 to 10 on-site inspections annually
in the Soviet Union, and from 8 to 10 nationally manned control posts
on Soviet territory. In an earlier meeting, on October 30, Ambassador
Dean had said that he thought that a mutually satisfactory arrange
ment covering all tests could be arranged, and that the United States
had in mind a small number of on-site inspections.
At about the same time, in late October 1962, Jerome B.
Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technol
ogy, had occasion to meet privately with Soviet scientist Fedorov in
Washington, D.C., a friend from his Pugwash days. Trying to get
the USSR to modify its position so that negotiations would again be
possible, Wiesner told Fedorov that if the Soviet Union would come
back to its earlier position and accept a small number of inspections,
he felt confident that the United States would be able to reduce the
number which it would ask for. Till that point the minimum American
demand had been for 12. Wiesner continued saying that once the
principle of on-site inspection had been established he would hope
that the two sides could arrive at some satisfactory number. Dr.
Wiesner did not intend to mislead Fedorov, nor to create the impres
sion that the United States could accept as few as 3 or 4 on-site
inspections, but merely sought to take action that would get the
negotiations started again.
Apparently, however, Chairman Khrushchev interpreted the re
ports of the Dean and Wiesner conversations as indicating that the
United States would be willing to agree to a comprehensive test ban
treaty if the USSR would merely accept 3 on-site inspections an
nually. According to hi.s own account

(as relayed by Norman

Cousins), Khrushchev p�·esented this information to the Council of
Ministers and got the Council to agree to reinstate the Soviet offer of
3 on-site inspections annually.1s

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Reconvenes
When the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened
on November 26, 1962, it was faced with two imminent deadlines.
1 8Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1 963 Visit with Khrushchev," Saturday
Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 45 (November 7, 1964 ) , pp. 1 6-21, 58-60.
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First, it had to report its progress on the test ban issue to the
General Assembly by December 10. Secondly, there was the cut-off
date of January 1, 1963, established by Assembly Resolution 1 762 A
(XVII). According to the schedule originally established the Com
mittee would have had more time, but to accommodate Soviet desires
the opening date of the Committee had been moved back two weeks
from November 12, the date set at the time of the recess and written
into the General Assembly resolution. As it was, the Soviet Union
had just completed its series of aboveground tests when the Committee
reconvened, although it, like the United States, was still conducting
tests underground.
Since it was obvious that the nuclear powers would not be able
to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty within the
specified time, and since at the conference table the USSR continued
to reject the alternative of a partial ban, the eight new members of
the Committee concentrated their efforts on the solution suggested in
paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII), a
partial ban accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending under
ground explosions. Canada, continuing to follow a course somewhat
independent of its NATO allies, also participated in these efforts.
A number of concrete suggestions emerged. Sweden again raised
its suggestion that the international scientific commission proposed in
the Eight-Nation Memorandum should be constituted immediately.19
In the Swedish view this body could act as an interim commission
and it could ( 1 ) provide the conference with scientific information
and undertake certain scientific investigations, ( 2 ) assist in elaborat
ing the detection and data exchange system, and ( 3) perform the
functions which the Eight-Nation Memorandum envisaged for the
permanent commission. The Swedish delegate even suggested that it
might be helpful if it were possible for this interim commission to
undertake an on-site inspection. Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ethiopia,
Mexico, and the United Arab Republic supported this suggestion.
Canada maintained that an interim arrangement would have to be of
limited duration, perhaps a year or six months.20 Various delegations
also echoed this sentiment. Others, however, such as Ethiopia, argued
that an interim arrangement should not be bound by a time limit
19ENDC/PV. 84, pp. 1 1-23.
2 0ENDC/ PV. 85, p. 17.
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and that to impose a time limit would violate the sense of the Assem
bly resolution. This was also the USSR's position.
Ambassador Lall of India suggested that it might be possible for
the states concerned to agree to an annual quota of invitations for
on-site inspections.21 In the course of his remarks about on-site
inspection, he also said that the Eight-Nation Memorandum put "an
obligation upon all countries to supply all that is required in order
to establish the nature of an event."22 He went on to say that "under
the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a country which
was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the agreement,
which would no longer subsist." Although these remarks seemed to
favor the Western position, they had been submitted to Ambassador
Zorin seventy-two hours before they were delivered, and he appar
ently raised no objection to them. Furthermore, in response to later
questioning, Ambassador Lall admitted that his formula ·did not in
volve an obligation.
On the same day that Ambassador Lall spoke, Ambassador
Padilla Nervo made a similar point. He maintained that "refusal by
one of the parties to invite scientific groups would have the same
consequences as the violation of a provision for compulsory inspec
tion."23 The consequence, he felt, in both cases would be to release
the injured party from its political and legal obligations-to terminate
the treaty.

The "Black Boxes"
The first sign of loosening in the Soviet position came on De
cember 3, 1962. The USSR proposed, although somewhat obliquely,
that control over underground nuclear explosions could be established
through the use of automatic seismic recording stations in the terri
tory of the nuclear powers and in adjacent countries.24 In subsequent
discussions it emerged that the USSR felt that the use of "black
boxes" would obviate the need for internationally supervised, nation
ally manned control stations and also for on-site inspections. The
Western powers were willing to consider the use of "black boxes"
indeed, the United States had made such a suggestion to the Soviet
21 ENDC/PV. 85, p. 24.
22Jbid., p. 25.
23Jbid., p. 37.
2 4ENDC/PV. 86, p. 33.
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Union in private meetings in New York before the Eighteen-Nation
Committee resumed-but felt that at most they would merely reduce
the number of manned stations and on-site inspections required.
Moreover, the Western powers wanted to explore the technical details
of the "black boxes." The United Kingdom proposed that a group of
experts should be convened for this purpose. 25 Later the United States
joined the British in urging a technical meeting. Western experts were
confident that scientific evidence could not be marshalled to support
the Soviet stance. This probably explains why the United States was
again willing to support a proposal for technical talks. The USSR, in
contrast to the Western powers, insisted that the concept bad to be
accepted in principle first, then the relevant technical details could
be elaborated jointly. Thus the deadlock remained on December 7,

1 962, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee filed its required report
with the General Assembly. 26
In the almost two weeks before the Committee recessed on
December 20, there were three more meetings of the tripartite sub
committee on nuclear testing and six-plenary sessions. On December

1 0 the USSR expanded its "black box" proposal by listing three
sites where such installations could be located : near Yakutsk for the
Far Eastern zone, near Kokchetav for the Central Asian zone, and
near Badaibo for the Altai zone. 27 The United States felt that a larger
number of "black boxes" would be required and thought that only
one of the three suggested sites would be acceptable. Nevertheless it
welcomed this Soviet move as providing at least some details.28 In
the same statement, the USSR also announced that it would be willing
to have foreign personnel from the international center participate in
the delivery and replacement of the "black boxes," it being under
stood that the USSR could establish appropriate precautionary meas
ures and that Soviet personnel and aircraft would be involved. This
was a significant step, for it was the first time since November 28,

1961, that the USSR had been willing to commit itself to allowing
some foreigners to enter Soviet territory in connection with a nuclear
test ban. For this reason, even though it was not directly related, it
had some bearing on the controversial question of on-site inspections.
2 5ENDC/PV. 87, p. 1 3 .
26ENDC/ 68.
2 7ENDC/ PV. 90, p. 1 5.
28ENDC/ SC. 1/ PV. 49, pp. 7-9.
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It certainly did not solve this conflict, however; and, when the
ENDC recessed, the deadlock on nuclear testing persisted. Moreover,
on December 1 3 , 1962, the USSR resumed atmospheric testing, and
there was some speculation in the West that it might have engaged
in atmospheric testing before that date.

The Khrushchev-Kennedy Correspondence: Back to On-Site
Inspections
The next moves of the negotiations occurred outside the Eigh
teen-Nation Committee. This was partly because of the recess. More
importantly, however, at this point the two parties principally in
volved, the Soviet Union and the United States, appear to have desired
privacy.
On December 19, 1962, as a part of the private correspondence
between the two heads of government inaugurated during the Cuban
crisis, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a letter which
dealt exclusively with the nuclear test ban issue. 29 The most notable
feature of the letter was the statement that the USSR would be
prepared to agree that two to three on-site inspections should be
carried out each year "when it was considered necessary," in seismic
areas on the territory of the nuclear powers. The effect of this was
almost to bring the Soviet position back to what it had been prior to
November 28, 1961. At that time, however, the USSR had not limited
the inspections to seismic areas. The offer was cleverly phrased so
as not to denigrate the Soviet claim that on-site inspections were
unnecessary. Khrushchev stated that he understood from the President
and his representatives that the United States Senate would not ratify
a nuclear test ban which did not provide for a minimum number of
on-site inspections and that this was preventing an agreement. The
offer was made, Khrushchev stated, to overcome this obstacle. The
Chairman also stated that precautions, such as the use of Soviet
aircraft flown by Soviet crews to transport inspection teams on Soviet
territory, the screening of windows on the aircraft, and a prohibition
on members of inspection teams carrying cameras, would have to be
taken to preclude the misuse of inspections for intelligence purposes.
Khrushchev finally repeated the Soviet offer with respect to the
three automatic recording stations, and stated that if the sites which
29Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 1 239-42.
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had been proposed were not acceptable, the Soviet Union would be
willing to discuss the matter and "to seek a mutually acceptable
solution."
Western policy-makers were puzzled by two of what they con
sidered to be outright misstatements of fact. First, Khrushchev's
letter asserted that at the recent Pugwash meeting, English scientists
had proposed the use of automatic seismic recording devices. It was
the Western understanding that the idea had been introduced by
Soviet scientists, and the public recommendation had been signed by
three American and three Soviet scientists. Secondly, the letter de
clared that in his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
on October 30, Ambassador Dean had stated "that in the opinion of
the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the
territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient." That meeting was
conducted in English. During it, Kuznetsov read a draft of the letter
which Chairman Khrushchev would send to President Kennedy. Am
bassador Dean claims that he told Kuznetsov, both at that meeting
and at the one on November 7, that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would
not be sufficient. He mentioned a figure from 8 to 1 0 as being the one
which the West would accept. At this point, no mention was made of
the Wiesner-Fedorov conversation. For the moment Western policy
makers attributed these two-from their point of view--errors to
hasty composition, of which there was other evidence in the letter.
Despite this puzzlement Western policy-makers thought that the
letter advanced the negotiations considerably. President Kennedy
himself was "exhilarated" on receiving it. 29a Now at least both sides
agreed on the principle of on-site inspections.
President Kennedy replied on December 28, 1 962. 30 The Presi
dent welcomed the change in the Soviet position. He repeated that
the United States would be willing to allow "reasonable" security
provisions relating to on-site inspection, so long as the inspectors
could assure themselves that they were taken to the intended area and
had the necessary freedom within the designated inspection area. He
also said that an effective test ban treaty was of such importance to
him that he "would not permit such international arrangements to
become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other
29aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 896,
30Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 1 277-79.

432

DIPLOMATS,

SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

types of information about the Soviet Union. " Thus he gave his
personal pledge not to use on-site inspections for intelligence pur
poses.
Elsewhere in his letter, the President corrected what he con
sidered the factual errors in Chairman Khrushchev's message. He
gave the American version of the Dean-Kuznetsov conversations and
stated that the only figures that Ambassador Dean had mentioned
were from 8 to 10. He also stated his understanding that the proposal
for the use of automatic recording stations had been introduced by
Soviet scientists, not British. In passing, he noted that none of the
three American scientists who had signed the recommendation were
seismologists and that they had been acting as private citizens, not
as governmental officials. He also refuted the suggestion that Congress
was the sole reason for the American insistence on on-site inspections,
asserting that this issue went to the "heart of a reliable agreement."
The President argued that on-site inspections should be allowed
in aseismic as well as in seismic areas. He maintained that the auto
matic recording stations should be established in the areas of greatest
seismicity, and thus that there "would be a need for a number of
stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka area and a number in the
Tashkent area."
At last the differences between the two sides appeared to be
susceptible to negotiation. With this in mind, President Kennedy
suggested that a Soviet representative meet with William C. Foster,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to attempt
to resolve the differences.

The Washington and New York Talks
Chairman Khrushchev agreed to this course in a letter dated
January 7, 1 963, and talks between Mr. Foster and Soviet representa
tives began in Washington one week later. After several days the
talks were moved to New York, and British representatives were
added. On Januitry 26, President Kennedy ordered the Atomic Energy
Commission to postpone the underground nuclear tests which were
scheduled to occur in Nevada. (The United States had continued its
underground testing program despite the exhortation contained in
General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII ) . However, no tests
had as yet been conducted since January 1 . ) Many thought that a
nuclear test ban treaty was finally in sight, but as so often in the past,
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these hopes were dashed. Questions relating to on-site inspections
continued to be at the center of the most important disagreements.31
In his letter of January 7 Chairman Khrushchev bad agreed that
inspections should occur in aseismic as well as seismic areas. The
Western powers now wanted to probe the technical details relating
to on-site inspections. The United States made proposals concerning
the criteria to be used in locating suspicious seismic events; the
method of choice for exercise of the quota; the size and shape of the
area to be inspected; the personnel and techniques to be utilized in
the inspections ; and the safeguards to be established surrounding
inspections. The Western powers indicated that they would be willing
to allow procedures whereby sensitive defense installations could be
excluded from on-site inspections, provided that there would also
be a remedy for abuse of this privilege. While the Western powers
stuck to their position that they would require a quota of from 8 to

10 on-site inspections annually on the territory of the Soviet Union,
they indicated that they might be willing to reduce this figure some
what if they were satisfied that the arrangements would ensure the
effectiveness of on-site inspections. The Soviet Union argued that
the Western powers were attempting to put off the conclusion of a
treaty by the discussion of technical detail, and that these technical
matters could be discussed after the quota figure of from 2 to 3 on-site
inspections on the territory of the nuclear powers had been accepted.
Thus there was once more a deadlock.
Again according to his own account, Chairman Khrushchev felt
betrayed by the Western powers, since be had thought that they would
accept his offer of 3 on-site inspections annually. Because of domestic
opposition to his policy of detente with the West, and because of the
opposition of Communist China, he has claimed that he felt that he
could not ask that the USSR make still one more concession to the
West, since he bad asserted that the first would be sufficient.32 Both
the domestic and international forces opposing his policies would
3IAithough there are no public records of the talks, the major partici
pants all gave detailed accounts before the ENDC. See the remarks by
Foster ( ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 9-14; ENDC/PV. 1 04, pp. 1 5-2 1 ) ; Stelle
(ENDC/ PV. 1 1 6, pp. 1 0- 1 6 ) ; Godber (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 30-33) ; and
Kuznetsov (ENDC/ PV. 96, pp. 20-23) .
32 See Norman Cousins, "Notes o n a 1 963 Visit With Khrushchev,"
supra note 1 8 , pp. 2 1 , 58.
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argue, he has said that he felt, that if another concession were made,
the West would merely raise its demands again.
In the private talks the Western powers agreed with the Soviet
Union that the control system should consist of nationally owned and
operated control stations which would subinit data regularly and in a
uniform manner to an international data-collection center. The Soviet
Union and the United States exchanged preliininary lists of seismo
graphic stations from which a control network Inight be formed ( the
United States subinitted a list of 76 stations and the USSR, 73 sta
tions ) , and the United States gave the Soviet Union a general descrip
tion of the instrumentation at each of the United States' stations. The
Western powers also agreed that the nationally owned and operated
stations would be supplemented by automatic recording stations. The
United States suggested ten sites in the United States where automatic
recorders might be installed and furnished information on the average
seisinic noise levels at each site. The Soviet Union accepted one of
these, declined the other nine, and requested two additional sites. The
United States did not object to these two sites, and furnished seisinic
noise-level data on them. The United States specified ten general
areas within the Soviet Union where it felt automatic recorders might
be located, and requested that the Soviet Union designate specific
sites within those areas. The Soviet Union countered that there need
only be three automatic recording stations on its territory. Ultimately,
agreement was reached on three sites in both the USSR and the
United States, and on January 3 1 the Soviet Union provided back
ground noise information on these sites, but there continued to be a
debate about whether or not more sites were necessary. The United
States eventually stated that its requirements Inight be met by as few
as seven stations, but the Soviet Union refused to agree to more than
three. The United States made a number of specific proposals re
lating to the installation, operation, and removal of the "black boxes,"
to which the Soviet Union made no response. Implicit in the discus
sion of "black boxes" and nationally owned and operated stations was
the fact that the West no longer insisted on internationally supervised
stations.
On the surface, and to much of the press, the disagreement
seemed to be quantitative, about the numbers of stations and on-site
inspections. In reality, it may well have been considerably broader
since the Soviet Union refused to discuss the modalities of conducting
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on-site inspections. This made many participants in the formulation of
American policy pessimistic that negotiations on numbers would
prove useful. On January 3 1 , 1 963, the Soviet Union requested that
the private talks be ended, and that the negotiations be taken up again
when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed. This
was widely interpreted as an attempt to use that body as an instrument
to bring pressure on the West to agree to Soviet terms.
III

Plans, Fears, Explanations, and Frustrations
Plans for a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force
Meanwhile, other events had occurred which would have an im
pact on the test ban negotiations. Prime Minister Macmillan and
President Kennedy met at Nassau in the Bahamas from December 1 8
to 2 1 , 1962. Their discussions centered on matters relating to national
security. The principal topic with which they had to deal was the
American decision to abandon the development of the Skybolt
medium-range air to surface missile, on which the United Kingdom
had counted to maintain and extend the useful life of its bomber
force. In searching for an alternative, the United States offered to
provide the United Kingdom with a certain number of Polaris mis
siles, without nuclear warheads, which could be installed on British
submarines. A condition of this offer was that the British agree to
employ the missiles not as an independent deterrent, but as part of a
NATO nuclear force. 83 The United States agreed to make available
equal forces for inclusion in such a multilateral force. The President
and the Prime Minister took the occasion, therefore, to attempt to
solve the strategic crisis in NATO, as well as to solve the immediate
British problem. The creation o(new instrumentality, a NATO multi
lateral nuclear force (MLF) was implicit in their resolution of the
Skybolt controversy. By this move, which would mean giving a larger
voice in nuclear strategy to their allies-although exactly how much
larger was not clear-the two leaders hoped to head off the develop
ment of further independent nuclear forces and to increase confidence
in and the viability of NATO. As an immediate start on the creation
of a multilateral nuclear force, the Prime Minister suggested, and
sssee the communique, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II,
pp. 1 274-76.
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the President agreed, that some elements of the United States Strategic
Forces and the United Kingdom Bomber Command could be assigned
to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans.
Whether or not the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear
force would actually achieve the results for which the two leaders
hoped was moot. The detailed plans for implementation, of course,
would have to be worked out. However, it was clear that the United
States had no intention of assigning more than a fraction of its Stra
tegic Forces to NATO, thus it still would have the ability to inaugurate
a nuclear war without the consent of its allies. On the other hand, it
was fairly clear that the United States would insist that it would have
to agree to any decision to employ the MLF. Therefore the defense
of Europe through nuclear weapons would continue to be dependent
upon an American decision. France indicated clearly that a multi
lateral nuclear force would not solve the problems relating to NATO
which concerned it. France turned down a United States offer similar
to that which was made to the British to supply Polaris missiles and
refused to participate in the discussions of plans for a multilateral
nuclear force. Some other Western European members of NATO,
especially Western Germany, were more receptive to the plan, which
would give them greater access to nuclear weapons and a larger voice
in NATO nuclear strategy than they had had previously. For this very
reason the MLF had implications for the "nth country" problem, one
of the issues at stake in the test ban negotiations.

Rising Republican Opposition
A second development during this period was the growth of
serious opposition within the ranks of Republican Congressmen to
American policy in the nuclear test ban negotiations. The two draft
treaties which the United States tabled on August 27, 1962, had been
cleared with the relevant congressional committees. At that time
some members of Congress had not paid much attention to the shifts
in United States policy because they were convinced that the Soviet
Union would reject the new American proposals.34 When the negotia
tions began to look more serious as a result of the Khrushchev
Kennedy correspondence, some of these Congressmen began to have
second thoughts. One, Representative Craig Hosmer, a Republican
3 4See New York Times, August 3, 1 962, p. 3 .
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from California, the ranking minority member of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, and the individual who as an Army officer had
led the first United States occupation forces into Hiroshima in 1945,
concluded that the Kennedy Administration might well agree to ar
rangements which, in his view, would prejudice American security.
He expressed his concerns in a speech in the House of Representatives
on January 24, 1 963.35 What he appeared to fear most was that the
United States would agree to the Soviet offer of three on-site inspec
tions annually. He was also concerned that the United States would
accept three "black boxes" in lieu of a much larger number of
international control posts. He further worried that the Soviet Union
had made significant gains through its atmospheric tests in December
and that the United States was acting before these gains could be
properly analyzed and their impact on the United States assessed. He
recommended that President Kennedy restate the American 1 958
terms and that these be made nonnegotiable. By this he seemed to
mean an international control system involving 20 on-site inspections
and 1 9 internationally manned control posts on Soviet territory.
After his speech the Republican leadership took the unusual
step of establishing a Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear
Testing, with Representative Hosmer as its head. Initially this Com
mittee planned to arrange for the personal appearance by experts
before a meeting of the Republican Conference on January 29. How
ever, when President Kennedy announced the suspension of nuclear
testing on January 26, Hosmer thought that an agreement was near,
and changed his plans. He then decided to issue a series of papers
prepared by experts. The first of these, written by Edward Teller, was
issued on January 3 1 , 1 963. In it, Teller argued that acceptance of
the current Soviet proposals would constitute acceptance of an un
policed moratorium. Other scientists who prepared subsequent papers
reiterated this position, and also argued that further tests were needed
to explore and develop nuclear weapons and to create a pure fusion
weapon. The Kennedy Administration attempted to answer these
criticisms with a paper prepared for the Republican Conference
Committee by William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and also a lifelong Republican and former
official in the Department of Defense. He argued that the United
ar.congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 1 , pp. 950-5 1 .
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States was ahead of the Soviet Union in many areas of nuclear
weapons development and that a test ban would slow down or
"freeze" Soviet efforts to catch up. He also maintained that as a first
step toward other measures of arms control, a test ban would offer
important advantages. Although he conceded that there would be
risks in a test ban, he maintained that on balance the advantages
would outweigh the disadvantages.
With these developments, the domestic battle was joined. The
Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing would con
tinue its attack throughout the spring of 1 963.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Resumes
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened on
February 12, 1963, almost a month later than had been planned.
Both East and West sought to gain the support of the eight new
members of the Committee for their position. The Western repre
sentatives gave a detailed explanation of their position, and attempted
to indicate its reasonableness and flexibility, however, the British dele
gates put considerably greater stress on the latter point than the
Americans. Soviet representatives, on the other hand, argued that
the USSR had made major concessions to the West and that it was
the West which was blocking agreement. They also strongly criticized
the current American underground tests, the first of which was con
ducted on February 8, 1963-President Kennedy rescinded the
suspension after the New York talks collapsed-underscoring that
these tests violated General Assembly Resolution 1 762 A (XVII ) . In
contrast, the Soviet Union, so far as could be determined, had not
conducted any nuclear tests since the conclusion of its Arctic series
in December 1 962.
As in the January private talks, the principal differences between
East and West involved on-site inspections. Soviet delegates argued
that they had made a major concession in accepting obligatory on-site
inspections. They maintained that this was a political concession,
since the USSR did not feel that such inspections were necessary.
They also developed the argument, touched upon in Chairman
Khrushchev's letter of December 1 9 , that the USSR had been led to
believe that if it accepted 2 or 3 on-site inspections, the West would
agree to a treaty banning all nuclear tests. In seeking to substantiate
this case, Soviet delegates reiterated their version of the Dean-Kuznet-
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sov conversations, and maintained thllt in the private conversations in
January Mr. Foster had been very cautious in denying this, saying
merely that Mr. Dean was not authorized to offer any figure other
than 8-1 0.36 They also quoted a number of statements made in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee and the seventeenth General Assembly
by British and American representatives to the effect that all that was
needed to achieve a comprehensive treaty was for the Soviet Union
to accept the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, and to revert
to the position which it had held prior to November 28, 1961.
At that time the Soviet Union was willing to accept 2 to 3 on-site
inspections. Soviet delegates also stated that in the second half of
October, 1 962, Jerome B. Wiesner, during two informal meetings in
Washington and New York with Soviet academician Fedorov, had
requested that the Soviet Union should agree to on-site inspections,
and that a small quota of 2 to 3 inspections annually would open the
way to an agreement.37 The USSR held that by now insisting on more
than three on-site inspections the West was acting in bad faith.
Western delegates denied most of the Soviet charges. As Presi
dent Kennedy had in his letter of December 28, they refuted in
unambiguous terms the Soviet version of the Dean-Kuznetsov talks.
They argued that Soviet delegates were distorting the statements
made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the General Assembly.
They also said that "no official representative of the United States"
had ever said that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would be acceptable to
the United States, and pointed out the number of occasions, including
President Kennedy's letter of December 28, on which a higher figure
had been named. However, they never denied the Soviet account of
the Wiesner-Fedor(W conversation. Moreover, some American of
ficials have conceded that the USSR may have "honestly misunder
stood" some of the private meetings that preceded the December
correspondence between the two heads of government. 88
The American failure and inability to deny the Soviet accounts
of the Wiesner-Fedorov conversations damaged its case before the
eight new members of the Committee. Dr. Wiesner, beyond being an
important administration official, had after all borne the burden of
3 6ENDC/PV. 1 1 3 , p. 35.
37See ENDC/PV. 101, p. 48; and ENDC/ PV. 1 1 3, p. 16.
SBNew York Times, April 23, 1 963, p; 8.
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the technical situation as the United States

understood it.
In his initial presentations to the Eighteen-Nation Cominittee,

Mr. Foster continued to maintain that the Ininimal number of on-site
inspections annually on the territory of the USSR which the United
States could accept would be from 8 to 10. In one session, he argued
that in order adequately to deter a would-be violator, a country would
have to save at least one or two of its quota of inspections until the
end of the year. 39 If the annual quota were only three, this would
mean that a country would only be able to call for one on-site inspec
tion during most of the year. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, who was
a member of the American delegation during the first days of the
resumed session, emphasized in private conversations with other
delegations that the United States Senate would not ratify a test-ban
treaty which provided for only three on-site inspections in the USSR
annually.40 According to the testimony of some of the representatives
of the eight new members of the ENDC, he did state, however, that
the Senate Inight accept a figure lower than 8-10. American negotia
tors continued to maintain that before the United States would agree
to any quota figure, the Soviet Union would have to specify its view
concerning several aspects of the overall verification system.
During the week of February 1 8 , Mr. Foster met privately with
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. In this meeting he explained a
new American position on several features of the inspection system,
and then stated that in the context of the verification system which
he had described, the United States could accept an annual quota of
seven on-site inspections for each side.41 The Western press had
widely forecast that the United States would reduce its demands, and
some within the Kennedy Adininistration were arguing that the
United States could go still further. Secretary McNamara was re
portedly willing to settle for 6. 41a Jerome B. Wiesner maintained that

5 inspections per year would provide adequate security against clan
destine testing.42 Five is the number which the representatives of the
S9ENDC/ PV. 99, p. 2 1 .
40Washington Post, February 2 1 , 1963, February 22, 1963.
41ENDC/ PV. 102, pp. 23-24.
4 1 aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 897.
42Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet ( 1 965 ) , p. 1 67.
Interestingly and perhaps significantly Wiesner states tllat the United States
formally reduced its demand to 6 or 7 (ibid. ) .
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eight new nations in the ENDC expected the United States to ask for.
The other changes in the Western position which Mr. Foster described
related to the conduct of on-site inspections. Western delegates pre
sented them in more detail to the ENDC at various times during the
next month, and then summarized them in a memorandum submitted
on April 1 , 1963.43 As of mid-March, the United States actually had
a new draft treaty prepared. However, it did not table anything more
than the memorandum.
These changes shifted the most important elements of the on-site
inspection process in the case of the nuclear powers to representatives
of the other side. Thus they moved away from the impartial concepts
that had been written into the August 27, 1962, draft comprehensive
treaty and in the direction of reciprocal or adversary inspection. The
other nuclear side would not only have the right to select which
events it chose to inspect (as in the 1 962 draft treaty) but in addi
tion it would supply the leader of the inspection team and over half
of the team's technical personnel. Only the remainder of the person
nel would be selected from the international staff. Beyond this, the
Western position specified various time limits. The most important of
these were that the other nuclear side would have up to sixty days
after a seismic event to request an on-site inspection, and, unless
drilling were required or mutual agreement for an extension obtained,
an on-site inspection team would have only six weeks in which to
complete an inspection. The inspection area would consist of an
ellipse with a semi-major axis of no more than 1 5 kilometers, with a
maximum area of 500 square kilometers. The country on whose terri
tory the inspection was to take place would be responsible for trans
porting the team to the inspection area. It could use its own aircraft
and pilots, and could select the flight routes. It could have its own
personnel including observers accompany the team. The number of
such personnel could equal the team. The Western powers also
spelled out their concept of the use of the "black boxes."
Despite repeated requests in private and plenary sessions, Soviet
delegates refused to comment on these matters. They argued that the
Western powers were seeking to block an agreement by having the
negotiations become involved in a morass of technical details. They
43See ENDC/ PV. 108, pp. 5- 1 0; ENDC/PV. 1 1 0, pp. 1 9-26; ENDC/ 
PV. 1 1 3 , pp. 5-9; and ENDC/ 78.
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continually asserted that if the West would agree to the number of
"black boxes" and on-site inspections proposed by the Soviet Union,
there would be no difficulty reaching agreement on the details. Since
the Western powers would not do this, the deadlock continued.
The eight new members of the Committee were perplexed and
irritated by the situation. Because of the Washington and New York
talks, they had returned to Geneva in an optimistic mood. When their
expectations were not fulfilled, they became irked, yet they did not
know what to do. Some of them made rather halting attempts at sug
gesting compromise solutions, and they were even encouraged to do
this by the United Kingdom, but these attempts were virtually ignored
by the United States and the USSR. The two states even discouraged
the eight new members of the Committee from submitting compromise
proposals which they had formulated but not tabled. While the eight
agreed not to act-apparently because of pressure applied by both
Soviet and American diplomats in their national capitals44-some of
them warned that if agreement were not forthcoming soon, they might
submit their proposals even if these proposals met the displeasure of
both powers. 45 The United Kingdom suggested that the tripartite
Subcommittee of the three nuclear powers should be revived, and the
United States and other countries supported this proposal, but the
Soviet Union refused, insisting that the discussion should be conducted
in the plenary sessions.
IV

For the Moment: Pianissimo
In mid-March the United States and the Soviet Union, as Co
chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, suggested
that the Committee should also discuss the other items on its agenda,
and thereafter normally only one of the three weekly meetings of the
Committee was devoted to discussion of the nuclear test ban.
The Soviet Union appeared to be quite interested in the discus
sion of other matters. When the Eighteen-Nation Committee had
resumed in February, it had tabled two new proposals. The first was
44Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament, p. 25. Eventually, in a
public address in Copenhagen, on May 9, 1 963, Mrs. Alva Myrdal exposed
most of the details of the proposals ( ibid., pp. 27-28 ) .
45£NDC/ PV. 123, pp. 48-49.
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for a declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for
stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the
second was for a nonaggression pact between the parties of the War
saw and North Atlantic Treaties.46 In the debates Soviet delegates
linked both of these proposals with the Western efforts now in prog
ress to develop a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. They asserted
that such a force would be dangerous, among other reasons, because
it would give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons. These
delegates argued that the MLF, in widening access to nuclear weap
ons, would contradict one of the aims of a nuclear test ban. Western
delegates, on the other hand, explained that the purpose of the MLF
was to prevent the development of independent nuclear capabilities
and that it was consonant with long-standing Western policies oppos
ing the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. The French nu
clear test in the Sahara on March 1 8, 1 963, furnished Soviet delegates
ammunition for their attack on Western policy. Obviously, all of these
issues were linked with the test ban negotiations in Soviet strategy.
What this new development in the test ban negotiations meant
was the subject of speculation. Did it mean that these other issues
would have to be solved before or simultaneously with the achieve
ment of a test ban treaty? Various answers were given. Regardless
of their answer to this question, many, both within and outside of the
Committee, regarded the lower priority now accorded the test ban
issue as a sign that the high hopes raised by the correspondence be
tween the heads of government in December 1 962 and the private
talks the following month would not be fulfilled.

46ENDC/ 75, and ENDC/ 77.

Chapter XIII

The Moscow Treaty

I

Prelude
The Administration Moves to Rebut Domestic Criticisms
While the negotiations in Geneva continued at a low

key and

reduced tempo, the domestic opposition to the Administration's
efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban, which had begun to make itself
felt in late January 1 963, continued its attacks and appeared to gain
strength. However, the Kennedy Administration also moved to rebut
the criticisms and demonstrated that it would fight for its policies.
On February 2 1 , 1 963, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, a Democrat
from Connecticut, gave a long, critical analysis of the American
position in the negotiations in a major address on the Senate floor.1
He argued that the United States had made a number of unwarranted
concessions, and that it should return to its "original Geneva formula."
On February 28, Senators Richard B. Russell, Stuart Symington, and
Henry Jackson, all Democrats especially influential in defense policy
matters, sent a letter to President Kennedy advising him that they
could not approve the 1 962 draft comprehensive treaty in its present
form.2 In early March, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy con
ducted six days of hearings on the technical aspects of verification of
a nuclear test ban. In these hearings, Dr. Carl Romney admitted that
the seismic system currently being proposed by the United States
would generally be unable to detect fully coupled underground nuclear
explosions of below 1 kiloton if they were conducted in granite, below

2 to 6 kilotons if they were conducted in tuff, and below 20 kilotons
if they were conducted in alluvium.3 He added that some tests below
lCongressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 2, pp. 2798-2809.
2See Washington Post, March 5, 1 963.
3Hearings: Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and
Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests, 88th Congress, 1st Session ( 1963 ) , p. 104.
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that level might be detected and that the United States would of
course have its unilateral intelligence capabilities. On the other hand,
decoupling would raise the threshold even higher. The current esti
mate was that decoupling would muffle a seismic signal by a factor of

200 or more.4
The most optimistic statement which the American scientists
who had been working on the problem of on-site inspection under the
Vela Program would make was that the system envisaged in the West
em 1 9 62 draft comprehensive treaty would give some probability,
which they could not evaluate, of identifying an underground nuclear
explosion. 5 They also admitted that with careful planning an under
ground detonation could be executed so that proof of its occurrence
would probably be lacking. Thus far there had been no field exercise
involving on-site inspection techniques, because the scientists involved
did not think that their techniques were "sufficiently advanced," and
because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was not con
vinced that given the conditions in the United States-limited areas
in which to test and limited abilities to maintain secrecy-such
exercises would be useful. 6
Representative Craig Hosmer played an active role in the hear
ings, which provided ample material for the use of his Republican
Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing. This group continued its
assault on the Administration position.
As the attacks against the Administration's efforts mounted,
those who favored these efforts rallied to their support, and members
of the Administration launched a major effort to justify their course.
In early March, Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, took the unusual action of writing a letter
to the Editor of the Washington Post, in reply to a letter which that
paper had printed from Senator Dodd.7 Senator Humphrey made a
major speech in the Senate on March 7.8 Four days later, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing which provided a
4Jbid., pp. 7 1 , 297.
5See the statement of Theodore A. George, General Engineer, Ad
vanced ReSearch Projects Agency, ibid., p. 257.
6Jbid., pp. 2 5 1 , 475.
7Washington Post, March 1, 1963 ( Dodd ) ; and, March 4, 1963,
(Fisher) .
scongressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 3 , pp. 3 7 1 1 -24.
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platform from which Secretary of State Rusk could defend the Admin
istration's efforts. Senator Pastore arranged it so that Messrs. Foster
and Long of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were the
concluding witnesses before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
President Kennedy utilized his news conferences personally to defend
the Administration's position.
These individuals all argued that the ability to detect under
ground explosions had substantially increased. They also pointed out
that the thresholds of detectability were not absolute, that some
events under the commonly assumed thresholds would be detected.
They maintained that the possibility that an on-site inspection would
discover incriminating evidence of a nuclear explosion would be a
powerful deterrent to a would-be violator, and they pointed out that
unilateral intelligence capabilities could be used in selecting events to
be inspected. Presumably such intelligence capabilities would include
agents, observation satellites, and other devices. In their view, this
would substantially increase the probability of an on-site inspection's
being successful. They also argued that the new United States' posi
tion emphasizing reciprocal inspection would enhance the effective
ness of inspections. Finally, they argued that the risks of a continued
unfettered arms race would outweigh the acknowledged risks of a
comprehensive test ban. President Kennedy, in his public remarks,
seemed to be particularly impressed with the dangers which he felt
would result ftom the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. 9

Steps to Break the Deadlock
Although there seemed to be major obstacles to a test ban treaty
both in Geneva and Washington, more promising signs soon appeared.
On April 5, 1 963, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee,
toward the end of a somewhat polemical speech, Mr. Tsarapkin
announced that the Soviet Union was ready to consider the Uilited
States proposal, tabled the previous December, to establish a direct
line of communication between the governments of the USSR and
the United States. 10 The difficulty of insuring reliable communications
between the two states had become painfully evident during the Cuban
crisis, and the United States had come to emphasize this proposal as
an important means of preventing war arising through accident or
9See his news conference remarks of March 2 1 , 1 963.
I OENDC/PV. 1 1 8, p. 52.
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miscalculation. After this announcement, talks began on the technical
modalities of establishing a "hot line," as it was called. A memo
randum of understanding on this subject was finally signed on June 20,
1 963.11 Also in April, negotiations were begun between the Soviet

Union and the United States to renew their agreement on cooperation
in nuclear research. A new agreement was signed the following month.
In late April, in an interview with an Italian newspaper editor,
Chairman Khrushchev raised the possibility that if the Western
powers did not soon agree to accept the Soviet offer of from two to
three on-site inspections annually, the offer might be withdrawn.12 At
about the same time the American and British Ambassadors in Mos
cow jointly approached first Foreign Minister Gromyko and then, on
April 24, Chairman Khrushchev on the test ban issue.13 The move was
taken at British urging and without great American enthusiasm. The
two ambassadors delivered a letter ,to Chairman Khrushchev from
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. This "letter con
cluded by saying that the writers would be ready in due course to send
to Moscow very senior representatives empowered to speak for them
directly with Khrushchev."13a Despite Chairman Khrushchev's un
promising initial reply, this touched off another round of correspond
ence between the heads of government in May and June.
There were also developments within the United States. On
May 8, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of De
fense announced that they would detonate three low-yield nuclear
explosions in Nevada later that month. Five days later the two
agencies announced the cancellation of these shots.14
On May 27, Senator Dodd submitted a resolution stating that it
was the sense of the Senate "that the United States should again offer
the Soviet Union an immediate agreement banning all tests that con
taminate the atmosphere or the oceans, bearing in mind that such
tests can already be monitored by the United States without on-si.te
inspection on Soviet territory."15 The resolution suggested that if the
Soviet Union should reject this offer, the United States should reiterate
llENDC/ 97.
12The transcript was published in New York Times, April 22, 1963, p. 1 .
13New York Times, April 2 3 , 1963, p . 1 ; April 25, 1 963, p . 1 .
13aArthur M . Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p . 898.
14New York Times, May 14, 1 963, p. 1 .
1 5Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 7 , p . 9483.
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it, and seek the widest possible international support for it. If the
Soviet Union should continue to refuse such an agreement, the resolu
tion proposed that the United States should commit itself "before the
world to conduct no nuclear tests in the atmosphere or under water so
long as the Soviet Union abstains from them. " As far as was known
in the West, the USSR had not conducted any nuclear tests since its
December 1 962 series. The resolution added that the United States
should maintain its readiness so that it would not be unprepared if
the Soviet Union suddenly resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere
or underwater. Senator Humphrey joined Senator Dodd as the princi
pal cosponsor of the resolution. Thirty-two other senators from both
parties also became cosponsors,16 making a total of thirty-four. Al
though Senator Dodd informed the Administration of his proposal
in advance, he did not act at its behest. Indeed, President Kennedy
had some concern that it might undercut American efforts to achieve
a comprehensive test ban. 1 6a During the course of his speech intro
ducing the resolution, Senator Dodd stated that although he felt that
a comprehensive test ban would be preferable to a partial ban, he
had serious reservations about the current American proposal for a
comprehensive treaty, which he knew several Senators shared.
Ten days earlier, Senator William Proxmire had asserted in a
major address that it was unlikely that the Senate would ratify the
comprehensive treaty currently being proposed by the Administra
tion, 17 and after a private survey conducted by members of his staff
during the month of May, Senator Joseph S. Clark concluded that,
at that time, at most, fifty-seven Senators would support the current
American proposal. 18 This was ten less than the required two-thirds
16They were Senators: Bartlett, Brewster, Burdick, Case, Church, Clark,
Dominick, Douglas, Engle, Gruening, Hart, Hartke, Inouye, Iavits, Keating,
Kefauver, Lausche, McCarthy, McGee, McGovern, Metcalf, Morse, Moss,
Muskie, Neuberger, Pell, Prouty, Randolph, Ribicoff, Scott, Sparkman, and
Yarborough.
16aArthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 899.
17Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 7, p. 8894. Jerome B. Wiesner
has gone even farther. In his book, he wrote that "Many times during the
bitter Senate hearings on the partial test ban treaty we [The Kennedy Admin
istration] had reason to wonder whether a comprehensive treaty would indeed
have been acceptable given any number of inspections." ( Where Science and
Politics Meet, p. 1 67.)
18Senator Joseph S. Clark, "Would the Senate Ratify a Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty?," War/ Peace Report, Vol. III, No. 6 (June 1 963 ) , p. 6.
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majority. On the other hand, it was obvious that the resolution sub
mitted by Senator Dodd commanded much wider support.
The extent to which the Senate resolution affected the Soviet
position cannot be known. It must have been obvious, though, if that
many Senators had grave reservations about the American proposal
involving 7 on-site inspections annually, to obtain Senatorial consent
to a treaty involving only 3 on-site inspections annually would have
been virtually impossible.
On June 10, Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party,
stated, at a news conference in Moscow where he was visiting, that
he had gained the impression in a three-hour interview with Chairman
Khrushchev that the prospects for an immediate agreement on a
comprehensive test ban were not very hopeful.19 Mr. Khrushchev ap
parently implied that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its offer of two
or three on-site inspections annually. Mr. Wilson also said, though,
that he thought that prospects for a partial ban were fairly good.
That same day President Kennedy delivered the commencement
address at The American University. He titled his remarks "Toward
a Strategy of Peace. "20 Earlier in the spring, the President had decided
that he would make a speech about "peace."21 Norman Cousins con
tributed to the timing of the speech by suggesting in a letter to Ken
nedy on April 30 that such a step at this time might affect the course
of Soviet policy and would certainly help the American image in the
world. The letter was written just after Cousins' return from a trip to
the Soviet Union, during which, among other things, he told Khrush
chev-at Kennedy's request-that the President really did want a
test ban treaty.
In his address, President Kennedy called for a reexamination of
American attitudes toward peace itself, toward the Soviet Union, and
toward the Cold War, and called for a new context for world discus
sions and increased understanding with the USSR. He announced-as
Harold Wilson did also-that he, Prime Minister Macmillan, and
Chairman Khrushchev had agreed that high level discussions would
begin shortly in Moscow on a nuclear test ban treaty. Unlike Mr. Wil
son, however, he stated that the negotiations would be "looking for19New York Times, June 1 1 , 1 963, p. 1 .
20U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1253 (July 1 ,
1 963 ) , pp. 2-6.
21'fheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 730.
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ward toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. "21 a
The President apparently was determined to pursue the objective of a
comprehensive ban despite the feeling in the Senate and the apparent
retraction by the Kremlin. 22 As evidence of American good faith,
President Kennedy declared that "the United States does not propose
to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do

not do so." His hand was strengthened in this regard by the resolution
which Senator Dodd had introduced. Moreover, as far as is known,
neither side had tested in the atmosphere since the end of December

1 962. Some within the Administration had proposed that the United
States also suspend underground testing for a limited period, but the
President rejected this suggestion. 22a

Apparently, the agreement to hold the meeting resulted from
the exchange of correspondence between the heads of government
initiated in April, and more specifically from Chairman Khrushchev's
response on June 8 to a joint proposal of Prime Minister Macmillan
and President Kennedy, delivered on May 3 1 , 1 963.
Prior to this there had been important developments on the
Soviet scene. The quarrel between the Soviet and Chinese Communist
parties had deepened, and a conference between the two groups on
their ideological differences had been scheduled to meet on July 7. A
plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union had also been scheduled to open on June 1 8. Thus it
seemed that events on various fronts were moving toward a climax.

II

Drafting the Treaty
American Preparations
Even before President Kennedy's American University speech, the
Administration had begun preparing for the forthcoming Moscow
negotiations, The first steps consisted of the relevant agencies of the
Administration reviewing current Western positions. Most of the
American preparation concerned a comprehensive treaty. Almost
simultaneously, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
2 1 a"Toward A Strategy of Peace," supra note 20, p. 6.
22See New York Times, June 3, 1963, p. 1 .
22aTheodore C . Sorenson, Kennedy, p . 730.
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Senate Committee on Armed Services began a series of executive
session hearings.
In the process of the review of American policy, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff concluded that the current Westero proposal for a
comprehensive nuclear test ban was "not consistent with the national
security," because it was "not adequate to prevent the Soviet Union
from making important advances in nuclear weaponry that could alter
the present military relationship in favor of the Soviets."23 There were
several reasons for their decision. First, they concluded that the pres
ent proposal would prohibit all tests, including those "which have
essentially no probability of detection. "24 They felt that this would
prevent the United States from testing while providing "the oppor
tunity for the Soviets to test clandestinely." The Joint Chiefs felt that
any test ban treaty should "permit testing below appropriately speci
fied and realistic detection thresholds." The Joint Chiefs also con
cluded that 7 on-site inspections "would not provide a reasonable
deterrent considering the number of suspicious events likely to occur
in the Soviet Union annually." They regarded the criteria for initiating
an on-site inspection as too restrictive, and the area within which the
inspection would be confined as being too small. They objected to
the fact that the host country would provide the logistic support. They
disliked the fact that the International Commission would have the
sole right to order inspections on the territory of the nonnuclear
powers. Finally, they felt the withdrawal provisions were too time
consuming, and that at most 60 days should be required to complete a
legal withdrawal. What the position of the Joint Chiefs was when the

1 962 draft treaty was formulated has never been satisfactorily ex
plained.
After the individual agency reviews, the American position was
discussed in the Committee of Principals. Interesti.11gly, on May 22,

1 963, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made an official
member of the Committee of Principals; prior to that time he had
routinely attended the Committee, but as an advisor. The change was
made to mollify Congressional criticism. On June 14 the Committee
of Principals met, and decided that in the forthcoming Moscow nego23U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings: Military A s
pects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters,
88th Congress, lst Session ( 1 964 ) , 2 vols., Vol. I, p. 305.
24fbid., p. 303.
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tiations the United States should continue to give priority to efforts to
achieve a comprehensive treaty, essentially on the basis of the draft
which had been prepared in March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dis
sented. The Secretary of Defense, however, concurred in this recom
mendation, which the President accepted. It was in accord with his
own thinking on the matter.
Two days earlier it was announced that W. Averell Harriman,
onetime Ambassador to Moscow and then the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, would head the American delegation to
Moscow.25 Lord Hailsham, who was Minister of Science, was
chosen to head the United Kingdom delegation. 26 He was known to
take a passionate interest in achieving a nuclear test ban treaty.
On June 1 8, the United Kingdom pledged that it would not be the
first nation to resume atmospheric testing.
President Kennedy visited Prime Minister Macmillan during his
Western European trip on June 29 and 30. The two leaders co
ordinated Western strategy for the forthcoming talks, and Kennedy
arranged to have the American delegation take the lead in the negoti
ations. He had much more confidence in Harriman than in Hailsham.
Before the American delegation departed for Moscow, according
to Theodore C. Sorenson, President Kennedy
. . . made clear his belief ( 1 ) that this was the last clear
chance to stop the diffusion of nuclear tests and poisons and
to start building mutual confidence with the Russians ; (2)
that the delegation should keep in daily contact with him;
and ( 3 ) that extreme precautions should be taken to pre
vent their prospects of success from being ruined by any
premature leak of their position. 26"
25The other members of the American negotiating team were: Adrian
W. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs; William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;
John T. McNaughton, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Frank E.
Cash, Department of State; Alexander Akalovsky, Franklin A. Long, and
Nedville E. Nordness, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Frank
Press, a seismologist at California Institute of Technology.
26The other members of the British delegation were Duncan Wilson,
Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, and Sir Sully Zuckerman and Sir
William Penney, scientific advisors.
26aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 734.
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Again according to the same source, "he made arrangements for only
six top officials outside the White House (Rusk, Ball, McNamara,
McCone, Thompson, and Foster) to read the cables from Moscow on
a hand-delivered, 'for-your-eyes-only' basis." When the actual negoti
ations were in progress, he would meet each evening with these six
officials to discuss the progress of the talks, and he insisted that all
communications to the delegation in Moscow be cleared through him.

Soviet Preliminary Moves
As these developments were in process, the USSR gave various
indications of the position which it would take. On June 14, in an
interview with a Pravda correspondent, Chairman Khrushchev stated
that the USSR would not permit any on-site inspections as part of a
nuclear test ban treaty.27 He also said, though, that President Ken
nedy's American University speech had made "a favorable impres
sion." Immediately after it was broadcast, Khrushchev had told
Harold Wilson that it was "the greatest speech by any American
President since Roosevelt."27a Moreover, Soviet jamming of the BBC
and the Voice of America, which had begun to slacken off in May,
was stopped completely shortly after the President's speech. When
the speech itself was rebroadcast, the USSR did not jam a single
passage.
On July 2, in East Berlin, Chairman Khrushchev gave what
could be considered a formal reply to the President's speech. Much
of his address was devoted to an analysis of the past negotiations. He
argued that underground nuclear tests could be monitored by national
detection systems combined with automatic seismic stations, and that
on-site inspections were not necessary. He reiterated the Soviet
charge that the Western powers sought on-site inspection for intelli
gence purposes, and then went on to say :
. . . it is time for the imperialist gentlemen to know that
the Soviet Government will never abandon the security
interests of its country and of all the Socialist countries and
will not open its doors to NATO intelligence agents . This is
no subject for bargaining.2 8
27New York Times, June 1 5, 1963, p. 1 .
2 7aArthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p . 904.

28U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings:
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Congress, 1st Session ( 1963 ) , p. 1000.
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After asserting that a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments
was impossible because of the Western position, he declared that the
Soviet Government would be willing to conclude a treaty banning
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. He
said that the USSR had "made this proposal before, but the Western
Powers had frustrated an agreement by advancing supplementary
conditions which envisaged large-scale inspection of our territory."
The record of the negotiations contains no evidence to substantiate
this claim of a prior Soviet offer. Until June 1 963 the USSR had
always refused to consider a partial ban without an unpoliced mora
torium on underground testing. Now for the first time, the USSR
did not insist that a moratorium on underground tests accompany a
partial ban. At the conclusion of his speech, Khrushchev attempted
to link the conclusion of a partial nuclear test ban with the signature
of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the War
saw Pact states ; however, it was not clear whether or not he intended
the latter to be a condition of the former.
On July 3, seemingly in response to Chairman Khrushchev's
speech, Prime Minister Macmil!an declared in the House of Com
mons that although the West ought to seek a comprehensive test
ban, an agreement banning tests in the sea, the atmosphere, and space
"would still be an advance." That same day the Administration of
ficials in Washington also revealed that the United States would be
willing to accept a partial test ban.

The Moscow Negotiations
Negotiations between the three nuclear powers opened in Mos
cow on July 1 5 , 1 963. The day before, in the midst of the Sino-Soviet
ideological talks, the Soviet Communist Party chose to make public
a full statement of its grievances against the Chinese Communist
Party. The Moscow test ban talks thus would be held in the context of
seriously deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationships.
Chairman Khrushchev opened the first meeting of the treaty
negotiations, and during the course of this meeting he tabled a draft
treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and
under water. Except for the fact that it provided for a partial ban, it
bore a strong resemblance to the treaty which the USSR had tabled
on October 3 1 , 1 958, the opening day of the Conference for the Dis
continuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and to the USSR's draft treaty
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of November 28, 1 96 1 . It was simple and brief. It merely stated
that the three governments agreed to ban nuclear tests in the three
environments. There was no withdrawal clause or provision for peace
ful detonations. Significantly, however, there was provision for the
accession of other states.
In response the Western powers tabled their draft partial test ban
treaty of August 27, 1 962. The Western delegates also attempted to
engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on a comprehensive ban but
without avail. They even were unsuccessful in their attempts to ar
range meetings between Professor Press, the seismologist member of
the American delegation, and Soviet seismologists, all of whom were
said either to be out of town or otherwise engaged. After a few days,
the Western delegates abandoned their efforts to achieve a compre
hensive treaty, and by mutual agreement discussion was based on the
Western draft partial test ban treaty of August 27, 1 962. Even after
accepting this draft as a basis for discussions, however, Soviet dele
gates continued to argue for the title from their draft, "Treaty Ban
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests." They finally agreed, but with great re
luctance, to the more accurate but more cumbersome Western title
-"Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and Under Water. "
There was some talk of the "nth country" problem, both
with respect to France and Communist China, and for a while the
USSR maintained that France would have to be brought into the
treaty. However, it soon dropped this condition. On the other hand,
the USSR, despite Western queries, refused to be drawn into a dis
cussion of the problem of the adherence of Communist China.
The USSR pushed, although not too hard, for the signature of
a nonaggression pact between the governments of the North Atlantic
Treaty and the Warsaw Pact. The Western delegations made it clear
that they were not authorized to negotiate such a treaty. Eventually
the matter was disposed of by a sentence in the final communique
stating that the three delegations had discussed the matter and had
agreed "fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations
concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing
discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement
satisfactory to all participants. " 29 This met the contention of the
29U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1 259 (August
12, 1 963 ) ' p. 239.
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Western powers that they could not negotiate on such an issue without
involving all of the NATO allies.
On July 25, 1 963, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Lord
Hailsham, and Mr. Harriman initialed a treaty, which was formally
signed, again in Moscow, on August 5 by Mr. Gromyko, Foreign
Secretary Lord Home, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Prime
Minister Macmillan had wanted to convene a summit meeting to
sign the treaty. 29a President Kennedy had thought this unwise, but he
had told Harriman that he would go to a summit meeting if neces
sary. Happily from his point of view, it was not. The President
regretted that because it would be politically inexpedient he could
not include Adlai Stevenson in the delegation which accompanied
Secretary of State Rusk when he signed the treaty. Stevenson, of
course, regarded the treaty as a vindication of his proposal made in
the midst of the 1956 Presidential election campaign.

The Moscow Treaty
The Moscow Treaty closely resembled the Western August 27,

1 962, draft proposal. There were two principal differences. The first
was that the 1962 draft contained a provision allowing nuclear
detonations for peaceful purposes if the original parties agreed, or if
the detonations were carried out in accordance with the provisions
outlined in an annex. The Moscow Treaty did not include such a
provision. The Soviet Union took the attitude that it was already "
allowing the West to conduct nuclear explosions underground and that
it did not want to extend this right to explosions in other environ
ments. The Western delegates argued for retention of the provision.
They had an annex partially worked out, although there were some
uncertainties concerning the degree of disclosure which the United
States would insist upon and accept. The USSR was adamant, how
ever, and President Kennedy eventually ruled that the American
delegates should agree to the Soviet position, even though he knew
that the Atomic Energy Commission would oppose this and that the
absence of such a provision would create certain difficulties for the
Plowshare peaceful uses program. The necessary change in the text
was effected by including the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion,"
in the first paragraph of the first article immediately after the state29aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 735.
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ment that the parties were not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion, and again prior to the listing of the environments in which
nuclear explosions are prohibited. This same phrase was also included
in the second paragraph of this article, which imposed the obligation
to "refrain from causing, encouraging or participating in" nuclear
weapon tests in the prohibited environments. In other words, the
broadened provisions prohibited the signatories to the treaty both
from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions in the prohibited en
vironments themselves and also from assisting others to conduct such
explosions. As a consequence of agreeing to drop the provision al
lowing nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, the Western Powers
insisted on reducing the number of ratifications required for amending
the treaty from that of two-thirds of the parties, including the
original parties, to that of a majority, including the original parties.
They hoped that this would make it easier in the future to obtain an
amendment allowing such explosions.
The second principal difference concerned the withdrawal clause.
As will be recalled, the 1 962 draft treaty embodied a complicated
procedure for withdrawal, which would have taken up to 120 days
and would have involved the convocation of a conference of all
signatory states. In addition, the permissible grounds for withdrawal
were specified in a fairly detailed fashion. The Moscow Treaty simply
stated :
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall
in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to with
draw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three
months in advance.
At first, Foreign Minister Gromyko argued that there was no need
for a withdrawal clause; that the right to withdraw was an inherent
right of sovereignty. The Western negotiators insisted that the treaty
had to have a withdrawal clause because they felt that the absence
of such a clause would be a more severe restraint on the Western
powers than on the Soviet Union. In all, two days were spent on this
issue. One of the complicating problems was that the Western dele
gates wanted to specify the grounds for withdrawal in as much detail
as possible. These would have included testing by "nth countries."
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Soviet delegates, in contrast, apparently wanted to avoid pointing too
directly at Communist China, which obviously was not going to sign
the treaty. The compromise, ultimately suggested by the United
States and accepted by the other parties, was to insert the qualifying
phrase "related to the subject matter of this Treaty," after the words
"extraordinary events." Thus a conference as a possible forum for
discussion of violations of the treaty and an instrument for mobilizing
political pressure, as well as the enumeration of specific grounds for
withdrawal were dropped from the treaty. Both features had been
designed by American policy-makers to make withdrawal as difficult
as possible. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, it will be recalled, they
would have made it too difficult.
A third change involved listing all three of the Original Parties
as depository governments, instead of naming just one government
as is the normal practice. The reason for this was to ease the embar
rassing problems which might arise from the attempted accession of
governments which an Original Party did not recognize, such as East
Germany and Nationalist China. Because of this change, there is no
single agreed list of the parties to the treaty, since each depository
government keeps its own list. The only circumstances in which this
conceivably could cause a problem would be in determining whether
or not a majority of parties had ratified an amendment.
A final change consisted of the addition of a hortatory paragraph
in the preamble which proclaimed the objective of an agreement on
general and complete disarmament under strict international control.
During the negotiations the delegates had ample time to go over
the Treaty word by word and to achieve a consensus on the meaning
to be attached to each. Among other things, they agreed that the
Treaty in no way inhibited the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.
Chairman Khrushchev publicly confirmed this understanding in reply
ing to written questions from Soviet correspondents the day after the
Treaty was initialed.
III

The Epilogue to the Negotiations
Ratification of the Treaty
President Kennedy submitted the Treaty to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification on August 8,

1 963. Hearings in the
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Committee on Foreign Relations began on August 12 and lasted
through August 27. The Committee had, however, been shown the
Treaty as early as July 23, before it was initialed, and a bipartisan
group of Senators had been included in the delegation for the official
treaty-signing ceremony. The hearings before the Preparedness In
vestigating Subcommittee, which had started in May, also continued
through this period. Administration witnesses before both commit
tees appeared to be quite candid in their appraisal of the Treaty. All of
the civilian officials, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm, argued
that on balance the admitted risks of the Treaty-which they assessed
in much the same terms as Paul Nitze had the previous September
were outweighed by its advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indi
vidually and collectively recommended ratification, though somewhat
ambiguously. They concluded that while there were military disad
vantages to the Treaty, they were "not so serious as to render it
unacceptable."30 Because of its "broader advantages," they felt that
the Treaty was "compatible with the security interests of the United
States," and consequently supported its ratification. The Joint Chiefs
insisted that if the Treaty were ratified, certain safeguards would have
to be implemented to protect the security interests of the United
States.
It transpired that General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, probably would have been against the Treaty if it had not
already been signed. 31 Appearing before the Preparedness Investigat
ing Subcommittee, General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief of
the United States Strategic Air Command, stated that he did not feel
that the Treaty was "in the best interest of the United States. "32 In
somewhat oversimplified form, his position was that the United States
could only maintain its security through the further development of
nuclear weapons.
Edward Teller also opposed the Treaty before both committees.33
His arguments essentially were that the United States needed to know
'

30Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, p. 275.
3 1Jbid., p. 372.
32Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban
Proposals and Related Matters, supra note 23, p. 790.
33Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, pp. 417-506, and
Hearings: Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals
and Related Matters, supra note 23, pp. 542-84.
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more about the effects of nuclear weapons and this information could
be gained only through atmospheric testing. He also wanted more
proof tests and more work on the development of a defense against
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Dr. John Foster, Director of the
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, did not go
quite as far as Dr. Teller, but he concluded that "from purely techni
cal-military considerations," the Treaty appeared to him to be
"disadvantageous. "34
Interestingly, one of the principal witnesses from the Adminis
tration was Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense. He had been on the staff of
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory from 1952 through 1 9 6 1 , ulti
mately serving as Director from 1960 through June of 196 1 . He was
also one of the two American scientists who did the basic work in
Geneva on the system recommended by the Conference of Experts.
In supporting the Treaty, he was in effect arguing against his former
colleagues. One might speculate that one of the reasons for this was
that as the Defense Department's Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, the position which he then occupied, Dr. Brown had to
face daily choices of trying to assess value in making decisions on
expenditures for military purposes. In such a role, taking the position
that cost did not matter when national defense was at stake, as many
Livermore scientists were prone to, was simply not feasible. Dr.
Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
the other center for nuclear weapons development in the United
States, speaking for himself and for the majority of his staff, also
supported the Treaty.35 He acknowledged that it had risks, but felt
that they could be minimized through a vigorous program of under
ground testing. Throughout the negotiations the scientists at Los
Alamos had generally been more sympathetic toward efforts to achieve
a nuclear test ban than their counterparts at Livermore.
Among those who had been associated with the test ban nego
tiating over the years, Harold E. Stassen and Arthur H. Dean, John
J. McCloy, Hans Bethe, and Dr. Herbert York, the first director of
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and Director of Defense Re
search and Engineering in the Eisenhower Administration, Professors
34Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 28, p. 6 1 6.
35fbid., p. 583.
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I. I. Rabi, Linus C. Pauling, and Edward M. Purcel supported the
Treaty. Dr. Willard F. Libby and Dr. George B . Kistiakowsky did
also, though somewhat less enthusiastically.
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, although he did not oppose the
Treaty, gave essentially negative testimony. Former members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirals Burke and Radford and General
Twining, went somewhat further and expressed grave misgivings
about the treaty.
Former President Eisenhower ultimately gave the Treaty a
qualified endorsement. 36 He said that his recommendation that the
Treaty should be ratified was conditional upon the safeguards recom
mended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff being implemented. He also
suggested that a reservation might be added to the Treaty specifying
"that in the event of any armed aggression endangering a vital interest
of the United States this Nation would be the sole judge of the kind
and type of weaponry and equipment it would employ, as well as the
timing of their use." Later, he said that he did not have in mind a
formal reservation.
In the course of their testimony Administration officials, who
included Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Seaborg, empha
sized that the Treaty did not affect the use of nuclear weapons during
war. They also emphasized that the Administration intended to do
all that it could to maintain American readiness, including increasing
the underground testing program. As if to underscore this point, on
the day that the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions opened, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated a nuclear
device with intermediate yield underground in Nevada. Administration
officials also declared that in their view the Treaty would not inter
fere with the development of a NATO Multilateral Force. Finally,
Secretary of State Rusk asserted that, in the event of a Soviet abroga
tion of the Treaty, the United States would not feel itself bound by
the Treaty and would feel free to resume testing whether or not it had
complied with the withdrawal provision.a7
On September 3, 1 963, the Committee on Foreign Relations
filed its report on the Moscow Treaty. By a vote of 1 6 to 1 , the
36fbid., pp. 846-48.
31fbid., p. 37.
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Committee recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent
to ratification. The lone dissenter was Senator Russell B. Long, of
Louisiana.
Six days later, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee filed
its report. Although this committee did not make a recommendation,
it concluded that the Treaty would "result in serious, and perhaps
formidable, military and technical disadvantages. "38 It also concluded
that it was not convinced that comparable military disadvantages
would accrue to the USSR. Senator Symington signed the report, al
though in a separate statement he said that he would vote for the
Treaty, because of its other advantages. Senator Saltonstall filed a
dissenting statement in which he said that he felt that the conclusions
drawn were "overly adverse."39 The other five members of the Sub
committee presumably approved the report without reservation.
Floor debate in the Senate opened on September 9, 1 963. On
September 1 1 , President Kennedy sent a letter to Senators Mansfield
and Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders respectively, giving
them several "unqualified and unequivocal assurances."40 These were

( 1 ) that the underground testing program would be "vigorously and
diligently carried forward" ; (2) that the United States would maintain
its readiness to test in the prohibited environments, and that it would
"resume atmospheric testing 'forthwith' if the Soviet Union violated
the treaty" ; ( 3 ) that the United States facilities to detect nuclear
weapons tests "will be expanded and improved as required" ; ( 4 ) that
the Treaty in no way limited the "authority of the Commander-in
Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States or
its allies"; ( 5 ) that if the Island of Cuba should be used to circum
vent or nullify the Treaty, the United States would take all necessary
action in response; ( 6) that the Treaty in no way changed the status
of East Germany; ( 7 ) that the government would "maintain strong
weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons develop
ment," and that it would "maintain strategic forces fully ensuring that
this Nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor,
even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack" ; and ( 8 ) the
asu .s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, Interim Report on the Military Implications of
the Proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban ( 1 963 ) , p. 1 1 .
39Jbid., p . 14.
40Congressional Record, Vol. CIX, Part 12, pp. 1 6790-9 1 .
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United States would continue to pursue the development of nuclear
explosives for peaceful purposes underground, and when develop
ments made possible constructive uses for peaceful shots in the atmos
phere, the United States would seek international agreements to permit
this. The President also gave assurances that any amendments to the
Treaty would be submitted to the Senate for its approval.
Again, as if to underline the President's assurances; on Septem
ber 1 3, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated two. underground
explosions in Nevada. One of these was reported to have a yield
equivalent to 1 megaton.
President Kennedy intervened in the Senatorial debate in other
ways too.40" He was concerned that a sufficient number of Southern
Democrats might join with Republicans and prevent the necessary
two-thirds majority. He wanted a large majority, and he wanted to
ward off possible formal reservations. He spoke individually with key
Senators. He encouraged the creation of a private "Citizens Com
mittee for a Nuclear Test Ban," a group of leaders from both parties
organized to gain support for the Treaty. He "advised them which
Senators should hear from their constituents, . . . counseled them on
their approach to the unconvinced, and suggested particular business
and other leaders for them to contact. "40b Kennedy felt so strongly
that he remarked to his associates on one occasion "that he would
gladly forfeit his re-election, if necessary, for the sake of the Test Ban
Treaty. " 40c
On September 24, the Senate, by a vote of 80 to 19 gave its
advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty. According
to Theodore C . Sorenson, President Kennedy called the vote " 'a
welcome culmination.' No other single accomplishment in the White
House ever gave him greater satisfaction."40d The 1 9 who voted
against the treaty included

1 1 Democrats and 8 Republicans.4 1

The list included Senator Goldwater, who would become the Re40aSee Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 737-40.
40bfbid., p. 739.
40cfbid., p. 745.
40d[bid., p. 740.
4lThey were Senators: Bennett (Utah) , H. F. Byrd (Va. ) , R. C. Byrd
(W. Va. ) , Curtis (Neb. ) , Eastland ( Miss.), Goldwater (Ariz. ) , Jordan
(Idaho ) , Lausche (Ohio ) , Long (La. ) , McClellan (Ark. ) , Mechem (N.M. ) ,
Robertson (Va.), Russell (Ga. ) , Simpson (Wyo. ) , Smith (Me. ) , Stennis
(Miss. ) , Talmadge (Ga. ) , Thurmond (S.C. ) , and Tower (Tex. ) .
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publican presidential nominee in 1 964. Four of the 1 9 were members
of the 7-man Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and 2 more
were members of the parent Committee on Armed Services. The 1 9
included 1 member o f the Joint Committee o n Atomic Energy and 2
members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Lausche, in
keeping with his maverick style, voted against the Treaty, even though
as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations he had voted
for the report recommending that the Senate give its advice and
consent to ratification. Of the 19, all but 4 (Senators Byrd [W.Va.],
Curtis [Neb.], Lausche [Ohio], and Smith [Me.]) were from the con
servative strongholds of their parties in Southern or Western states.
Some of the Senators who voted for the Treaty-most notably Sena
tor Jackson, another member of the Preparedness Investigating Sub
committee-indicated that they did so reluctantly and with some
misgivings.
President Kennedy signed the Moscow Treaty on October 7 ,
completing the United States ratification. The Presidium of the Su
preme Soviet unanimously voted to ratify the Treaty for the USSR on
September 25, the day after the Senate completed its action. The
Treaty formally entered into effect at 1 : 00 p.m. on October 1 1 , 1 963.
That same day, it was announced in Oslo that the Nobel Peace Prize
for 1 962 had been awarded to Linus C. Pauling. Among American
scientists, he had clearly been the most outspoken critic of nuclear
testing.

"Nth" and Potential "Nth Countries"
While the nuclear powers were completing their ratification,
more than 1 00 other countries signed the Moscow Treaty. By the end
of the year this total, so far as those states which signed or acceded
to the Treaty in Washington, D.C., were concerned, rose to 1 1 6.
There were, however, certain notable exceptions. The day after the
Treaty was initialed in Moscow, a leading Chinese Communist official
flatly asserted that China would have nuclear weapons in the not-too
distant future, and he condemned the efforts of a small number of
nuclear powers to restrict nuclear capabilities. 42 As the days wore on,
Chinese denunciation of the Moscow Treaty increased. Of course it
did not sign, and on October 1 6, 1964, Communist China detonated
42New York Times, July 27, 1964, p. 1 .
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its first nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere. Both Albania, China's
ally in the ideological struggle within the Soviet camp, and Cuba also
refused to sign the Treaty.
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan made a
personal appeal to President de Gaulle for France's adherence. They
even offered some assistance with the development of the French
nuclear weapons program as an inducement. President Kennedy was
prepared to declare that France had achieved a nuclear capability
within the meaning of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy
Act, thereby rendering it eligible for the same assistance that the
United Kingdom received from the United States.42a However, at
a news conference on July 29, President de Gaulle definitely ruled out
the possibility that France would sign, restating the position that
France had maintained during the negotiations.

The Eighteenth General Assembly
When the eighteenth session of the General Assembly opened

in September 1963, the Moscow Treaty was widely welcomed. How
ever, there was also a fairly general feeling that it should be extended
to cover all environments, which, according to the preamble to the
Treaty, was the objective of the three nuclear powers too. The eight
new

members

of the

Eighteen-Nation

Disarmament Committee

wanted the Assembly to adopt a resolution which would pledge the
Committee to continue to seek an accord banning all nuclear tests
with adequate provision for inspection. Both the USSR and the
United States balked at such specific instructions and would agree to
no more than a paragraph instructing the Committee to continue its
efforts "to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of the
partial test ban treaty."43 Both the USSR and the United States ap
parently wanted to avoid reopening the controversial question of
monitoring a ban on underground tests, and the USSR gave no indica
tion that it was willing to renew its offer of a limited number of on-site
inspections on Soviet territory annually.44 Only Albania opposed the
resolution, which the Assembly adopted in November, and which was
tailored to the nuclear powers' specifications.
42aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 9 14, and Theodore
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 573.
43General Assembly Resolution 1 9 1 0 (XVIII) .
44See New York Times, October 24, 1 962, p. 1 ; October 29, 1962, p . 1 .
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Since then there have been no serious negotiations on a ban on
underground tests. It may well be accurate to say, as Jerome B.
Wiesner has said, that political and military conservatism on the part
of both sides prevented the achievement of a comprehensive test
ban. 45 Important groups within the Soviet Union appear to have been
most reluctant to agree to a treaty which would involve lifting the
USSR's veil of secrecy beyond the most miniscule amount. Important
groups within the United States, on the other hand, were unwilling
to agree to a treaty which might involve significant risks of the
Soviet Union's being able to engage in clandestine testing. Some of
these same individuals were also strongly desirous, for a variety of
reasons, of being able to continue testing nuclear weapons. The
leaders in both camps, Chairman Khrushchev and President Ken
nedy, both appear to have been willing to go farther than several
other policy-makers within their respective countries. But achieving
an international agreement in an age of mass and bureaucratic gov
ernment requires a broader coalescence of forces than agreement
merely between two heads of state. There was this broader coales
cence for a partial test ban treaty, but not for a comprehensive one.

4 5Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, pp. 1 67-68.

PART IV

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Chapter XN

The Test Ban Negotiations and Treaty
in Retrospect

I

Introduction
Did the signature of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water mark a
turning point in the nuclear era? Obviously it is too early to answer
this question. Only in the future will it be possible accurately to
assess the significance of the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately though,
except for the purposes of historical analysis, it is impossible to wait
to make judgments. To act rationally in formulating policy the out
come of each step must be scrutinized with care and analyzed before
a choice is made among the possible courses for the next move. An
assessment must be made, however tentative it may be and subject
to reevaluation. Similarly, although a single case study is hardly an
adequate basis for formulating answers to the questions raised in the
introductory chapter concerning the processes by which United
States security policy was formulated and executed, the nature of
these policies, and the characteristics and modalities of the con
temporary international system, these too demand immediate answers.
Fortunately, the nuclear test ban negotiations probably provide
as good a basis for generalizations as any single set of diplomatic
talks that have occurred since the end of the Second World War.
The nuclear test ban talks involved, in one way or another, most of
the actors in the contemporary international system, and the most
important states-the super-powers-were deeply engaged. There
were significant differences among the political systems of the three
states principally involved. The negotiations covered a long time
period. During this period, the distribution of military power in the
international system shifted. Again as a result of their length, the
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negotations spanned two administrations within the United States.
Among other things, the change in administrations brought changes
in personnel, in administrative organization and procedures, and in

presidential-legislative relationships. The nuclear test ban negotiations
were conducted in a variety of forums, ranging from bilateral talks,
through a tripartite conference and a larger committee, to the general
international organization with the broadest membership, the United
Nations. In several respects, therefore, the negotiations offer the
opportunity of comparative analysis. And as an unique series of
events, because of their importance, the negotiations had sufficient
salience to permit at least some conclusions to be drawn.

II

The Formulation and Execution of American
Security Policy
With respect to the formulation and execution of American security
policy, analysis of the test ban negotiations yields not so much new
insights as confirmation and refinement of the consensus-building
model. The circle of participants in the consensus-building process
widened or narrowed depending upon issues and circumstances. In
most instances during the course of the negotiations decisions concern
ing what American policy should be, or how it should be executed,
could be made by the executive branch acting alone. Since the end
product of the negotiations was envisaged as being an international
treaty, however, the Senate always had a potential role; and, because
certain inspection procedures could have required modifications in
American legislation concerning atomic energy, the House of Repre
sentatives also had such a role.
Except for a few brief periods, such as when the USSR abro
gated the moratorium on nuclear testing or immediately before and
after the signature of the Moscow Treaty, the test ban negotiations
elicited little public interest. Certain segments of the public, how
ever, followed the negotiations very carefully and were deeply and
often emotionally interested. These groups included large numbers of
scientists. Those scientists who worked on weapons development
obviously had a direct professional interest. Other scientists were
involved through their feeling of personal or collective responsibility
for the consequences of the development of nuclear weapons. Among
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the lay public, attentiveness was largely confined to those especially
concerned about peace on the one hand and the United States mil
itary posture on the other. Members of SANE and the Women's
Strike for Peace provide examples of the former; members of vet
erans' organizations the latter. Given the nature of the issues and
the limited extent of Congressional involvement, the interested mem
bers of the public had few means at their disposal, other than pub
licity, to give effect to their views.

Consensus-Building in the Eisenhower Administration
In these circumstances the process of consensus-building was
more often than not confined to the executive branch. This did not
necessarily make the process smoother or easier. The Eisenhower
Administration was deeply divided on several questions relating to
the nuclear test ban negotiations, including even the wisdom of at
tempting to negotiate on this issue. President Eisenhower himself
saw little advantage from the viewpoint of American security policy
in a test ban as such, and-responding to the advice of the Atomic
Energy Commission-he was not convinced of the great danger of
the radioactive fallout that would result from continued testing.
Fundamentally, he was doubtful that when the chips were down the
Soviet Union would agree to a treaty acceptable to the United States,
or that a treaty, even if agreed upon, would be followed by a
substantial slowdown in the arms race. Although it entails great
oversimplification and some distortion of their detailed positions, the
various interested agencies in the Eisenhower Administration can be
ranked along a continuum.1 The Atomic Energy Commission, which
had the greatest doubts about the wisdom of a nuclear test ban,
would be at one extreme. The Department of Defense would be
next to the AEC. It tended to be somewhat more favorably inclined
toward a test ban than the Commission. Next, in a center, although
slightly positive position, would be the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Department of State would come next, and then the President's
Science Advisory Committee, at the opposite extreme from the AEC.
Both on balance were favorably inclined toward a nuclear test ban.
As a consequence of these divisions, when policy was made by
1 Compare this ranking with that given by Sir Michael Wright, Disarm
and Verify, p. 1 20.

472

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

committee, as it usually was, the result tended to be a compromise
which straddled the issues and occassionally contained contradictory
elements. The position which the United States adopted at the outset
of the political negotiations in the fall of 1958 is an example. The
United States was willing to agree to a nuclear test ban, but it in
sisted that after a specified period, the continuance in force of the
ban would be dependent upon satisfactory progress being made in
other areas of arms control and disarmament. This "link" with other
measures of arms control and disarmament was eventually dropped,
but it was dropped only at the time when the "new seismic data"
had raised serious obstacles to achieving a nuclear test ban. Thus one
set of obstacles replaced another. The American insistence on tech
nical conferences in 1 959 can be seen as a neutral policy, acceptable
both to those who were enamored with the prospects of obtaining a
nuclear test ban and to those who seriously doubted the wisdom of
such a measure. When the United States did hint at the possibility of
a partial ban in 1 959 as a first step toward a comprehensive ban, it
failed to specify in detail what control measures it would demand, but
in any case made it clear that they would be fairly extensive. Yet a

year earlier Senator Gore had stated that an atmospheric ban could
be policed by control instruments under the unilateral control of the
United States, and this is what the United States eventually proposed
in 196 1 , and in 1 962, and it is what was finally accepted in 1 963.
In addition, under the Eisenhower Administration largely be
cause of the deep divisions of opinion, decisions were taken at an
extremely slow pace. Countless examples can be recalled. To cite
only one, although Technical Working Group I accepted virtually
all of the American proposals, a month and a half elapsed before
the American Ambassador could even accept "the report as a correct
technical assessment . . . in the light of presently available scientific
knowledge. "2 It was not until after the Kennedy Administration had
assumed power that the United States would finally submit treaty
language based on the report.
Under the Eisenhower Administration, consensus-building also
tended to exercise a gyroscopic effect on policy. In the period from

1958 through 1 960, once negotiations were underway, it proved
2QEN/DNT/ PV. 1 27, p. 4.
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almost impossible for the United States to break them off, or to
radically alter their course.
This is not to imply that all of the agencies which participated
in these decisions did not have vital interest in them and an im
portant contribution to make, nor that American policy necessarily
would have been better had it been formulated exclusively by one
agency. At least one major decision during this period was not
made within an elaborate committee structure. This was the proposal
for a conference of experts. In this instance President Eisenhower
acted solely on the advice of Secretary of State Dulles. This meant
that the participants in the decision were confined to the White
House Staff and the Secretary of State with a few of his advisors.
This decision has been and can be criticized. In proposing a con
ference of experts, the United States committed itself to a course of
action with potentially far-reaching consequences without having
fully explored the consequences and without having formulated ap
propriate and adequate contingency policies. Of course, proposing a
conference of experts solved certain immediate tactical problems,
and provided a needed response to a Soviet initiative. Two questions,
however, can be raised. The first is whether or not the short-range
gains outweighed the longer-range difficulties. The second is whether
or not the short-range gains could not have been obtained without
also incurring the longer-range difficulties.

The Advent of the Kennedy Administration
From 1 9 6 1 on decisions within the executive branch concerning
a nuclear test ban flowed more rapidly and smoothly.3 This was
partly because different personnel headed the relevent agencies, and
the new men held more homogeneous views concerning the wisdom
of a nuclear test ban. However, the change in administrations did not
bring a complete change in personnel. Allen W. Dulles continued to
serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until September

27, 1 9 6 1 , when he was replaced by John A. McCone. Mr. McCone
had also been a member of the Committee of Principals during the
Eisenhower Administration, in which he had served as Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission. Moreover, the extent to which
3See Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 1 2 1 , 127.
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prinicipal officers are bound to the collective viewpoints of their
agencies should not be underestimated.
A second factor explaining the smoother flow of decisions after
the advent of the Kennedy Administration was that the institutional
balance was altered. In September 196 1 , the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency was established. The Director of
ACDA immediately became a member of the Committee of Prin
cipals, and even before ACDA was established, President Kennedy's
adviser on disarmament, John J. McCloy, met with the Committee.
Thus, starting in 1961 the balance on the Committee of Principals
was altered by the addition of an individual more or less institution
ally committed to advocate measures of arms control and disarma
ment. The creation of ACDA also meant that many more resources
within government were devoted to analyzing issues of atms control.
Positions could be explored more thoroughly before being advocated
and the analyses would be done from the point of view of trying to
achieve agreements. Furthermore, there were many more people
available for consensus-building efforts. Unlike the State Department
in the past, ACDA had its own scientific advisers.
On balance, however, the fact that the quest for a test ban was
approached with a new intensity and drive in the Kennedy Adminis
tration seems to have been more important than the institutional
changes. The advent of a new Administration brought the appoint
ment of a new principal negotiator in Geneva, Arthur Dean. Al
though his predecessor held a strong personal conviction of the de
sirability of a test ban and was an experienced and skillful negotiator,
it is demonstrable that Ambassador Dean made a greater effort to
understand the technical issues involved in the negotiations, devoted
more energy toward trying to stimulate new policies, and at least
partially as a consequence was more actively involved in the formu
lation of American policy. More importantly, President Kennedy
himself seems to have devoted more attention and energy to this issue
than President Eisenhower. President Kennedy appears to have been
more interested in achieving a nuclear test ban that President Eisen
hower was. He certainly was more willing to take risks, in terms of
both domestic and international politics, to gain such an agreement
than President Eisenhower. This was in large measure a reflection of
President Kennedy's general policy of seeking to engage the Soviet
Union in a continuing realistic dialogue designed primarily to clarify
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positions and remove misunderstandings and also to explore avenues
toward possible agreements. The test ban negotiations offered an
obvious opportunity in this respect. President Kennedy also made a
greater effort to understand the technical intricacies involved in the
test ban negotiations. Jerome B. Wiesner, the President's science ad
viser, has written that President Kennedy "made himself an expert
on these subjects."4 It was only by becoming an expert that he could
successfully cope with the expert advice which he received. President
Kennedy gave his Administration a greater sense of direction on this
issue, and his Administration responded with a more forthcoming
process of decision-making.
It was only after President Kennedy assumed office that the
United States tabled an entire draft treaty for a nuclear test ban.
Such a draft had been in existence for some time, but it had been
impossible to obtain agreement among the relevant interested agencies
to table it, and President Eisenhower had not insisted that agreement
be achieved. It was only during the Kennedy Administration that the
United States submitted alternative draft treaties. All of these steps
were at least partly attributable to the President's leadership. Without
this leadership, a test ban might never had been achieved. In a
decision-making structure as decentralized as that of the American
government, Presidential leadership is necessary for action to be taken.

The Contribution of Congress
Much has been written about the decline of the legislative
branch of government in the modern era. On the surface the test ban
negotiations might be viewed as another case supporting this general
thesis. Yet full examination reveals that Congress played an im
portant role in the shaping of United States policy.
In the first place, the record indicates that Congress had ample
opportunity to obtain information relevant to the test ban negotia
tions. Congressional hearings produced a wealth of technical and
political data. It is true that different Congressional committees
tended to develop different kinds of data. The Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy tended to rely mainly for its information on the
Atomic Energy Commission and sources provided or sponsored by
that agency. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its
4Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, p. 1 1 .
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Subcommittee on Disarmament, on the other hand, · tended to rely
mainly on the Department of State and later on the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. Partly as a consequence, the policy posi
tions of the two committees tended to reflect the differences between
the executive agencies. However, any individual Congressman, if he
had the inclination and the time, could read the records of both
committees. Moreover, some Congressmen, notably Senator Albert
Gore and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, served on both committees, thus
providing a bridge and an element of continuity. These two men also
served as Congressional advisers to the American delegation in
Geneva and were able to gain additional data through this means.
In sum, so far as obtaining data, Congress was not at a serious dis
advantage in relation to the executive branch. It could not engage
in research itself, it is true, but almost all of the governmental experts
and all of the private experts within the United States were available
to it. Careful staff work on the part of the staffs of the committees
made it possible to utilize the expertise rationally and wisely. The
only group of experts within the administrative branch not available
to Congressional committees were those within the Executive Office
of the White House, namely the Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology and his immediate staff. In this in
stance, the inability to question these individuals does not appear to
have been a serious obstacle to obtaining relevant information. In
broad terms, Congress appears to have been as well informed as the
executive branch was on this issue.
In the formal or procedural sense, the initiative in formulating
policy, of course, always rested with the executive. However, Congress
and Congressmen were able to influence in important ways the man
ner and purposes for which the executive branch utilized its powers.
At the very outset, the hearings of Senator Humphrey's Subcom
mittee on Disarmament clearly contributed to the pressure on the
executive to separate the test ban issue from other measures of dis
armament and to enter negotiations on this issue alone. On the other
hand, during the course of the next several years the frequent hear
ings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy kept before the
public the difficulty of controlling underground nuclear explosions
and no doubt this inhibited the executive's freedom. Whether or not
the executive branch would have followed a more flexible policy
had it not been for this is naturally an unanswerable question. At
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least prior to 1 9 6 1 it probably would not have; however, even if the
executive had wanted to make concessions, it would have found it
difficult to do so in view of the activities of the Committee. Indeed
there can be serious doubt that the Senate would have ratified the
comprehensive treaty which the United States proposed in 1962 and

1 963 had the USSR accepted it.
In October 1 959, Senator Humphrey suggested in a public
speech, that the United States should propose that a partial ban
should be accompanied by a moratorium of limited duration on test
ing in those environments where control techniques were not at the
moment adequate, the hope being that by the end of the moratorium
adequate control measures would have been discovered so that the
ban could be extended to cover all environments. The following
spring the United States made such a proposal.
Toward the end of the negotiations, the resolution sponsored
by Senator Dodd and others and adopted by the Senate clearly
strengthened President Kennedy's hand. Although the content of the
President's American University speech might have been the same
even without this resolution, clearly it was easier for him to an
nounce that the United States would forego further testing of nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere after the Senate had recommended that
this country should take such action.
The test ban negotiations also indicate the limits of Congres
sional influence on the formulation of policy by the executive. As
early as November 1 958, Senator Albert Gore proposed that the
United States should abandon the attempt to negotiate a compre
hensive ban on nuclear weapons tests and concentrate its efforts on
attempting to achieve a partial ban. Several other Congressmen
repeated this suggestion in the following years. Despite this, it was
not until August 1 962 that the United States seriously proposed a
partial treaty; and as late as the Moscow talks in July 1 963, Ameri
can negotiators were still instructed to give priority to a compre
hensive ban. But even here, Congressmen can be said to have shaped
the environment in which a partial ban became the most feasible
outcome.

Science and Security Policy
Implicit in the foregoing discussion of the formulation of United
States policy is the assumption that judgments on scientific issues
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played a crucial role. It is self-evident that any rational decision on
the wisdom of attempting to negotiate a nuclear test ban would
postulate in the first place some judgment about the danger to human
life resulting from the fallout and other by-products of past and
continued testing of nuclear weapons both with respect to immediate
and long-range genetic effects, if any. Again, one would have to
form some estimate of the gains that could be achieved in weapons
technology through further testing, and of the gains that could be
made without testing. Finally, one would have to assess the tech
nological feasibility of establishing control measures to insure the
observance of a test ban. Each of these is almost a purely scientific
question.
In addition, there are several questions which, although not as
purely scientific, involve, in varying degrees, important scientific
elements. One would want to have an estimate of the types and
qualities of nuclear weapons presently held by other states and a
sense of how these compared with one's own nuclear arsenal. One
would also want to have some sense of the possibilities of the dis
persion of nuclear weapons capabilities among the presently non
nuclear countries and of the consequences of this. It would finally
be necessary to make judgments about the role of nuclear weapons
in military strategy in the light of all the available knowledge of their
effects.
Finally, there are essentially nonscientific questions containing
nevertheless a limited scientific component. Thus a decision-maker
would want to make some estimate about the likelihood of the op
ponent state violating the treaty. In part this would involve the
scientific issue of the risk of detection through available technical
devices that a potential violator would have to face. But it would
also involve a perhaps more important judgment concerning the
general attitude and willingness of the potential violator to run such
a risk. Again a decision-maker would also have to have some notions
about the dangers arising from the nuclear arms race, such as the
possibility of war by accident, which would have to reflect, among
other things, an evaluation of the technical safeguards. Finally, he
would have to make an estimate of what kind of treaty the Senate,
the American people, and other states would be likely to accept.
While this would call for an exercise of political judgment, the
scientific component is readily identifiable.
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To take a position on a nuclear test ban, any policy-maker
would have to deal in some fashion with all of these questions. He
could of course choose to ignore one or more of them, but even
that would be dealing with them. Moreover, a policy-maker's task
is complicated by the fact that many of these questions involve
issues concerning which there is great scientific uncertainty. It is
highly unlikely that any given forecast of future scientific develop
ments would prove to be completely accurate. Nor are the first answers
formulated in any scientific inquiry always the best, and many tech
nical questions were raised in the test ban negotiations for the first
time. Again, the scientific element is often so closely intertwined
with nonscientific factors that it would require great restraint and
discipline to limit a judgment to the scientific element. Concerning
all such questions a scientist can give a wide range of answers without
violating his scientific integrity. The answer that a scientist gives will
depend partly upon his personal preferences and predilections, in
cluding his

concept of international

relations

and his political

orientation, and on his experience and maturity. It will also depend
on the way in which the question is phrased and asked and the
form and type of answer permitted.

Scientists

as

Policy Advisers

In a theoretical model of rational decision-making, it might be
desirable for the decision-maker to permit each of his advisers to
speak only on matters affecting his special area of expertise. In such
a scheme scientists would confine their observations to scientific ques
tions, economists to economic questions, lawyers to legal questions,
military experts to military questions, and political experts to political
questions.
There is a great deal to be said for keeping this model as an
ideal goal that participants in the American system ought to strive
to approximate. Much has been written demonstrating what poor
advisers specialists are when they stray beyond their areas of special
competence, and Albert Wohlstetter has persuasively demonstrated
the weaknesses of some scientists when they have ventured into the
realm of military strategy. 5 Clearly certain scientists such as Linus
Pauling and Edward Teller blatantly violated the precepts of this
5See "Strategy and the Natural Scientists," pp. 1 74-239 in Robert Gilpin
and Christopher Wright (eds. ) , Scientists and National Policy-Making ( 1 964 ) .
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ideal model in their public comments on the nuclear test ban issue.
To say that the risk from radioactive fallout caused by continued
testing in the atmosphere was intolerable or could be ignored, or to
maintain that the control system devised by the Geneva Conference
of Experts was adequate or inadequate, implicitly involved judgments
on a number of issues, some of which were not at all scientific in
character. On the other hand, other scientists, Wolfgang K . H.
Panofsky, for example, phrased their pronouncements very care
fully, distinguishing as well as they could between the scientific and
nonscientific elements which were involved.
It is difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy the effect
in this instance of the tendency of scientists like Linus Pauling and
Edward Teller to stray beyond the areas of their expertise. Probably
public and perhaps even official understanding would have been
easier had these individuals distinguished more clearly between their
role as scientists and their role as citizens. Unquestionably, the
policy-maker had to scrutinize their scientific advice and judgments
with greater care, and their standing in this respect was impaired.
However, to ask them to refrain from speaking freely on any issue
risks robbing the American system of one of its most dynamic ele
ments. These men played important roles in the test ban negotiations
because they had deep convictions extending far beyond their scien
tific expertise. There is little question that they contributed to the
motive force without which policy might have atrophied on dead
center. Moreover, the admixture of nonscientific elements in the
pronouncements of individuals such as Teller and Pauling was often
so obvious that its discovery was not a task of inordinate intellectual
difficulty. Admittedly, there has been a tendency in American society
to transfer authority earned in one field to other fields ; but if this is
a problem, a better corrective might be to strive to develop greater
official understanding and more sophisticated public attitudes, than
to harness the scientists.
In the nuclear test ban negotiations the subtle mixing of scien
tific and nonscientific elements in judgments offered by scientists
was much more bothersome than the blatant mixing mentioned
above. As has been shown, when a scientist was asked to give advice
on certain seemingly scientific questions, his personal, nonscientific
views almost inevitably intruded. In these instances, it could be
extremely difficult for the nonscientist decision-maker to detect the

The Negotiations and Treaty in Retrospect

48 1

nonscientific elements implicitly interwoven into the answer. How
could the decision-maker know whether his scientist adviser had
been, within the range of scientific uncertainty, excessively optimistic
or excessively pessimistic? The problem was complicated by the fact
that, despite their uncertainty, the scientists could answer questions
in quantitative terms, which could give a misleading impression of
precision.
In retrospect, it would seem that the scientists advising the
President and the Secretary of State prior to and during the time
of the Conference of Experts may well have allowed their hopes for
a more orderly international political system to interfere with their
giving as properly qualified technical answers concerning control
possibilities as they should have on the basis of the scientific evidence
then available to them.
At the same time, the scientists did not have an unlimited op
portunity to present their views. Issues concerning a nuclear test ban
were only a few of countless numbers facing top decision-makers.
The amount of attention that the decision-makers could devote to
any individual issue was inevitably limited. Furthermore, even con
cerning a nuclear test ban, there were several technical issues which
had to be considered. In this case, a second factor explaining why
the principal decision-makers perhaps did not understand the tech
nical complexities relating to the control of nuclear explosions as
fully as they might have during most of 1958 is simply that they did
not spend enough time on these issues. Within the limited amount of
time that they could spend considering what position the United
States should adopt with respect to a nuclear test ban, most of their
attention-perhaps rightly-was devoted to considering issues other
than control. They were particularly concerned about comparing
American and Soviet nuclear strength and about the possibilities for
future developments in the realm of weapons technology. The point
is not to question the allocation of their attention, for these may
well have been the most important questions, but merely to point
out that little time was left for considering the technical aspects of
control.

The Need for "Scientific Literacy" Among Nonscientists
A final, more subtle, factor also seems to have been involved in
the communications difficulties which were apparent in American
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policy-making during the earliest stages of the negotiations. To un
derstand fully what a scientist means when he says, "On the basis of

one experiment, we think that . . . ," one must have some notions
about the way in which science progresses from initial tentative
estimates to more fully documented and more definitive judgments.
Similarly, if one is to understand all of the ramifications of the
scientists' report that the seismic magnitude of the Rainier explosion
appears to be 4. 1 on the Richter scale rather than 4.25 as had pre
viously been thought, one must know something about how many
more earthquakes there are at the smaller seismic magnitude. It
would also be helpful to know something about the way in which
these figures are calculated, and that measurements in this area of
the Richter scale are usually given with the understanding that the
margin of enor may be plus or minus .4.
Understandably, the individuals who were the principal decision
makers in the United States during the earliest stages of the negotia
tions seem to have known little about modern science. They had
received their education prior to the First World War, and thus prior
to the great expansion in scientific activity which has occurred after
that time. During most of their earlier careers both President Eisen
hower and Secretary of State Dulles had not been deeply involved
in science. Their background for fully comprehending scientific ad
vice was not especially strong. Of course, one could use intelligent
questioning to make up for an inadequate background. Often, how
ever, the ability to ask intelligent questions is dependent upon having
at least a minimal background. Moreover, questioning takes time,
which was in extremely short supply in this instance, and probably
will be in similar cases.
Thus it is clear that the first prerequisite to adequately coping
with the problems posed by the growth of the role of science in
security policy is the development of more "scientific literacy"
among policy-makers, both politicians and diplomats. Only then
will the nonscientists be able to make the best use of their scientist
colleagues. In this connection, it should be noted that at least some
of the scientists found the higher level policy-makers more willing
to be concerned with and to make an effort to understand the tech
nical details which were involved in the nuclear test ban negotiations
than the professional diplomats, members of the Foreign Service.
These scientists felt that many of the latter group tended to take
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the attitude that what was important was the technique of negotiation,
that a personal knowledge of the substance was secondary and might
in fact be disturbing toward reaching an agreement Obviously, the
need for "scientific literacy" is as great among the diplomats as it is
among the politicians. Just as the process of formulating policy can
not be divided into rigid compartments horizontally, and experts
confined to their area of expertise, it also cannot be divided vertic
ally. Improper understanding of technical issues at a lower level may
be equally as damaging as improper understanding at a higher level;
among other possibilities it could prevent important questions from
ever reaching the higher level.
Scientific Advice at the Highest Levels of American Government
The experience in the nuclear test ban negotiations suggests
that for communications between scientists and nonscientist decision
makers at the highest levels of American government to be as effec
tive as possible, policy-makers must receive advice from several
scientists rather than one. This appears to be the most effective
means of guarding against the tendency for advice on scientific mat
ters to be colored by personal predispositions. The President's Science
Advisory Committee, with about twenty members and additional
scientists who serve as regular consultants, can adequately meet the
need for divergent viewpoints. If the Committee is to meet this need,
however, it must develop adequate techniques for transmitting di
vergent views. The President and other top decision-makers must
also be willing to receive conflicting advice and to assume the
responsibility for deciding which advice they should accept as bases
for policy. Ideally the top policy-makers should have the oppor
tunity to witness in some manner a confrontation between scientists
who hold divergent views. If a scientist is to remain true to the train
ing and to the canons of his work, he must acknowledge certain
facts. The test ban negotiations supply evidence that scientists will
behave in this manner. Thus Hans Bethe readily acknowledged the
correctness of Albert Latter's decoupling theory even though it pre
sented a new obstacle on the road to a test ban agreement which
Bethe strongly favored in principle. One of the virtues of the Congres
sional hearings was that they provided forums for confrontation
among scientists holding divergent viewpoints. Such confrontations,
by clearly developing the points concerning which the scientists

484

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

agree and disagree, can significantly clarify the issues and thereby
ease the policy-makers' problem of choosing among divergent advice.
There is also another reason why policy-makers at the highest
level should receive advice from several scientific sources if they are
to act as rationally as possible. Most problems with which policy
makers must deal have several facets. Their scientific segments alone
often involve not one but several academic disciplines. In the light
of the difficulties concerning the detection of underground nuclear
explosions which plagued American policy during the test ban nego
tiations, it may have been significant that there was no seismologist
on the President's Science Advisory Committee until 1 962. The Com
mittee headed by Hans Bethe which conducted an overall appraisal
of the situation with respect to the nuclear test ban in early 1 958,
and on which initial American policies were based, did not include a
seismologist either. The President's Science Advisory Committee has
generally been dominated by scientists who specialized in aspects of
nuclear energy, particularly physicists. It can be argued that PSAC
might have been a more effective source of advice if its membership
had included a wider spectrum of disciplines. The counter-argument
that scientists in all disciplines are employed by the government and
therefore available to PSAC does not completely meet the problem,
because having the proper mixture of disciplines is as important in
the final stages involving evaluation of data and drafting of recom
mendations as it is in early stages involving data collection.

Sdentific Expertise Within the Bureaucracy
Providing advice for policy-makers at the highest level is only
one aspect of the problem of integrating scientists into the procedures
for formulating American security policy. Obviously, decisions which
are taken at a lower level also involve scientific questions. In addi
tion, frequently scientific and technical research must be conducted
in order to develop necessary data. An overwhelming number of
the scientists who have been involved in the formulation of American
security policy thus far have been employed by the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Defense. There can be no doubt
that these two agencies have had the greatest need for scientists.
However, the experience during the test ban negotiations illustrates
that other agencies, such as the Department of State, also deal with
questions which have scientific elements, and it can be argued that
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American policy would have been better had scientific expertise been
interspersed more widely throughout .all of the agencies working in
the area of security policy. It is not sufficient merely to have access
to scientists in another agency. For one thing, having to go to another
agency immediately raises all of the physical and psychological
problems involved in inter-agency coordination. For another, as was
apparent during the test ban negotiations, there are what can be
called "agency viewpoints" on policy questions, and the views of
most individuals are affected more or less strongly by the milieu in
which they work. Moreover, an individual's tasks and responsibilities
are bound to be defined in terms of the priorities of the agency for
which he works.
It is easy to argue that governmental agencies which have only
peripheral responsibilities in scientific fields ought to have more
scientists on their payroll. Unfortunately, implementing this recom
mendation is extremely difficult. A scientist long in the employ of
an agency such as the Department of State will soon lose his ex
pertise. On the other hand, short term service involves considerable
waste in terms of time lost in gaining familiarity with problems and
procedures of the agency and in preparing to leave government
service.

Furthermore,

employment in a nonscientific government

agency has few attractions for a promising young scientist, deeply
interested in and committed to his discipline. Joining the Depart
ment of State, for example, means substantial risk of losing contact
with his discipline.
With respect to getting research done and investigating tech
nical problems, the typical pattern, much in evidence during the test
ban negotiations, has been either to assign the tasks to scientists
employed by the government or to let contracts to institutions out
side the federal government, and then to have the results reviewed
by panels of governmental and nongovernmental scientists convened
on an ad hoc basis. This system has much to recommend it. It in
volves independent checks and is in accord with the pluralistic pat
tern and structure of American life. However, it is cumbersome and
time-consuming. For this reason, it is not responsive to the needs
of modern diplomacy. In addition, it has meant that within the
government the only agencies dealing with security policy equipped
to conduct scientific research themselves have been those which have
had as their primary responsibility maintaining the nation's military
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strength or developing uses of nuclear energy. Since the Vela Pro
gram has always been administered by the Department of Defense,
even after the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, it seems that these are also the only agencies deemed
capable of administering large-scale scientific research programs, re
gardless of their purpose. Inevitably, the approach of these agencies
to security problems has been colored by their primary responsi
bilities.
A possible and perhaps the best way of overcoming the diffi
culties involved in getting high quality scientists to serve in non
scientific government agencies at the lower and middle ranks, and
also easing those connected with the conduct of research, might be
to establish a national scientific institute or to expand some existing
facility, such as the Bureau of Standards. Such an institute would
have to allow scientists great freedom to pursue their own interests,
but it might also be capable of responding to some of the govern
ment's needs. If a promising young scientist could look forward to
a career in such an institute, the prospect of a brief assignment with
a nonscientific government agency might not seem so unpalatable.
Presumably the scientific staff of the institute would be chosen so
that their interests would have some relevance to governmental needs.
Given this concurrence of interests, the institute might be able to
conduct certain research itself and to monitor projects entrusted to
institutions outside the government which would be of immediate use
to the government.
Scientists in Negotiations and as Negotiators
During the nuclear test ban negotiations, scientists were not
only involved in the formulation of American policy, they also
served at various times and in various capacities as negotiators.
There were four conferences conducted primarily by scientists : the
Conference of Experts, Technical Working Groups I and II, and
the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group. During the Geneva
Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, at least
one scientist was always assigned to the American negotiating team.
Later, during the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament, several senior American scientists went to Geneva
and presented briefings to members of other delegations. Finally,
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scientists accompanied diplomats to Moscow when the partial test
ban treaty was drafted and initialed.
Evaluating the wisdom of the decisions to assign scientists to
these roles and appraising their performance depends upon assump
tions about the purposes of the tasks which they were given. In
negotiating, any specific move may be made for a variety of reasons,
some of which may have little intrinsic relationship to that par
ticular move. Given the decentralized system of formulating security
policy within the United States, the probability is high that any move
will reflect a variety of motives, and it is by no means inconceivable
that these motives might conflict. Thus, any move may at the same
time successfully fulfill certain motives and fail to fulfill others. More
over, a move which satisfied certain short-range motivations of
policy-makers may prove to be disfunctional in terms of their longer
range goals or other criteria.
No one can question the use of scientists as advisers to diplo
matic negotiators during the test ban negotiations. This was ob
viously necessary, and as far as can be determined from the public
record, the scientists assigned to these missions performed their tasks
creditably. The use of scientists as negotiators, however, was more
controversial. Robert Gilpin, for one, has been quite critical of the
performance of the American scientists as negotiators. His analysis
of the 1958 Conference of Experts led him to conclude that the
American scientists "lacking sufficient political guidance, fell into
a number of regrettable errors. "6 It might be fairer, though, to include
in an evaluation an assessment of the tasks assigned to the scientists
and of the motives for these assignments.
One of the motives behind the original American proposal to
hold a meeting of experts was a desire to neutralize the public pres
sures against testing so that the United States could conduct its
planned series of nuclear weapons tests in the summer of 1 958. A
second motive was a desire to test Soviet intentions; it was thought
that this would offer a means of establishing whether or not the
Soviet Union would really accept control. The third motive was to
provide a tactical response in a diplomatic situation where some
Western move was considered advisable. In terms of the first and
third motives, the Conference of Experts was undoubtedly a sue6American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 2 1 9.
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cess, and it probably was also successful in terms of the second. If
other criteria are used, however, the Conference of Experts appears
in a less favorable light.
After the new seismic data was discovered and the theory of
decoupling developed, some writers criticized the American scien
tists at the Conference of Experts because they had agreed to a
report which then appeared to be excessively optimistic about the
possibility of detecting and identifying underground nuclear ex
plosions.7 Now that there have been further experiments, this criti
cism no longer appears valid. So far as the technical work of the
American scientists at the Conference of Experts including their part
in the drafting of the report, it was probably as good as could be
done, given the existing state of knowledge.
Other criticisms, though, can be made of the Conference of
Experts. By their report the Experts virtually committed the United
States to engage in negotiations, and-what was perhaps even more
crucial-to negotiate on the basis of the particular control system
which they recommended. As a strategy for getting the United
States to take positive action, this course may have been wise. With
out some such development, because of the difficulty of formulating
an agreed policy within the American government, the United States
might never have engaged in the negotiations.
On the other hand, practical as this course may have been, it
fell far short of criteria for rational decision-making. Entering nego
tiations in this manner meant that the threshold of detectability
which would be acceptable to the United States was determined in
Geneva by a group of scientists temporarily serving as negotiators,
with very skimpy instructions, not through a deliberate decision at
the highest levels of government. It also meant that until the acces
sion of the Kennedy Administration, the government was not united
in support of the negotiations. Thus the United States often seemed
to be pulling back; reluctant to accept what its scientists had pro
posed.
The wisdom of committing the United States to a particular
control system at an early stage in the negotiations can also be
7See, for example, Freeman Dyson, "The Future Development of Nu
clear Weapons," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (April 1 960) , pp.
457-64.
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questioned. Doing so severely limited American flexibility. Any
control system is composed of variable elements, some predominantly
technical, others predominantly nontechnical. All of these elements
are interrelated, and changes in one area can be compensated for by
adjustments in another. For example, one can compensate for a
smaller number of on-site inspections by having a greater number
of control posts. Similarly, one might also compensate for less effi
cient or trustworthy operating personnel by having a greater number
of control posts. The ability to make such trade-otis, however, was
greatly reduced as long as the Report of the Conference of Experts
remained the immutable basis for the nuclear test ban negotiations,
and the Soviet Union certainly viewed the report in this light for
several years.
The American motivation for insisting on convoking Technical
Working Groups I and II was always rather ambiguous. Calling for
additional technical conferences was a course which was acceptable
within the American government, both to those who wanted to
abandon and to those who wanted to continue the negotiations.
Since it could be viewed as a means of testing Soviet intentions, it
was also agreeable to those who wanted a nuclear test ban treaty,
but only under "acceptable" conditions.
From the point of view of the utilization of scientists as negoti
ators, Technical Working Group I appears to have been by far the
more sensible of the two. In TWG I the scientists were given a nar
rowly defined task-to elaborate a control system for high altitudes
and outer space-on which there was substantial agreement among
the negotiating partners. The American scientists obviously had
profited from their earlier experience at the Conference of Experts :
they insisted on much more careful phraseok•gy and on recommend
ing alternative systems rather than a single one.
In Technical Working Group II, the scientists were in effect
asked to solve the deep controversies which plagued the negotiations,
an obviously impossible task. Moreover, they were asked to do this
at a time when the United States was in the process of empirically
testing the theory of decoupling, the development of which had done
the most to dampen American enthusiasm for a test ban. In addi
tion to failing to accomplish their mission, the scientists participating
in Technical Working Group II jeopardized the intricate and delicate
network of their personal relationships extending across national
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frontiers, which they had so carefully nurtured. One cannot but ques
tion whether this was a sensible assignment.
The Seismic Research Program Advisory Group was another
matter. It is hard to conceive of any way of planning a joint or
coordinated research program other than to have scientists them
selves meet and produce agreed elements of a program.
After this meeting, American policy placed less emphasis on
formal meetings of scientists, and probably wisely. If the purpose of
bringing scientists into the negotiations was either to convince the
opposite side or neutrals of the legitimacy of the Western position,
there was no inherent reason why this could not be done as well, if
not better, through informal sessions rather than through formally
constituted meetings of scientists. The use of scientists after 1 960
for elucidating and buttressing Western positions seems to have
accomplished these goals, to the extent that they could be accom
plished, and yet avoided the difficulties of the formal meetings of
scientists.
In this connection, the Kennedy Administration had a distinct
advantage over its predecessor-and this must be kept in mind in any
evaluation or comparison of the conduct and contributions of the
two administrations. It was under the Eisenhower Administration
that the decision-makers were faced for the first time with the novel
and complex scientific issues involved in the test ban and with the
difficult task of finding the proper men and devising organizational
patterns and procedures through which scientific advice could be
integrated in the governmental process. By the time the Kennedy
Administration took office a number of career diplomats and other
governmental officials had acquired basic background in these prob
lems and some lessons could be drawn from earlier experience.
This was necessarily reflected in both the policy formation and in
the later shapes of the negotiations.
III

The Substance of American Security Policy
Vacillation and Ambiguity
Much of what has already been said concerning formulation and
execution of American security policy obviously has implications for
the substance of that policy. Because the Eisenhower Administration
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was deeply divided concerning the wisdom of a nuclear test ban, and
because President Eisenhower did not take decisive steps to end
this division, until 1961 American policy toward the nuclear test ban
negotiations was characterized by ambiguity and vacillation. The
United States often appeared not to know whether or not it wanted
a test ban or what the minimum conditions were that it would accept.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether this situation was due
primarily to President Eisenhower's basic belief that the Soviet Union
was not prepared to accept any agreement except on terms disad
vantageous to the United States or to his reluctance to resolve dif
ferences within the Administration. In fact, he remained skeptical of
the wisdom of the Moscow Treaty even after it was negotiated.

Inadequate Technical Preparation
A second major problem was that throughout the negotiations
the level of the United States technical preparation left much to be
desired. During the Conference of Experts, the United States based
its calculations for elaborating control measures over underground
nuclear explosions on one experiment. Subsequent experience proved
that this base was too narrow. Several times American scientists
discussed and agreed to control devices which did not exist and the
real operational capacities of which therefore could not fully be
known. An operating prototype of the control station recommended
by the Conference of Experts in 19 58 did not exist until October
1 960. The satellites recommended by Technical Working Group I
for the detection of nuclear explosions in outer space were not put
into orbit until the fall of 1963, three years before an entire system
would be operational. Twice during the negotiations the United
States attempted to settle technical issues despite the foreknowledge
that relevant experiments would be conducted during the technical
discussions or after their conclusion. This occurred, as will be re
called, in the case of the Conference of Experts. It also occurred
with respect to Technical Working Group II. The first major ex
periment in Operation Cowboy, a series of chemical explosions de
signed to test Albert Latter's decoupling theory, was conducted on
December 1 7, 1 959, the day before the Working Group recessed.
The tests in this series would continue until mid-March 1 960.
This is not to suggest that the level of American technical
preparation was inferior to that of the Soviet Union, for the record
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certainly does not indicate this. On the contrary, the United States
scientists provided by far the largest proportion of the technical
data. Given the asymmetrical interest in control, which regardless of
whether or not it is desirable will probably continue as long as
Western societies maintain a higher degree of openness than Com
munist regimes, the situation requires that the West be better pre
pared technically than the East. Nor is it to attempt to set absolute
and ideal standards by which to judge the American performance.
It is merely to state that the United States' level of technical prepara
tion was not adequate to the seriousness of the task. This criticism
of course applies with even greater force to the Soviet Union. Ad
mittedly, it is impossible always to foresee or control the pace of
negotiations, but in 1958 a test ban was an issue of long-standing,
and the United States was unprepared despite its salience.
In part, technical preparation is a function of administrative
and financial support. The United States' position in 1958, among
other things, reflected the relatively low priority accorded to arms
control and disarmament matters within the government then. Pre
sumably the situation has at least been improved with the establish
ment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Clearly more
human and physical resources within the government are now de
voted to tasks in this area. Whether or not sufficient resources are
allocated to these matters, though, is an unanswered question. And
one curious effect of the establishment of ACDA has been that be
cause there has now been amassed a wealth of technical detail it
has become progressively more difficult for creative outsiders to
get a foothold in this field, and therefore the number of technical
people not in government employ who are willing to concern them
selves actively with trying to find radical solutions has been reduced.
Technical preparation is also a function of the linkage between
political intelligence and technical research. Forthcoming technical
issues have to be defined far enough in advance so that scientists have
ample time to probe their complexities. Again, establishment of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should help to create and
maintain this linkage. Moreover, the office of the Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology and the President's Science
Advisory Committee-both created as responses to the Sputnik crisis
of the fall of 1957-are now much more firmly established as parts
of the governmental structure than they were in 1958. Representa-
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tives of the scientific community now have an unquestioned place in
the nation's highest policy councils. Perhaps as much has been done
as is possible in terms of institutional arrangements. The questions
which remain-and which by their nature are presently unanswerable
-center on whether sufficient thought is given to future problems.
As far as the role of ACDA is concerned, there is also a question
whether-in the absence of arms control agreements that would give
it operating responsibilities-the Agency will be able to retain high
quality personnel and assert its place in the mainstream of policy
making in Washington.
The Linkage Between Controlling the Arms Race and Altering the
State System
A third substantive problem was the linking of the nuclear test
ban issue with American schemes for and concepts of world order.
The United States originally proposed and argued that a grandiose
organization would be required to monitor a nuclear test ban. This
body would have dwarfed all existing international organizations.
Interestingly, few of the American participants in the negotiations
felt that such a huge organization could long stand with such a
limited function; they felt that it would either have to assume addi
tional functions in the field of arms control or collapse. Of course
one reason for the extent of the American proposals in this realm
was that those within the United States government who questioned
the wisdom of a nuclear test ban treaty found this a convenient way
of working against a test ban without engaging in a frontal attack.
However, more fundamental factors were also responsible. American
concepts of world order ultimately looked forward to the hierarchical
organization of the world. In considering the organizational require
ments of a nuclear test ban the United States drew from past ex
perience with such organizations as the United Nations and also tried
to insure that whatever new organizational developments were im
plemented in connection with the nuclear test ban would fit in with
the general long-range goal. Little thought was given to the relation
ship between the limited arms control functions to be performed
and the organizational requirements. As a result, in many ways the
United States was as unprepared for serious arms control negotia
tions when it came to determining the appropriate organizational
arrangements as it was lacking in the essential technical data.
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Inferring from the American proposals, it appears that little
thought had been given in the earlier years of the negotiations to
the problem of how to reduce the possibility of nuclear holocaust
without at the same time reforming the world political system. Re
ciprocal or adversary control

( more accurately in this instance

unilateral control) , the technique eventually embodied in the Mos
cow Treaty, was one obvious response to this problem, but the United
States did not even suggest this possibility until 1 962. It is apparent
from the record that the Soviet Union was equally if not more de
ficient in thinking about these problems. Throughout the negotiations
there was no evidence that within the Soviet government the organiza
tional aspects of disarmament were being considered separate from
other policy questions.

The Consequences of the American Position
An assessment of the consequences of the policies pursued by the
United States may be made on several levels. It seems clear that
these policies caused certain difficulties for the United States in the
realm of propaganda, and on these grounds it can be argued that the
United States would have been in a better position had it main
tained its original position of clearly insisting on linking a nuclear
test ban with other measures of arms control and disarmament
rather than taking the positions that it did. At least then the United
States could not have been accused of negotiating in a disingenuous
fashion.
A more fundamental consequence was that Soviet intentions
were never fully explored. It may well be that the Soviet Union
would not have agreed to any formally binding commitment prior to

1963, nor at any time to a treaty that would have involved on-site
inspection. The point is that since American policies were not flexible
and generous enough to allow ultimate testing of Soviet motivation
these assertions cannot be made with certainty and without fear of
contradiction. As the record stands, it is always possible to argue
that if only American policies had been framed in terms a bit more
acceptable to the Soviet Union, a more far-reaching agreement would
have been possible earlier. 8
8Both American and British negotiators have implicitly stated this.
See James I. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p. 73, and Sir Michael Wright,
Disarm and Verify, p. 1 09.
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On the level of negotiating tactics, the decision to proclaim a
one-year moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons at the outset of
the diplomatic negotiations has been seriously questioned. Many have
argued that this deprived the United States of one of its most import
ant means of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union to reach an
agreement. It is clear that regardless of the course of the negotiations
it became very difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to
end the moratorium. On the other hand, whether or not the Soviet
Union would have consented to engage in negotiations had the
United States insisted on continuing its testing is problematical.
Furthermore, had it chosen to pursue this course, the United States
government would have had to have been willing to face serious pres
sures from both internal and external sources, the latter especially in
the United Nations.
IV

The International System
Open and Closed Societies
The way in which the two sides handled the important issue of the
moratorium on testing brings out as clearly as any example drawn
from the nuclear test ban negotiations the tactical advantages that a
closed society enjoys over an open society in international negotia
tions. The former can shift course quickly and radically, and can
plan its moves in secrecy, thus maintaining the advantage of sur
prise. Open societies, in contrast, except during crises, tend to move
more slowly and to give ample forewarning of their moves. Thus the
Soviet Union could break the moratorium suddenly, while the West
could not.

A somewhat different disadvantage but stemming from the
same cause was that the open and pluralistic societies of the West
gave off ambiguous signals. Some in the West spoke in more severe
terms than the official policy, others in more lenient terms. Those
who took lines which diverged from official policy sometimes even
included individuals with policy-making responsibilities. The Kremlin
could read these divergent signs as indicating on the one hand that
the official policy might be only a cover for a harsher line, or, on
the other, as indicating that further concessions would be forthcom
ing, and that to gain these one need only wait. Of course, the open-
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ness of Western society could also be an advantage to the extent
that it allowed the West to introduce "feelers" into the negotiations.
To make use of this advantage requires skill and care, and also
greater control over circumstances than sometimes exists in reality.
Policy-makers in a closed society are less subject to external
and internal pressures than their counterparts in an open society.
The test ban negotiations indicate that the Western states tended to
take such matters as UN resolutions and pronouncements of neutrals
more seriously than did the Soviet Union. However, they also show
that both sides were affected by such matters to some extent, and
that both would ignore them if they felt that their vital interests were
at stake. Thus both sides tried to have their position endorsed by
the UN, and both also did things that UN resolutions exhorted them
not to.
A related difference is that the USSR could appeal to segments
of the Western public, over the heads of the Western governments,
while the Western states could not as easily engage in similar opera
tions with respect to the Soviet people.
The differences in the nature of Soviet and Western societies,
however, affected the negotiations in more fundamental ways than
simply with respect to the tactics and relative freedom of action on
the part of the negotiators of the two sides. At least partly because
of its closed society, the USSR's attitude toward the establishment
of control measures was significantly different from that of the
United States and the United Kingdom. To the end of the negotia
tions, the Soviet Union firmly resisted any outside intrusions that it
could not control. For a while the Soviet Union appears to have
been willing to accept the intrusions connected with the establishment
of a limited number of fixed control posts manned by at least some
non-Soviet personnel. This position was in a sense an unprecedented
step but it was retracted in November 1961 and never reinstated.
The Soviet position toward on-site inspection was always so hedged,
that-partly for reasons suggested earlier in connection with the
United States policies-it is impossible to say that the USSR was
ever entirely willing to accept such intrusions. The rationale for the
Soviet Union's penchant for secrecy has been amply analyzed else
where ;9 it is only necessary here to note how deeply it affected the
9See especially Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet Union, Arms
Control and Disarmament, pp. 142-58.
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USSR's policy in this instance. No doubt the Soviet Union's secrecy
contributes something to its military security, though it is also clear
that this secrecy is an important part of the regime in its own right,
and as such has a vital effect on arms control negotiations. These
remarks are of course not intended to suggest an absence of secrecy
and concern with secrecy in the West, but rather to indicate an
important difference.
A related point is that the USSR never consented to the estab
lishment of a control organization in connection with a nuclear test
ban which could take significant action against its wishes. No doubt
the positions of East and West are colored by the experience of the
two sides in and with existing and past international arrangements
and institutions such as the United Nations, an experience which thus
far has been much more favorable to the West in East-West confronta
tions. But the more important explanation of the differences in the
attitudes toward control and inspection probably lies in the differ
ences between the two societies.
The Effects of Technology
The record of the test ban negotiations is interesting in this
respect for it showed how these fundamental differences between the
two societies-and particularly the closed character of the Soviet
society-were being altered among other factors by the growth of
modern technology. In 1963 the United States felt that it could do as
good a job of detecting underground nuclear explosions within the
Soviet Union with stations outside of the territory of the USSR as it
had felt in 1 958 that it could do with a significant number of sta
tions within the USSR. The development of observation satellites
also sharply inhibited the ability of any society to act in secret.
Thus the Soviet system has become more open, not necessarily by
its own conscious design, but simply because technology has made
it easier for others to observe Soviet territory, regardless of Soviet
wishes. In the long run, this factor should reduce at least to some
extent the difficulty of negotiating arms control agreements, par
ticularly if it is reinforced by the conscious efforts toward greater
openness such as increased exchange of persons and scientific co
operation between East and West. As a result, the USSR should be
come less reluctant to accept intrusions, and the West less insistent
on their necessity.
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The Role of Nonnuclear States
The proposition that other powers can affect the policies of the
superpowers is implicit in what has already been said. The United
Nations was one forum available to virtually all states during the test
ban negotiations, and many of them sought to and did exercise in
fluence through it. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
was a more effective instrument for those states which were mem
bers; there can be no doubt that both the USSR and the United
States were more sensitive to pressures brought to bear and sug
gestions raised in this organ than in the more diffuse General As
sembly. It is also demonstrable, as many British leaders have claimed,
that the United Kingdom had influence far greater than that of other
states of equivalent size, mainly, in this case, because of its possession
of nuclear weapons.10 It is further clear, though, that ultimately the
superpowers, the USSR and the United States, or more accurately
political configurations within them, determined whether or not there
should be a nuclear test ban treaty. Other states and international
organizations could influence the superpowers, and their internal
political configurations, but they could not determine the course of
events.
Power and Agreements
The record of the test ban negotiations also has relevance for
long-debated questions about the relationship between the distribution
of power and the achievement of agreements. When the Moscow
Treaty was signed, the relative position of the Soviet Union and the
United States with respect to the development of nuclear weapons
was very different from what it had been when the negotiations began
in 1 958. In 195 8 the United States apparently held the technological
lead with respect to all areas and levels of nuclear weapons develop
ment. By 1963 the Soviet Union had detonated larger weapons than
the United States, and the test ban treaty would make it difficult if
not impossible for the United States to develop weapons of such
magnitude. In more general terms, the USSR appeared to have be
come technologically more advanced than the United States in the
development of high-yield weapons; that is, weapons with a yield of
5 or 1 0 megatons or larger. The situation with respect to weapons
l OSee Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, p. 1 4 1 .
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with intermediate yield was indeterminate. The United States defin
itely held the lead in low-yield weapons; that is, weapons with a
yield of less than one megaton. However, since continued under
ground testing was permitted under the treaty, and since weapons
with such yields can be tested underground, presumably the Soviet
Union could attempt to equal or surpass the United States level of
achievement. This consideration might have made the treaty more
attractive for the Soviet Union in 1963. It should be noted though
that since the signature of the treaty the frequency of underground
tests conducted by the United States has exceeded that of tests con
ducted by the Soviet Union by almost a factor of ten. Whether
this is due to a lack of preparation on the part of the USSR, to a
low opinion of the value of such tests, or to their high cost and
complexity, it is impossible to know.
What was perhaps equally as significant as the exact state of
the technological race was that both sides appeared to have neared
the theoretical limits of nuclear weapons development in their last
series of tests, and also to have discovered most or all that was
"interesting" to them in terms of their concepts of military strategy.
The Soviet Union, having apparently decided under Khrushchev to
put great emphasis on deterrence, had developed the counter-city
weapons that it needed for this strategy. The United States under
President Kennedy, on the other hand, moved to deemphasize the
role of nuclear weapons in its strategy, and in particular became less
interested in the development of tactical nuclear weapons.
The changes in positions of the two sides with respect to the
development of nuclear weapons should be viewed against the
changes concerning total military strength. In 1963 the United States'
margin of superiority was significantly greater than it had been five
years earlier.
In sum, with respect to military power, in 1963 there were
reasons for both sides to have greater confidence in their own
abilities to achieve the missions that they might assign to their military
establishments than they had in 1958. This bears on the question of
whether in an arms race an increase in one side's security neces
sarily decreases that of the other side, and also on the degree of
confidence necessary to achieve arms control agreements. P. M. S.
Blackett's argument, though, that the Western superiority in missile
strength made the USSR unwilling to accept an international control
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system for a test ban on the ground that such a system would detract
from Soviet security by possibly revealing the location of Soviet
missile sites, should be noted.11 He feels that the USSR counted on
the secrecy of these sites to offset the Western numerical superiority.
Many strategists disagree with his argument, and in any case observa
tion satellites have to some extent made it obsolete.
The Decline of Bipolarity
At the same time that both the United States and the Soviet
Union became more confident concerning their own military capa
bilities vis-a-vis one another, they each became more worried about
other problems on the world scene. In the first place, both appear
to have become more concerned about the consequences of the
dispersion of nuclear weapons capabilities, and this has marked
the emergence of a common interest of the two nuclear superpowers
in the status quo. More specifically, for their own reasons both the
Soviet Union and the United States became interested in inhibiting
increases in Communist China's military power. Again, the Soviet
Union had always been concerned about the spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities in the West, and especially to Western Germany.
Although the United States was never as concerned about the spread
of nuclear weapons capabilities within the West as it was within other
areas, it foresaw a connection between the spread within the West
and elsewhere and increasingly came to oppose the spread within
the West also. One purpose behind the American proposal for a
multilateral nuclear force under NATO was to foreclose pressures
for new national nuclear forces in the West and particularly in
Germany although the Soviet Union has refused to view the pro
posal in this light.
To say that both the Soviet Union and the United States be
came increasingly interested in a nuclear test ban because they
became increasingly interested in inhibiting the nuclear capabilities
of other states, implies that this arms control agreement was partially
a consequence of decreasing bipolarity. Paradoxically, signing the
agreement hastened the dilution of bipolarity, for it meant that each
coalition leader had to oppose the wishes of a major ally : the Soviet
11P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War:
burgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1 962 ) , p. 1 60.
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Union, those of Communist China and the United States, those of
France.
The Problem of Controlling Modern Technology
The experience with the nuclear test ban negotiations confirms
the immense difficulty inherent in the task of controlling modern
technology in an environment of the multi-state system. The negotia
tions brought out how hard it was to arrange matters so that the
interests of just two sides (and three states ) coincided enough to
allow for an agreement. The refusal of Communist China and France
to adhere to the Moscow Treaty, although anticipated, reduced the
value of the treaty for the two sides and showed that bargains made
essentially bilaterally cannot easily be extended to other parties.
The makeup and interests of states are not identical and agree
ments affect them differently. Constructing an agreement that has an
equal range of benefits and disadvantages for many disparate partners
is a task of great intellectual difficulty, and one which is made even
more laborious if it must be worked out through the mechanisms of
multi-governmental bargaining and complex intragovemmental pro
cesses such as those existing in the United States.
The fact that modern technology is subject to swift changes
as was amply evidenced during the nuclear test ban negotiations
makes this task even more complicated. The insistence by the West
in 1 959 that "new data" be brought into the negotiations after the
scientists had agreed on the relevant technological basis in 1958and the refusal by the Soviet Union to agree to this proved a major
stumbling block in the negotiations.
If it is difficult to strike a bargain among several disparate parties
for a static situation, it is even more difficult to strike one that will
accommodate technological change and yet any agreement without
such accommodation would be of limited value. Sovereign states are
most unlikely to accept agreements which have a built-in potentiality
for unpredictable alterations. Thus the Soviet Union would be very
unlikely to accept a treaty that would at the outset provide for 20
on-site inspections on its territory annually but might under certain
circumstances require several hundred.
The conceivable solutions for this problem are limited. The
participating states could give broad powers to a panel of scientists
to modify the control system in accordance with new technology,
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but during the test ban negotiations neither side seemed very eager
or willing to accept such a solution. If the panel of scientists were
given such powers the states would be exposed to the danger that
the distribution of benefits and disadvantages built into the treaty
could be radically altered by a group beyond their control. Moreover,
the test ban negotiations show how many different interpretations of
some data are scientifically plausible. Thus the margin of discretion
would be quite wide and the scientists could not be expected to
achieve universally accepted decisions. Another possibility would be
to require a periodic review of the control provisions, but what this
actually would amount to is a provision for periodic renegotiation,
if significant technological changes occurred which vitally affected
the subject matter of the treaty. That this renegotiation would be
conducted within the framework of the treaty might provide some
guidelines and an additional incentive for agreement, but little be
yond that. Of course, if an adversary or reciprocal control system
were used, as it was in the Moscow Treaty, accommodating tech
nological change could be accomplished on the basis of unilateral
decisions by interested parties. Of the various ways of treating the
problem, this is clearly the easiest to negotiate and the least cumber
some, but whether or not it can be applied to other than essentially
bilateral relationships is open to serious question.
Although it does not show in the terms of the Moscow Treaty,
the nuclear test ban negotiations made it apparent that some control
measures can be developed as a by-product of peaceful activities.
The use of weather stations to collect information on radioactive
fallout and of seismological stations to collect information on under
ground nuclear detonations are examples. Interestingly, as the level
of technology has risen, effective exploitation of such developments
has often required increased international collaboration. The terri
tories of states are often just too small to exploit new technological
developments. The position of the United States in the test ban
negotiations concerning the use of already existing stations shows
the doubts that many states would have about the reliability of in
formation from such national sources, but perhaps this problem
could partially be overcome by having redundant systems for gath
ering information. Moreover, it is possible that there may be more
sources that a state could trust in a multipolar world than in a bi
polar world, and for this reason the movement of the world from
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bipolarity may make it increasingly possible to rely on information
gained from such sources. One can envisage a relatively high degree
of control over technology resulting from overlaying the world with
multiple networks based on international arrangements for scientific
collaboration, established principally to facilitate other purposes such
as weather prediction and high-speed, long-distance communication.
As the nuclear test ban negotiations so clearly demonstrate
though, the questions of whether or not such control will be estab
lished, and the extent of this control, are preeminently political and
diplomatic, not technical. Science and scientific research can con
tribute to the solution of arms control and disarmament problems;
it cannot solve them.
It is obviously impossible to give a definitive answer at this stage
to the crucial question of whether or not the signature of the Moscow
Treaty marked a turning point in the nuclear era. What can be
said, though, is that the Treaty represented an attempt to create a
turning point; that the attempt has been made is important and it has
had an impact on international atmosphere. Furthermore, what has
been learned in the process of making the attempt may have been as
important as the actual Treaty, for mankind now knows a good bit
more about how to proceed in efforts to create a more peaceful
world. Finally, the record of the test ban negotiations also shows
that the growth of technology may contain within itself important
potentialities for control.

Chapter II

1957: La Mise en Scene

I

What Beginning?
Neither October 31, 1958, the opening date of the Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, nor July 1, 1958, when
the Conference of Experts began-the conference which formulated the technical basis for the subsequent diplomatic talksis an appropriate starting point for an analysis of the nuclear test
ban negotiations. The negotiations, and American policy in them,
can be properly understood only when put in the context of earlier
events, particularly several occurrinJ!; during 1957. For one thing,
the 1957 London session of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament
Commission of the United Nations was clearly a prelude to the
nuclear test ban negotiations; there is an important connection between the two, and the latter was in many ways a consequence of
the former. For another, certain conflicting international and domestic forces vitally affected American policy on the question of a test
ban; and, although it is difficult to fix a point in time when these
forces first emerged, their impact was strongly felt by 1957. Finally,
the formal arrangements for the participation of scientists in the
policy process within the United States government were signficantly
altered in 1957.
II

The Status of International Negotiations
The Confrontation at Lancaster House
The Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission composed of
Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, held its most significant, and also its last, session at the
Lancaster House in London from March to September of 1957. As
14
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a consequence of major policy reviews, both East and West came to
the meeting with new proposals, and during the course of the session, they revised their policies still further. 1 Three developments
during the London meetings in effect set the stage for the Geneva
test ban negotiations.
The first of these developments was the announcement by the
USSR on June 14 that it would agree to the establishment of a
control system, including control posts on its own territory, on that
of the United Kingdom and the United States, and in the Pacific
Ocean, to monitor an agreement for the cessation ·of nuclear weapon
tests. 2 Until that date the Soviet Union had always argued that no
international control mechanism was necessary for this purpose. In
the same announcement, the USSR also declared its willingness to
accept a temporary suspension of tests for a period of two to three
years. Previously the Soviet position had been that any agreement
on suspension must be of unlimited duration. Both aspects of the
announcement represented an important change from past Soviet
positions. Ever since 1954 when the testing of nuclear weapons had
become a matter of widespread public concern, the Soviet Union
had sought to place itself in the forefront of the movement to prohibit further testing, although it had continued its own test program
without interruption. 3 Starting in May 1955, the USSR had advanced
a variety of proposals on the subject, and because of its insistence,
this issue had been placed at the head of the agenda for the London
session of the disarmament Subcommittee. In the Western view,
however, prior to June 14 the Soviet positions. offered no basis for
constructive negotiations.
The West also altered its position on a test ban during the
course of the London session, and this was the second development
which contributed to the subsequent Geneva negotiations. Previously, the cessation of nuclear tests had been accorded relatively
lFor detailed descriptions of the London session see Bernhard G.
Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, pp. 241-439, and Ciro
E. Zoppo, The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London Disarmament
Conference of I957: A Study in East-West Negotiation (The RAND Corp.,
RM-2821-ARPA, 1961).
2UN Document DC/SC. l/60.
3See Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy Towards International Control of
Atomic Energy, pp. 211-13.
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low priority in Western proposals, and the Western states had taken
the position that they could accept a ban on tests only if an adequate
control mechanism was operative and the ban was part of a broader
agreement covering other measures of disarmament as well. There
were several reasons for the Western position. The most important
was that Western military strategy depended on nuclear weapons to
counter Soviet superiority in conventional forces. In addition, France,
which was just beginning to develop nuclear weapons, was unwilling
to have a test ban block its progress in this area, unless it were
confident that the three nuclear powers were actually going to reduce their nuclear arsenals and perhaps also other components of
their military power. The insistence on the establishment of a control system was, of course, an integral part of the Western position
on disarmament.
At London, three changes were made in the Western position.
First, the United States indicated at the outset that it was willing to
accord a new priority to a test cessation; this measure could become
an integral part of the initial stage of a disarmament agreement. 4
Secondly, on July 2, after the Soviet Union announced its willingness to accept an international control system, the four Western
members of the Subcommittee stated that they would agree to a
temporary suspension of testing while the control system was being
established. 5 The following day, Harold Stassen, the American
representative, mentioned ten months as the duration of the temporary suspension. Later, he offered to extend this period to twelve
months, and to agree that there might be an additional suspension
of another year. Thirdly, the Western powers hinted that they might
accept a loosening of the tie between the test ban issue and other
measures of disarmament, although the extent of this concession
was not clear. In the end, the Western powers presented all of their
first stage measures as an indivisible package, thus reducing the
scope of the concession. 6
This package-the provisions of which significantly would have
allowed the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powersincluded measures for numerical limitation of armed forces and
fixed reductions in armaments, safeguards against surprise attack,
4See UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 89, pp. 2-14.
5UN Document DC/SC. 1/59.
6UN Document DC/SC. l/66.
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limiting entry into outer space exclusively to objects designed for
peaceful and scientific purposes, a cut-off on the production of
fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and a test cessation.
However, during the London session there were various indications
in the press (especially following the review of American policy in
May) that the United States was willing to treat questions relating
to the production and testing of nuclear weapons as a separate
issue.'1 Moreover, the only condition that Mr. Stassen listed for
extending the temporary suspension of testing for a second year
was that there should be progress "in relation to the cessation of
production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. "8 In addition, he implied that the suspension would become permanent if a
cut-off on production were achieved during the second year.
Thus, the gap between East and West on the question of a
cessation of nuclear weapon tests bad been narrowed considerably.
However, important differences still remained. The Soviet Union
was opposed to formally linking a test cessation with any other
measure of disarmament. It was also unwilling to accept the extensive controls which the Western proposal would have required
for supervising a cut-off on the production of fissionable materials
for weapons. 9 In fairness, it should be pointed out that other states,
such as Canada, also had some reservations about the extent of the
proposed controls. 1o
The final development during the London session of the disarmament Subcommittee which had a bearing on the Geneva test
ban negotiations was the introduction by the Western delegates of
the idea of holding technical talks on control systems. As early as
the opening meeting, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd,
suggested that the Subcommittee consider appointing technical working groups which would meet concurrently with the Subcommittee
and explore the technical aspects of the various agenda items. This
idea of having technical experts meet was an old favorite of Mr.
7See New York Times, June 1, 1957, p. 1.
SUN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 149, p. 24.
DSee Ambassador Zorin's statements in the Subcommittee on July 8 and
August 27, 1957, UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 132, pp. 2-26; and DC/SC.
1/65/RPV. 1.
lOSee Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control,
p. 342.
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Uoyd's, which he had raised several times previously in other contexts. On May 6, the United Kingdom formally proposed "that a
Committee of technical experts be established within the framework
of the disarmament Sub-Committee, to consider possible methods of
limiting nuclear test explosions and to investigate the requirements
of effective supervision over an Agreement to limit such explosions."11 This same suggestion was repeated in the July 2 response
of the Western powers to the Soviet acceptance of the principle of
international control, again by Selwyn Uoyd on July 17, and finally
by Harold Stassen on August 21 when he announced the willingness
of the United States to agree that the temporary suspension could
be extended for a second year. The motivation for this suggestion
was never made explicit. The British may have hoped that the
proposed technical talks might precipitate broader political agreement. For the Americans, it was most likely a way of testing the
reality of an essential aspect of the new Soviet position; that is, the
declared Soviet willingness to accept a control system. The USSR,
however, refused to consent to technical talks unless there were
first an agreement on the period and the conditions of a test cessation.12 From the point of view of the Geneva negotiations, the important thing was that the idea of technical talks was introduced and
gained currency.
III

Conflicting Forces in Test Ban Policy Formulation
International Pressures

The encounter between the East and West at the conference table
in London was only one factor in the formation of the American
policy leading to the nuclear test ban negotiations. In diplomatic
negotiations, the point and counterpoint· of proposal and response
often force adjustments of policy, but as a rule factors external to
the negotiations play a greater role. Facts as understood by the
policy-makers; their assumptions, philosophies and idiosyncrasies;
the general policy framework; the working of national institutions
as well as the many complex pressures exerted upon the policyllUN Document DC/SC. 1/56, p. 1.
t2See Ambassador Zorin's statement, UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV.
136, pp. 2-15.
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makers by individuals and groups in and outside the government,
privately and through the mass media of communications; interventions of friendly governments in and outside international organizations; estimates of reactions of unfriendly governments-all these
affect the content of a policy. Exact weighting of the relative influence of these factors is impossible in the case of the American
test ban policy-as it is in most cases. For the purpose of this
background, however, it may suffice to identify certain salient
international and domestic forces which had a crucial impact on the
policies pursued by the United States in the London session of the
disarmament Subcommittee and thereafter. The principal issue for
the American policy-maker during and after the London confrontation was whether and on what conditions the United States could
accede to the Soviet demand and agree to taking the test ban negotiations out of the disarmament package with the resulting possibility
that a test ban could come into effect without any assurance of
nuclear or other disarmament.
One of the most important of the external pressures was the
widespread public feeling against the testing of nuclear weapons.
The motives for this worldwide attitude were mixed. For some, the
issue provided a dramatic focal point for expressing their pacifist
beliefs. Others, recalling Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were horrified by
the frightful devastation which modem weapons could cause and
feared the consequences of further technological developments. The
fact that nuclear weapons had been used first and only against a
nonwhite population linked the test ban issue with antiwhite and
anticolonial attitudes. The problem of fallout, though, was probably
the principal reason for the issue's arousing such a broad public
response.
Public concern about radioactive fallout began to mount in
1954. On March 1 of that year the United States detonated a 15
megaton hydrogen bomb over the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall
Islands. 1a The fallout from this explosion covered an unexpectedly
t8For a detailed analysis of the public reaction to this shot see Earl H.
Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap (1963), pp. 37-50. In general,
Voss tends to belittle the danger from fallout. The United States' testing of
nuclear weapons in a UN Trust Territory raised several political and legal
issues. For analyses of these points see Harold Karan Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial' Problem in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (October
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large area of approximately 7,000 square miles. Some of the inhabitants of the American Trust Territory were endangered, and a
Japanese fishing vessel, the Fukurya Maru, was contaminated.
Shortly thereafter, a radioactive rain fell on Japan as a consequence
of a Soviet hydrogen bomb test. People throughout the world were
alarmed by these incidents and by the increasing quantity of radioactive material in the atmosphere. Later in March, 104 British
Labor Members of Parliament signed a motion asking the United
Nations to proclaim a ban on testing hydrogen weapons. The following month Prime Minister Nehru addressed a personal plea to
the United States to end such tests. A few days after that, in a
speech before the Indian Parliament, he proposed that the three
nuclear powers should accept a "standstill agreement" on nuclear
testing.
The limited extent of knowledge about fallout and its consequences-particularly the genetic effects-allowed a wide variety
of estimates of the danger, and this in itself probably made the
public alarm greater than it would have been had the dangers of
fallout been known exactly. The United States government moved
to quell these fears, but with little success. In February 1955, the
Atomic Energy Commission published a report on this subject, but
many discounted it on the ground that the source was an interested
party. Later that year the United States and the United Kingdom
proposed that the United Nations establish a scientific committee to
study the effects of atomic radiation. This proposal was adopted
unanimously, and the Committee was appointed in December 1955.
However, it did not publish its first findings until June 1958.14
Meanwhile, public concern about the effects of fallout grew, and
Soviet tactics played on these fears.
During 1957 international opposition to the continued testing
of nuclear weapons reached a high point. In March the Japanese
1960), pp. 56-66, at 59; Myers S. McDougal and Norbert A. Schlei, "The
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security," The
Yale Law Journal, Vol. LXIV, No. 5 (April 1955), pp. 648-710; and,
Emanuel Margolis, ''The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International
Law," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. LXIV, No. 5 (April 1955), pp. 629-47.
14 UN, General Assembly, Official Records (13th Session), Supplement
No. 17, "Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation."
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government decided to send Professor Masateshi Matsushita, an
eminent scientist, on a special mission to the USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, to urge a cessation of nuclear
weapons tests. The following month, in a major address, Prime
Minister Nehru renewed his appeal for a test ban, and he continued
to urge such action throughout the year. Again in April the Labor
Party in Britain, during a Parliamentary debate on the 1957 White
Paper on Defense, moved that the government should be requested
to take immediate initiative and put forward effective proposals for
the abolition of hydrogen weapon tests through effective international agreement. 15 Later that month, eighteen of West Germany's
leading nuclear physicists, including Professor Otto Hahn, the first
to split the atom, signed a declaration that they would not participate
in the construction or testing of nuclear weapons. On April 23 Dr.
Albert Schweitzer issued an appeal through the Norwegian Nobel
Committee which was broadcast in fifty countries, and received
wide coverage elsewhere, asking that public opinion demand an
end to nuclear tests. Within a few days his appeal was endorsed
by the Pope, and on May 10 the West German Bundestag adopted
a resolution, sponsored by the governing Christian Democratic
Coalition, urging the three nuclear powers to temporarily suspend
their tests, pending the negotiation of an arms control agreement. 16
During the most active phase of the London session of the UN
disarmament Subcommittee, these pressures subsided somewhat, but
even then they remained at a high level. During June and July the
Soviet Union gained some support in its efforts to have the International Labor Organization and the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations recommend a test ban, and in August the
World Council of Churches urged an international accord to stop
further testing, or if that proved impossible, unilateral action.

"The Disarmament General Assembly"
When the Subcommittee's failure became apparent, the pressures rose again, and they came to a head at the twelfth session of
the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1957. It is significant that
15See U.K. House of Commons, Debates, April 16, 1957, 5th ser. vol.
568, col. 1758-1878; and, ibid., 1929-2060.
16German Federal Republic, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Verhandlungen,
209. Sitzung, Mai 10, 1957, pp. 12051D-12138A.
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that session has been dubbed the "Disarmament General Assembly."
In all, eleven different resolutions dealing with disarmament were
considered, as well as several amendments to them. Most of the
proposals, in one way or another, dealt with the question of testing. The USSR led off by proposing-along the lines of its London
announcement-that further tests of nuclear weapons be suspended
for a two to three year period starting January 1, 1958,17 It also
proposed-as it had at the London meeting-that an international
commission should b6 created to supervise the test suspension, and
that control posts should be established on a basis of reciprocity
in the USSR, in the United Kingdom and its possessions, in the
United States, and in the Pacific Ocean areas, including Australia.
However, the Soviet Union eventually withdrew its draft in favor
of an Indian proposal. The Indian resolution would have asked the
nuclear powers to agree immediately to suspend tests and also
would have provided for the creation of a commission of experts
to recommend an adequate control system. 18 This resolution was
rejected by a vote of 24 to 34, with 20 abstentions. Pakistan and
Tunisia were the only countries from the Mrican and Asian group
to vote with the West. The Assembly also rejected a Japanese proposal which was somewhat closer to the Western position. In the
end, the Assembly adopted, by a vote of 56 to 9, with 15 abstentions, a resolution sponsored hy twenty-four powers, which in effect
endorsed the package proposal for a first stage disarmament agreement which the Western powers had presented during the closing
days of the London session. 19 This proposal included a test cessation as only one of several measures which presumably would occur
simultaneously. 20 In addition, as a consequence of an amendment
proposed by Norway and Pakistan, the resolution requested that the
disarmament Subcominittee appoint groups of experts to study the
technical aspects of monitoring disarmament agreements-an idea
also aired at London.
After the twenty-four power resolution had been introduced
in the Political Cominittee, and it was evident that it would probably be adopted there and in the plenary session, the Soviet Union
17UN Document A/3674 and Rev. 1.
lSUN Document A/C. 1/L. 176 and Revs. 1, 2, and 4.
19General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII).
20See ibid. §1(a).
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announced that it would no longer participate in the Disarmament
Commission or its Subcommittee. 21 The reason which the Soviet
delegation gave for this position was that both bodies were composed in a one-sided fashion. The USSR was the only Communist
country represented on the two organs. Nine of the twelve states on
the Commission were members of the Western alliance system, and
four of the five states on the Subcommittee were members of NATO.
The fact that the twelfth Assembly was the first occasion, with one
minor exception, since 1948 that the West-reportedly in response
to a personal decision by Secretary Dulles-had insisted on the
endorsement of its position on arms control despite Soviet opposition, may also have affected the Soviet stand. Generally, the practice
had been to refer both sides' proposals to the Commission or the
Subcommittee for further negotiations. The Western action in obtaining the backing for its position in the Assembly underscored
the importance of the composition of the negotiating forum. However, it should be noted that the USSR had criticized the composition of the Commission and the Subcommittee from the opening of
the Assembly session.
The Soviet Union proposed that the Disarmament Commission
should be expanded to include the entire membership of the UN;
and, although the Soviet representatives did not state this explicitly,
they implied that such a body should conduct its affairs in public.22 Alternatively, the USSR was willing to support proposals
which would alter the composition of the Commission in the direction of parity between East and West. The West, on the other
hand, even though it was willing to enlarge the Disarmament Commission, was unwilling to accept either solution favored ~y the
Soviet Union. The net result was an impasse-although the Assembly voted to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission, it did not significantly alter the disparity between East and
West (sixteen of the twenty-five members belonged to Western alliances), and the Soviet Union stated that it would not participate in
the new body either.
21UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (12th Session), p. 117.
22UN Document A/ L. 230. See the statements by A. A. Gromyko
and V. V. Kuznetsov: UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official
Records (12th Session), p. 34, and pp. 469-70.
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The denouement was susceptible to varying interpretations.
Bernhard Bechhoefer, in his authoritative account of the postSecond World War arms control negotiations, called the Assembly
resolution endorsing the Western package proposal a "hollow victory" for the West. 23
He asserted that:
The Soviet refusal to participate further in the work of the
Disarmament Commission was a logical and foreseeable
consequence of the Western insistence on securing the
United Nations endorsement of their August 29 proposals.24
It is also possible to argue, however, that the dispute about the

composition of the Commission was independent of this action;
that the USSR would not have agreed to participate in any body
which would have been acceptable to the West at that time. In the
narrow context of the test cessation issue, although the West enjoyed a temporary triumph, the resolution did not reduce the pressure for a nuclear test ban in any lasting way. In addition, the West
found itself without any forum for continuing the negotiations,
since Hamlet cannot be performed without the Prince of Denmark.
The Presidential Campaign
For those who had to set the course of American policy, particularly the Secretary of State and the President, this pressure was
not merely an international phenomenon but a domestic one as
well. Within the United States, discontinuing nuclear weapon tests
became an important issue in the public debate in 1956, when during the Presidential campagin the Democratic nominee, Adlai E.
Stevenson, suggested that the United States might unilaterally stop
testing as the first step toward obtaining an agreement with the
Soviet Union on this subject. Apparently the question of ceasing
the testing of at least the largest nuclear weapons had been under
study within the Administration since the spring of 1954 or per23Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, p. 418.
MJbid., p. 425.
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haps even earlier. 25 Mr. Stevenson's proposal therefore was not a
totally new suggestion. President Eisenhower's response to the proposal was that to take such action outside of the context of a
comprehensive, enforceable disarmament agreement would endanger
the security of the United States. At the time, in the public image,
the twin crises of Hungary and Suez seemed to support his position.
The fact that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR, Nikolai A. Bulganin, publicly endorsed Mr. Stevenson's
suggestion probably did little to enhance its attractiveness, either to
the Administration or to the American public. 26 However, as the
Soviet posture became less bellicose in 1957, there was a resurgence
of public concern about the effects of further testing.
Mr. Stevenson continued to press his position, and others
joined him. The American Friends Service Committee and the
American Unitarian Association both formally urged a test cessation, and they were joined by other religious groups. In several
public appearances, Norman Thomas called for a monitored moratorium on further testing. Individual scientists and groups of scientists also took a stand. In February 1957, the Council of the
Federation of American Scientists recommended that the Administration should "seek worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests
without making this contingent on achieving more far-reaching goals
in arms limitation." 27 In May and June over two thousand American
scientists signed Linus Pauling's petition urging an immediate international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs. 28 In public
pronouncements, Dr. Pauling, winner of the 1954 Nobel prize for
research in molecular chemistry, stressed the dangers of radioactive
fallout resulting from nuclear testing.

Voices in the Congress
Various congressmen also urged that the United States should
seek a test ban of some sort. In June Senator Mike Mansfield, a
25See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy,
p. 154; Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (1960),
pp. 86-89; and Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 31-34.
26For the reaction of one Administration official see Lewis L. Strauss,
Men and Decisions (1962), pp. 416-17.
27Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April 1957), p.
138.
28See ibid., Vol. XIII, No. 7 (September 1957), pp. 264-66.
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member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed that a
summit conference should be held on halting tests of large nuclear
weapons. That same month, Representative Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, recommended that the United States might
unilaterally halt such tests to alleviate the problem of fallout. In July,
Representative Sterling Cole, another member of the Special Subcommittee, made a similar proposal. The recommendations by
Representatives Holifield and Cole-Democrat and Republican respectively-were especially noteworthy because they were made
immediately after their Subcommittee had conducted an extensive
public hearing on the dangers of radioactive fallout. 29 During the
year, the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations explored the issue of a test ban, and in November, the Chairman, Hubert H. Humphrey, suggested in a letter to
President Eisenhower that the United States should:
. . . declare its willingness to negotiate separately on a
ban on nuclear weapons tests for a 2-year period with the
only condition being agreement on an effective inspection
system with United Nations supervision to insure that the
ban is being scrupulously observed. 30
Although President Eisenhower's reply was noncommittal,81 he
obviously had to take these pressures into account. Thus, the Administration was being pushed by powerful international and domestic forces toward agreeing to some limited accord for the cessation
of nuclear weapon tests.
New Tasks for Nuclear Weapons
However, other influential factors worked in a different direction. Although by this time the United States had abandoned "massive retaliation" as a conceptual basis for its military doctrine-if
2 9U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Hearings: The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its
Effects on Man, 3 parts, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1958).
sou.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments: Final Report,
85th Congress, 2d Session (1958), p. 34.
31Jbid.
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it indeed had ever accepted this concept in its bald outline32-it
still relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet expansionist
moves. The Air Force, and within it the Strategic Air Command,
continued to receive the largest share of the defense budget. Moreover, by 1957 nuclear weapons were also being thought of as important elements in the armament of American tactical forces.
Thus, a test ban might inhibit developments of potential importance
for both the strategic and tactical forces of the United States. This
raised the fundamental issue of the effects of a nuclear test ban on
the distribution of military power.
At the time, American scientists were working on the development of so-called "clean" weapons, which would produce little or no
radioactive fallout. In general terms, since fission (the splitting of
atoms) results in the release of radioactive products, while fusion
(the joining together of atoms) does not, other things being equal,
the radioactive fallout resulting from a nuclear weapon depends
upon the relative extent to which fission and fusion processes contribute to the energy of the weapon. 88 Making a "clean" bomb therefore depends upon minimizing the proportion of the energy of the
weapon derived from fission and maximizing that derived from
fusion. Such weapons could be of special importance in defense
against a nuclear-missile attack and in tactical situations. In addition, the scientists were attempting to improve the yield-to-weight
ratio of nuclear weapons, a development which would have general
utility, but which would probably have greater significance for the
United States than for the Soviet Union, since in the immediate
future Soviet missiles would have greater thrust and therefore
greater carrying capacity.
This work was outlined in secret testimony before the Military
Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, which was headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, on June
82Jnsufficient attention has been paid to the differences between John
Foster Dulles' speech before the New York Council on Foreign Relations
and his subsequent article, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 353-64. In the latter, he stated a position which was not too different from that of many of his limited war or
graduated deterrence critics, see especially pp. 358-59.
sasee U.S. Department of Defense, Samuel Glasstone (ed.), The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1962, revised edition), pp. 414 ff.
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24, 1957, by three scientists from the Livermore Radiation Laboratory of the University of California, Ernest 0. Lawrence, Mark M.
Mills, and Edward Teller. 34 The members of the Subcommittee were
particularly impressed with the concept of a neutron bomb which
the scientists advanced. This weapon would have a relatively low
yield and would have its greatest use in battlefield situations. It
would be produced by tailoring the energy of a fusion explosion so
that its primary product would be a burst of neutrons, instead of
heat and blast. This burst would operate as a kind of death ray,
doing almost no physical damage and leaving no contamination,
but immediately destroying all life in the target area. Since this
weapon would not produce fallout, there was no contradiction between the interest which certain Congressmen, such as Representative Holifield, displayed in it, and their position with reference to
discontinuing tests of high yield, "dirty" weapons. The Subcommittee
members arranged for the scientists to present their concept to
President Eisenhower the following day. That the President was
impressed can be seen by comparing his remarks on a test ban at
his news conferences on June 19 and June 26. 35 On the latter occasion his support of an agreed cessation of further tests was a bit
more cautious and qualified.
In addition to these factors, several policy-makers had the
suspicion that the Soviet Union's demand that further testing be
stopped was merely a continuation of its "ban the bomb" campaign.
They thought that the Soviet Union would regard a test ban as a
prelude to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and that the
whole campaign was merely an effort to render ineffective the
American superiority in nuclear weapons while preserving Soviet
preponderance in conventional arms. There was sufficient evidence
to give this interpretation some plausibility. During his opening
statement in the General Assembly in September 1957, Soviet
Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, in listing the advantages of
a temporary cessation of nuclear weapons tests, asserted that it
would constitute "a first practical step towards the main goal-the
absolute and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen
34See Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss,"
Fortune, Vol. LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), pp. 122-25, 155-62, at 156, and
New York Times, June 25, 1957, p. 1, June 25, 1961, p. 1.
35See New York Times, June 20, 1957, p. 18, and June 27, 1957, p. 10.
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weapons. " 36 The same thought, in almost identical phraseology, was
contained in the preamble to the draft resolution on this issue which
the USSR submitted to the twelfth Assembly. 37
For all of these reasons a number of high officials, such as
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, several members of the Commission, and Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Wilson, argued that a test cessation without other measures of arms control would be harmful to American security interests. However, some individuals in this group, for instance
Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, would have been willing to have
the United States forego testing high yield nuclear weapons in the
interest of reducing the effects of fallout. The argument that no test
ban could be considered unless it were linked with other measures
of arms control was pressed forcefully within the Administration,
and carried the day, but curiously it was not articulated clearly or
effectively in public until a later time.

The NATO Interest
Significant international factors were pressing in a similar direction. The attitude of France has already been mentioned. On a
more general level, the Western alliance was just as dependent upon
American strategic nuclear power as was the United States. Moreover, in 1957 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was in the
midst of what proved to be a series of crises concerning its strategic doctrine. NATO strategy had always been based on the concept of the "sword" and the "shield"; the "sword" being the
strategic forces of the United Kingdom and the United States, and
the "shield," local forces within Europe. Although the local forces
had never been brought up to a level which military planners considered adequate to counter the opposing Eastern forces, until the
middle nineteen-fifties there had been general confidence that the
superior strategic capability of the United States would deter an
attack. With the growth of the USSR's strategic capacity, this
confidence gradually began to wane. Many felt that the USSR could
36UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (12th
Session), p. 33. See also V. V. Kuznetsov's statements in the Politic1tl Committee, UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (12th
Session), pp. 97, 135.
37UN Document A/3674 and Rev. 1.
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neutralize NATO's "sword," and that then Europe would be left
with only a flimsy "shield."
Since the NATO powers, for a variety of reasons, appeared
to be unwilling to raise the level of local forces-indeed, in 1957
there were even cutbacks-there was considerable groping for some
method of restoring confidence. One idea was that arming the local
forces with tactical nuclear weapons might make up for the gap in
numbers, and the NATO Council authorized such action in December 1954. However, because the United States alone could make
such weapons and because the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 prohibited the transfer of such weapons from American control, only
American troops in Europe received such armaments. Another problem was that the tactical nuclear weapons then in existence, if used,
could well contaminate large areas of Europe; hence the attractiveness of a neutron bomb.
A second idea for strengthening NATO was dispersing strategic
capabilities among more NATO members. 38 NATO began to move
in this direction in December 1957 when the NATO Council,
consisting, for this meeting, of the heads of governments, decided to
establish stocks of nuclear warheads in Europe and to put intermediate range ballistic missiles at the disposal of the Supreme Allied
Commander. Again because of the provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act, the warheads would remain in the control of American forces;
the missiles, however, could be given to non-American troops.
Neither solution was totally satisfactory. Both left Europeans
dependent on American willingness to use nuclear weapons, and
many doubted even at that time that, short of an attack on the
United States, an American President would actually take such a
decision, even though at the December meeting President Eisenhower promised that he would do so. Therefore, the crisis concerning NATO strategy created pressures both for the development of
clean weapons and for the dispersal of nuclear weapons, either by
independent weapons programs, as in the case of France, or by
transfer of knowledge or the actual weapons themselves. As early
38For cogent expressions of this proposal see Hans Speier, German
Rearmament and Atomic War (1957), pp. 227-34, and Hans Speier, "Soviet
Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," World Politics, Vol.
IX, No. 3 (April 1957), pp. 307-28.
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as April 1957, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared that Germany
should be allowed to have tactical nuclear weapons for its own
defense. 39 During the year other NATO political leaders stated that
all NATO forces should be so armed, and there was some discussion
of the creation of a NATO strategic force. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, in an article which was published in the October
1957 issue of Foreign Affairs, indicated that he was considering
these possibilities. 40 On the twenty-fifth of that month in a joint
statement President Eisenhower promised Prime Minister Macmillan
that he would ask Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act so as
to permit a "close and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries."41 These developments explain why the Western powers
included in their first stage package proposal submitted to the
London Disarmament Subcommittee on August 29, 1957, provisions
which would have allowed the transfer of nuclear weapons.
To summarize the situation as it stood at the end of 1957,
although there were powerful international and domestic pressures
favoring an attempt to negotiate an arms control agreement covering
only a cessation of nuclear weapons tests, there were also strong
policy considerations pushing American policy-makers in a different
direction. Presumably, the USSR's leaders were also subject to
domestic and international pressures, but any analysis along these
lines would be beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that
during 1957 Nikita S. Khrushchev seemed to be moving toward the
consolidation of his power, Messrs. Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov,
and Shepilov were dropped from their party and governmental posts
as a result of a meeting of the Central Committee in late June, and
Marshall Zhukov suffered the same fate in October and November.
It was impossible to know the actual meaning of these events, but
in the West they were widely interpreted as heralding a victory for
the advocates of a moderate policy.
39Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1957
(1957), p. 98.
40"Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. XXXVI, No. I (October 1957), pp. 25-43, at 30-33.
41U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 959 (November 11, 1957), p. 740.

32

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

N

A New Base for Scientists in the White House
The Science Adviser and PSAC
Government organizations and procedures also affect the substance
of policy. Since key decision-makers cannot help but be influenced
by their immediate advisers, the question of access is crucial. Significantly, the formal arrangements for the participation of scientists
in the policy process within the United States government were
altered in late 1957, and a new group of scientists was given immediate access to the President. This change is an important element
of the background for the Geneva test ban negotiations.
The change actually came about as a response to two spectacular Soviet scientific feats. On October 4, as a part of its participation in the International Geophysical Year, the USSR launched the
first earth satellite, Sputnik I. About a month later, on November 3,
the Soviet Union launched the half-ton, dog-carrying Sputnik II.
These accomplishments were impressive evidence of Soviet scientific
capabilities. They also had ominous connotations, for they indicated
that the USSR led the West in the development of ballistic missiles.
Westerners were hardly reassured when the Soviet Union announced
on October 7 that it had successfully tested a powerful hydrogen
warhead of a new design. Soviet leaders emphasized that their missiles could easily carry such warheads.
In an effort to restore confidence in American capabilities,
President Eisenhower made a special telecast on November 7. After
recounting American military strength and scientific prowess, the
President admitted that there were certain deficiencies, and he proclaimed that science and technology would receive greater emphasis
in the future governmental programs. As a first step, he appointed
James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
Several days later, the President announced that the membership
of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) would be enlarged and that the Committee would
become a part of the White House Office on December 1. This
Committee, which consisted of nongovernment scientists sitting on
a part-time basis with certain government administrators serving
as consultants, had been appointed by President Truman in 19 51. 42
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Dr. Killian had been a member of the group, and with the administrative change, he became its Chairman. In the past, however,
the Committee had had access to the President only through the
Director of ODM; now it was in a quite different position.
The effect of these decisions was to introduce a new group of
scientists into the highest levels of the policy-making process within
the United States. 43 Of course many scientists had had access to
those levels previously, but in the mid-nineteen-fifties they had
principally been those who were directly connected with the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. Although the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) contained a wide
range of views, there were clearly some members who held opinions
different from those which had previously been heard within the
inner circles of the Eisenhower Administration.
Thus, when the issue of further testing of nuclear weapons
came up again, as it was certain to, given the course of the past
negotiations and the current of international and domestic pressures, the President would have scientists on his own staff to turn
to for advice and would be confronted with new positions and
viewpoints. With this development, the stage was set for the first
act of the nuclear test ban negotiations.
42For a general description of the evolution of the role of scientific
advisers in the policy process in the United States see J. Stefan Dupre and
Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (1962), pp.
64-77.
43The initial members of PSAC were Dr. Robert F. Bacher, Dr. William
0. Baker, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk,
Dr. James H. Doolittle, Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, Dr. James
R. Killian, Jr., Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel
R. Piore, Dr. Edward M. Purcell, Dr. Isador I. Rabi, Dr. H. P. Robertson,
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Dr. Herbert York, and Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias. All
but seven of the eighteen were physicists. The seven who were not were
Baker (physical chemistry), Bronk (physiology, biophysics), Doolittle (aviator), Haskins (physiology, genetics), Killian (administration), Kistiakowsky
(chemistry), and Wiesner (electrical engineering). In Robert Gilpin's terms, the
"finite containment school" scientists now had access to the Eisenhower Administration comparable to that which those of the "infinite containment
school" had had (American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 17677). Although his categorization can be criticized as oversimplified, the
broad point in this case is certainly valid. For confirmation by a knowledgeable and sensitive journalist see Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in
the United States Government," in Donald G. Brennan (ed.) Arms Control,
Disarmament and National Security (1961), pp. 379-90, at 384-85.

Chapter III

The Conference of Experts
I

The Context-1958
The developments which began to take shape in 1957 continued
their course with little change in the first half of 1958, and predetermined in large measure both the nature of the next negotiating
forum and the subject matter for the negotiations.
Due to the refusal by the Soviet Union to accept the new
composition of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, there
was no agreed forum for continuing arms control and disarmament
negotiations. In mid-February the Japanese government began to
explore with other governments the possibility of convening a
meeting of the Disarmament Commission, but this initiative was
abandoned when on March 14, the USSR reiterated its refusal to
participate in the Commission as long as the majority of its members belonged to Western military alliances. The impasse thus remained and could not be broken within the context of the decisions
of the twelfth Assembly.
The pressure against the testing of nuclear weapons also continued unabated. Indeed, on the first day of 1958, the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference, meeting in Cairo, adopted a declaration
which among other things called for a cessation of further tests. 1
On January 13, Linus Pauling presented his petition urging an
immediate accord to halt tests, now signed by more than nine thousand scientists from forty-three countries, to the Secretary General
of the United Nations. On February 1, The Council of the Federation of American Scientists adopted a statement favoring a test ban
which would cover even the smaller nuclear weapons and asserting
that an appropriate control system could easily be established. 2
ISee New York Times, January 2, 1958, p. 2.
2Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (March 1958), p.
125.
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From the point of view of the American Administration, perhaps the most significant pressure was that engendered by Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament. This group
held a series of hearings in February, March, and April, which will
be considered in detail later, to explore the question of a nuclear
test ban. Although the Subcommittee ostensibly approached the
matter without a prior commitment to any position, at least some
of the Senators clearly thought that the hearings should serve
primarily to demonstrate the feasibility of developing a control
mechanism for policing a test ban and also the wisdom of attempting
to negotiate a separate agreement on this issue. The Chairman,
Senator Humphrey, had, after all, written to the President urging
such a course as early as November 1957. Senator Humphrey
obtained strong support for his views in the hearings from Senators
Stuart Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and a leading Congressional expert on military affairs, and Clinton Anderson,
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
On the other hand, the forces which operated in the opposite
direction also continued unabated. Some scientists and policymakers asserted that further testing would result in breakthroughs
for "defensive" weapons, and in discoveries that would lead to
important peacetime uses of nuclear energy. In the latter connection, the Atomic Energy Commission, which was consistently concerned lest a test ban impair weapons development, now also
stressed the importance of its Project Plowshare, a continuing series
of experiments designed to explore the peaceful uses of nuclear
explosions for such purposes as building harbors or canals. It is
important to realize that there has always been a significant link
between the Plowshare experiments and the attempt to achieve
"clean" bombs or neutron weapons, for using nuclear detonations
as a means of excavation would be practical only if one could
minimize the radioactivity resulting from the detonation. Planners
in Project Plowshare have always counted on the availability of
"clean" bombs. 3 Put in another fashion, the Plowshare experiments could have been in the very forefront of nuclear weapons
SSee Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (1963),
p. 123.
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research since they involved minimizing the amount of fission
products in nuclear explosions.
Edward Teller, at that time Associate Director of the University of California Radiation Laboratory, was the most forceful
and articulate· exponent of the case for further testing. Although
he expounded his views in various forums, his most complete exposition was in a book entitled Our Nuclear Future, 4 which he wrote
jointly with Albert Latter, a physicist employed by the RAND
Corporation, an independent research organization supported principally by contracts from the Air Force. In their book, the two
men minimized the danger of radioactive fallout, and argued the
need for continued testing.
So far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was concerned, the events of early 1958 were a logical outgrowth of the
decisions of the previous fall. In pursuance of these decisions
atomic weapons were to be stocked on the territory of certain
NATO countries, under the custody and control of United States
military forces, to be turned over to NATO forces on the outbreak
of hostilities at the direction of the President. Selected NATO
countries were to be furnished missiles to which the atomic warheads might be attached, although the warheads would remain
in American custody until the President authorized their transfer.
Thus the actual use of the nuclear components of the weapon
systems was to be dependent on an American decision.
The implementation of this plan was impossible under existing
United States legislation. Consequently, the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 was amended on July 2, 1958.5 The amended act authorized
the · transfer of the non-nuclear parts of atomic weapon systems
and the communication of sufficient information to enable nonUnited States forces to handle atomic warheads, attach them to
missiles, and monitor them prior to launching. The non-nuclear
parts of atomic weapon systems could be transferred only to an
individual nation and subject to the condition that "such transfer
will not contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapon
design, development, or fabrication capability." Information could
4Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts,
Dangers, and Opportunities (1958).
5J>ublic Law 479, 85th Cong.; 72 Stat. 276 (1958).
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be communicated either to a nation or to a regional defense organization such as NATO.
Another important innovation of the amended act was the authorization to transfer nuclear material for use in atomic weapons and
non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, and to communicate design
information required for the fabrication of the nuclear core and
assembly of the weapon. However, such cooperation could be
undertaken only if the recipient nation had "made substantial
progress in the development of atomic weapons."
Congress intended to limit the benefits of these provisions to
the United Kingdom through this caveat. Although Congress clearly
did not wish to encourage additional nations to achieve production
capability, the caveat in a sense put a premium on developing independent production capability and may have served as a goad to
the French nuclear weapons program. In addition, it probably
added to General de Gaulle's bitterness toward the "Anglo-Saxons"
at a time when, restored to power in the context of a military
rebellion, the General began to shape a program for his Fifth
Republic in which an independent force de frappe was to play a
crucial role.
On July 3, the day after the amended act came into effect,
the United States and the United Kingdom signed an Agreement
for Cooperation. 6 This agreement authorized the communication of
information concerning non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems
and information concerning nuclear reactors for military purposes.
It also authorized the transfer of a nuclear submarine propulsion
unit with its nuclear fuel. The following year the agreement was
amended and the United Kingdom was in effect authorized to receive all of the component parts of an atomic weapon except its
fabricated core. 7 Agreements for cooperation concerning military
applications of nuclear energy as permitted under the 1958 amendments were also signed with Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Fr11nce, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. 8
6U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts
Series No. 4078 (1958).
7U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts
Series No. 4267 (1959).
Bfbid., Nos. 4271, 4276, 4268, 4292, 4764, 4277, and 4278. A second
agreement was signed with France in 1961: ibid., No. 4876.
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While their provisions varied, none provided for an extensive collaboration as did the Anglo-American accord.
During the spring of 1958, NATO planners laid the groundwork for the employment on NATO bases of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles which would be equipped for nuclear
warheads, and in June the first consignment of Redstone missiles
was shipped to Europe for stationing in West Germany. 9 The first
shipment of Thor missiles for delivery to the United Kingdom
forces was received in September 1958. But these actions could
hardly be called more than the implementation of the joint United
States-United Kingdom communique of October 1957 and the
NATO Council decision in December of that year. Moreover, they
did not involve dispersing nuclear weapons capability to "nth countries." Whether or not they adequately anticipated the new role of
continental Western Europe restored in its economic and political
power, though, is another question.
Because of the nature of these decisions NATO continued to
be plagued by a crisis concerning its strategic doctrine. Nothing had
been done to raise the level of the Alliance's conventional forces
and thus to increase its capability to defend itself without resort to
nuclear weapons; little had been done to increase the participation
of the continental allies in the general policy-making within NATO;
and the defense of Europe by nuclear weapons continued to depend on either an American or a British decision to use such
weapons-a situation which was to prove entirely unacceptable to
France and which had already and would continue to cause considerable concern elsewhere on the continent. Furthermore, the
nuclear weapons then available if employed in Europe would cause
so much contamination that they would have limited usefulness in
tactical situations. The crisis in military planning in NATO therefore created two pressures against the cessation of nuclear weapons
tests. First, it tended to provide an added argument for the French
program to develop an independent nuclear capability, which, given
the legal and other inhibitions against the transfer of nuclear weapons, probably could not be achieved without testing. Secondly, it
also provided an argument for the development of "clean" nuclear
9See New York Times, June 4, 1958, p. 13.
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weapons, and possibly a neutron bomb, which presumably would
also require continued tests.
In summary, in early 1958, American policy-makers were
faced with roughly the same pressures and factors operating for
and against the continued testing of nuclear weapons as they had
been in 1957.
II

The Development of American Policy
The Correspondence Between Heads of States
In the months immediately preceding the Conference of Experts,
American policy concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons tests
was expressed principally in a series of exchanges of correspondence
between President Eisenhower and the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai A. Bulganin until March 1958 and
Nikita S. Khrushchev thereafter.
Within the United States government this exchange was treated
primarily as an exercise in communications. The principal criterion
determining what should be said appears to have been the estimated impact of a given position on public opinion. In the process,
decisions were made which resulted in quite far-reaching and perhaps unforeseen consequences. American policy, as expressed in
this exchange of letters, was not based on any considered and
agreed position with respect to the interests of the United States,
as was for instance the later decision to continue the 1958 American test series, nor was there any contingency planning concerning
what the United States would do if certain of its proposals were
adopted.
The exchange began with a letter which Chairman Bulganin
sent to President Eisenhower on December 10, 1957.1° In it, Bulganin dwelt at length on the dangers which he felt would result
from dispersing nuclear weapons, and especially those which he
foresaw if West Germany were to be armed with nuclear weapons.
His comments were clearly aimed at the agenda of the NATO
Council meeting. After reviewing the state of disarmament negotiations, he made a variety of proposals, of which the following were
lOU.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 970 (January
27, 1958), pp. 127-30.
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the most important for the issue of nuclear testing. First he suggested that the three nuclear powers should agree to stop further
tests of nuclear weapons as of January 1, 1958, for a period of
from two to three years. Secondly, he proposed that no nuclear
weapons should be stationed in Germany, either the Eastern or the
Western portion. He stated that if the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Democratic Republic of Germany would agree neither to
produce nuclear weapons nor to have them stationed on their territory, Czechoslovakia and Poland would also take similar action.
Finally, Chairman Bulganin suggested that these matters could all
be resolved at a summit conference, and he stated his willingness
to have a personal meeting with President Eisenhower.
The President did not reply immediately, and his answer came
in sections. Indirectly, he gave a partial answer through his proposals at the NATO Council meeting, which, as we have seen,
eventually involved stationing nuclear warheads for missiles in
Europe, including Western Germany, although these would remain
under American control. In addition, on December 15, he stated the
American position on nuclear testing in a letter addressed to Prime
Minister Nehru. 11 The essence of his statement is contained in this
excerpt:
I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to
stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied by any assurances that other measures-which
would go to the heart of the problem-would follow. We
are at a stage when testing is required particularly for the
development of important defensive uses of these weapons.
To stop these tests at this time, in the absence of knowledge that we can go on and achieve effective limitations
on nuclear weapons production and other elements of
armed strength, as well as a measure of assurance against
surprise attack, is a sacrifice which we could not in prudence accept. To do so could increase rather than diminish the threat of aggression and war. I believe that bolder
and more far-reaching measures are required. Specifically,
I believe that any government which declares its desire to
agree not to use nuclear weapons should, if they are sincere, be prepared to agree to bring an end to their pro11U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 967 (January
6, 1958), pp. 17-18.
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duction. Agreement to devote all future production of
fissionable material to peaceful uses is, as I see it, the
most important step that can be taken. Together with this
we have proposed that we begin to transfer to peaceful
uses, on a fair and equitable basis, fissionable material
presently tied up in stocks of nuclear weapons.
It is difficult to measure the difference between President Eisen-

hower's statement and the Western position at the conclusion of
the London session of the disarmament Subcommittee in August
of the same year. The President implied in his letter that a test
cessation might be a first step in a series of measures, but-as in the
Western position in London-he clearly insisted on linking a test
ban with an agreement for a cut-off on the production of weapons,
and perhaps with an accord on transferring fissionable material
from weapons stockpiles. The extent to which he contemplated
links with other measures of disarmament was not clear.
Finally, on January 12, 1958, President Eisenhower sent a
formal reply to Chairman Bulganin. 12 The only new element in
this letter was the President's statement of his unwillingness to
attend a summit meeting without proper preparatory work. He
mentioned in particular the need for a meeting of Foreign Ministers, and repeated the suggestion that technical groups from East
and West should meet together to discuss appropriate control
mechanisms.
This reply can be properly understood only in the context of
earlier events. President Eisenhower had been greatly encouraged
by his first summit meeting with the Soviet leaders in Geneva in
1955. At least partly because of this euphoria, he was bitterly disappointed when the agreements in principle reached at Geneva
dissolved into thin air. As a result, he became even more skeptical
of Soviet motivation in seeking agreement with the West, and was
determined that the 1955 experience should not be repeated.
Other letters were exchanged in February and March, but
they were essentially restatements of points made in the original
exchange. Perhaps the most important new element concerning the
general positions of the two powers on arms control and disarmament measures related to another aspect of military activities. In a
12U.S. Department of State, Publication No. 7008, Historical Office,
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959. (1960), 2 vols., Vol. II, pp. 932-41.
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letter of March 3, Chairman Bulganin stated that the questions of
limiting the uses of outer space to peaceful purposes and the liquidation of foreign military bases had to be considered together. 13
This point was also made in a proposal concerning outer space
which the Soviet Union submitted on March 15 for consideration
by the thirteenth General Assembly the following fall. In submitting
this proposal, the Soviet Union stole a march on the United States,
for although American spokesmen had said that some international
action was necessary with respect to the use of outer space, the
United States had not advanced any concrete proposal. Although
these matters may seem rather remote from the issue of nuclear
testing, they were relevant.
In considering military policy, and in thinking about arms
control or disarmament, it is necessary to consider the means of
delivering explosives as well as the explosives themselves. The
revolution that has taken place in military technology since the
outbreak of the Second World War has involved both of these
aspects. Not only has the explosive power of weapons been increased vastly, but new carriers have also been invented which
have greatly shortened the time that it takes for a weapon to reach
its target. The developments with respect to carriers have had almost as frightening implications as those concerning explosives, for
they have narrowed reaction times to dangerously short periods.
The maximum warning time for a country under attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles would be about fifteen minutes. In
such circumstances there would be little time for rational consideration. Decision-makers would have to respond quickly or risk
the possibility of losing a substantial share of their forces. Since
controlling the uses of outer space implied controlling the development of missiles as carriers of explosives, this issue concerned the
other part of the revolution in military technology, and thus was
relevant to attempts to deal with nuclear explosives.
The Debate About Linking a Test Ban with Other Measures of
Arms Control
In March 1958, then, it was obvious that if there were to
be any progress in arms control negotiations, compromises would
13U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 (April
21, 1958), pp. 648-52.
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have to be made. Soine agreement would have to be reached concerning the negotiating forum, and the gap between the two substantive positions would have to be narrowed. So far as the
American position was concerned, the question of linking a test
ban agreement with an agreement on a production cut-off and
other measures of arms control was subjected to intense scrutiny
for the purpose of discovering whether some compromise might
be possible. Although this debate occurred in many places, it was
conducted in public principally before Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament.
On February 28, the opening day of the Subcommittee's hearings, Harold Stassen, whose resignation as Special Assistant to the
President for Disarmament had only recently been accepted, advocated a test ban as a separate measure. 14 He argued that the
control requirements for a test ban agreement were not very great
and that such an agreement could therefore be negotiated with
relative ease. He felt that a test ban agreement, in that it would do
something to break the spiral of the arms race and would therefore
hopefully have the effect of increasing confidence, might well be an
important first step toward achieving other measures of arms control and disarmament. In subsequent sessions of the Subcommittee
some of the problems of maintaining a link between a test ban and
other measures of disarmament were brought out.
On March 12, for example, in response to questioning, Dr.
Spofford English of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that to
police a cut-off on the production of nuclear weapons in the Soviet
Union three thousand to thirty-five hundred inspectors would have
to be stationed on Soviet territory, and he asserted that under a
cut-off agreement there could be no secret information with respect
to nuclear energy. 15 In addition, the point was made several times
in the hearings that there was no way of ascertaining with complete
certainty the exact size and location of the stockpiles of nuclear
weapons then in existence, since such weapons could be hidden
14U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments,
85th Congress, 2d Session (1958), pp. 1335-64.
15Jbid., pp. 1420, 1423. Jules Moch presented a much smaller estimate
to the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission in
1957. See UN Document DC/SC. 1/PV. 131, pp. 11-15.
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with relative ease. Thus, it would be almost impossible to police
an agreement concerning the transfer of fissionable materials from
weapons stockpiles if the object of such an agreement were the reduction and ultimate elimination of the stockpiles. One would never
know what the starting point was.
On the other hand, the ease with which a test ban alone could
be policed was brought out on several occasions. In his testimony,
Harold Stassen estimated that eleven or twelve stations in the Soviet
Union would be sufficient.l 6 Later, Professor Harrison Brown, of
the California Institute of Technology, estimated that only ten stations would be needed in the USSR, while Professor Jay Orear, of
Columbia University, who had just completed a special study for
Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies,17 held
that twenty-five would be required. 18
Whatever number one chose, it seemed clear that the control
measures needed to police a test ban would not be very extensive.
Thus the impression was given that linking a test ban with a production cut-off and possibly a transfer from stockpiles was irrational,
in that it meant joining a measure which did not require very
much control with others which required extensive control and
concerning which, therefore, agreement was unlikely. Clearly, this
was the impression that Senator Humphrey at least had sought to
create.
In the hearings the various witnesses connected with the
Atomic Energy Commission-the Chairman, Admiral Lewis L.
Strauss; Commissioner W. F. Libby; Brigadier General Alfred D.
Starbird; and Dr. Spofford G. English-all strongly defended the
link. They argued that it was the production of nuclear weapons,
not their testing that was dangerous for world peace. In addition,
they held that the knowledge which would be derived from further
testing would be of greater benefit to the defensive side in a future
conflict and thus in their view would be more useful to the United
States than to the Soviet Union. For some unexplained reason,
they never made the obvious point that if a test ban were achieved
without a production cut-off, the Soviet Union could continue to
16Jbid., pp. 1351-52.
17See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (1958),
pp. 85-99.
IBHearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, p. 1495.
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enlarge its stockpile with the possibility that eventually it might
equal or surpass that of the United States, thus wiping out this
element of American superiority. Interestingly, no one from the
Departments of State or Defense testified before the Subcommittee
during these hearings. Therefore, the representatives of the Atomic
Energy Commission were the only Administration witnesses. One
could infer from the absence of the State Department spokesmen
that Mr. Dulles was not very strongly interested in the issue at this
time.

The Soviet Cessation of Testing
On balance, those who favored eliminating the link probably
made the better case in public, but this was only one contributing
factor in the evolution of American policy. A more important
element-which, however, played on the same public sentimentswas a step taken by the USSR. On March 22, the Soviet Union
concluded an extensive test series which it had begun the previous
fall. This series had been conducted at an unprecedented rate,
with two or more nuclear explosions sometimes being detonated in
a single day. Professor Hans A. Bethe, a physicist from Cornell
University, who for some time had headed the Atomic Energy
Commission's scientific panel which reviewed the effects of Soviet
nuclear weapons tests, alleged that the pace was determined so
that the series would be completed before the United States began
its planned 1958 tests. 19 As a consequence of the Soviet test series,
radioactivity levels rose sharply in the spring of 1958. While the
Soviet test series was in progress, it was largely kept secret within
the USSR. After it was finished, however, on March 31, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree resolving "to discontinue the testing
of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Soviet Union. " 20
The decree also contained an appeal to the other nuclear powers to
follow a similar course and the warning that if they did not, the
Soviet Union would feel free to resume its own testing program.
Chairman Khrushchev restated the appeal on April 4 in a personal
letter to President Eisenhower.
19Jbid., p. 1545.
20U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, /945-1959,
Vol. II, p. 979.
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The USSR's action won worldwide public acclaim and put the
United States in a difficult position, especially since it was just about
to begin an extensive test series. President Eisenhower's dismissal
of the Soviet move, in his press conference of April 2, as a "gimmick" that should not be "taken seriously," only served to cornpound the situation.21 A day earlier Secretary of State Dulles had
admitted that the USSR had at least scored a "certain propaganda
victory. " 22
It was probably extremely difficult for Mr. Dulles to make
this admission. No Secretary of State enjoys admitting a propaganda
defeat, and in this case the unpleasantness was compounded by the
fact that Mr. Dulles had seen the problem corning, and had sought
to avoid it. Only a few days previously he had argued within the
Administration that the United States should itself unilaterally stop
testing, presumably because he had been forewarned that the Soviet
Union might take this initiative. 23 He argued his case principally in
terms of the standing of the United States in world public opinion.
His position was buttressed by his foreknowledge that a special
panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, which had
been appointed in January 1958 and which was headed by Hans
Bethe, would report its more or less unanimous view that a test
ban could be policed and that to stop testing at some point in the
near future would be in the best interests of the United States.

The Bethe Panel
The appointment of the so-called Bethe Panel was the result
of a discussion of the question of nuclear testing at a National
Security Council (NSC) meeting in early January. During the discussion Secretary of State Dulles made the point that the United
States was suffering propaganda losses because of its nuclear testing programs and expressed his fear that the United Nations
General Assembly might soon adopt a resolution condemning further testing, which he felt would prove extremely embarrassing to
21New York Times, April 3, 1958, p. 1.
22U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 (April
21, 1958), p. 642.
23Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," Fortune,
Vol. LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), p. 122, at 160. See also Secretary Dulles'
own account: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982
(April 21, 1958), p. 642.
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the United States. The President apparently shared his concerns.
At this juncture, James R. Killian, Jr., the recently appointed
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, whom the President
had invited to attend the NSC meeting, offered to have the President's Science Advisory Committee conduct a study of the issues
involved in banning nuclear weapon tests. In the late fall of 1957,
at one of its first meetings in its new incarnation, PSAC had already
begun a tentative exploration of some of the issues.
A few days after the NSC meeting Mr. Killian was directed
to appoint the Panel.2 4 In addition to Professor Bethe, the Panel
contained one other member of PSAC, Dr. Herbert York, then
Director of the University of California Radiation Laboratory at
Livermore. The other members of the Panel. were military officers
or civilian employees of the government. All members of the Panel
were actively involved in either the nuclear weapons development
or test detection programs. Although seismologists were available
to the Panel, no seismologist was a member, nor did the membership of PSAC include a seismologist. Ronald Spiers, a junior officer in Department of State, attended the sessions as an observer,
but this was the only connection which the Department of State
had. The Panel was asked to explore two questions: ( 1) what
would be the effect of a nuclear test ban on American and Soviet
weapons development programs; and (2) to what extent would it
be possible to detect evasions of a nuclear test ban.
In Professor Bethe's view, at the outset, the majority of the
Panel was highly skeptical of the advantages to be gained from a
nuclear test ban. Eventually, however, the members of the Panel
became persuaded that continued testing would ultimately result
in the Soviet Union's narrowing the United States' lead in the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. 25 Professor Bethe
probably held this view from the outset. In addition, unlike several
24The members of the Bethe Panel were Dr. Hans Bethe, Chairman;
Dr. Harold Brown; Major General Richard Coiner, USAF; General Herbert
Loper; Dr. Carson Mark; Mr. Doyle Northrup; Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.;
Dr. Roderick Spence; Brig. General Alfred Starbird; Col. Lester Woodward,
USAF; and Dr. Herbert York.
25The findings of the Bethe Panel have never been made public. It
seems reasonable to assume, however, that they are reflected in Professor
Bethe's testimony before the Humphrey Subcommittee on April 17; see
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other members of the Panel, he felt that the additional benefits to
be gained from further testing were minimal. To put his views in
proper perspective, it should be recalled that in 1950, at the time
of President Truman's controversial decision to proceed with the
development of the hydrogen bomb, Professor Bethe, along with
several other scientists, had signed a statement recommending that
the United States government pledge never to use hydrogen weapons
first, and that he had strongly recommended that the government
make every effort to reach an agreement with the USSR concerning
the control of nuclear weapons. 26 This had ranged him in that
debate opposite Edward Teller, perhaps the most ardent advocate
within the scientific community of the development of the hydrogen
bomb.

Formulating the Initial American Response
Within the counsels of the Administration, apparently Chairman Strauss and Donald Quarles countered Mr. Dulles' position
by arguing that important military advantages would be gained
from the forthcoming test series, a view shared by members of
PSAC, including Professor Bethe. In the end then it was decided
not to try to take preemptive action against a possible Soviet
initiative in this matter.
However, in the new setting the United States obviously had
to make some response to the Soviet move, and to Chairman
Khrushchev's letter of April 4. President Eisenhower's first reply,
on April 8, was essentially a restatement of the general American
position on arms control and disarmament issues, along with a
repetition of the January 12 suggestion that technical experts from
East and West should meet to discuss specific control measures. 27
It neither advanced the negotiations nor detracted from the Soviet
Union's propaganda advantage.
Hearings, supra note 14, pp. 1526-47. In addition, the findings of the Bethe
Panel have been analyzed in Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear
Weapons Policy, pp. 179-82; and in Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," supra note 23.
26See "Let Us Pledge Not to Use the H-Bomb First," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), p. 75; and Hans A. Bethe,
"The Hydrogen Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. VI, No. 4
(April 1950), pp. 99-104, 125.
27Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 982-85.
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Apparently, Secretary Dulles drafted the letter himself. When
the question was raised what would happen if the Soviet Union should
accept the proposal for technical discussions, he averred that this
was extremely unlikely, but that it was nevertheless a limited risk
which he was willing to accept. He apparently felt that if the Soviet
Union unexpectedly accepted the proposal, "the United States
would have a fresh opportunity to pin the Kremlin down to either
accepting an effective inspection system or rejecting it. The American propaganda position would benefit either way." 28
On April 22, Chairman Khrushchev sent another letter to
President Eisenhower. 29 The letter covered a range of points, but
centered particularly on the issues of a test cessation and measures
to guard against a surprise attack. With regard to the former,
Khrushchev argued that no international controls would be necessary to detect violations of a test ban, but that in any case the
Soviet Union had already agreed in principle to the establishment
of such controls. In response to the suggestion for a meeting of
technical experts, he asserted that it would be impossible for the
experts to contribute to the solution of the problem of disarmament unless agreement had been reached between governments. To
study the problem of control would simply delay matters. He also
restated the Soviet positions concerning aerial inspection zones and
controlling the uses of outer space.
Meanwhile, Professor Bethe had reported the conclusions of his
Panel to the President, and the President's Science Advisory Committee had retired to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to
reconsider the American position concerning a test cessation in
the light of the unilateral suspension by the USSR. They returned
with the recommendation that the planned test series should be
completed, but that after that, the United States could risk a test
suspension.

President Eisenhower Suggests a Conference of Experts
President Eisenhower's reply, dated April 28, to Chairman
Khrushchev's most recent missive, appears to have reflected this
advice and also the mounting pressure for a test suspension. 30
28Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 177.
29Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 996-1004.
30Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1006-7.
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Though quite brief, it clearly implied that United States policy was
in transition. The President repeated the suggestion for technical
studies, but this time in the specific context of an agreement to
suspend testing. This significant sentence came immediately after
the suggestion for technical studies: "Studies of this kind are the
necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into
effect." Although this was followed by the caveat that technical
studies would of course be without prejudice to the positions of
the two sides, it should have been clear that if the USSR agreed to
have a meeting of experts, and the experts reached an agreed conclusion on a control system, reservations or no, diplomatic negotiations on a test ban agreement would be inevitable, and that these
would be pursued separately from those on broader measures of
arms control and disarmament.
This letter was drafted in the Department of State and signed
by the President and dispatched without consulting the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission. Since the
suggestion for technical talks had been a part of the American
negotiating position since 1957, it was assumed-as it had been
in the case of the April 8 letter-that there was no need for additional clearance. The immediate problem facing those who drafted
the letter was to minimize the propaganda advantages which the
Soviet Union had won, and at the same time, to permit the United
States to continue its 1958 test series. The decision to continue
this series of weapons tests was the only agreed decision within the
Administration on the various issues involved. There were of course
previous negotiating positions, but no formal consideration was
given to the question of whether or not these were applicable to
the current situation. The lack of consultation in the drafting of
the President's reply prevented the development of an agreed
position within the Administration about what the United States
should and would do if the Soviet Union accepted his suggestion.
The implications of the proposal were not thought through.
Much to the surprise of most American policy-makers, Chairman Khrushchev in his next letter to the President on May 9, after
belittling the need for technical discussions, nevertheless agreed to
the proposal. 31 Thus the Soviet Union now chose to accept a
3IJbid., pp. 1036-41.
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proposal which it had rejected or ignored ever since the London
disarmament discussions and which reflected the Western emphasis
on a control system as a prerequisite for any test ban agreement.
American policy-makers could only speculate on the motivation
for this step by the Soviet Union. As they viewed it, several factors
conceivably could have had some infteunce. Having just completed
the test series which had advanced the Soviet weapons art, Soviet
leaders may have decided that a test ban agreement might be
worth exploring because it would prevent further American testing
and development of American weapons and because it might provide relief for the Soviet economy by slowing down the arms race
and perhaps leading to further disarmament measures which in
tum might reduce the chance of a nuclear war. The prospect of
continuing American superiority in nuclear weapons perhaps was
less objectionable in the light of Soviet advances in other weapons
areas, especially missiles. Moreover, the Soviet military apparently
displayed little interest in developing tactical nuclear weapons for
which continued testing would be required. Again, a generally
accepted test ban agreement might help to resolve the "nth
country" problem: both Germany and China might be less likely to
obtain a nuclear arsenal. In addition, a recognized US-USSR-UK
monopoly in nuclear weapons might point toward broader settlements among the three powers and a directorate-type sharing of
power which has always seemed to appeal to the Soviet Union.
The international pressures for a test ban mentioned earlier may
have had some limited impact on the Soviet government, and the
acceptance of President Eisenhower's proposal would obviously
strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as being both reasonable
and anxious to avoid further fallout pollution. To the extent that
President Eisenhower's proposal may have indicated Western willingness to take the test ban out of the disarmament package as a
concession to the Soviet view, and considering the character of the
proposed forum, it may have appeared worthwhile to test the West's
price in terms of a control system, or perhaps to try for an unpoliced ban. It was also possible to believe, however, that the
Soviet leaders merely hoped to maneuver the West into a temporary
test suspension, which could be used to cut the Western lead in
the development of nuclear weapons.
A further exchange of letters between the two heads of states
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ensued, and ultimately it was agreed that the Conference of Experts
should open on July 1 in Geneva and that the Conference should
consist of two panels of experts, one composed of specialists from
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, and
the other, of specialists from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Rumania. There was no consensus as to whether or
not agreement at the Conference would automatically commit governments to a test cessation; the USSR insisted that it would, but
the United States insisted that it would not.
Through the exchange of correspondence a new negotiating
forum was created. Significantly, East and West received equal
representation: the concept of parity for which the Soviet Union
had striven unsuccessfully in the United Nations and which the
Western powers had rejected in the twelfth Assembly only a few
months before, was now established. The Soviet Union apparently
viewed parity in representation as essential not only as an assurance
against being "outvoted" but also as a recognition of what it claimed
to be the new power relationship requiring equality in negotiations
between East and West.
Moreover, unlike the previous bodies for disarmament negotiations, the new forum was outside of the framework of the United
Nations, a development which caused Secretary General HammarskjOld great concern. As recently as April 2, the Secretary General
had argued that controlled disarmament would only be possible
through the instrumentality of the United Nations, 32 and as soon
as the Conference of Experts appeared likely, he offered the United
Nations' facilities and services. His offer was accepted and the
Conference of Experts as well as the subsequent diplomatic negotiations were held at the European headquarters of the UN and were
serviced by the UN Secretariat personnel. A personal representative
of the Secretary General attended all of the formal meetings. Although the Secretary General's representative at times played an
important role as an intermediary, there is no evidence that either
he or the Secretary General influenced the basic course of the
negotiations.
The establishment of the new negotiating forum outside the
United Nations was a logical consequence of the Soviet Union's
32New York Times, April 3, 1958, p. 4.
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refusal to negotiate in the UN Disarmament Commission as enlarged by the twelfth Assembly, and perhaps also of the endorsement by the same Assembly of the general Western position on
disarmament. It is also true, however, that moving outside the
United Nations' framework had certain attractions for the West.
Even in 1958 some in the West were beginning to be apprehensive
about the implications of the UN's expanded membership. Also,
serious negotiations usually require some privacy, which presumably
it would be more difficult to ensure in the UN. Finally, the problem of nuclear testing primarily concerned the three nuclear powers.
Although it may have been argued that the prestige of the United
Nations was adversely affected, it is difficult to identify any tangible
repercussions of the fact that the new forum was not created by the
UN or specifically approved by it. The General Assembly continued
to concern itself with the disarmament problem in its subsequent
sessions, and to attempt to affect the course of the negotiations.
One unique characteristic of the new negotiating forum deserves mention. International meetings of scientists arranged by
scientific societies and institutions are, of course, a common occurrence. Another pattern is suggested by the 1955 and 1958
international conferences on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
organized by the United Nations in Geneva, at which scientists as
members of governmental delegations exchanged and disseminated
technical information. Again, scientists have frequently served as
advisers to governmental delegations in the United Nations and
other bodies and at times have ac~ed themselves as governmental
delegates to technical international bodies and conferences. The
1958 Conference of Experts, however, represented the first instance
in which a group of scientists, under the rubric of a technical
investigation, was given an independent, specific negotiating task
which proved, as will be seen, of paramount importance as a link
in a chain of vital diplomatic negotiations.
Perhaps the implications of the new forum were not fully
apparent to all persons concerned in the spring of 1958. But as a
result of the modifications in the governmental positions mentioned
earlier, the stage was set for the first phase of test ban negotiations.
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Ill

Preparations for the Conference
The Western Panel of Experts
After the preliminary arrangements were settled, or at least underway, it was necessary for the four Western governments to agree
on the composition of the Western delegations. The Western panel
of experts was announced on June 20. It included three Americans:
Dr. James B. Fisk, then Vice-President of Bell Telephone Laboratories and a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee; Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a professor of physics at the California
Institute of Technology and a member of the President's Science
Advisory Committee; and Dr. Ernest 0. Lawrence, the Director of
the University of California Radiation Laboratory. The other members of the panel were: Sir John Cockroft, a Fellow of the Royal
Society; Sir William Penney, also a Fellow of the Royal Society;
Professor Yves Rocard, the Director of the Laboratory of Physics,
Ecole normale superieure de Paris; and Dr. Ormond Solandt, former
chairman of the Defense Research Board of Canada.
Dr. Fisk was appointed Chairman of the delegation. He was
a prominent physicist, who, like many other American senior
scientists, had had extensive administrative responsibilities for some
time. Except for two brief teaching assignments, and a period in
1947 and 1948 when he served as Director of Research for the
Atomic Energy Commission, he had spent most of his active career
with the Bell Telephone Laboratories, ·where he had been a VicePresident since 1954. He had been a member of the Science Advisory Committee since its formation.
A number of advisers were also assigned to the Western delegation. Among the Americans in this group were: university scientists
including Professor Hans Bethe, who had headed the special PSAC
panel, a number of scientists from government agencies and from
the two laboratories which were involved in weapons development (the University of California Radiation Laboratory in Livermore and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), and several of
the scientists responsible· for the operation of the United States
nuclear test detection system, which had been in existence since
1947. 33 The Atomic Energy Commission was kept informed of
developments through Captain John H. Morse, Jr., who was a
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Special Assistant to ABC's Chairman, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss.
In addition, there were three officers from the Department of State:
Donald Morris, a 28-year-old foreign affairs officer, who had joined
the Department in June 1957; Ronald I. Spiers, the Officer in
Charge of Disarmament Affairs, a Foreign Service Reserve Officer
Class 4, who was 33, and who had joined the Department in 1955,
after having spent five years with the Atomic Energy Commission;
and Thomas B. Larson, 43, Chief of the Division of Research for
the USSR and Eastern Europe, who as a Foreign Service Officer
Class 3, held the highest rank. The fact that a person of as junior
a rank as Class 4 was Officer in Charge of Disarmament Affairs
reflects the scant attention given to such matters in the Department
of State at that time.
In the selection of American scientists for service on the
delegation an attempt was made to maintain some balance between
the differing views in the scientific community on the wisdom of a
test ban agreement. However, this was largely a balance within the
center, for the scientists who took extreme positions on either side
were not represented. AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss had recommended that Edward Teller be made a member of the Western
delegation, but there was so much resistance to Dr. Teller that
Strauss withdrew the suggestion, and instead recommended Dr.
Lawrence. 34 James Killian recommended the other two American
members of the Western delegation to President Eisenhower. Although Dr. Bacher was somewhat favorably disposed toward a
nuclear test ban, he was certainly not as ardent an advocate as
33Jn addition to Professor Bethe, the other scientists were Harold
Brown, Associate Director, Livermore Laboratory; Perry Byerly, Director,
Seismographic Stations, University of California; Norman Haske!, Geophysics
Research Directorate, Air Force, Cambridge Research Center; Spurgeon M.
Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology; J. Carson Mark, Director, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory; Doyle Northrup, Technical Director, Office of Atomic
Energy, Department of Defense; George B. Olmstead, Assistant Technical
Director, Office of Atomic Energy, Department of Defense; Carl F. Romney,
Assistant Technical Director, Office of Atomic Energy, Department of De·
fense; Herbert Scoville, Jr., Consultant, President's Science Advisory Com·
mittee; and Anthony L. Turkevich, Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear
Studies, University of Chicago.
34Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 182.
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Hans Bethe, much less Linus Pauling. Dr. Fisk, the Chairman,
was regarded as being "neutral" on the issue.
This neatly contrived balance may have been upset somewhat
by the fact that Dr. Lawrence became seriously ill during the course
of the Conference. On the other hand, the other Livermore scientists
on the delegation maintained frequent cable and telephonic contact with Edward Teller in California.
The effort to obtain a balanced representation may be taken
in the first place as an indication of an awareness on the part of
the American policy-makers that for a variety of factors, which
will be discussed later, the technical investigation of the Conference
would in fact require exercise of judgment which would or could
be affected by the personal views of the scientists. In a delegation
acting under governmental instructions the effect of personal views
can be minimized if not eliminated. Not so in this "technical"
delegation which was to function with minimal instructions, and
which nevertheless was to grapple with problems that could not be
resolved by resorting exclusively to scientific facts and knowledge.
That the A9Jninistration felt it necessary to seek balanced membership testified also to the deep division within the American scientific
community regarding the wisdom of attempting to seek a test ban.
Thirdly, the Administration may well have had in mind the need
of ensuring widest possible support in the Congress and by the
public generally for whatever conclusions would be reached by
the Conference.
Unlike the American members, the two British scientists,
members of the Western delegation, as well as the British scientific
advisors, all held official government positions. They were connected with the Atomic Energy Authority, the United Kingdom
counterpart of the US Atomic Energy Commission, and their selection does not appear to have been affected by their personal views
on the desirability of a test ban.
The Eastern Panel of Experts
The Eastern panel of experts should be listed for purposes of
comparison. It included Yevgeni K. Fedorov, a corresponding
member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; N. N. Semenov,
an academician; I. Ye. Tamm, an academician; M. A. Sadovsky,
a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR;

The Conference of Experts

57

0. I. Leypunsky, a professor and doctor of physical-mathematical
sciences; I. P. Pasechnik, a scientific collaborator of the Academy
of Sciences of the USSR; K. Ye. Gubkin, a scientific collaborator
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; and Semen K. Tsarapkin,
chief of the section of international organizations, and member of
the Collegium of the Soviet Ministry. of Foreign Affairs. In addition, scientists from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania were
also included.
Dr. Fedorov, who served as Chairman and thus was Dr. Fisk's
counterpart, was a geophysicist and had been a member of the
Communist party since 1938. Since 1955 he had been Director of
the Institute for Applied Geophysics of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR. He had been deeply involved in the Soviet sputnik
program and had been a prominent Soviet representative in the
International Geophysical Year. In 1958 he published a book
entitled Rockets and Artificial Earth Satellites in Investigation
of the Upper Atmosphere and the following year another entitled
Weather Control. Interestingly, his earlier publications included
The Red Army: An Army of the People (1944) and a novel, Concerning the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (1939).
His scientific colleagues on the panel were an impressive group.
Dr. Semenov was the USSR's first Nobel prize winner. Tamm, the
only Soviet delegate who was not a member of the Communist
party, was a distinguished physicist; however, his actual role in the
Conference was relatively slight. Dr. Sadovsky was a seismologist
who apparently had been concerned for some time with the Soviet
Union's nuclear test detection system.
The inclusion of Mr. Tsarapkin, one of the USSR's leading
diplomats, marked the most important difference from the composition of the American delegation, which had no diplomats among
its members and included even among its advisors only junior
diplomats. Fifty-two years of age, Tsarapkin had been a member
of Soviet delegations to the United Nations since 1947, eventually
becoming Secretary General of the delegation. During the Second
World War, he had been Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy
in Washington and he had represented the USSR at the Dumbarton
Oaks and San Francisco Conferences. After the Conference of
Experts he became the USSR's chief delegate in the test ban
negotiations. He did not speak during the formal sessions of the
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Conference of Experts, but it was obvious to the participants that
he played a crucial role in determining the Eastern position. High
ranking Polish and Czechoslovakian diplomats were also included
in the Eastern panel.

The Technical Preparation of the American Delegation
Since the time between its appointment and the opening of
the Conference of Experts was little more than five weeks, the
American delegation had to rely for technical preparation principally on their personal knowledge and experience, the work and
conclusions of the Bethe Panel, and previous studies conducted by
such groups as the task forces which Harold Stassen had assembled
during his tenure of office. It is not clear, however, to what extent
this earlier work was actually available and how much it was
taken into account. Because the problem of detecting nuclear
weapons tests involved a number of disciplines, several Western
delegates had to spend part of their time prior to the conference
merely in attempting to learn enough about disciplines other than
their own so that they could understand their colleagues.
Although the report of the Bethe Panel has never been made
public, it is possible to make certain inferences concerning its
nature. In general, it can be said the Panel concluded that large
nuclear explosions on the surface of the earth and in the atmosphere
and substratosphere could be detected fairly easily by the United
States' own detection system, but that an international network of
control stations and the use of airborne sampling techniques for
the collection of radioactive debris would be necessary for the
conclusive identification of such explosions and for the detection
of low-yield tests.
There were two possible environments for testing nuclear
weapons in which the United States had little or no experience-,deep underground and at extremely high altitudes (above 30 to 50
kilometers, or above approximately 19 to 31 miles). The United
States had detonated only one nuclear explosion deep underground,
the Rainier 1. 7 kiloton shot, fired in Nevada on September 10,
1957. This shot had been designed as an experiment to explore
whether certain kinds of weapons could be tested without creating
radioactive fallout. It had been set up on a short time schedule,
and was not highly instrumented. Thus, knowledge about the ex-
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plosion and its effects was limited. Although the purpose of the
shot was not to measure detectability, because of the general
interest in detectability the test had been announced in advance,
and a number of seismological stations-seismic signals are the
only known means for the ·detection of deep underground explosions when no radioactive debris escapes the earth's s~rface-had
voluntarily, and without financial .support from the government,
attempted to detect it. The shot was detected by a number of
seismological stations within a radius of approximately 650 miles
and by two stations beyond that distance, the most distant of
which was at College Station, Fairbanks, Alaska, approximately
2,350 miles from the test site. However, it was somewhat debatable
whether the signal which was received at that station would actually
have been noticed there and distinguished from those created by
minor earthquakes, had not the test been announced in advance. 85
The direction of the first motion of the signal produced by a
disturbance was probably the most important piece of diagnostic
information-at least it was the one that most American seismologists felt should be used-in distinguishing between nuclear explosions and minor earthquakes. In the case of an explosion the first
motions in all directions from the event are compressions, which
wiii be registered as outward movements, while in the case of an
earthquake there are usually some rarefactions, which will be registered as inward movements.
It is worth viewing the recording of the Rainier shot at College
Station (Fig. 1), to see how difficult is the problem of distinguishing
explosions from earthquakes.
In any case, regardless of one's willingness to agree that explosions could be detected at great distances, it was clear that the
Rainier shot had been detected at near stations and the tendency,
at least in nonclassified studies, was to generalize and extrapolate
from this single experiment. 36 Presumably, the Bethe Panel also
followed this tendency.
On the basis of the Rainier experiment, the general under:J5See the testimony of Admiral Lewis Strauss: Hearings: Control and
Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, pp. 1584-87.
36See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament, pp. 8893. See also Jay Orear's testimony before the Humphrey Subcommittee:
Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14, pp. 14961500.
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Fig. 1. Rainier seismic signal recorded at Fairbanks, Alaska.
A Coast and Geodetic Survey photograph.

standing was that even relatively small underground nuclear explosions could be detected, the exact magnitude depending upon
the distance between control stations. The willingness of scientists
to generalize on the basis of this one experiment varied greatly,
depending on the individual's temperament, his basic predispositions, his office, and several other factors. Presumably, one factor
was the way in which and persistence with which questions were
asked. While a scientist in a laboratory might say that it was impossible to draw any general conclusion at this stage, the same
individual might make some response when subjected to repeated
questioning by government officials.
The range of answers that was possible was brought out clearly
in June 1958 when the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament published the replies of thirty-five seismologists, geophysicists, and
geologists to a questionnaire on the detection of and inspection for
underground nuclear explosions. 37 The report contained a mass of
contradictory information. Some of the scientists replied unambiguously that underground explosions could be detected, others
thought that some such explosions could, while still others held that
it was impossible to make any general statement on the basis of
37U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments: Detection of
and Inspection for Underground Explosions: Replies from Seismologists to
Subcommittee Questionnaire: Staff Study No. 10 (Comm. Print 1958).
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existing knowledge. There was no agreement concerning the size
of signals produced by explosions of various yields.
There was general agreement that on-site inspections would be
necessary in some cases to determine whether an underground
activity shown on a seismograph was an earthquake or a nuclear
explosion, and in all cases to establish positive evidence that a
nuclear explosion had taken place, since the only conclusive identification would be the discovery of radioactive debris. However,
relatively little was known about the procedures which would be
required in the case of an on-site inspection. Again, the Rainier
shot was the only available experimental evidence. In that instance,
even with foreknowledge of the location of the detonation, it had
taken investigators more than two months to discover any radioactive materials evidencing the explosion. 38 Admittedly, this had
been the first attempt of this nature, and the investigators had proceeded with great caution, but their experience was sufficient to
indicate. that the task would be difficult.
Prior to 1958, the United States had not detonated any
nuclear weapons at high altitudes. (The Soviet Union may have.)
Perhaps as a consequence, the Bethe Panel did not deal with testing in this environment.
There was still another area in which American technical
preparation was relatively weak. Little thought had been given to
ways in which nuclear explosions might be camouflaged and hidden. 39 There was not much experimental evidence, even with regard
to fairly unsophisticated techniques such as shielding. Thus the
Bethe Panel could not have done much more on this subject than
to make certain hastily contrived assumptions and theoretical calculations.
The Problem of the Threshold
It was obvious to those who had studied the problem of detecting nuclear explosions that in the prevailing state of knowledge
no feasible system would be capable of detecting and identifying
all explosions in all environments. There would always be, deassee Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14,
pp. 1366-68.
39See ibid., p. 1486. Jay Orear made a few estimates, but they were
extremely unsophisticated. See ibid., pp. 1501-2; and Seymour Melman (ed.)
Inspection for Disarmament, p. 96.
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pending on the number of .control stations and their equipment
and the rights of inspection, various thresholds beyond which under
certain circumstances evasion might be possible. Apparently, the
Bethe Panel made this point. However, neither that group nor the
Administration generally reached a conclusion concerning what
threshold would be compatible with American security interests;
that is, concerning what was the maximum yield explosion which
could be allowed to remain outside the absolute reach of the control system. Under the circumstances this was essentially a matter
of political judgment which called for the highest level decision,
taking into account all the relevant military as well as political
considerations.
Uncertainty about the threshold in large part accounted for
the varying estimates of the number of control posts which would
be needed in the USSR. Public estimates ranged from Professor
Harrison Brown's statement before the Humphrey Subcommittee
that ten would be sufficient, through Mr. Dulles' press conference
remark that more than twenty-four would be required, 40 to the
high estimate given by Professor Frank Press, a leading seismologist
at the California Institute of Technology, who stated that even
with one hundred stations in the USSR, some nuclear explosions of
2 kilotons or more might escape detection. 41
In view of the then current interest in developing low yield
tactical nuclear weapons-especially the neutron bomb, the detonation of which would be difficult to detect-and because of the
scientific possibility of extrapolating data gained from small explosions, there was general agreement that the threshold would
have to be fairly low. Despite the urging of various scientists,
however, the Administration did not attempt to reach a decision
on a specific figure; instead this issue was dropped into the lap
of the American delegation in Geneva.

Policy-Makers' Awareness of the State of Knowledge Concerning
the Detection of Nuclear Explosions
It is important to ask how well United States policy-makers,
whose decisions were responsible for the convening of the Con40U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983 (April 28,
1958), p. 684.
41New York Times, May 1, 1958, p. 5.
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ference of Experts, understood the state of knowledge with respect
to the detection of nuclear explosions. It seems clear that they
understood these matters in broad outline. Professor Bethe presented his conclusions· to the National Security Council in early
April, 42 and later that month testified before the Subcommittee on
Disarmament. Of the forty-five minutes which the National Security
Council spent discussing the issue, about forty were devoted to a
discussion of the effects of a nuclear test ban on the relative military
strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, and about five
to a discussion of the problems of detection, although the fifteenpage report was equally divided between the two questions. Professor Bethe spent two hours and five minutes before the Subcommittee on Disarmament. Most of that time was spent on the
issue of detection. In addition, the Subcommittee received testimony
from several other scientists on this issue on other occasions.
Secretary of State Dulles' remarks in his news conferences
indicate that in his case at least the scientists had made the point
that no control system would give an absolute guarantee against
evasion. 43 Indeed, it is widely reputed that members of the President's Science Advisory Committee were responsible for the acceptance by the Administration of the proposition that a less than
absolute guarantee would provide adequate deterrence against evasion, 44 although this idea certainly must have fitted Mr. Dulles'
predispositions, as the broad concept of deterrence played an
extremely important role in his own thinking. The political leaders
must also have understood that very little was known about testing
nuclear weapons deep underground and at high altitudes. In view
of subsequent events, however, it is less clear that they understood
the scientific implications of this lack of knowledge; that it was
difficult if not impossible to predict what future discoveries would
yield. Perhaps no one who did not have an extensive background
in science could understand this, and, indeed, even some scientists
42Charles I. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," supra
note 23, p. 124.
43See especially his remarks at his news conference of April 8, 1958,
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983 (April 28, 1958),
pp. 682-83.
44See William R. Frye, "The Quest for Disarmament Since World War
II," in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for the Public (1961) pp.
18-48, at 42.
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occasionally tend to state their tentative conclusions as final answers.
For the nonscientist, one confusing issue is that even the most
tentative conclusions can be stated in what appear to be quantitatively precise terms. Since the space age was only a few months
old, the whole concept of testing nuclear weapons at high altitudes
may well have seemed more like science fiction than reality. Nor
is it clear that American policy-makers were fully aware of the
inability on the part of the scientists to say with any degree of
accuracy what would happen if clever scientific minds were applied to the task of devising means of conducting clandestine tests
of nuclear weapons. Whether the scientists did their best to emphasize these uncertainties and whether they were influenced in their
presentation of the sketchy scientific facts by their own ideas regarding the wisdom of a test ban is also less than clear.

The Instructions Given to the American Delegation
The instructions which were given to the American members
and advisors of the Western delegation to the Conference of Experts
appear to have been minimal. In a press conference on June 10,
Secretary of State Dulles described his instructions to the American
experts in this manner:
Our guidance to the United States experts, at least-1
talked to them a few days ago and told them to look upon
their job as a purely scientific technical job. They are to
come to their own conclusions as to what is necessary to
detect an explosion. Perhaps, in the light of the Soviet
proposal, they may have to report on the evaluation of a
lesser than complete detection system-bearing on the likelihood that there would be an evasion attempted. For example, it may be that they would say this system isn't
100 percent perfect but it is good enough that we would
think that there would be a 75 percent chance that any
evasion would be caught. They may have to make calculations of that sort. But we have given them complete
authority to work on this matter as a purely scientific
technical matter, to use their best judgment and report to
us accordingly. I do not anticipate that there will be any
need for political guidance. 45
45U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 (June 30,
1958), p. 1085.
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Mr. Dulles was more painstaking in his private conversations than
these remarks indicate. Terms of reference were drafted prior to
the American experts' departure and a position paper was prepared by the Department of State and cleared with other interested
departments. Nevertheless, in broad outline, Mr. Dulles' press conference remarks were a fairly accurate summary of the instructions.
The American experts were given a great deal of freedom. They
were merely told to seek some common understanding concerning
the various techniques of detecting nuclear weapons tests, to
analyze the capabilities and limitations of each technique, and to
outline possible systems for policing a test cessation agreement.
· They were not told what role and status any report resulting from
the Conference of Experts would have. As an entity the Administration obviously had no clear conception or expectations in this
matter.
The general attitude reflected in these instructions or lack
thereof partially explains why the advisers from the Department of
State who were attached to the Western delegation had such relatively junior rank, in contrast to the Soviet delegation which included a senior diplomat as a full member. The assumption apparently was that the Conference of Experts would be purely a
technical conference, and the Department of State adhered to this
assumption throughout the Conference, for although the American
delegation reported daily, it was never given fixed instructions nor
told what position to take. A large number of the scientists in the
American delegation also regarded their task as a purely technical
one. Public opinion, however, certainly did not treat the Conference
in this fashion. On the contrary, it was widely heralded in the
public debate as an event of great political significance, as the
prelude to a test ban agreement. That the public concept of the
political nature and significance of the Conference was not far from
reality was to be brought out by subsequent events.
One of the few political instructions which the American experts were given was that any control system must ultimately include mainland China. 46 The reason for this was that it was thought
46Jn the same press conference, Mr. Dulles made the following statement: "I would suppose that we would want to have-that the experts would
feel we needed to have-inspection posts with some mobility not only in the
Soviet Union but also on the mainland of China and other areas of that
sort." Ibid., p. 1085.
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that control posts on mainland China would be necessary for the
detection of certain explosions inside some border areas of the
USSR. Moreover, without control posts in China, in view of the
Sino-Soviet alliance, the Soviet Union might conduct clandestine
explosions there. It was known that the Soviet Union had conducted
certain underground tests in China, though these were assumed to
be chemical explosions. 47 Because of the United States' position
wi~ respect to the recognition of the People's Republic of China,
however, the experts were not permitted to refer to China, but
instead had to insist on drafting a scheme for a "worldwide" system. As Mr. Dulles put it in a press conference: " . . . after the
experts decide where it is necessary to have these posts, then there
will have to be a political problem dealt with." 48 Apparently as of
June 1958, he was not prepared to tackle this problem in the
abstract. Considering the known views concerning Communist China
of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter
S. Robertson, and other influential political leaders, the problem
would indeed be formidable.
Beyond this, the experts were, as Mr. Dulles said, "to come to
their own conclusions." Thus the experts were asked to "decide
where it is necessary to have these posts," to determine in general
terms the number and location of the control posts without, however, being told what risks the United States was prepared to accept
in view of the fact that a foolproof control system was not technically feasible. As the Conference unfolded-it will be seen shortly
-other judgments with important political implications had to be
made and Mr. Dulles' statement of instructions proved increasingly
inadequate.
The United Kingdom Component
In addition to the Americans, the British were the only members of the Western panel to play an important role in the Conference of Experts. Like the Americans, the British scientists were
given minimal political instructions. They were, however, urged to
do all that they could to facilitate an agreement. They did not bring
47See Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments, supra note 14,
p. 1546.
48U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 (June 30,
1958), p. 1085.
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a substantial body of independently obtained scientific information
to Geneva. What information they had, they had gained from staff
studies of the official Atomic Energy Authority, rather than from
studies by panels of nongovernment scientists, such as had been
used in the United States. The strength of the United Kingdom
participation was mainly derived from the scientific competence
and stature of the British scientists.
IV

The Conference
The External Environment
The Conference of Experts ran its course, on the whole, uninfluenced by external events. It was not that the world beyond the
shores of Lake Geneva was static. On the contrary, East-West
tension rose sharply during the period of the Conference. The
principal cause was the crisis in the Middle East, which led eventually to military intervention by the United States and the United
Kingdom. In the spiraling tension, the projected summit conference
was at least postponed. The only encouraging development during
the Conference of Experts was that on July 2, Chairman Khrushchev, in another letter to President Eisenhower, in a sense responding to the President's earlier general proposal, suggested that
there should be a meeting at the expert level to consider practical
aspects of the problem of developing guarantees against surprise
attacks, and the United States agreed to this suggestion on July 31. 49
It later transpired, however, that the two governments were hopelessly at odds as to the nature of this meeting.
One other external event should also be mentioned. On July
2, the day after the Conference of Experts opened, Premier Charles
de Gaulle stated in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev that France
would not agree to a test ban unless it were accompanied by other
measures of disarmament. 50 This communication made it clear
that the French government, obviously determined to preserve its
freedom to develop its own weapons program, was opposed to any
loosening of the Western disarmament package.
49Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1084-90.
50New York Times, July 3, 1958, p. 2.
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The Agenda
As had become the fashion in East-West meetings, the Conference of Experts opened with an argument about the agenda. The
argument stemmed from the Soviet desire to obtain a prior commitment that the ultimate objective of the Conference was a test
ban, 51 and the contrary Western desire to limit the Conference to a
technical analysis of the methods of monitoring a test ban. 52 The
USSR had know}l what the Western position would be even before
the opening of the Conference, among other reasons, because the
United States Embassy in Moscow had delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a list of the technical factors and special questions
which the United States felt should be covered in the talks. Obviously, though, the submission of the list did not settle the issue,
and at the very outset of the Conference the experts were faced
with an essentially political issue. In this debate, Dr. Fedorov
argued that national detection systems would actually be adequate
to monitor a test ban, while Dr. Fisk, on the other hand, maintained that an international system would be required. Some EastWest meetings, it will be recalled, have deadlocked on the agenda
issue with political implications and have never reached the substantive problems. Unlike these confrontations, however, this controversy about the agenda was resolved fairly easily, and the
solution was largely based on the Western position. After a brief
recess, an agenda was adopted, and technical discussions began at
the third meeting on July 4, 1958.
The Analysis of the Techniques of Detection
After a general exchange of views concerning the various
methods of detecting nuclear explosions, the Experts examined in
detail each of the four basic methods-recording acoustic and
hydroacoustic waves, recording radio signals, collecting radioactive
debris, and recording seismic signals. During this phase, the Conference was a curious cross between a diplomatic negotiation and
an international scientific congress, with the latter aspect generally
5lSee Ye. K. Fedorov's opening statement:
Document EXP/NUC/PV. 1, p. 27. Hereafter all
ference of Experts and the Geneva Conference will
only.
52See J. B. Fisk's opening statement, ibid., p.
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The Conference of Experts

69

predominating. 53 The objective was to write brief reports outlining
the capabilities and limitations of each of the methods. This was
mainly a matter of interpreting agreed theories and objective data.
Nevertheless, the conclusions would have significance for national
positions and policies, and this fact was always apparent.
The Western scientists tended to present more quantitative data,
and their interpretations were, in general, more conservative than
those of their Eastern counterparts. In a sense, this situation was a
logical consequence of the respective political positions of the two
sides; since the West was insistent upon the necessity of international control, it also had to bear the burden of proof of the
necessity for such control. The Soviet scientists consistently took the
position that the progress of science would make the task of detection easier. Although the Western scientists were unwilling to admit
such a broad proposition in principle, interestingly, in each of the
specific assessments of the four main techniques of detection, they
were willing to admit a statement to the same general effect. Thus,
the concluding paragraph in each subsection analyzing a particular
technique, contained a sentence stating that the capabilities of that
particular technique will most likely improve in the future.
One of the most significant features of the exchange between
the Western and Eastern scientists concerning these matters was
that it was incomplete. Neither side was willing to reveal the effectiveness of its national detection system, nor to divulge information
about its weapons tests which might not be known by the other
side. Therefore, the Eastern scientists generally presented their calculations in theoretical terms only, and when the Western scientists
used concrete data, it was information about Western tests which
had already been fairly widely publicized. It is impossible to know
whether or not greater openness on both sides would have resulted
in more clarity and certainty. Presumably neither side accepted
conclusions which its private information contradicted.
There was one exception to this general pattern. Fairly late in
the Conference, in an attempt to buttress an argument, Dr. Fedorov
stated that during the current American test series in the Pacific,
53For detailed analyses of this aspect of the Conference see Ciro E.
Zoppo, Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiations: The
1958 Experts Conference (RAND Corp. 1962, Memorandum RM-3286ARPA), and Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 183-203.
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although the Atomic Energy Commission had announced only
fourteen explosions, the USSR had detected thirty-two and he gave
the time of each of the shots. 54 Although the United States task
force in charge of the series had in fact planned and attempted to
detonate thirty-two explosions, only thirty of these attempts had
actually been successful. The Western scientists could only conclude
therefore that the USSR had obtained its data through some technique other than those being discussed at the Conference. Conceivably the Soviet data could have been gained through monitoring
the American communication network from Soviet ships stationed
near the Pacific testing area. It goes without saying that Dr. Fedorov's presentation did little to advance the Soviet position. Moreover, the American scientists were convinced that certain American
explosions of small nuclear weapons had not been detected in the
Soviet Union. 55
There was little controversy between East and West regarding
two of the methods of detection, recording acoustic and hydroacoustic waves and recording radio signals. The other two, recording seismic waves and the collection of radioactive debris, however,
were the source of some dispute.

The Collection of Radioactive Debris and the Dispute Concerning
Overflights
There was a controversy as to whether the collection of radioactive debris from ground stations would be sufficient, or whether
sampling techniques involving the use of aircraft would also be
needed. This issue was important because radioactive debris is the
only incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear explosion has occurred. The Soviet scientists maintained that collection points at
ground stations would be sufficient for purposes of detection of
nuclear explosions in violation of a test ban agreement, 56 while the
Western scientists argued that in addition samples taken from the
air were vitally necessary. 57 The problem can be stated this way: if
the parties to a test ban were willing to allow aircraft to fly over
MEXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp. 4-5.
New York Times, August 1, 1958, p. 4.
li6See EXP/NUC/PV. 8, p. 91; EXP/NUC/PV. 10, pp. 4, 26;
EXP/NUC/PV. 12, p. 121.
57See EXP/NUC/PV. 9, pp. 4, 5, 11; EXP/NUC/PV. 10, p. 21;
EXP/NUC/PV. 12, pp. 4-6; and EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 41, 48-50.
55See
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their territories on certain occasions, they would gain a more sensitive, more precise and prompter means of detecting and identifying
nuclear explosions. Exactly what the margins were, though, was
difficult to determine. In reply to Dr. Fedorov's doubting request
for information about explosions which were detected by aircraft
but not by ground stations, 58 two Western scientists--employees of
the Department of Defense--cited the cases of two "low kiloton"
explosions in Nevada, but added that the really important issue was
the speed of detection. 59 Everyone agreed that as a consequence of
a test ban agreement both methods would become more effective,
since the quantity of radioactive debris in the atmosphere would
decrease, and the effects of a new explosion would therefore be
more obvious.
Clearly this controversy involved an issue of basic political
significance: the effectiveness of a system to monitor a test ban
agreement on the one hand, and the degree to which signatory
states would be required to open their territory on the other. Two
years later the U-2 incident would show how sensitive the issue of
overflight was. That the dispute had political implications was
confirmed by the fact that when it was leaked to the press, presumably by some member of the Western panel, the Soviet delegation complained bitterly. 60 Ultimately, a compromise was worked
out. It was agreed that sampling techniques involving the use of
aircraft would be recommended. However, this agreement in principle was qualified in the following manner:
To this end use should be made chiefly of the aircraft
flights over the oceans made for the purpose of meterological observations.
10. In some cases use can be made of aircraft flights over
the territories of the USA, the USSR, the UK and other
countries to collect air samples for the purpose of checking on data obtained by the other methods of detection
of nuclear explosions.
The Experts consider that to accomplish this task it
would be quite sufficient to make use of the aircraft of
5BEXP/NUC/PV. 12, p. 121.
59See EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 41, 48-50.
60See New York Times, July 13, 1958, p. 1, and EXP/NUC/PV. 12,
p. 122.
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the country being overflown and that in such cases it is
sufficient that flights for the purpose specified should be
made along routes laid down in advance. Representatives
of the USSR, the USA, the UK or other States participating in the operation of the control system may be on board
these aircraft in the capacity of observers. 61
The Western scientists felt that because of the nature of this issue
they had to refer the exact wording of the compromise formulation
to Washington for approval, which was granted. This was the only
instance in which this procedure was followed.

The Problem of Seismic Signals
Eastern and Western scientists were unable to agree on the
effectiveness of the method of recording seismic signals. The reason
for the difficulty was not clear. It may have stemmed partly from
the fact that different scales for measuring seismic waves were
used in Eastern and Western countries, and it was difficult to correlate the data measured by the two scales. In addition, the problem of estimating the seismic signal which would be produced by
nuclear explosions of varying yields was a task of considerable intellectual difficulty, particularly in view of the fact that all of the
calculations had to be extrapolations from a single point, the
Rainier explosion. Whatever the cause, the controversy was extremely important, for the conclusions would determine many of
the basic characteristics of the control network. Since underground
nuclear explosions could only be detected through seismic waves,
and since this was perhaps the least efficient of all the techniques,
the figures accepted here would be of critical importance in determining the spacing and location of control posts. Moreover,
since a major purpose of this technique was to distinguish earthquakes from nuclear explosions, the assessment of the capability
for accomplishing this purpose would vitally affect the number of
on-site inspections which would be required. The Soviet scientists
were consistently more optimistic than their Western counterparts.
The Americans attempted to buttress their position by citing the
61 "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear
Tests, August 21, 1958," in U.S. Department of State Publication, No. 7258,
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (hereafter cited as Geneva Conference), pp. 271-310, at 277.
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Rainier experiment, but Dr. Fedorov and other Soviet specialists
countered by arguing the need to introduce theoretical considerations and data from TNT explosions. In the end, a compromise was
reached, and as a consequence, the conclusions concerning this
technique were considerably more optimistic than the original
American presentation, 62 although they were not inconsistent with
the Rainier data.

Detection of Explosions at High Altitudes
As indicated earlier, the United States had not detonated any
nuclear weapons at high altitudes prior to 1958 and thus the
Western scientists had no empirical foundation for any position.
Both sides recognized this lack of experimental data with respect
to the problem of detecting nuclear explosions conducted at high
altitudes. The report made it clear that the Experts' conclusions in
this area were based on purely theoretical considerations. Moreover,
in contrast to the situation with respect to the surface, atmospheric,
and underground explosions, the control system recommended by
the Experts did not include any specific techniques for the detection
and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes.
Camouflaging and Concealing Nuclear Explosions
During the course of the Conference very little attention was
ghen to the ways in which a state which was determined to violate
a test ban agreement might attempt to conceal or disguise nuclear
explosions. Hans Bethe presented a paper in which he purported
to prove that it would not be possible to "decouple" an underground explosion so that no or significantly weakened seismic
waves would be produced. 63 Richard Latter, of the RAND Corporation, and Doyle Northrup, of the Department of Defense, discussed the possibility of shielding nuclear explosions so that their
effects would be greatly reduced, and Harold Brown, of the University of California Radiation Laboratory, pointed out a number
of techniques which might be used to make the identification of
some nuclear explosions extremely difficult if not impossible. Soviet
delegates tended to denigrate these presentations. Although the
62Compare EXP/NUC/PV. 12, pp. 67-85, and "Report of the Conference of Experts," Geneva Conference, pp. 277-79.
63See EXP/NUC/PV. 14, pp. 57-85.
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points raised by Drs. Latter, Northrup, and Brown found their way
into the Experts' report, they were mentioned only in passing and
quite incidentally.
In these matters, as in the case of deep underground explosions, the scientists were working without the benefit of much
empirical data. Their calculations were largely theoretical. This had
the effect of making it difficult if not impossible for either side to
prove its points conclusively.

The Elaboration of a System
After an analysis of each of the various techniques for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions had been completed, the
next point on the agenda of the Conference of Experts was to
examine these techniques in combination, with a view to considering what kind of system could be established for monitoring a test
ban agreement. Formulating a system was partly a matter of deduction from the previously agreed conclusions concerning each of
the various techniques-of applying the agreed formulae. However,
various choices also had to be made. Perhaps the most important
concerned the threshold-how sensitive should the system be, what
yield explosions should the system be designed to detect and identify, and with what degree of assurance? Deductions as to the
character of the system would depend on the answer to this question.
Even after the threshold had been established, there were
other choices to be made. An equation containing several variables
allows flexibility in fixing its components, and designing a control
system involved manipulation of such an equation with a considerable degree of discretion; for example, increasing the number
of fixed control posts would tend to reduce the need for on-site
inspections. Elaboration of a system depended to some extent upon
assumptions about unknown factors, especially the level of background noise throughout the world which would interfere with
reception by the various techniques and thus reduce their reliability.
Finally, assumptions had to be made about the competence, efficiency,
and reliability of the personnel who would operate the system. For
example, one could compensate for presumed low level technical
competence by more elaborate mechanisms or by mechanical redundancy. In making these choices the American scientists, and
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apparently the entire Western delegation, were completely on their
own; their instructions provided no guidance.
When the discussion of this agenda item opened, Dr. Fedorov
immediately tabled a proposal for a control system involving from
100 to 110 control stations. 64 All of the technical bases for this proposal were not immediately made clear; however, several assumptions
and calculations underlying it were brought out by both the Soviet
and Western scientists in the subsequent debates. Apparently the
acoustic method-a relatively efficient method of detecting nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere-was used in establishing distances
between control posts and thus determining their number.· In addition, the Soviet proposal relied considerably on the existing net
of seismic stations for distinguishing earthquakes from underground
nuclear explosions and purported to use other aspects of seismic
signals than first motion for purposes of detection and identification.
Neither approach was acceptable to the West. The Western
scientists felt that the seismic method should determine the location
of control posts. They held that existing seismic stations could be
used to supplement the international control system, but could not
serve as its basic components. For one thing, the Western scientists
were doubtful about the adequacy of the equipment of existing seismic stations. In addition, since reversing the polarity of a seismograph can be accomplished fairly easily by merely switching some
wires and the sign of first motion is thereby obscured and a compression made to appear a rarefaction, they were unwilling to rely
on seismic stations which were completely manned by the personnel
of a possible violator state. Nor were the Western scientists willing
to accept other criteria than first motion, which they felt was the
only method that had been proved.
The Soviet scientists never gave a flat estimate of the capabilities of the system which they proposed, what yield explosions it
would detect and identify. But given Mr. Tsarapkin's presence on
the Eastern delegation-if nothing else-the threshold on which the
proposal was based was presumably politically acceptable to the
USSR. At one point the Western scientists estimated that the system
by itself would have the following capability of detecting and
identifying underground nuclear explosions of various yields: 5
64EXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp. 3-31.
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percent of those which had a yield of 1 kiloton; 50 percent of those
which had a yield of 5 kilotons; and 90 percent of those which
had a yield of 20 kilotons. 65
Obviously, the Western panel could not just simply reject this
proposal, but had to introduce a counter proposal. The task of
elaborating a system for the West to propose was assigned to two
young American scientists: Harold Brown of the University of
California Radiation Laboratory and Richard Latter. The former,
a child prodigy who had received his Ph. D. in physics while still
21, was at the time 29. His colleague was 35. They used the
seismic method-the principal means of detecting underground nuclear explosions and a technique for which the most effective
range is somewhat less than that of the acoustic method-as the
determinant of distances between control posts. They postulated
that the criteria for determining the threshold of the system would
be observation of the sign of first motion on seismographs at five
stations of the international control system. On the basis of these
assumptions, and positing that the system should have a 90 percent
capability of detecting and identifying underground explosions with
a yield of 1 kiloton, they concluded that approximately 650 control stations would be needed.
Some of the Brown-Latter assumptions and calculations were
outlined at the same meeting at which the Soviet proposal was introduced, and they were developed in more detail and the conclusion
about the number of control posts needed was presented in subsequent sessions. Although the exact number of control posts which
would be required in the Soviet Union was never specified, it was
obvious that it would be fairly large. Without formally rejecting the
Western presentation-which the Americans insisted was not a proposal-Or. Fedorov made it obvious that such a control system would
be unacceptable to the USSR.
Mter several sessions, on Tuesday, August 5, Sir William
Penney of the United Kingdom, reading an agreed Western position,
introduced a third system. 66 It was based on the same type of
analysis as the system which the West had introduced previously;
however, the threshold was raised. In this case with approximately
65EXP/NUC/PV. 26, p. 26.
66Jbid., pp. 26-35.
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170 land-based control posts and several ships, the system was
estimated to have a "good probability" of detecting and identifying
nuclear explosions with yields down to one kiloton in the atmosphere
and in the open ocean and also a "good probability" of recording
seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions equivalent to one kiloton. In the latter case, it was assumed that there
would be some difficulty in distinguishing the signals generated by
explosions from those generated by earthquakes, and that this
difficulty would increase significantly as one moved down from
five kilotons to one kiloton. It was estimated that the system would
be able to "identify .as being of natural origin about 90 percent
of the continental earthquakes, whose ~ignals are equivalent to 5
kilotons, and a small percentage of continental earthquakes equivalent to 1 kiloton." 67 Since the system had relatively little capability
with respect to subkiloton explosions, it was thought that it would
probably not have been able to detect experiments involving the
development of a neutron bomb.
At the same meeting, Dr. Fisk suggested that the experts
might adopt a report which wquld list all three systems, outlining
the capabilities and limitations of each. 68 Dr. Fedorov, however,
made it apparent that the Eastern panel would only consider agreeing to a report which listed one system. Obviously a report which
listed one system would have many more political implications and
much greater political impact than one which listed several, and
would be much more of a commitment so far as subsequent negotiations were concerned.
Six days elapsed before the next formal meeting. Dr. Fisk
tried desperately to obtain a judgment from Washington as to
whether or not the control system presented by Sir William would
present an acceptable risk to the United States, but he could not
obtain this assurance. Meanwhile, in Geneva there were three
informal meetings, at which records were not kept. On Monday,
August 11, the two sides promptly agreed to recommend to their
governments a control system generally patterned after that which
had been outlined by Sir William Penney. It was probably during
this period that a number of the Western scientists were made
61Geneva Conference, p. 290.
68EXP/NUC/PV. 26, p. 61.
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aware of the political ~plications of their efforts. Many of them
appear not to have realized at the outset that what they did would
become the basis for subsequent diplomatic negotiations. Even at
this point, all of them may not have fully grasped all of the implications of their situation, but they must at least have been conscious
of them to some extent. In any case, from this day on, and for
the next three years, the figure of from 170 to 180 land and sea
control posts became the fixed basis for negotiations.
There were a number of other matters which had to be settled
once agreement had been reached on the broad outlines of a
system. Dr. Fedorov sought to include in the Report of the Conference of Experts recommendations on the staffing of the control
posts and the phasing of their establishment. He ventured the opinion that one or two controllers from "the other side"-that is,
from the Western powers in control posts in the USSR and other
communist countries and vice versa-would be sufficient to insure
the proper functioning of a control post, 69 and that the control
posts should be established first on the territories of the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, Africa,
and the Pacific Ocean area. 70 The Western scientists ruled out
discussion of both of these proposals on the ground that they
involved "political" rather than technical issues. The Report of the
Conference of Experts merely stated that approximately thirty
persons would be required to man a control post, 71 and it only
specified the number of control posts that would be required on
each continent and generally on islands and ships on the high seas,
without mentioning specific countries. 72 The Experts also considered
and reached detailed agreement on the specific equipment to be
installed at each control post.

On-Site Inspection
The final matter discussed by the Experts was the problem of
on-site inspections. Originally, the Western scientists advanced the
69EXP/NUC/PV. 23, p. 41.
70EXP/NUC/PV. 22, p. 31.
71 "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear
Tests," Geneva Conference, p. 288.
12Jbid.
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concept that inspections should be initiated by automatic criteriaany suspicious and unexplained signal of a given magnitude-and
that there should be an elaborate mechanism for conducting such
inspections. 73 For a variety of reasons-principally Soviet objections and lack of time and data-the Western scientists did not
follow this initial presentation with detailed proposals. Consequently, the section in the Experts' Report dealing with the problem
of on-site inspections is quite brief and contains few detailed
directives. 74 As a result, it was possible to have a good deal of
technical argument in the subsequent negotiations. The section on
on-site inspections estimated that there would be from 20 to 100
earthquakes a year which would be undistinguishable on the basis
of their seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions
of about 5 kiloton yield, and it also stated that:
When the control posts detect an event which cannot
be identified by the international control organ and which
could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, the international control organ can send an inspection group to
the site of this event in order to determine whether a
nuclear explosion had taken place or not. 75
This could· be interpreted as a mandate for compulsory on-site
inspection in the case of all unidentified events.

v
An Agreed Report: A Hopeful Sign?
Concluding Communiques
With the agreement on this point, except for matters involving the
drafting and style of the report, the Conference of Experts had
concluded its work. These matters were handled expeditiously, and
on August 21 the Conference held its final session. The Conference
then issued a public communique; the report itself was not pub73See the presentation by Robert F. Bacher: EXP/NUC/PV. 22, pp.
36-50.
74"Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear
Tests," Geneva Conference, pp. 289-90.
15/bid., p. 289.
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lished for several days after the conclusion of the Conference.
Public attention probably focused most on these words in the
communique:
The Conference adopted an agreed conclusion regarding
the technical equipment of the control system necessary
for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.
The Conference reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and
limitations, a workable and effective control system for the
detections of violations of a possible agreement on the
world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 76
Probably most people tended to read this as saying--controls for
a test ban are technically feasible. But was this an accurate representation of the work of the Conference?
In Geneva, among the Western delegations at least, there was
a feeling of satisfaction that a difficult task had been completed. In
the world at large, there was widespread public expectation that an
arms control agreement might actually be in the offing. Dr. Fisk
issued a communique which summed up the feeling of at least the
American participants :
The Conference of Experts has completed its work.
We on the Western side are gratified that the task set for
this Conference, which began its work seven weeks ago,
has been successfully accomplished.
That task was to seek a common understanding of
the technical problems involved in the detection and
identification of nuclear explosions. We have now reached
such a common understanding, which is embodied in the
report we have just agreed upon, and which we are now
transmitting to our Governments. My colleagues and I are
hopeful that this report, which carefully examines and
sets forth the capabilities and limitations of present methods of detecting nuclear explosions, will prove helpful to
all of our Governments in their future consideration of
this important subject.
As scientists we have sought to establish the facts
pertinent to our subject and to draw from them sound
and logical conclusions regarding a system of control.7 7
76Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1091.
77U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1004 (September 22, 1958), p. 452.
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But had their role simply been that of scientists attempting to
establish the facts, and were Dr. Fisk's modesty, on the one hand,
and optimism, on the other, warranted? Had not the scientists
engaged in a role of extremely great political importance? And how
happy should one be with a document which in fixed terms stated
matters concerning which there was very little empirical data? It
is one thing to have a scientific paper proved incorrect, but what
would happen if an internationally agreed to document was proved
incorrect?
Perhaps the basic question, however, was what would the
United States do now in the light of this unexpected denouement.
Even though at the outset the United States did not have any clear
expectations in terms of broad strategy about the purpose of the
Conference of Experts, now that there was an agreed report some
fundamental decisions would surely have to be taken.

PART II

THE CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Chapter IV

The Opening of the
Diplomatic Negotiations

I

The Eisenhower Proposal
The Conclusion of the Conference of Experts
As the Conference of Experts drew to a close, it became apparent
to the participants, and to the outside world as well, that it would
result in a report accepted by the scientists of both East and West.
Drs. Fisk and Penney informed President Eisenhower and Prime
Minister Macmillan of the probable nature of the agreement several
days before the conclusion of the Conference, and the American
press began to forecast the outcome as early as August 10, 1958. 1
This development would clearly call for new policy decisions,
especially by the United States. Since the United States had proposed the Conference, and since American diplomats and politicians
had consistently argued that the principal obstacle to disarmament
was lack of agreement on controls, the United States bore a special
onus for making the next move.
The Committee of Principals
The task of preparing the American response devolved upon
a small group of officials within the Administration who had major
responsibilities in the fields of foreign policy and national security.
This group had met informally during the first half of 1958 in
connection with the preparations for the Conference of Experts.
Later, when negotiations for a nuclear test ban became an actual
prospect, it came to be called the Committee of Principals. The
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
lSee New York Times, August 10, 1958, IV, p. 6.
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Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology were regular members of the Committee. In addition, the Special Assistan,t to the President for National Security
Affairs was what might be described as an ex officio "nonvoting"
member, and the Director of the United States Information Agency
attended occasional sessions.
Whether an individual's role in a group such as the Committee
of Principals is determined principally by his title and position within
the Administration or by his own personal views is a moot point
and in any case obviously varies with the individual, the strength
of his convictions and personality, his experience, and the issue
under consideration. It is obvious though that policies emerging from
such committees are always a montage of departmental and agency
viewpoints admixed with personal attitudes. Therefore, it is important to list the individuals who were involved. Under the Eisenhower Administration the Committee of Principals consisted of:
John Foster Dulles, until he was replaced by Christian Herter in
April 1959; Neil H. McElroy, until he was replaced as Secretary of
Defense by Thomas S. Gates in December 1959; CIA Director
Allan W. Dulles; John A. McCone, who succeeded Lewis L. Strauss
as Chairman of the AEC in July 1958; Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.,
until he was replaced as the President's Special Assistant for
Science and Technology by Dr. George Kistiakowsky in July 1959;
Gordon Gray, who succeeded Robert Cutler as Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs in July 1958; and, occasionally, USIA
Director George V. Allen, or their deputies. When the Kennedy
Administration assumed power in January 1961, the personnel of
the Committee of Principals was changed to Dean Rusk, Robert S.
McNamara, Allan W. Dulles, Glenn T. Seaborg, Dr. Jerome B.
Wiesner, McGeorge Bundy, and, occasionally, Edward R. Murrow,
or their deputies.
During the first three and a half years of the diplomatic negotiations, the Committee of Principals held somewhat more than
thirty formal meetings. Although American policy relating to the
negotiations was generally developed at a lower, "working," level,
especially in the so-called Interdepartmental Working Group, the
members of which came from the same departments and agencies as
were represented on the Committee of Principals, this policy usually
was at least discussed by the Committee of Principals before being
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approved by the President. In those instances in which it reached a
decision, the Committee usually made a definite recommendation to
the President. Decisions in the Committee of Principals were always
the result of agreement, rather than voting. If it proved impossible
to obtain agreement in the Committee, the issue could be taken to
the President for resolution; however, this was seldom done. Although the Committee was sharply divided on a number of issues
during the Eisenhower Administration, there were strong pressures
against raising disputes to the Presidential level. To take a strong
position necessitating a submission to the President would have
risked alienating individuals whose collaboration was essential for
the matter at hand and also in other vital endeavours. In such circumstances, an individual must regard an issue as being of particular
importance before he will risk the possible consequences of elevating
the dispute to the highest level. Moreover, in this case there was
another inhibition. President Eisenhower strongly preferred to receive an agreed recommendation. At times, when he was confronted with conflicting views, he would call for further study and
discussion to see if the dispute could not be resolved. Under the
Kennedy Administration, the Committee of Principals was much
more united, and it also received firm Presidential directives. Thus,
in both administrations, the device of appeal was seldom used.
President Eisenhower's Statement of August 22
When this group began to formulate the American response
to the anticipated successful conclusion of the Conference of Experts, Secretary of State Dulles was in New York at the Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly which met from August
8 until August 21, 1958, to consider the crisis in the Middle East.
He was represented in the discussions by the Under Secretary,
Christian Herter.
Although no brief formulation can adequately portray several
complex positions, the viewpoints. expressed in the Committee of
Principals can be summarized in the following fashion. The Department of State strongly felt that the United States should take
the lead in proposing negotiations for a test ban. The reasons for
this varied with individuals. It was partly a matter of wanting to
respond to and capitalize on public pressures; to put the United
States in a favorable light before public opinion. To put it nega-
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tively, the Department of State wished to avoid being placed in the
position that it had been in the spring when the USSR unilaterally
suspended nuclear testing. Another motivation was a desire to explore and follow up a seemingly favorable first step toward a
measure of arms control. Put in simplest fashion, this meant
exploring Soviet intentions (calling the USSR's bluff, if that is
what it was) or, more hopefully, proceeding with constructive
negotiations. Mr. Dulles himself inclined toward nuclear test ban
negotiations as he viewed the changing role of nuclear weapons in
military strategy and the developing "nth country problem."
Although not at all sanguine about Soviet intentions or the outcome,
he seemed to favor exploring arrangements, including a test ban,
which might ultimately offer some assurance, not only against a
deliberate nuclear attack but also against accident and miscalculation which could unleash nuclear war. The wish to exploit the
agreement at the Conference of Experts for a move toward arms
control was particularly strong in the American scientific community, and it no doubt had an impact on the President's Science
Advisory Committee and was expressed by the Special Assistant
for Science and Technology. In addition, many scientists were
deeply troubled by the problem of fallout. The Central Intelligence
Agency favored any move which might introduce more openness
into Soviet society. The Atomic Energy Commission and the
Department of Defense, however, were convinced that a test ban,
as an isolated measure of arms control, would endanger American
security. 2
Beyond the basic disagreement on the wisdom of a test ban,
there was also a disagreement as to whether the United States
should continue testing nuclear weapons while the negotiations
were in progress. The principal protagonists in this dispute were
the Department of State, which argued that the United States should
cease testing the day that the negotiations began, and the Department
2 Robert Gilpin argues that the fact that John A. McCone replaced
Lewis Strauss as the head of the AEC on July 1, 1958, "removed from the
policy debate a strong opponent of a nuclear test ban," (American Scientists
and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 199). Even though Mr. McCone may have
opposed a nuclear test ban less than Admiral Strauss, neither he nor the
AEC favored a test ban as an isolated measure of arms control in these
discussions.
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of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, which held that
testing should continue until the coming into force of a treaty. A
compromise solution involving a moratorium covering only atmospheric testing was mooted for a while, but ultimately abandoned
on the ground that such a move would not be properly understood
by public opinion.
After consensus had been achieved within the Administration,
on August 21, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was informed of the action which the United States planned to take.
Although the members of the Committee could present their views,
it was then so late that they could not alter the course of American
policy. 3
Allied views were also a factor. Perhaps the French view was
the most important; at least it was the most clearly formulated and
was argued with the greatest force. France was determined to push
ahead with its plans for the development of an independent nuclear
capability, and, as a consequence, continued to oppose a test ban
as an isolated measure of arms control. Foreign Minister Maurice
Couve de Murville reiterated the French position to President
Eisenhower on August 21. In essence, the United States chose to
downgrade seriously or perhaps even to ignore the French position.
The American response to the successful conclusion of the
Conference of Experts-specifically President Eisenhower's statement of August 22-was a product of this melange of views. After
it was drafted in Washington, the statement was taken to New
York for Mr. Dulles' approval and then was released to the public.
It was also immediately transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
The statement proposed the inauguration of negotiations for a test
ban treaty and also defined the initial American negotiating position.
The most important part of the statement was contained in the
following paragraphs:
The United States, taking account of the Geneva conclusions, is prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an
agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear
weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and
the actual establishment of an international control system
on the basis of the experts' report.
3Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p.
199.
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If this is accepted in principle by the other nations
which have tested nuclear weapons, then in order to
facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is
prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to
withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen
weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of
the negotiations.
As part of the agreement to be negotiated, and on
a basis of reciprocity, the United States would be further
prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on
a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the
beginning of each year: (A) the agreed inspection system
is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory
progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures
such as the United States has long sought. The agreement
should also deal with the problem of detonations for
peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests.
Our negotiators will be instructed and ready by
October 31 this year to open negotiations with other
similarly instructed negotiators.
As the United States has frequently made clear, the
suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is
not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of
armament. An agreement in this respect is significant
if it leads to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of fissionable material
for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament.
It is in this hope that the United States makes this proposal.4

The British statement which was issued almost simultaneously
was similar. 5 The October 31 date for the opening of diplomatic
negotiations and the inauguration of the one-year moratorium meant
that the United States would have over two months to continue the
test series which was then in progress. However, if the USSR
accepted the Western invitation to engage in diplomatic negotiations, the United States was pledged not to test nuclear weapons
in any environment for a period of twelve months after October
30. This decision to engage in a moratorium prior to the achievement of a test ban treaty proved to be crucially important, and some
4Geneva Conference, p. 311.
5See ibid., pp. 311-13.
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have argued woefully misguided. 6 The rationale for the decision,
which was developed mainly by the Department of State, was that
such action was necessary because of the pressure of public opinion
and to create the most propitious atmosphere for the diplomatic
negotiations. The opposition of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Department of Defense to the decision was partly mollified
by limiting the moratorium to twelve months.
The implied suggestion that detonations for peaceful purposes
should be dealt with separately in the agreement, while safeguarding the American Project Plowshare, would pose difficult problems
of discrimination. How could the purpose of an explosion be determined and how would it be possible to be certain that a device
allegedly designed to produce a huge natural cavity would not also
have military applications?
Perhaps the most important part of the statement concerned
the conditions under which the United States-and the United
Kingdom also-would be willing to cease testing nuclear weapons.
The United States held to its earlier position that a test ban could
only be regarded as one of several measures of arms control or
disarmament, and as in earlier proposals, the United States sought to
enforce this link by making the test cessation conditional on progress in other fields. In essence, President Eisenhower's statement
was very similar to that which Harold Stassen had made on August
21, 1957, before the London session of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. 7 The only differences were, first, that since the technical talks
which Mr. Stassen had called for had already occurred, they could no
longer be listed as a condition for extending the test cessation
for a second twelve month period. Secondly, Mr. Stassen had
implied that the only condition for making the test cessation permanent would be the achievement of a production cut-off, in
addition of course to the condition that the test ban monitoring
system be functioning effectively. President Eisenhower's statement
opened up the possibility of several conditions. In some ways the
American position as stated by President Eisenhower could be
interpreted as indicating a lesser propensity to negotiate on the test
6See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy,
pp. 219-20; and, Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace, pp.
93-96.
7See supra p. 18.
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ban issue than could be inferred from Mr. Stassen's statement two
years earlier.
The requirement that a test cessation be conditional on achieving progress in other fields of arms control or disarmament was
inserted in President Eisenhower's statement at the insistence of
the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Department of State did not favor this position, but agreed
to it in the process of mutual accommodation.
Why the requirement was stated so vaguely, however, rather
than in terms of specific disarmament measures, is not clear.
Perhaps the vagueness was a negotiating tactic, a device for gaining
bargaining strength and maintaining flexibility. The vagueness may
also have stemmed from the fact that by this time the difficulties
involved in linking a test cessation with a production cut-off and
possibly with a requirement for the transfer of fissionable materials
from weapons stockpiles were widely recognized, and there were
therefore cogent arguments against maintaining this particular link.
Rather than substitute some other measure immediately, it may
have seemed wiser to await the outcome of other developments
then in progress relating to arms control and disarmament. At that
time, a technical conference concerning measures for the prevention
of surprise attack was a distinct possibility. Also, the question of
the uses of outer space was scheduled for discussion at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, which would open in
September. Both of these discussions would deal in some fashion
with the launching of missiles, among other things. It was thought
that controlling the launching of missiles would require control
measures of roughly comparable scope to those needed to monitor
a test cessation; 8 and controlling technological developments with
respect to delivery vehicles on the one hand and warheads on the
other might be regarded as equivalent measures. Consequently, some
may have hoped that a link between missile controls and a controlled test ban could be established.
There are also two other possible explanations for the vagueness of the link. It may have stemmed from inability to reach agreement within the Administration or from a lack of preparation.
8 See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament, pp. 18-25,
and passim.
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Perhaps it was both. Assuming that there were strong arguments
against the old position, discovering alternative measures of arms
control with which a test ban could be linked would require a
considerable amount of analysis. If a test ban alone would prove
disadvantageous to the security interests of the United States, what
other measures of arms control might serve as adequate compensation? What types of controls would these measures require? These
were questions which could not be answered simply, or without
detailed analyses of the technical as well as of the political and
military aspects, and at that time the United States government was
ill-equipped to conduct such analyses. Mr. Stassen's staff had largely
been dispersed even before his resignation in February 1958. It is
true that other offices had responsibility for American policy concerning arms control and disarmament; within the Department of
State, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and
Atomic Energy Affairs, and within the Department of Defense,
the Office of International Security Affairs. However, both of these
offices had relatively small staffs, and, as their titles indicated, they
also had other responsibilities. In addition, many of the personnel
were directly involved in the Conference of Experts. Thus, there
was hardly any manpower available for broad planning. Moreover,
there was no group which could do technical analyses quickly and
on a continuing basis. Mr. Stassen had relied on task forces comprised principally of nongovernmental experts, and if the appointment of the Bethe Panel was indicative of a policy, it appeared
as if this technique would be continued. There seemed to be no
alternative, since the Department of State did not have any
technically qualified scientists among its personnel, and since the
staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology was quite small and the Science Advisory Committee
was only a part-time group. However, the device of convening a
special panel is relatively cumbersome, and it is not likely to be
utilized unless a problem is clearly identified. Although cooperation
of scientists in private employment is clearly indispensable, the
panel of this type does not lend itself to systematic advance planning
aimed at exploring a variety of longer range contingencies. The
vagueness in the American position therefore probably was the
result of disagreement on the old link and inability to conceive of
a new one.
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The Holifield Dissent
The subtleties of President Eisenhower's statement, though,
were largely ignored in public discussion in the United States. In
the public view, the statement was generally regarded as an
unambiguous invitation to negotiate a test ban. There was, however,
at least one exception to the general euphoria. On August 22,
shortly after the President's statement was released, Representative
Chet Holifield read two statements into the Congressional Record.
After generally expressing his approval, he went on to say that he
was "gravely troubled" by the inclusion of the principle that a
test cessation would be dependent on progress being made in other
areas of arms control. 9 He pointed out that the statement was "unclear" and "susceptible of different interpretations," and asserted
that if the condition were maintained he had "little hope for the
completion of a nuclear testing agreement." He continued:
I regret that I must state that the inclusion of the "one
package" requirement as a contingency for nuclear weapon
test cessation on a step-by-step basis casts a reflection on
the sincerity of the President's statement. It seems to be a
tragic continuation of the futile and abortive Dulles philosophy which has failed to establish, in world opinion, our
sincerity in the search for world peace.
It is this fatal lack of vision, this holding back, this
being dragged into the future which is killing our influence
throughout the world.
His statement was about as harsh a criticism of American policy
as could be imagined. Interestingly, none of the major American
newspapers or wireservices reported it. The Tass correspondent,
however, noticed it and it was reported in Pravda. 10
II

Interim Sparring
The Bombardment on Quemoy and Matsu
In the interval between the issuance of President Eisenhower's
statement of August 22 and the opening of the Geneva test ban
9Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 15, p. 19245.
lOAugust 25, 1958, p. 4.
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negotiations on October 31, all interested parties sparred for position. Chronologically, the first relevant event was Communist China's
commencement on August 23 of heavy bombardment of the offshore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu. On that day the islands
were hit by some fifty thousand shells within a period of two hours.
The crisis which this action touched off continued until late October.
It is impossible to know whether or not the Chinese Communist action was in any way related to the developments concerning a test ban. The People's Republic of China had for some
time been engaged in a military build-up in the Fukien Province
opposite Taiwan, and an increasing number of air and naval clashes
between the Communists and the Nationalists occurred during the
late summer. The Chinese Nationalist government had declared a
state of emergency on Taiwan as early as August 7. It is therefore
conceivable that the bombardment was unrelated to the events in
Geneva and Washington.
On the other hand, the People's Republic of China would be
affected by a test ban. The Conference of Experts had after all
proposed a global system of control posts. Moreover, a test ban
might affect Communist China's ability to develop an independent
nuclear capability in the same sense that it might have an impact
on France's program. If the three nuclear powers agreed to a test
ban, public opinion throughout the world would probably strongly
oppose any attempt by other states to test nuclear weapons. The
three nuclear powers presumably would also have a strong interest
in seeing that other states did not test because it might upset the
delicate balance of trust and calculation of advantage on which a
test cessation would rest. Thus, a test ban conceivably could freeze
the situation in Eastern Asia in which Communist China would
continue to face nuclear equipped American forces without having
such weapons of its own.
Communist China and the USSR apparently had discussed the
question of the former's obtaining a nuclear capability from time
to time. 11 The Chinese have claimed that the two governments
signed an agreement on October 15, 1957, relating to new technolllSee Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear
Era (1962).
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ogy. 12 The Chinese claim that the terms of this agreement obligated
the USSR to provide the People's Republic of China with a sample
of an atomic bomb and technical data relating to its manufacture.
The USSR has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of this
agreement. If in fact such an agreement existed, it is significant that
it was signed after the breakdown of the London negotiations. The
Soviet Union may well have agreed to sign the agreement only after
it became clear that the prospects of obtaining a test ban at that
point were rather remote.
Immediately prior to the bombardment of the off-shore islands,
Nikita Khrushchev visited Peking from July 31 to August 3 and
held extensive talks with Mao Tse-tung. Soviet Defense Minister
R. Y. Malinovsky and his Chinese counterpart, Marshall Peng Tehhuai were present at the discussions. Rumors circulated in the West
that the USSR had promised to supply its ally with nuclear
weapons. 13 If such matters were discussed at these meetings, in
the light of subsequent developments and Chinese claims about the
1957 agreement, it seems more likely that in return for assistance
in developing a nuclear capability, the USSR insisted on gaining
some control over China's military establishment. 14 Whether or not
it was at these meetings, it is fairly clear that the USSR made such
a demand sometime in 1958. Once the possibility of a test ban
increased, as it did with the progress of the Conference of Experts,
Soviet leaders may well have reasoned that they should proceed
cautiously with the implementation of the 1957 agreement. The
Chinese, on the other hand, probably saw a test ban and the
degree of East-West detente that it would imply, as an obstacle to
their gaining an independent nuclear capability, and to achieving
their broader political objectives.
For these reasons, the timing of the Chinese bombardment
of the off-shore islands is of particular interest, as is the reluctance
with which the USSR supported the action. The Chinese move
was certainly an expression of independence from the USSR, and
12This Chinese claim is discussed in detail in Alice Langley Hsieh,
"The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. VIII, No.2 (June 1964), pp. 99-115, at 110-14.
1 3Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958
(1959), p. 315.
14See Alice Langley Hsieh, supra note 12, at 111-13.

The Opening of the Diplomatic Negotiations

97

it also may well have been a warning of opposition to a test ban,
and more broadly to an East-West detente.
Regardless of its motivation, however, the action by Communist
China would certainly have had implications for the test ban negotiations. Among other things it strengthened the forces in the
United States which opposed the recognition of Communist China,
and thus would complicate the problem of bringing that state into
any agreement which might be negotiated.
The Initial Soviet Reaction
The first official reaction by the USSR to President Eisenhower's August 22 statement was an interview which Chairman
Khrushchev gave to a Pravda correspondent, which was published
on August 29. 15 In this interview, Chairman Khrushchev asserted
that:

The statements of the United States and United Kingdom
governments show that these Governments are continuing
to seek every possible loop-hole in order to avoid an immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests. This becomes
especially clear if we consider the reservations and manifestly far-fetched conditions which the Governments of the
Western Powers attach to their proposals.
He objected to the fact that the initial suspension would be
limited to one year. "It is obvious to everyone . . . that such a
brief suspension of tests is completely meaningless, since one year
is precisely the time required for preparing the next series of tests."
To the extent that it would require at least a year of preparation for
the United States and the United Kingdom to carry out test series as
extensive as those conducted in 1958, his time estimate was correct.
He also objected to the two requirements which the Western
powers listed as conditions for extending the moratorium on testing.
He considered the requirement that a control system should be
"installed and working effectively" was "an artificial one, since it
has long been known that modem science guarantees the possibility
of detecting any nuclear explosions and therefore control over the
observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests is
I5UN Document A/3904, pp. 3-9.
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readily feasible." Did he mean to say that an international network
of control stations was not necessary, that existent national systems
were sufficient? Chairman Khrushchev's amplification of this statement compounded the ambiguity. He argued that "the conclusions of
the conference of experts fully confirm the correctness of the point
of view which the Soviet government has always maintained on this
question and demonstrate the falseness of the position of the Western
Powers." But he then went on to say that the Soviet government
agreed with all of "the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the conference concerning a system of control. . . ." The
exact implications of these statements were far from clear, and a
doubting mind on the Western side could with little difficulty interpret them as being most evasive.
Chairman, Khrushchev also attacked the other requirement concerning "satisfactory progress" with respect to other measures of arms
control:
But as everyone knows that it is the Governments of the
Western Powers and those Governments alone which, by
persistently adhering to a policy based on an armaments
race and atomic blackmail, have year after year frustrated
the achievement of agreement on matters of disarmament.
In view of this situation, how is it possible to believe
that they really want a discontinuance of tests when they
put forward such a condition?
Again, anyone convinced of the basic reasonableness of the Western
position over the years with respect to disarmament and arms control, could easily regard his remarks as ominous.
Despite his harsh comments, Chairman Khrushchev agreed that
the negotiations should start October 31. However, he proposed that
the negotiations should be held in Geneva, rather than in New York
as the Western powers had suggested. He also proposed that the negotiations should be limited to two or three weeks. Finally, he flatly
stated that the USSR was "completely unable to accept the reservations and conditions which the Western powers attach to their statement of readiness to participate in the negotiations, since to accept
them would be to foredoom the negotiations to failure."
The following day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a note to the
American Embassy in Moscow accepting the proposal that negotia-
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tions should begin October 31 and repeating Chairman Khrushchev's
suggestions with respect to the place and duration of the negotiations.l6 The Chairman's interview with the Pravda correspondent was
attached. For the next two months, the USSR and the United States
argued, through various exchanges of notes and statements, about
the nature of the forthcoming negotiations. 17 In these exchanges, the
USSR suggested that the conference should be at the level of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and also sought to limit its duration. A time
limitation would have created a public expectation that agreement
could be reached promptly, and presumably would have subjected
the Western delegations to considerable public pressure. The Soviet
government would not have been subjected to corresponding pressure
from its own public opinion in view of its control over its domestic
mass media and public spokesmen. Both Soviet suggestions were refused. The Soviet Union also continued to protest the requirements
which the Western powers listed for extending the moratorium and
to argue that the purpose of the conference should be "to conclude
an agreement on the permanent discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests ... and to establish an appropriate control system
for the enforcement of such an agreement." The Western powers, on
the other hand, refused to drop their conditions, and always referred to the forthcoming conference as "the meeting on suspension
of nuclear tests and establishment of an international control system." These differences were never entirely resolved.
Continued Testing of Nuclear Weapons
As these exchanges went on, both sides also maneuvered to
gain advantages in nuclear weapons development. With at least
a temporary cut-off date on further testing in prospect, where the
development race would end became an important consideration, both
in reality and in a symbolic sense. The United States and the United
Kingdom test series were pressed forward. Additional shots, originally
planned for a later period, were added to the American series then
in progress. The effort came to be dubbed "Operation Deadline."
In his interview with the Pravda correspondent, Chairman Khrush16Jbid., p. 2.

17See UN Documents 3940, 3956, and 3973; and U.S. Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 503.

100

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

chev said that because of the continued testing by the United States
and the United Kingdom, the USSR was released from the obligation
which it had unilaterally assumed the previous March, and on September 30, the Soviet Union in fact resumed testing. Between that
date and October 25, the USSR conducted fourteen explosions.
Seven of these were in the megaton range. These tests were probably
designed both to advance the USSR's knowledge of nuclear weapons,
and for their psychological effects. The Soviet resumption of testing
would clearly put the West under a certain pressure by making a test
ban agreement appear more desirable. It might also intimidate the uncommitted who in turn would increase the pressure on the West for
a test ban.
On October 7, Foreign Minister Gromyko, extending the concept of East-West parity to a new sphere, asserted that the USSR
had the right to continue testing until it had matched the number
of tests conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom
since March 31, the date on which the Supreme Soviet had adopted
the decree resolving to discontinue testing in the Soviet Union. His
statement had ominous implications for the possibility of establishing
a moratorium at the beginning of the negotiations, for it was almost
inconceivable that the USSR could match the number of Western
tests by October 31. Nonetheless, the Western powers continued to
plan that their testing would cease by October 31, and the last
American shot was detonated shortly before midnight on October
30. As of that date, according to a later official American tabulation, the United States had set off 174 announced nuclear detonations, the United Kingdom, 21, and the USSR, 53. 18 Neither the
United States nor the USSR had announced all of their shots. Of the
American announced shots, 66 had been conducted in 1958. The
Soviet Union had detonated 23 of its announced shots in that year.
The Thirteenth General Assembly: Arena for Sparring
The General Assembly of the United Nations, which opened
its thirteenth session on September 16, was another arena for EastWest sparring in the period immediately preceding the Geneva test
ban negotiations. Several subjects relating to disarmament and arms
18 U.S.

671-81.

Department of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, pp.
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control were on the agenda, and the discussion and action on these
subjects in the Assembly had direct and indirect implications for the
forthcoming Geneva conference.
Although the provisional agenda of the thirteenth General Assembly included a general item entitled, "The Question of Disarmament," on September 15, the day before the Assembly opened, the
USSR proposed that a specific item, "The Discontinuance of Atomic
and Hydrogen Weapons Tests," should be added to the agenda. 19 In
its supporting memorandum, the USSR stressed its view:
. . . that the question of the discontinuance of atomic and
hydrogen weapons tests should be separated from the
general disarmament programme and resolved independently and at once, and that it should not be linked with
other disarmament problems on which substantial differences exist among the States.
Clearly, one motivation for the Soviet action was again to bring
pressure to bear before the opening of the Geneva Conference against
the Western insistence on linking a test ban with other measures of
disarmament.
One other part of the Soviet memorandum is also of special significance. It contained the statement that "consideration and positive
solution" of the problem "would constitute the first important step
towards the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons,"
and then went on to say that it would also "create favourable conditions for the solution of other important disarmament problems."
Obviously the USSR and the Western powers had somewhat different
expectations and hopes concerning the consequences of a nuclear
test ban. The USSR seems to have hoped that the most important
consequences of a test ban would be a prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union had advocated over the
years. The effect of such a prohibition would of course have been
to neutralize the American nuclear superiority. The Western powers
on the other hand-insofar as such broad generalizations are possible
-appear to have had in mind other measures of arms control and
disarmament. These and other differences between the two sides were
delineated and exposed in the course of the ensuing debate in the
Assembly.
19UN

Document A/3915, p. 1.
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When the Assembly's Political Committee held its first meeting
on October 8, Ambassador Zorin maintained that the question of
nuclear testing should be discussed first and settled before other questions relating to disarmament were brought up. 20 As supporting arguments, he cited the urgency of the issue, the need to affect "the
course and outcome of the Geneva negotiations," and the ineffectiveness--demonstrated in his view in past sessions-of combining all
disarmament items in one discussion. Ambassador Lodge, on the
other hand, argued for a combined discussion, maintaining that the
issues "were interrelated." 21 He allowed, however, that delegates
would "be free to discuss the items separately and in any order they
wished." The issue of whether a link should be maintained between
the test ban and other steps toward disarmament thus arose again
in a procedural-tactical context at the very outset of the proceedings. After three days' debate, the Committee adopted an American
compromise proposal, which provided that all items relating to disarmament should be discussed together in a general debate, but that
the decision on the priority of consideration of draft resolutions
should be postponed until the conclusion of the general debate.
For all practical purposes, the General Assembly's handling of
the test ban issue and all other questions relating to disarmament was
completed before the Geneva negotiations were really underway. The
Political Committee concluded its work on these matters on November 4, and that same day the plenary session adopted the resolutions
which the Committee recommended. In both forums, resolutions relating to the cessation of nuclear testing were voted on first. The
Political Committee voted on these resolutions on October 31, the day
the Geneva negotiations opened. In a sense then, the Assembly's
action can be regarded as an adjunct to negotiations which were
conducted outside of the United Nations. Certainly, most of the
Member States, and especially the participants in the Geneva negotiations, regarded the Assembly proceedings in this light.
In all, six resolutions relating to nuclear testing were submitted
to the Political Committee. Both India and the USSR submitted
resolutions on October 5. The Soviet draft, after repeating in the
preamble the opinion often expressed by Soviet spokesmen that a
20 UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th Session), p. 3.
21Jbid., p. 4.
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cessation of nuclear tests would be a first important step "towards
the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons," called upon
all states to halt nuclear tests, recommended that the nuclear powers
"enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them," and called upon all states "to
accede to that agreement. " 22 Since the draft resolution made no mention of controls, it could be regarded-like the Western statements
of August 22-as a retrogression from an earlier position, that is from
the position the Soviet Union had taken in 1957 during the London
session of the Disarmament Subcommittee and the twelfth Assembly.
There is also another interesting aspect of the Soviet proposal.
One of the hoped-for effects of a test ban would be that it would
serve to prevent the dispersion of nuclear weapons; that it would
ease the so-called "nth country problem." Concern about this problem was probably one of the motivations for Soviet policy on
nuclear weapons testing. To the extent that such a brief draft could
provide an indication of the USSR's attitude, it seemed to imply
that the rest of the world should go along with whatever the three
nuclear powers decided regarding a test ban.
The Indian resolution also called for an immediate suspension
of the testing of nuclear weapons. 23 However, the cessation was
envisaged as a transitional step "pending an agreement at the forthcoming conference among the States concerned in respect to the
technical arrangements considered necessary to ensure the observance
of the discontinuance of such tests." The "nth country problem"
was handled by requesting the participants in the Geneva negotiations to report back to the General Assembly so that it could take
steps to extend the agreement to all other states, which meanwhile
were requested not to test.
Since both resolutions called for an immediate and essentially
unconditional cessation of tests, they were unacceptable to the
Western powers. Therefore, on October 10 the United States together with sixteen other countries-all of which were involved in
NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, or OAS-tabled an alternative proposal. 24 It first urged the parties to the Geneva negotiations to
"make every effort to reach an early agreement on the suspension
22UN Documents A/L. 247 and A/C. 1/L. 203 and Corr. 1 and Rev. 1.
23UN Documents A/L. 246 and A/C. 1/L. 202.
24UN Document A/C. 1/L. 205.
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of nuclear tests under effective international control." Then, perhaps
as a concession to the other side, and certainly as a concession to
the pressure of world opinion, it urged the parties to the negotiations not to test nuclear weapons while the negotiations were in
progress. This could involve a longer suspension than had been
envisaged in President Eisenhower's August 22 statements, but it
was not as extensive a commitment as one not to test "pending an
agreement," the formulation embodied in the Indian proposal. The
seventeen-power resolution also called attention to the importance
of the forthcoming technical conference on surprise attack. It
lauded the effectiveness of the technical approach to negotiations and
expressed the hope that it would contribute to the creation of "a
balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament." The resolution provided that the UN should render assistance to the Geneva negotiations and asked the parties to the negotiations to keep the world organization informed. Interestingly, the
draft resolution contained no provision relating to the "nth country
problem."
There were two major attempts during the course of the Political Committee's consideration of these matters to discover some
compromise which might lead to a unanimous decision. India, in
company with thirteen other countries-including Pakistan, which
was also a sponsor of the seventeen-power resolution-submitted a
modified version of its resolution. 25 The principal changes were to
urge a cessation of nuclear weapons tests "until agreement is
reached," rather than pending an agreement, and to insert mention
of controls. Even as modified, however, the resolution was unacceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom.
France also opposed the Indian resolution for the same reasons
motivating the two Western nuclear powers as well as for other
reasons, the most important of which concerned the resolution's
treatment of the "nth country problem." French delegate Jules
Moch stated that France would only agree to discontinue its nuclear
weapons development program if "the 'atomic powers' should immediately cease to increase and begin to reduce their stockpiles
under international control." 26 Perhaps the French attitude explains
Document A/C. 1/L. 202/Rev. 1.
General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th
Session), p. 63.
25UN
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why the seventeen-power resolution skirted this problem. Significantly, France was not one of the seventeen sponsoring powers,
and when that resolution was put to the vote, France abstained.
Austria, Japan, and Sweden offered the other compromise proposal. 27 Their draft resolution merely expressed the hope that the
Geneva negotiations would be successful, asked the parties to the
negotiations to report whatever agreement might result from the
negotiations to the Assembly, and asked the Secretary General to
provide such assistance as the Geneva conference might request.
After a long procedural wrangle about the order in which the
resolutions should be voted, it was decided ( 45-25 with 11 abstentions) to give priority to the seventeen-power proposal reflecting
the Western view, which was adopted by a vote of 49 to 9 with 11
abstentions. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the resolution. The compromise proposal submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was
voted on immediately thereafter and adopted by a vote of 52 to 9
with 10 abstentions. Only the first operative paragraph of the revised Indian resolution was voted on, and it was rejected 36 to 26,
with 19 abstentions. The remainder of the proposal was withdrawn,
as was the entire Soviet proposal. In the plenary session the seventeen-power resolution was adopted 49 to 9 with 22 abstentions, and
the resolution submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was approved 55 to 9, with 12 abstentions. 28 The revised Indian proposal, which was reintroduced, was rejected, 27 to 41, with 13
abstentions. 29
The other draft resolution relating to nuclear testing which the
General Assembly considered dealt solely with the dispersion of
nuclear weapons capability. 30 It was proposed by Ireland. After
asserting that such a dispersion would aggravate international tension and make it more difficult to attain general disarmament, the
resolution provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee to study
the dangers inherent in this course and to recommend appropriate
measures for averting these dangers. Only the paragraph containing
the assertion was put to a vote, and it was adopted 37 to 0, with 44
27UN Document A/C. 1/L. 213.
2 SUN, General Assembly Resolutions 1252 A and B (XIII).
29UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th
Session), p. 430.
30UN Document A/C. 1/L. 206.
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abstentions, including France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. After this vote, the resolution was withdrawn.
In addition to the resolutions relating to nuclear testing, three
other resolutions concerning arms control and disarmament were
considered by the Assembly. One of these was a Soviet proposal
which recommended that France, the USSR, the United Kingdom,
and the United States should reduce their military budgets by from
ten to fifteen percent and devote some part of the savings to
economic development projects. 31 This proposal was rejected in the
Political Committee by a vote of 10 to 39, with 32 abstentions.
The other two resolutions were both sponsored by India and Yugoslavia. One gave the Assembly's blessing to the forthcoming technical talks concerning surprise attack. 32 The other provided for the
reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission so that it would include all UN Member States. 33 Both resolutions were adopted without opposition; there were, however, a few abstentions in each
case.
One other issue on the agenda of the thirteenth Assembly had
implications for the Geneva negotiations, the Peaceful Use of Outer
Space. Whether or not and under what conditions the development
of missiles was controlled would have implications for the control or
development of nuclear explosives. It will be recalled that the USSR
requested the inclusion of an agenda item on this subject as early
as March 1958. However, at that time, and in the original proposal which it submitted to the Assembly, the Soviet Union insisted
that the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military
purposes must be linked with "the elimination of foreign military
bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the
Near and Middle East and North Africa." 34 In other words, the
Soviet Union took the position that it would only renounce its head
start with respect to the development of ballistic missiles with intercontinental range, if the United States dismantled most of its military bases abroad. There is a striking parallel between the Soviet
attitude with respect to the control of missiles, an area of weaponry
in which it seemed to be ahead, and the United States attitude
31UN
32UN

33UN
34UN

Document A/C. 1/L. 204.
Document A/C. 1/L. 211.
Documents A/C. 1/L. 210 and Rev. 1 and 2.
Document A/C. 1/L. 219.
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toward the control of nuclear explosives, an area of weaponry in
which it held the lead. It is interesting and perhaps significant that
the Soviet proposal did not mention bases in Eastern Asia. Perhaps this implied a willingness by the USSR to have American
power used to check that of the People's Republic of China in
East Asia. In any case, the link between the control of missiles and
the elimination of overseas bases was completely unacceptable to
the United States and the USSR was fully aware of this.
The Western twenty-power proposal on this issue was modest. 85
It merely called for the creation of an ad hoc committee with a
broad mandate to explore the question of the peaceful uses of
outer space.
Eventually the USSR agreed to drop the condition that work
toward the elimination of foreign bases must accompany that concerning limiting the uses of outer space. 86 Nevertheless, the Soviet
Union and the United States could not agree on the composition of
the ad hoc committee; the Soviet Union insisted on parity of representation between East and West, a concept which the United States
refused to accept. In the end, the Assembly adopted a revised
version of the twenty-power proposal which provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee of eighteen-three from the Soviet
bloc, twelve affiliated with the Western alliance system, and three
neutrals-and the USSR announced that it would refuse to participate in the new body. 37 In view of this refusal, if any work were
to be done prior to the next session of the General Assembly in the
fall of 1959, when the composition of the ad hoc committee could
again be reviewed, it would have to be done in the technical conference on measures to prevent a surprise attack. This conference,
it should be noted, would be composed-by agreement of all concerned, including the United States--an the basis of parity.
If the thirteenth session of the General Assembly can be regarded as a preliminary round to the Geneva negotiations, the United
States and the West emerged with a slight lead. At least the Assembly had been kept from going on record as favoring an unconditional cessation of nuclear testing, and thus prejudging the outcome
35UN Document AI C. 1/ L. 220.
36UN Document A/C. 1/L. 219/Rev. 1.
37UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th

Session), p. 616.
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of the Geneva talks. On the other hand, the United States had
backed a proposal calling for a suspension of nuclear testing as long
as the negotiations continued, which was different and went somewhat further than President Eisenhower's statement of August 22.
One analyst has argued that this resolution later became an important obstacle to the United States resuming testing after the
expiration of the initial twelve months' moratorium. 38
The origin of the inconsistency between the President's statement and the United States support of the UN resolution is not
clear. At least three alternative explanations are possible. The inconsistency may have been a conscious concession, considered and
agreed in Washington by the governmental agencies concerned, perhaps in response to pressures from friendly delegations reported to
the State Department by the United States delegation to the Assembly.39 As such it may have been agreed to by the ABC and the
Department of Defense without much thought of the consequences
because no one expected the negotiations to last as long as a year.
Again, the inconsistency may have resulted from a failure in the
coordination between the United States delegation on one hand,
and the Department of State and other agencies of the government
on the other. Finally, it may have reflected an effort by some individuals within the United States government to use the United
Nations as an instrument in bureaucratic infighting for the purpose
of forcing an adjustment in the American position against the opposition of their colleagues. Since the Department of State contained
the highest proportion of individuals favoring an intensive exploration
of test ban possibilities, and since it was in the best position to control the American stand in the UN, the last interpretation has a
degree of plausibility. Incidents of this sort occur when policy objectives are not clearly articulated and when disagreements among
the governmental agencies concerned are glossed over in general
policy statements which do not provide sufficient guidance in new
H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 284.
a matter of law the delegation receives instructions from the
President through the Secretary of State. In practice, the instructions are
formulated in the Department of State which is also responsible for clearance
with other agencies concerned. Not infrequently, the delegation suggests to
the Department that its instructions be modified.
38Earl
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tactical developments, such as the situation in the General Assembly,
requiring specific and prompt action.
The fact that the discussion of limiting the development of
missiles would be confined to the forthcoming technical conference
on measures against surprise attack was another significant outcome
of the thirteenth session of the Assembly.

Domestic Sparring
As this maneuvering for position was in progress on the international level, there was also considerable sparring on the domestic
level within the United States. Although no simple description is
adequate, perhaps the best way of briefly describing what happened
would be to say that the individuals who questioned the wisdom of
a test ban, having been somewhat nonplussed by the events of the
summer, sought to bring their views to the fore.
Perhaps the most significant effort of this group was an article
by Professor Henry A. Kissinger entitled "Nuclear Testing and the
Problem of Peace," which appeared in the October 1958 issue of
Foreign Affairs. It was the lead article, and that issue of the magazine was published in late September, coincidentally with the opening of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. During the
debate in the First Committee, Soviet bloc delegates cited the article
as proof that the United States was not really interested in a test
ban. 40 Similar Soviet attempts to impugn American motives on the
basis of citations from the public debate became a common feature
of the Geneva negotiations. Doubtlessly, this was a negotiating and
propaganda device. However, it may also have been more than that.
In the early fall of 1958, any shrewd analysis of the American
position would have to take account of the views which Mr. Kissinger expressed. On the basis of his book, Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy, published in 1957, he was a widely respected authority, and it was clear that his views would receive at least a respectful if not a sympathetic hearing by a number of influential people
within and outside of the government.
Mr. Kissinger asserted that when the Conference of Experts
had concluded that it was technically feasible to detect nuclear
weapon tests, the United States had been forced "to make a critical
40UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (13th
Session), pp. 16, 20 and 34.
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policy decision, although only its technical aspects had been fully
explored." 41 He then went on to questionwhether a complete suspension of nuclear testing was desirable. He argued that the United
States "should deal with the health hazard by ending tests which
produce appreciable fallout," but that it "should agree to a complete ban only as part of a general disarmament agreement which
includes conventional weapons." He described the technical difficulties and uncertainties which were involved in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions and pointed out that these would be
compounded in the case of a closed society, such as the USSR. He
also illustrated how difficult it might be to obtain credible evidence
of a violation of a test ban agreement and raised the fundamental
question of what action the United States could and would take
if a violation occurred, a problem which was unresolved when the
American delegation went to Geneva and which was to plague
American representatives in the Geneva negotiations. He raised the
possibility that the Soviet Union "might use a temporary cessation
to prepare tests of superior weapons," an interesting thought which
raised serious questions about the wisdom of accepting a moratorium
before a treaty was signed. His basic arguments, however, concerned
the wisdom of a test ban agreement from the point of view of
American military policy. He made the point that a ban on nuclear
testing might well lead to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
and argued that unless the United States and the West generally
were willing to increase substantially their conventional forces (or
unless Soviet bloc conventional forces were decreased), such a prohibition would cripple the defenses of the West. He maintained that
advances in the development of nuclear weapons would benefit the
West. Finally, Mr. Kissinger analyzed the strategic problems which
confronted NATO and suggested that they could be solved through
the development of a NATO nuclear striking force. As a policy for
the Geneva negotiations, Mr. Kissinger suggested that the United
States:
... should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which would immediately set a maximum dosage of
permissible fall-out from testing well below the level
41Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (October 1958), pp. 1-18, at 2.
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brought about by recent tests. The U.N. committee should
then assign a quota to the United States and its allies and
another to the Soviet bloc on a 50 - 50 basis. (Since most
of the potential 'fourth' Powers are in the West, this would
be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years
all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests
which involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to
exceed their quota. During those two years the quota
would be progressively reduced, ultimately to zero. Afterwards, unless there were by then a general disarmament
agreement, nations would remain free to conduct surface
tests of 'clean' weapons, underground tests and tests in
outer space, so long as they did not cause fall-out. Technical
experts from both sides would agree on an adequate inspection system, which would be relatively simple. 42
It is impossible to state the extent to which Mr. Kissinger's article

reflected or influenced the views of individuals in responsible positions; certainly the initial American position in the Geneva negotiations bore little resemblance to his recommendations. However, his
article was a persuasive statement of the doubts which some felt
about the wisdom of a comprehensive test ban as a single measure
of arms control or disarmament. It served as a rallying point for
individuals who shared these concerns. Thus the article was both a
symbol of the fact that the argument within the United States about
the course of American policy concerning this issue was far from
settled and also an instrument in this continuing battle.
The Surprise Attack Conference
Even though chronologically it occurred after the Geneva negotiations opened, the technical conference on surprise attack-formally known as "The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible
Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack"which met from November 10 to December 18, 1958, must also be
viewed as an element in the background of the test ban negotiations. The Conference recessed after six weeks with no concrete
achievements mainly because the two sides failed to agree on its
purposes. 43 The United States sought to discuss methods of con42Jbid., p. 16.
43For a more extensive analysis of the technical conference on surprise
attack see: Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control,
pp. 464-88. See also the report of the Conference: UN Document A/ 4078.
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trolling missiles, long-range aircraft, tactical aircraft, ground forces,
missile-launching submarines, other naval forces, and other possible
instruments of surprise attack, and in that order. The USSR, on the
other hand, sought to discuss such matters as the creation of zones
of inspection and the reduction of military forces in Europe, including the denuclearization of Germany. The USSR refused to
discuss the items which the United States raised on the ground that
such discussion would involve divulging secret information which
would be useful to the West without giving the Soviet Union any
compensating advantages in return. In addition, Soviet delegates said
that the USSR would not agree to discuss the establishment of
controls on missiles until nuclear weapons had been banned. The
American delegates, in contrast, who viewed this conference as another Conference of Experts, refused to discuss the matters raised
by the USSR on the ground that they involved "political" issues
not appropriate for consideration in a technical conference.
In essence, the two sides were concerned about different problems. So far as American policy in the Geneva test ban negotiations
was concerned, the first essential implication of this denouement
was that the USSR probably would not negotiate for controls on
missiles--on means of delivery of nuclear weapons--except in the
context of a board agreement covering several measures of arms
control or disarmament. In other words, the concession which the
USSR made on this point at the thirteenth session of the General
Assembly would not hold up in a more concrete negotiating situation than the Assembly, and the USSR still insisted on maintaining
a link between controlling missiles and other measures of arms
control. A second implication was the underscoring of the USSR's
concern about the possibility of the German Federal Republic's
obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Putting it in a different way,
the conference emphasized that the USSR was concerned about a
very specific "nth country problem."
The Opening Atmosphere
Despite the optimistic expectations arising from the agreement
at the Conference of Experts, the real setting for the Geneva Conference was still the unrelieved Cold War atmosphere of deep
distrust and mutual suspicion in which the motives of the other side
were constantly questioned and scrutinized, with every doubt in-
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variably resolved against rather than in favour of the other side's
good faith. Despite the generally recognized dangers of a nuclear
catastrophe, the atmosphere was clearly not conducive to decisions
involving the risks entailed in an immediate diminution of national
power, in return for longer range benefits conditioned more or less
on the continuing good faith of the other side. On entering the
negotiations, the Soviet Union appeared to aim at obtaining an immediate, permanent, and far-reaching commitment from the West,
with minimum control machinery. The United States, while apparently willing to give a qualified commitment, demanded guarantees against evasion which would lift the "iron curtain" substantially
and which could not be frustrated unilaterally, and perhaps also
further measures of arms control. Both sides appeared to question each other's sincerity in desiring to give any genuine commitment with respect to a test ban. The Soviet Union sought to
find confirmation of its suspicions in the open public debate continuing in the United States on the wisdom of the test ban; the
Western suspicions on the other hand fed on the unrestrained
resort to propaganda by the Soviet Union's indiscriminately seeking
to generate pressures on the West. As the negotiations opened, this
pervading atmosphere made it exceedingly difficult for the two sides
to cut through the underbrush of tactical and propaganda positions
developed in the preliminary sparring and to start real negotiations.
All in all, the setting was not auspicious.
III

The Initial Phase of the Geneva Negotiations
The Selection and Preparation of the American Delegation
As soon as the USSR agreed in its note of August 30 that negotiations concerning a test ban agreement should begin on October
31, and while the preconference maneuvering for position was in
progress, the United States began preparations for the opening
of the talks. The first step was the appointment of a delegation.
James J. Wadsworth was chosen as the U.S. representative, with
the personal rank of Ambassador. Prior to 1953, he had been
engaged in the management of various business enterprises and had
held a variety of public offices, including membership in the New
York State Assembly from 1931 to 1941. When the new adminis-
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tration took over in 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Mr.
Wadsworth, a Republican, to the office of deputy representative of
the United States to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. In this capacity he had participated in various negotiations
involving arms control and disarmament and nuclear energy. However, by self-admission, he was not in any sense a technical expert
in the subject matter of the test ban negotiations. In fact, during
the course of the conference he sometimes emphasized that he did not
understand the technical intricacies which were involved. Ambassador Wadsworth's greatest strength was his skill in advocacy and
his personal relationships. Robert F. Bacher, a member of the
President's Science Advisory Committee and one of the Western
delegates at the Conference of Experts, was chosen as his deputy.
In addition, the American delegation included: senior advisors from
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the
Atomic Energy Commission; two Congressional advisors, Senator
Albert Gore, with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as his alternate
(both Democrats); Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Republican);
and a number of special advisors. 44
Unlike the Conference of Experts, which consisted of Eastern
and Western panels, the Geneva negotiations would be comprised
of delegations from the three nuclear powers, the USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. In practice, however, as the Soviet
representatives constantly pointed out, there were only two sides.
The two Western delegations hardly ever differed in the public
sessions of the Geneva talks. The principal British delegate was
David Ormsby-Gore, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He
44The advisers to the American delegation were: Charles C. Stelle, Department of State; Alfonzo P. Fox, Lt. Gen., USA (retired), Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; George M. Kavanaugh, Atomic Energy Commission; all titled senior advisers; and Vincent
Baker, Department of State; Robert G. Baraz, Department of State; Stephen
Benedict, USIA; Hans Bethe, PSAC; Darcey Brent, Department of State;
Harold Brown, Atomic Energy Commission; Charles E. Collett, Col., USAF,
Department of Defense; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Richard Latter, RAND
Corporation; Doyle L. Northrup, Department of Defense; David H. Popper,
American Consulate General, Geneva; Luther Reid, Department of State;
Malcolm Toon, Department of State; Paul Toussaint, Department of State;
Henry S. Villard, American Consulate General, Geneva; and Secretary of the
Delegation, Virgil L. Moore, American Consulate General, Geneva.
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had been a delegate at the 1957 London session of the UN Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. The British delegation
included several others from the Foreign Office, but interestingly
no ranking scientists or high level officials from the Atomic Energy
Authority or the Ministry of Defense.
As has already been mentioned, Ambassador Semen K. Tsarapkin was appointed as the chief Soviet delegate. 45 Y evgeni K.
Fedorov was his principal technical assistant. Dr. Fedorov had
been the Chairman of the Eastern panel at the Conference of
Experts and Mr. Tsarapkin had been a member of the panel. The
Soviet delegation also included additional scientists and other diplomats who had had previous experience in disarmament negotiations.
The composition of the Soviet delegation reflected a consistent
Soviet policy of generally continuing to use the same diplomatic
and scientific personnel in disarmament negotiations. This policy
has facilitated continuity and has avoided the laborious process of
"educating" new persons. The American practice, followed by both
the Republican and Democratic administrations, has been in striking
contrast: new personalities, frequently lacking any related knowledge
or experience, have been regularly placed in responsible negotiating
or policy-making positions requiring almost instant action.
In the relatively short time available after its appointment,
the American delegation and other officials prepared a position
paper which ultimately was approved by the Committee of Principals. This paper, which was about ten pages in length, reiterated
the basic elements of the August 22 statement, which became the
core of the American negotiating position. The paper outlined the
major issues which could be anticipated and formulated an American position on each of these. It was in no sense a draft treaty.
Many issues were covered only generally and some hardly at all.
The progress in other areas of arms control that would be required if the test moratorium were to be extended was not defined,
any more than in the President's statement of August 22. A variety
of technical problems were not worked out. Interestingly, the position paper suggested that the United States might, at some appropriate stage in the negotiations, introduce the concept that the treaty
should only cover explosions above a certain yield level. In pre45See

supra p. 57.
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paring the paper, the scientists and the Department of State personnel tended to work separately on different problems and without
a great deal of interchange.
Whether or not the position paper constituted adequate preparation is a difficult question, and one which can be examined better
at a later stage, after the actual negotiations have been reviewed.
It is necessary though at this point to consider why the preparations
were not more extensive. Partly, it was again a matter of time. Less
than two months elapsed between the time that the delegation was
appointed and the time that they had to depart for Geneva. In
addition, the lack of detail in the position paper was partly a matter of tactics; it was thought that the American position should be
developed in the context of the Soviet position as expressed in the
negotiations, and in any case there was the general maxim of not
displaying one's hand too early in the game. Further, the nature of
the American preparation was related to the interim sparring that
went on in this period. Since it takes two to reach an agreement,
the seriousness with which one views one's task is partly a function
of one's perception of the seriousness of the opposite party. Viewing the course of events, an American justifiably could have some
reservations about Soviet intentions. Finally, it must be said that
American preparation was not more advanced because certain key
officials were unwilling to do more and, above all, because it would
have been difficult to get agreement in the Committee of Principals
on a more precise document. The cleavages concerning the wisdom
of various courses among the individuals and agencies represented
on the Committee were too great to allow more than an agreement
on broad and rather vague principles. Of course, these difficulties
could have been resolved by directive from the President, but they
were not.
Opening Controversies
As has already been mentioned, there was also something less
than full agreement between East and West on the objective of the
Geneva negotiations. The debate about this continued until the last
hour. The final note on the subject was sent from the Soviet Foreign
Ministry to the American Embassy and face to face controversy
occurred the moment the conference opened.
It took an informal, off-the-record meeting lasting three hours,
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on Saturday, November 1, 1958, to achieve agreement on the title
of the conference. Even after that the parties disputed the meaning
of the title, "The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests." The United States held that discontinuance meant
"suspension" while the Soviet Union interpreted it as meaning essentially "cessation. " 46 There was more to the dispute than mere
semantics, a basic issue was at stake, the question of whether a test
cessation would or would not be permanent and unconditional, and
both sides sought to have the title reflect their position.
There were also other procedural differences at an early stage.
The USSR wanted the meetings to be open, but ultimately agreed
to the Western proposal that they should be closed. 47 The Soviet
Union also suggested that the Conference should grant hearings to
representatives from nongovernmental organizations. 48 Mr. Tsarapkin advanced this as a general suggestion and made a specific proposal that the representatives from the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy-an international group with membership in several Western
countries which strongly opposed the testing of nuclear weaponsshould be heard. The Western powers refused to accept the Soviet
proposal, arguing that representatives of nongovernmental organizations could make their views known to the various delegations
separately.
Through both proposals the Soviet Union sought to use worldwide public pressure against the testing of nuclear weapons as a
way of influencing the Western position in the negotiations. Although the Conference decided not to grant hearings to these
representatives the Soviet delegation felt free not only to talk to
them but-despite the agreed procedure-to hold formal press conferences as well, obviously in order further to stimulate public
pressures. In practice, even though the Soviet Union accepted the
Western position that the Conference should be private-that is,
that attendance should be limited to the representatives of the three
nuclear powers and the Secretary General of the United Nations,
that the records of the meetings should not be published until the
participating states agreed, and that only brief communiques should
46GEN/DNT /PV. 2, pp. 3-4.
47GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 8.
48GEN/DNT/PV. 7, p. 3.
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be issued-the Soviet Union continued to play for the support of
public opinion.
For example, at the first meeting of the Conference the Soviet
Union submitted a short draft treaty (which will be analyzed in
more detail later) providing for an immediate, permanent and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 49 Within a few days,
the Soviet delegation to the United Nations gave the text of the
proposal to the press, and it was subsequently published in a number of Western papers, although not in Soviet papers. Sharp Western
protests in the Conference provoked first a defense of the action by
Mr. Tsarapkin, and then the interesting statement, made, as he put
it, purely of his "own volition, that the Soviet delegation has not
handed the text of the draft agreement to anyone." 50 Thus, despite
an action for which his government could be held accountable, he
sought to safeguard his own personal reputation with his negotiating
partners.
Subsequently, the Western delegations also sought to rally public opinion to their side, and thereby to buttress their position in the
Conference. In fact, Western techniques may even have been somewhat more sophisticated, leaks to the press were made with considerably more subtlety. Two points, however, must be made. The
first is that the USSR initiated the practice, and in a most blatant
fashion. The second is that the play for public opinion was necessarily confined almost entirely to efforts to influence opinion in
Western and uncommitted countries. Because of the rigid controls
of the press in communist countries, their citizens could read only
what their governments approved. Some Western radio broadcasts
may have reached citizens of these countries, but the effects were
clearly negligible. Thus, although both sides had a more or less
equal opportunity to influence people in uncommitted areas, the
battle for "home opinion" was quite unequal. Moreover, the principal Soviet policy-makers needed to be concerned about the "home
opinion" much less than the Western governments. The USSR
could seek to undermine the strength of the Western delegations,
while the West did not have the same opportunity. For the West,
this part of the battle had to be defined principally in terms of
49GEN/DNT/l.
50GEN/DNT/7, p. 10.
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countering Soviet efforts. In negotiations involving an issue charged
with as many emotional implications as that of nuclear testing, this
difference was quite important.
Continued Soviet Testing of Nuclear Weapons
Although these Soviet efforts to play upon public optmon in
the opening stages of the Geneva negotiations may have put the
Western powers under some constraint, another Soviet action was
even more bothersome to them. On October 30, the Soviet Foreign
Ministry issued a statement on the "Question of the Cessation of
Nuclear Tests," which was transmitted to the Secretary General of
the United Nations the following day, the day that the Geneva
Conference opened. 51 The statement asserted, as Foreign Minister
Gromyko had done previously, that because of the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the Western powers after the USSR had
unilaterally renounced further testing on March 31, and because of
the unacceptable nature of the Western proposal for a one-year
suspension of further tests, the USSR had the right to continue
testing until it had completed as many experiments as the United
States and the United Kingdom combined had undertaken since
March 31. The statement went on to say:
This is just the line of action the Soviet Government will
pursue, in its concern for the security of the Soviet people,
so long as the Governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom will persist in wrecking agreement and
raising repeated obstacles to an agreement on the immediate stopping of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons
for all time.
On November 7, the United States Atmnic Energy Commission
announced that the USSR had detonated two "relatively low-yield"
devices in Siberia on November 1 and November 3; that is, after
the Geneva negotiations had opened. The USSR's previous shots
that fall had been conducted at a different proving ground. In addition, the November shots were at a different height from the
immediately preceding series. The new shots seemed to be tests of
51UN Document A/3973.
52See Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958,
p. 78.
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relatively unsophisticated weapons. 52 They may well have been
planned principally for their psychological effect.
Immediately after the ABC's announcement, President Eisenhower issued a statement in which he said that although the Soviet
action relieved the United States of its unilateral obligation, under
his proposal of August 22, not to conduct further tests, it would
continue the suspension "for the time being," and he "understood
that the United Kingdom would also."
The Western delegations also raised the issue of the Soviet
tests in the Geneva Conference on November 7. Although Mr.
Tsarapkin replied immediately, over two weeks later, on November
29, he read a formal declaration, which probably should be considered the USSR's official reply. 53 The declaration essentially restated the October 30 statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It
asserted the right of the USSR to continue testing, and then said:
"This is exactly what the Soviet Government is doing, since it is
concerned about its country's security." However, after November
7, 1958, neither side announced a nuclear explosion on Soviet
territory, until the USSR publicly abrogated the moratorium in the
fall of 1961, and there is no publicly available evidence that the
Soviet Union conducted tests during this period. 54
There are several unanswered questions concerning the episode.
For example, why did the Soviet Union not announce the tests, or
why did the United States wait until November 7 to make its announcement? Were the two shots attempts to test the efficiency of
the Western national detection systems? The most plausible interpretation seems to be that the Soviet action was a warning that the
USSR would not be bound by any cut-off date unilaterally proclaimed by the West and also an attempt to bully the Western
governments into agreeing to the Soviet version of a test ban through
playing on Western anxieties concerning the relative state of weapons
development and on the widespread public fear of the consequences
53GEN/DNT/l5, pp. 3-11.
54Earl H. Voss, however, maintains that "the Defense Department
finally recognized that clap.destine t~::sting probably had been occurring in the
Soviet Union." (Nuclear Ambush, p. 512.) It is difficult to know how to
evaluate his conclusion. It seems clear that some suspicious seismic signals
were recorded during this period, but these obviously did not constitute
incontrovertible evidence of clandestine nuclear detonations.
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of further testing. If this was the Soviet goal, the action did not
succeed. Nor did it result, on the other hand, in widespread public
condemnation of the USSR for testing after the opening of the
Conference.

The Controversy Concerning the Agenda
The basic conflict between the two sides manifested itself in
the controversy over the agenda of the Geneva Conference. The
dispute about the agenda began during the opening session and
continued to occupy the Conference for three weeks. Finally, on
November 21, the Conference implicitly dropped the idea of attempting to reach agreement on an agenda, and launched into a
substantive discussion without any formal agenda.
In reality, the discussion on the agenda was a substantive discussion, for it involved attempts on both sides to influence the
outcome under the guise of settling mere procedural issues. The
essential issue at stake was whether the discussion of a control
organization would precede, accompany or follow the conclusion
of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The
Soviet proposal-mirroring those that it had advanced since the
very first post-Second World War negotiations on arms control and
disarmament-was that the first item on the agenda should be
"Conclusion of an agreement on the cessation, by States possessing
atomic and hydrogen weapons, of tests with such weapons." 55 After
that, according to the Soviet proposal, the Conference would approve provisions concerning the control organization to monitor
such an agreement. The Conference would finally prepare a report
to be submitted to the participating governments and the Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the Western
view-again resembling Western reactions in the past-such an
agenda could well result in an unmonitored test ban, since the obligation not to test would be adopted prior to agreement on the
control system. In any case, the Soviet agenda would have the
effect of making it difficult to condition the cessation of testing on
the establishment and effective operation of a control system and on
progress in other areas of arms control or disarmament.
In the agenda proposed by the United States, the order of the
first two items was reversed, and, in addition, the agreement on the
55GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 5.
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"discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests" would not be adopted
until the Conference had decided on interim measures to bring the
agreement and control system into operation. 56 Mr. Tsarapkin
initially took the attitude that to proceed in this fashion would be
"tantamount to talking about pointless matters, since it is proposed
to create a control system before any agreement is reached about
what is to be controlled." 57 He added that the nature of the control
system would depend on the nature of the agreement concerning
the cessation of the tests, and then asserted that a one-year moratorium would be an insufficient period of time even to establish
a control system. He argued that the conditional moratorium proposed in President Eisenhower's August 22 statement was a way of
creating loopholes so that the Western powers could resume their
testing programs.
Both sides offered revised versions of their proposals. 58 The
revisions were all in the direction of formulations which would
allow simultaneous discussion of the nature of the agreement and
the nature of the control system, although the Soviet proposals were
always somewhat ambiguous in this regard. In the end, however,
once the quest for an agenda was abandoned, this was in fact the
procedure which the Conference followed. In terms of distance from
opening positions, ignoring the question of whether or not these
were justifiable, the outcome represented probably a greater concession on the part of the USSR than on the part of the West.
The Initial Soviet Proposal
The same issues that were involved in the dispute about the
agenda arose in the discussion of the draft treaty which the Soviet
Union tabled during the opening session of the Conference. The
proposal was both brief and simple. Its provisions were:
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
United States of America,
Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear
56Jbid., p. 11.
57Jbid., p. 19.
58See GEN/DNT/PV. 7, pp. 11-12, 17-18; GEN/DNT/PV. 9, pp.
3-4; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 4.
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armaments race and to the further improvement and creation of new, even more destructive types of these weapons
of mass destruction,
Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the
'urgent objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and eliminating them from national armaments,' as indicated by
the United Nations,
Being moved by the desire to eliminate forever the
danger to the life and health of the population of all
countries of the world resulting from experimental explosions of nuclear weapons,
Have decided to conclude for these purposes the
present Agreement and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . who, having exchanged their full powers,
found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland and the United States of America solemnly
undertake not to carry out any tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type from the date on which the
·
present Agreement is signed.
Article 2
The three Governments undertake to promote the assumption by all other States in the world of an undertaking not
to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any
type.
Article 3
For the purposes of keeping observation on the fulfillment
of the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall institute
machinery for control.
The above-mentioned control machinery shall have at
its disposal a network of control posts set up in accordance
with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of
Experts.
Article 4
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland and the United States of America agree to
the installation on their territories and also--in the case
of the United States of America and the United Kingdom
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of Great Britain and Northern Ireland--on the territories of
their possessions and trust territories, of an agreed number
of control posts.
Article 5
This Agreement shall continue indefinitely and shall enter
into force immediately after it has been signed. 59

This proposal paralleled the Soviet suggestions for the agenda
of the Conference, and also the Soviet draft resolution submitted
to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. It also resembled
tactics often previously employed by the USSR. It would have resulted in the signatory states signing an agreement not to test
nuclear weapons at a point when they had achieved only a vague
agreement in principle on the nature of a control system. This draft
treaty, in combination with the Soviet actions at the thirteenth
session of the General Assembly, and the Soviet proposal with
respect to the agenda of the Geneva Conference, clearly made
many in the West wary of Soviet intentions and doubtful about the
Soviet willingness actually to accept a control system. The Soviet
position therefore served to strengthen the fears and also the hand
of those within the United States who questioned the wisdom of
a test ban. It also made those who favored a test ban somewhat
reluctant, at this stage, to press their position with vigor. In the
opening days of the Conference, it was difficult to argue that concessions should be made to the Soviet position in the interest and
hope of reaching an agreement. Whether the initial Soviet position
would have been different if President Eisenhower's statement of
August 22 had been more acceptable to the USSR is an interesting
subject of speculation. If the Conference of Experts could be interpreted as a concession to the West on the part of the USSR,
the August 22 statement contained no compensating concessions to
the Soviet position. Whether the statement was wise from the point
of view of American security interests is one question. Its impact
on the USSR is a separate, although related, question.
The Soviet draft treaty has a number of other interesting aspects. First, no mention was made of other measures of disarmament. Secondly, there was no mention of possible sanctions against
59QEN/DNT/1.
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a violation of the agreement. Thirdly, it was confined to the three
nuclear powers. Fourthly, it attacked the "nth country problem"
by fiat, so to speak. The only possible implication of Article 2
would have been that the United States, the United Kingdom and
the USSR would have been obligated in some way to see that
their allies and neutral states too should agree not to conduct
nuclear weapons tests. Immediately, this meant France and China
and possibly at a later date, West Germany. Finally, since the
"agreement" would have gone into effect immediately upon signature, so far as the United States was concerned, it would have
circumvented the requirement of consent by the Senate to ratification. No doubt, the choice of the word "agreement" was intentional.
Although the Western delegates raised most of these points
in the debate, their criticisms centered on the vagueness of the
provisions concerning control in the draft agreement. The initial
Soviet response was that the problem of control had been settled
by the Conference of Experts-the report of that Conference
contained recommendations for a control system with which the
USSR agreed-and that a separate document could be prepared
containing the "technical details relating to the control system. " 60
The Western powers regarded this as an inadequate reply since it
did not provide for the tight connection that they desired to see
established between the obligation not to test and the establishment and effective operation of a control system.
On a more fundamental level, the Soviet response raised a
problem which was to become increasingly troublesome for the
Western powers during the course of the negotiations. The question
concerned the status and significance of the report of the Conference
of Experts. To what extent was it the basis for the Geneva Conference? Was it the final formulation of the control system, or
merely an initial recommendation? To what extent could the system
recommended in the report be supplemented or altered without
destroying the basis for the negotiations? It will be recalled that the
Western panel had refused to discuss a number of issues at the
Conference of Experts on the ground that they were political. How
should these matters now be treated? In addition, the report of the
60GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 31.
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Conference of Experts contained no recommendations concerning
a system for the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes.
Just as the Western states lacked a clear conception at the outset
concerning the function of the Conference of Experts, when the
Geneva negotiations began, they were uncertain about the status
which they were willing to assign to the report. But while the
Soviet proposal raised this problem, it did not do so in a critical
fashion, and at this stage not much attention was devoted to the
issue.
Senator Gore's Reaction
Senator Albert Gore, who was a member of both the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and who had been appointed as a
Congressional Adviser to the United States delegation, attended the
Geneva negotiations for a week during the early period when attention was focused on the controversy about the agenda and on
the Soviet draft agreement. The experience left him profoundly
disturbed. On his return to Washington in mid-November, he
voiced his concerns publicly,61 and also sent a private memorandum
to President Eisenhower. In Senator Gore's view, the USSR's actions
relating to the Conference, including the draft agreement which it
had tabled, were ample grounds for suspicions of Soviet motives.
He doubted that the USSR was actually willing to accept adequate
control measures, and he had concluded that the USSR's ambition
was merely to weaken United States deterrent strength, and particularly to inhibit the development of tactical nuclear weapons.
Moreover, he felt that the USSR was winning widespread public
sympathy by its behavior and that the Western position was not
being properly understood. The conclusion that the Western position was incapable of receiving widespread public support was
implicit in his argument.
He proposed that the West should adopt a new position. In
his memorandum to the President he suggested that the President
should:
61See his signed article in New York Herald Tribune, November 16,
1-958, and also the accounts in New York Times, November 16, 1958, p. 1,
and November 18, 1958, p. 1.
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announce the unconditional and unilateral cessation
of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere for a specific
period, say three years, ask similar action by other nuclear
powers and suggest that the Geneva Conference proceed
immediately to negotiate a treaty among the nuclear powers
for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests. 62
His public recommendations were similar. Both publicly and privately he argued that stopping atmospheric tests would eliminate
most of the danger of radioactive fallout. He also asserted that
existing national detection systems had demonstrated their effectiveness in detecting atmospheric tests. This was a most interesting
assertion in view of the official American insistence then and later
on an international control system. Of course, at this point the official American position was not addressed to the question of a
ban limited to atmospheric tests. After an atmospheric ban was
signed, Senator Gore felt that the conference could go on to explore
the more complex questions of inspection and control involved in
a total ban. Senator Gore thought that shifting the United States
position in this way would make it more attractive to public opinion and might possibly lay the groundwork for a successful conference in Geneva, or, at least, mitigate or save the United States
from blame for its failure.
It is impossible to know whether Senator Gore's experiences
at the Geneva Conference spawned these ideas or whether his experiences merely reinforced views which he had previously held.
Certainly the ideas had been expressed before in the debate which
had gone on within the United States. However, Senator Gore's
expression of his ideas at this point was crucially important, and
probably exerted some pressure on the USSR-if it was interested
in a comprehensive test ban-to modify the Soviet position so that
it would be more acceptable to the West. At the same time, Senator Gore's opinions also cast doubt upon the extent to which the
efforts of the American delegation in Geneva would be supported
within the United States, and particularly within the Senate, which
would have to consent to the ratification of any treaty. Mr. Tsar-'
6 2 Memorandum for President Eisenhower from Albert Gore, U.S.S.,
November 19, 1958.
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apkin, citing the reports of Senator Gore's statements, raised these
doubts in the Geneva Conference. 63
However, there is no evidence that the Senator's actions provoked a formal reappraisal within the Eisenhower Administration
of the American position at this time. The Administration had in a
sense considered the possibility of a partial ban when the moratorium decision was made and had rejected it on the ground that
stopping tests in only some environments would be misunderstood
by public opinion. Moreover, it was thought that the USSR was
only interested in a comprehensive test ban. Finally, many in the
Department of State strongly wanted the world to experience the
establishment and operation of an international control system, and
it could be argued that the likelihood of this occurring would be
less if Senator Gore's suggestion were adopted. In the same vein,
one of the gains that the CIA saw resulting from a test ban was
that it would "open up" the USSR.
Just as Americans could be concerned about the USSR's motivations, Soviet analysts could with some justification have reservations about the American position. A casual reading of the popular
press would have revealed the deep division within the United
States about the wisdom of discontinuing tests of nuclear weapons.
In view of this, as was suggested earlier, the August 22 statements
of the Western powers could be interpreted as not indicating a
serious intention to negotiate a test ban agreement. Senator Gore's
statement could have had the effect of reinforcing the reservations
which Soviet analysts might have had. Although it is impossible to
weigh accurately the advantages and costs which would accrue to
each side, it is probably true that the USSR would not benefit as
much from a partial test ban as it would from a total cessation of
nuclear weapons tests. It was the United States, not the Soviet
Union, which expressed great interest in the development of tactical nuclear weapons and in testing such devices underground.
Putting it in a different way, American military leaders viewed
tactical nuclear weapons as a way of compensating for the USSR's
superior strength in conventional forces. Because of this superiority
the USSR showed little interest in tactical nuclear weapons. Thus,
probably neither the opening position of the Western powers in
63GEN/DNT/PV. 10, pp. 8-9.
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the Geneva negotiations-that is, the August 22 statements-nor
Senator Gore's suggested alternative were very appealing to the
USSR, and by mid-November, Soviet leaders, if they had any intrinsic interest in the problem, could-perhaps justifiably-begin to
question whether the United States would accept an agreement
which would also be acceptable to the USSR. If, on the other hand,
the Soviet elite was merely interested in using the negotiations as a
device to inhibit the weapons development programs of the West,
they could interpret the course of events as indicating a need for
some concessions to prolong the discussions.

The Soviet Concession
Since the opening positions of the two sides seemed basically
incompatible, the initial task of the negotiators was to see if the
gap between the two could be narrowed so that there would at least
be a chance of reaching an agreement. In essence, this is what
happened in the Geneva Conference during the period from the
opening on October 31, 1958, until the second recess began on
March 19, 1959, or during the first seventy-two meetings of the
Conference.
The process actually began even before the attempt to reach
an agreement on an agenda was abandoned. Starting at the fifth
meeting, on November 6, the Western representatives began to
outline their concept of a control organization. Mr. Ormsby-Gore led
off by outlining his conception of the general functions of a control organization. 64 A week later, following the announcement that
the USSR had continued testing after October 31, the United
States tabled a "Working Paper Outlining a Treaty on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions Including Establishment
of an Effective Control Organization. " 65 As in the August 22
statement, the duration of the obligation not to test nuclear weapons
was made conditional on satisfactory progress in the establishment
and effective operation of a detection and identification system and
on satisfactory progress "in reaching disarmament objectives to
be agreed."
Perhaps in response to the description of the control organiza64GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5.
65GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8.
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tion which was contained in these working papers and the verbal
explanations which accompanied their presentation, or perhaps as
a reaction to Senator Gore's statements, or maybe as an independently planned tactic, on November 29 Mr. Tsarapkin read a Declaration in which inter alia the Soviet government announced its willingness to have the basic provisions regarding control embodied in
the text of the test ban agreement. 66 The Declaration in its entirety was a curious mixture. It started out as a defense of the
USSR's continued testing of nuclear weapons, shifted to an attack
on the position of the Western powers in the Geneva negotiations,
mentioned, almost in passing, the new Soviet willingness to have
one document instead of two, and concluded with the submission
of a revised version of the draft agreement which the Soviet Union
had introduced the day that the negotiations had begun. The most
basic change was the insertion of a new article stating that the
provisions for a control system would be attached to the agreement
as a protocol which would enter into force simultaneously with the
agreement. In addition, the final article now stated that the agreement would enter into force immediately after it had been "ratified" by the parties "in accordance with their constitutional procedures." However, the obligation not to test would start on the
date that the agreement was signed. Apart from these changes, the
draft agreement was identical with the original version. Nevertheless, the basic concession was sufficient to narrow the gap considerably between the Soviet position and that of the West. The
USSR had again agreed that control was necessary as a part of any
test ban agreement, and it was at least back to its 1957 position
concerning this matter. With this concession, the actual negotiations
began.
What Parties to the Treaty?
One week later, on December 6, 1958, the Conference adopted
Article I of a Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests. Three more articles were adopted before the Conference adjourned on December 19 for a brief Christmas recess, and another
three were adopted before the second recess began on March 19,
1959. These agreed articles dealt in part with noncontroversial for66GEN/DNT/PV. 15, pp. 3-11.
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malities, such as the registration of the treaty with the United
Nations. Other parts, however, concerned more basic issues.
Perhaps more important than the number of agreed articles
was that both sides began to exchange views in detail on their concepts of a test ban treaty and a control organization, and to narrow
their differences. In this respect, the Conference was unlike any
other postwar political negotiations on disarmament.
One of the first issues to be explored and settled was whether
or not states other than the three nuclear powers would be allowed
to adhere to the agreement and to have membership in the control
organization. It will be recalled that the Soviet draft treaty mentioned only the three nuclear powers. The Western powers, on the
other hand, from the outset envisaged a more inclusive organization. The issue arose concretely first in the discussion of Article I;
should it read, "Each of the Parties to this Treaty agrees ..." as
in the American draft, 67 or should it read, "The Governments of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America solemnly undertake . . .", as in the Soviet version. Several
issues were involved:
1 ) the degree of security which would result from the system
depending on how many and which states were included;
2) methods of handling the "nth country problem";
3) the distribution of political power within the control organization; and
4) the timing of the test ban.
For the Western powers the first, or first two, aspects seemed
to be the most important. The problem of China apparently loomed
large in their considerations, although the United States delegation,
like the American experts at Geneva a few months earlier, was
under instructions not to mention the People's Republic of China. 68
Nonetheless, it was widely known that the USSR had conducted
explosions-apparently employing TNT-on the territory of the
People's Republic of China. Moreover, the ability to detect nuclear
67GEN/DNT/12.
ossee the exchange between Senators Gore and Humphrey: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, 86th Congress, 2d Session
(1959), p. 10.
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tests in the USSR depended to some extent upon having control
posts on mainland China. The USSR, on the other hand, seemed
to be mainly concerned about the last issue, the timing of the test
ban. It agreed to the Western phraseology only after it had received assurances from the Western powers that including other
states would not cause a delay, that the treaty would enter into
force as soon as it had been ratified by the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 69 Presumably, the original Soviet stand
was at least partly motivated by the known opposition of France
to a test ban.
The same issues were involved-and were settled in a similar
way-in the discussion of Article II, which obligated the parties to
the treaty to establish a Control Organization and to cooperate
with it.
The "nth country problem" also came up in connection with
the Soviet proposal that the treaty should contain an article binding
the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to "promote
the assumption by all other States in the world of an undertaking
not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any
type. " 70 This had been article two in the original Soviet proposal.
Significantly, Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question whether the treaty would
be abrogated if, despite the best efforts of the signatory states,
another state conducted a nuclear weapons test, went unanswered. 71
The Western powers argued that they could not accept an obligation of this nature. In part, it violated Western concepts of cooperation among sovereign states. Further, the Western powers too
were bothered by the position of France. So far as this phase of
the Conference was concerned, the "nth country problem" was
handled by agreeing to mention it in the preamble, agreeing that
the Control Organization should be open to other states and that
there should be an article on accession by other states, and agreeing
to this rather mild commitment in Article I, "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of
nuclear test explosions anywhere." In essence, what was ruled out
was aiding another state to conduct a nuclear test explosion by
69GEN/DNT/PV. 20, p, 6.
70GEN/DNT /1, p. 25.
71See Tsarapkin's vague statement: GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 16.
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giving it technical or material assistance. The transfer of nuclear
weapons for stockpile purposes, an important issue with respect to
NATO, was not ruled out.
Differing Concepts Concerning a Control Organization
More profound differences between the two sides developed
as they began to discuss the structure and nature of the proposed
Control Organization. The Western powers envisaged an organization which would consist of a small executive body or commission
composed of the three nuclear powers and a few other states, a
conference which would include all parties to the treaty, an internationally staffed detection and identification system including the
basic components recommended by the Conference of Experts and
certain other features, and a chief executive officer. 72 In the Westem view, the Control Organization should, with only a few exceptions, either operate automatically on the basis of pre-established
technical criteria or on the basis of some form of majority voting.
The original Soviet concept of the Control Organization was
quite different. 73 The detailed proposal which the USSR tabled had
no provisions for a conference or a chief executive officer. The
central headquarters of the detection and identification system would
be staffed on the basis of parity between East and West, and control
posts would be manned by the citizens of the territories where they
were located, except that there would be one "controller" from the
other side. All important decisions would require the agreement of
the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
An even more fundamental difference between the positions of
the two sides concerned what action the Control Organization might
take in the event of a suspected violation. The USSR argued that
if one of the three nuclear powers-and implicitly any state-refused to allow an investigation of a suspicious event, the only conceivable action would be for the Commission to report this disagreement to the states which were parties to the treaty and to the
Security Council of the United Nations. 74 Although the Western
72See GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8; GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 17, pp. 5-9; GEN/DNT/13; and
GEN/DNT/22.
73GEN/DNT/ 19, pp. 16-18.
74See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 19-20; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp.
6-7.
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delegates were always somewhat vague about their expectations,
they made it clear that the Soviet position was unacceptable, and
implicitly seemed to demand that the Control Organization should
be able to obtain incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear explosion
had occurred. 75 In the case of a suspected underground explosion,
this would have meant an on-site inspection, the only means of
obtaining definite proof. The Western position seemed to reflect
some uncertainty about the problem.
Taken at face value, the two different conceptions reflected
different interests and fears, and paralleled the broad approach of
the two sides toward international organization. The West wanted
to avoid creating a Control Organization which the East could
obstruct and the East wanted to avoid creating an international
organization which the West might use against the interests and
opposition of the East. In essence, the opening positions of the two
sides on these matters were such that they were obviously unacceptable to the other.
Some progress was made, however, prior to the Christmas
recess, in reducing the distance between the two positions. After
the Western powers had stated several times that the chief executive
officer would be responsible to the Commission and would generally
act under its directives, 76 and that some decisions of the Commission would require the agreement of the three nuclear powers, 77 the
USSR accepted this formulation of Article III, which was suggested
by Mr. Ormsby-Gore:
The Control Organization established under Article 2 of
this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission'; a Detection and
Identification System, hereinafter referred to as 'the System'; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as
'the Administrator'; and a Conference of Parties to the
Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 'the Conference'. 78
In particular, the USSR sought and received Mr. Ormsby-Gore's
assurance that the Administrator could not initiate an on-site in75See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, p. 12.
76See GEN/DNT/PV. 22, pp. 13, 22, and 28; GEN/DNT/PV. 23,
pp. 23-24; and GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp. 31-32.
77See GEN/DNT/PV. 21, pp. 5-6.
78QEN/DNT /PV. 24, p. 31.
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spection of a suspicious but undetermined underground event without a specific directive from the Commission. 79 The Conference
also agreed on a text of Article IV, which specified that the Commission should consist of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the
United States as permanent members and four states elected for
two-year terms by the Conference.
The most basic differences, however, remained unresolved
when the Conference recessed on December 19, 1958, and even
some of the apparent agreements were in actuality merely formulations which concealed wide disagreements. For example, even
though it was agreed that there should be an Administrator, his
powers remained undefined, and although it was agreed that the
Commission should consist of seven states, the principles which
should govern the selection of the four elected members and the
voting procedures of the Commission were not determined.
Differences on Other Issues
There were other differences between East and West, which
had been apparent even before the opening of the Geneva negotiations, concerning the link between a test ban treaty and other measures of disarmament and also the duration of the Treaty. Mr.
Tsarapkin kept pressing the Western delegates for an indication of
what specific measures in other areas of arms control would be
required for the continuance of the test moratorium. 80 The Western
delegates, however, were only able to say that the specific measures
would have to be accepted by the Conference. and that eventually
they would submit a detailed paper. That was the extent of their
instructions. Mr. Tsarapkin also repeatedly made the point that the
USSR would only agree to a permanent cessation of nuclear tests,
not a temporary and conditional cessation as suggested in the Westem proposals. 81
Even so, as East-West conferences go, the Geneva Conference
had an unusual record of achievement when the first recess began
on December 19, 1958.
79See GEN/DNT/PV. 23, pp. 16-20 and 23-24.
SOQEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 26; and GEN/DNT/PV. 6, pp. 18, 19.
SIGEN/DNT/PV. 3, pp. 10, 12, 13; GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 9; GEN/DNT/PV. 10, p. 7; and GEN/DNT/PV. 15, p. 7.
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IV

A Major Reverse and Some Lesser Advances
The New Data
When the Conference resumed on January 5, 1959, the American delegation requested that a brief informal meeting should be
held immediately prior to the formal session. At that time, Mr.
Wadsworth informed Mr. Tsarapkin, and through him the Soviet
government, that during the underground tests which had been
held in Nevada in October 1958, new data had been obtained which
indicated that it would be more difficult to identify underground
nuclear explosions than had previously been believed. In other
words the conclusions of the Conference of Experts now seemed to
be excessively optimistic in the light of further experimental evidence. Specifically, the United States government now believed
that:
a) The method for distinguishing earthquakes from explosions by the direction of first motion is less effective
than previously estimated.
b) The number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a
given yield is about double that previously estimated. 82
In practical terms, if the new data were valid, it would mean either
that the capability of the system proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions would not be as great as had been expected-roughly the
threshold would be raised from 5 to 20 kilotons--or that to obtain
the same capability, a greater number of control stations and onsite inspections would be required. In the informal session Ambassador Wadsworth introduced the information and requested that it
be considered. Later, in the formal session, he merely introduced
it. That same day, the President's Science Advisory Committee
released a public statement which contained similar information,
although it had considerably less technical detail. 83 The Department
of Defense issued a more detailed release on January 16, 1959. 84
The implications of this action were devastating. Reflecting on
82GEN/DNT/25.
B3Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1335.
84Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 255-56.
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his experiences as a negotiator on arms control and disarmament
measures in his book published in 1962, James Wadsworth wrote
that "it spread a pall over the negotiations from which they never
completely recovered. " 85 For the opponents of a test ban treaty in
the West, the new data provided convincing proof of the wisdom
of their position. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could
interpret the new data as an indication that the West was now
raising the ante in terms of opening up the USSR, and Mr. Tsarapkin charged that the data had been introduced to justify sending ten
times as many on-site inspection groups as the Conference of Experts had contemplated. The stark outline in which the new data
was presented, and the fact that it was not accompanied by a
definite proposal for action allowed all parties to draw whatever
inferences they might.
Why then, in the face of these obvious implications, did the
United States submit the data in such raw form? Why did it not
request an adjournment of the Conference during which the data
could be properly evaluated from the technical viewpoint and,
what is perhaps even more important, concrete proposals could be
elaborated for the necessary modification of the detection and
identification system?
There are several answers. In the first place, President Eisenhower's immediate reaction on being informed of the new data
(which will be treated in more detail later) was that the United
States government must tell the "truth" to its negotiating partners
and the American public. Secondly, it would have been impossible
to keep the new data secret. Many seismograms yield data for the
public domain. Moreover, the scientists and politicians opposing a
test ban obviously perceived the value of the new data as powerful
ammunition in support of their cause, and they could have leaked
it through Congressional or other channels with even more serious
consequences on the Geneva Conference. 86 Since past experience
had shown that the Administration was not willing or able to control interventions of this sort-and they were encouraged from
Congressional quarters-there was little risk involved for the persons concerned. Another and perhaps more important reason for the
85James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace (1962), p. 24.
86See Wadsworth's frank statement in this regard GEN/DNT /PV. 50,
p. 16.
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hasty submission may have been the conclusion reached by several
within the Department of State that it would have been impossible
to obtain agreement within the government on reasonable proposals
to accompany the submission of the new data. Mr. Dulles, who had
become increasingly convinced of the advantages of a controlled
test ban, although skeptical of Russian motives, was taken aback
by the new data. It will be recalled that the American delegation
was never given concrete guidance on the threshold problem so
that apparently there was no agreed policy on the subject which
could now be reviewed in the light of the new knowledge and all
other relevant technical and political-military considerations. Under
the circumstances, any proposals based on the new data on which
an agreement could have been reached among the agencies concerned through regular process of coordination would probably
have called for such far-reaching modifications of the scheme developed by the Conference of Experts that their submission in
Geneva might well have spelled the doom of any further negotiations. And Mr. Dulles was not prepared to take a strong stand
and bring the matter before the President. Hence, the decision to
submit the new data in unevaluated form appeared to be the least
of several evils.
Viewing it from a slightly different perspective, the new data
is a reflection on the rather casual way in which crucial decisions
were taken in the United States in the spring and summer of 1958.
At that time, as was shown earlier, it was a matter of common
knowledge, at least among American scientists, that the conclusions
with respect to detection and identification of underground explosions rested on extrapolations from one case. In an environment where there had been just one less case, high altitude, the
Conference of Experts had refused to make a recommendation.
In Geneva, during the formal session on January 5 in which
the new data was offered, Mr. Wadsworth suggested that the Conference should appoint an ad hoc working group of technical experts to discuss the problem of high altitude detection. 87 He recalled the absence in the Report of the Conference of Experts of
a recommendation concerning this environment, and asserted that
this gap had to be closed. He went on to say that he believed that
87GEN/DNT/PV. 29, p. 17.
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"good use" could be made of such groups "in getting forward with
our negotiations." Mr. Tsarapkin's response was lightning quick:

Mr. Wadsworth's last remarks with regard to high-altitude
explosions . . . only confirm our view that we should not
at this Conference depart from the starting point which
we have already taken as the basis for our discussion, that
is to say, the conclusions worked out by the meeting of
experts at Geneva last summer. 88
Obviously, both men had the problem of the new data in mind.
Two days later, Mr. Wadsworth formally proposed that the Conference should convene a technical working group to study the
implications of the new data. 89 Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate response
was negative. 90 He argued that to convene a technical working
group would merely delay the progress of the Conference, that
new information could always be discovered, and that political negotiations had to have a fixed basis, in this case the Report of the
Conference of Experts. He asserted that after the Control Organization was established, it could take steps to cope with the new
data but that in the present form the "preliminary and hastily
prepared document" did not call for study. Moreover, he affirmed
the belief, often stated by Soviet scientists at the Conference of
Experts, that the progress of science would make the process of
detection and identification of nuclear explosions easier rather than
more difficult.
Roughly, this is where the controversy stood when the second
recess began on March 19, 1959. The United States outlined the
various alternative ways in which the Conference might attempt to
cope with the new data, but its basic proposal continued to be that
an ad hoc technical working group should be convened. 91 The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to deprecate and refuse
any consideration of this proposal.

The Darkening Atmosphere
Meanwhile, the atmosphere surrounding the Geneva Conference
darkened. Within the United States, domestic opposition to the
BBJbid.

89QEN/DNT/PV. 31, p. 7.
90Jbid., pp. 8-13, 22-26.

91See GEN/DNT/PV. 52, pp. 4-8.
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test ban increased. After the new data was released, various congressmen and administration officials spoke out against a comprehensive test ban as an isolated measure of arms control. Some of
these had taken this position from the outset, and they asserted
that the new data confirmed the wisdom of their position. Others
apparently changed their position on the basis of the new data. And
there was silence at the White House.
In Geneva, the speeches became more acrimonious. Both the
USSR and the United States issued statements from their national
capitals blaming the other for the impasse. 92 While four articles
had been adopted in the first twenty-eight meetings of the Conference, none was adopted from the twenty-ninth until the seventysecond, and then, on the last day before the recess, three articles
were hastily accepted. 93
The Conference continued to discuss the various issues relating
to the nature of the Control Organization, but the differences between the two positions seemed to be even more implacable than
they had been before the Christmas recess.
Dropping the Link
The atmosphere, however, was brightened somewhat when on
January 19, 1959, Mr. Wadsworth opened the thirty-seventh session
of the Conference by announcing that the United States would "no
longer insist that the duration of the treaty be made conditional
upon progress in other fields of disarmament." 94 Mr. Ormsby-Gore
made a similar statement immediately thereafter. In other words,
"the link" had been formally dropped.
Obviously, before this action could occur in Geneva, the Committee of Principals had to agree to new instructions for the American delegation. Certain key Congressmen were also involved in the
reformulation of the American position, although the issue was
basically decided within the Adininistration. In this intra-administration struggle, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy
Commission continued to insist on the wisdom of maintaining "the·
link." Secretary of State Dulles, in opposition, argued that insistence
92Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1339-45.
93GEN/DNT/PV. 72, passim.
94GEN/DNT/PV. 37, p. 6.
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on the link was muddying the waters, harming the public image of
the United States by making it more difficult to prove to public
opinion that the Soviet Union was really unwilling to accept adequate control measures-a fact which in his view had been established by Soviet actions since the Conference of Experts and
particularly by the nature of Soviet participation in the diplomatic
conference thus far. The President decided in Mr. Dulles' favor.
Perhaps one reason that AEC and Department of Defense officials
did not strenuously object to this decision to "drop the link" and
to negotiate for a separate test ban treaty was their feeling that it
was unlikely that an adequate treaty could actually be achieved in
any event. This could explain the paradox that at a time when the
disclosure of the new data had lessened even further the value of
a test ban treaty in the eyes of the individuals who had insisted on
"the link," those same individuals acquiesced in dropping the link.
As is invariably the case when a controversial issue is considered within the United States government, the debate on the link
"radiated" beyond the governmental chambers. The arguments
in support of dropping the link, made for internal consumption,
minimized the value of the link from the American viewpoint
and the import of these arguments was, of course, not lost on the
USSR. This made it more difficult for the United States delegation
in Geneva to present the abandonment of the link as a real and
important Western concession. Nevertheless, after the Western announcement of this concession, the outlook for the negotiations appeared to improve slightly. Two days later, the USSR stated its
willingness to allow more than two foreign "controllers" at control
posts,95 and eventually suggested the number of four or five. 96 The
Western powers, on their part, developed their concept of an "international staff'' so that it allowed the possibility of citizens of
countries which were allied with and friendly to the host country
serving at control posts there as part of the foreign contingent. 97
In addition, they agreed that the administrative staff would be
comprised completely of host country nationals. The differences
between the two sides on the composition of the Commission and
95GEN/DNT/PV. 39, p. 10.
96GEN/DNT/PV. 47, R· 3.
97GEN/DNT/PV. 42, pp. 29-31.
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on that organ's voting procedures were also narrowed somewhat.
But no move was made toward settlement of the basic question of
whether or not the Control Organization would be able to take
action against the wishes of one of the three nuclear powers. Nor
was significant progress made with respect to a variety of other
subsidiary issues.
The West Tables an Article on Duration
Throughout this phase of the Conference the Soviet Union
constantly brought up the question of the duration of the treaty.
Finally, on March 10, 1959, the United States tabled this article:
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the
inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of
obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and
its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system,
are not being fulfilled and observed. 98
A party would have an "inherent" right to withdraw and be
relieved of its obligations (it is not clear whether necessarily with
immediate effect with respect to all obligations) if the treaty provisions, including the control system provisions, were not fulfilled,
or were violated by another party or presumably also by an organ
set up under the treaty. The violations which would give rise to
the right to withdraw were not defined; nor was there a provision
for an automatic termination of the treaty in case of certain treaty
violations. Thus the determination of the existence of the circumstances warranting withdrawal was left to each party but presumably
would have to be made in good faith.
In his book, Ambassador Wadsworth viewed this article as a
built-in "three-way stretch" girdle of support for the continuation
of the treaty. If one of the three nuclear powers parties to the treaty
were to refuse cooperation in any way-in the development and
maintenance of the control system or in observing other financial,
political, or technical provisions of the treaty--either of the other
two could withdraw; this-right, he argued, would constitute a strong
deterrence against any violation at least as long as the continuation
98GEN/DNT/PV. 70, p. 3.
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of the treaty was considered in the national interest by all the
powers concerned. 99
The Soviet Union, of course, had already had considerable
evidence that the United States did not intend to limit the test
cessation to a twelve-month period. At the thirteenth session of the
General Assembly, the American delegation had voted for a resolution urging that the moratorium should continue as long as the
negotiations continued. 100 And in January 1959, President Eisenhower, in his budget message, pointedly refrained from asking for
funds for the conduct of nuclear weapons tests during the fiscal
year 1960. 101 However, by tabling the article on duration the
United States formally accepted the Soviet position that a test ban
treaty should be of indeterminate duration.
Two sessions later, at the last meeting before the Easter recess,
the Soviet Union accepted this article. It also accepted an article
proposed by the United Kingdom authorizing negotiation of agreements between the Control Organization on one hand and the
United Nations and any future disarmament body on the other, and
a United States proposal relating to the periodic review of the control system. The former article was a purely formal matter, although it did have implications for the relationship between the
Control Organization and the United Nations. The latter article was
somewhat more significant in that it provided for a mandatory
review of the effectiveness of the system two years after the coming
into force of the treaty and the possibility of annual reviews thereafter.102 In a sense, this provision could be interpreted as a response
to the "new data," since it indicated the possibility of changes in
the detection and identification system proposed by the Conference
of Experts, which was to be embodied in the treaty.
To sum up the outcome of this opening stage of the Geneva
Conference, the two sides dropped conditions which were obviously
unacceptable to the other. The Western concessions concerning the
link with other measures of disarmament and the duration of the
treaty could-at least in terms of the negotiations-be regarded as
99James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, pp. 70-71.
100See UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th
Session), pp. 421, 430.
101New York Times, January 20, 1959, pp. I, 21.
102See GEN/DNT/44.
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the equivalent of the Soviet willingness to accept a Control Organization and some system of control, and to have one treaty instead
of two. On the other hand, when the Conference began its Easter
recess on the afternoon of March 19, many basic differences concerning the nature of the Control Organization remained unresolved. Indeed, the progress which had been made in this area
since January 5 was almost imperceptible. Moreover, the USSR
continued adamantly to oppose the convocation of a technical working group to examine the new data. Whether or not the Conference
was on balance nearer to a treaty than it had been at the time of
the first recess was debatable. In any case, there were now two
broad areas of controversy: one relating to technical data, going
to the very basis of the negotiations, and the other relating to the
Control Organization. Chapters V through VIII will deal with the
former, Chapter IX with the latter.

Chapter V

Formulating A New Western Position

I

The Shifting Technological Base
Although the information which the United States submitted to the
Geneva Conference on January 5, 1959, and the statement which
the President's Science Advisory Committee released that same day
gave some indication of how the progress of science and technology
had affected some of the conclusions of the Conference of Experts,
they did not portray the full magnitude of the problem. To see the
issues from the point of view of the American policy-makers, it is
necessary first to consider in detail certain aspects of the United
States 1958 nuclear weapon test series which, as was seen earlier,
ended on October 30, the day before the opening of the diplomatic
negotiations.
Hardtack I and Argus: New Data
For one thing, neither the information submitted to the Conference nor the PSAC statement indicated that the United States
now realized that it was possible to test nuclear devices at high altitudes and had some understanding of the consequences of this
possibility. During its 1958 test series the United States had detonated five nuclear devices at high altitudes. On August 1 and August
12, 1958, before the conclusion of the Conference of Experts, as
a part of the Hardtack I series, two nuclear devices with yields in
the megaton. range were detonated in the vicinity of Johnston Island
in the Pacific Ocean, the first-Teak-at an altitude of nearly fifty
miles, and the second-Orange-at an altitude of nearly twentyseven miles.! On August 27 and 30 and September 6, three more
1 U.S. Department of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962,
pp. 50-52.

145

146

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

devices having yields from 1 to 3 kilotons were fired in the South
Atlantic at an altitude of about three hundred miles. These three
shots were called the Argus Operation. They were not weapons
testing shots-but rather experiments designed to provide information on trapping electrically charged particles in the earth's magnetic
field-and therefore yielded only a limited amount of data which
was relevant for a test ban control system.
These high altitude shots were not made public until March
19, 1959, when an article concerning them appeared in the New
York Times. Although many scientists who knew about the tests
favored announcing them and publishing some of the measurements, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles expressed
disappointment about the leak which had resulted in the story in
the Times. 2 In the same statement, Mr. Quarles also denied that the
tests had any relevance for East-West negotiations then in progress.
In fact, however, the Johnston Island and Argus tests made
extremely obvious the need to fill in the gap which was caused by
the failure of the Conference of Experts to recommend control
measures for high altitudes and outer space. This need was further
underscored on January 2, 1959, when the USSR fired "Lunik I,"
an earth satellite aimed in the direction of the moon, which went
into permanent orbit around the sun, becoming the first artificial
planet. Consequently, the President's Science Advisory Committee
appointed a panel, headed by Professor Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
of Stanford University, to consider what control mechanisms would
be required to fill this gap.
The data gained from the high altitude tests also affected the
test ban negotiations in another way. They indicated that nuclear
explosions at high altitudes might interfere with certain radio and
radar frequencies and thus inhibit military communications and
warning systems. They also yielded data which indicated that the
released neutrons from high altitude blasts could possibly be used
to detonate incoming enemy warheads, and thus obviate the need
for physical contact by an anti-missile missile. The tests, though,
merely raised these possibilities, they did not confirm them. Thus,
they created pressures among persons in the military establishment
2New York Times, March 20, 1959, p. 10.
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and scientists interested in weapons development for further testing
at high altitudes.
Some have argued that this was the overall effect of the 1958
test series. Writing in 1960 former ABC Commissioner Thomas E.
Murray stated:
Furthermore, the elaborate series of "small" tests which
we rushed through at the Nevada Proving Ground in September and October 1958 to beat the moratorium deadline amply testified to the fact that the technology of
lower and especially fractional kiloton weapons was still
far from being adequately developed . . . the imperative
objectives of our test program had not nearly been
achieved. 3
Among other things, the neutron weapon was not developed. However, significant advances were made with respect to certain weapon
systems, for example, the Davey Crocket, a tactical nuclear weapon
which could be carried by a small vehicle or a man. The extent to
which one interpreted the 1958 test series as indicating a need for
further testing depended really upon one's estimate of what advances could be made in nuclear weaponry and their utility.

Hardtack II: More New Data
The United States 1958 test series also included eight underground detonations. These shots were fired from September 21
through October 30 in Nevada as a part of the Hardtack II series.
Of the eight, only two, the Logan 5~kiloton shot of October 16,
1958, and the Blanca 19-kiloton shot of October 30, 1958-the
last shot fired by the United States prior to opening of the test ban
negotiations on October 31-yielded sufficient data for meaningful
analysis of detection capabilities. However, the Working Paper
which the United States submitted to the Geneva Conference on
January 5, 1959, also listed the Tamalpais 72-ton shot of October
8, 1958. American scientists used this shot in constructing their
scaling law. The memorandum contained technical data only on the
two principal shots. The PSAC statement did not contain any technical data. The American public first received the technical data
in a Department of Defense press release of January 16.
3Nuc/ear Policy for War and Peace, pp. 94-95.
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In the West, the intensity of underground disturbances-thus
of earthquakes and explosions-is measured on a logarithmic scale,
commonly called the Gutenberg-Richter scale. Recorded earthquakes
range from -1.50 to 8.50 on this scale. The farther down the
scale one goes, that is, the smaller the size of the signal, the more
earthquakes there are. The estimate of the intensity of an underground disturbance is arrived at by averaging the signals received
at several seismological stations. Because of the process of averaging, and for other reasons, the estimate of an underground disturbance was normally given with the reservation that there may be
an error of plus or minus a specific amount which varies inversely
with the magnitude on the Gutenberg-Richter scale. At the time of
of the Conference of Experts in the summer of 1958, the magnitude
of the Rainier 1.7 kiloton shot was believed to be 4.25. Since in
the range from 4.1 to 5 the margin of error could be as high as
plus or minus .4, the magnitude of the Rainier shot should be
understood as 4.25 -+- .4. It should also be noted that the first
public paper on the Rainier shot estimated its magnitude as 4.6. 4
In calibrating the Blanca and Logan shots it was discovered that
the seven seismic stations near the event with adequate equipment
which had recorded the Rainier shot gave anomalously large magnitudes, 5.0 to 4.6 respectively. Three stations within the same
radius had not recorded Rainier at all, but this fact had been disregarded in the computation of its magnitude. Using seventeen stations, ten of which (including the seven that recorded Rainier)
were permanent stations, and seven other specially established temporary stations, the magnitude of the Blanca and Logan shots was
estimated to be 4.8 and 4.4 respectively. Extrapolating from this
data, American scientists concluded that the magnitude of the
Rainier shot had been estimated incorrectly; that it should have
been estimated as 4.06 -+- .4 rather than 4.25 -+- .4. Since seismologists knew that there were several times as many earthquakes of
magnitude 4.06 as there were of magnitude 4.25, the new estimate
of the Rainier magnitude meant that the problem of distinguishing
between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions would be
considerably more difficult than it had been thought to be at the
4G. W. Johnson and others, "The Underground Nuclear Detonation
of September 19, 1957, Rainier, Operation Plumbbob," (February 4, 1958).
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time of the Conference of Experts. Extrapolating and constructing
a formula-now on the basis of three points instead of oneAmerican scientists estimated that for any given yield there would
be several times as many unidentified events. The implication of
this would be that unless the technology of detection could be improved either the threshold of detection would have to be raised or
the number of control posts or on-site inspections drastically increased. The President's Science Advisory Committee examined
the new estimate of the seismic magnitude of the Rainier shot and
approved it. Later, however, some members of PSAC came to feel
that the Committee had not exercised its responsibilities with sufficient care and had acted too hastily.
The Blanca and Logan shots also produced smaller signs of
first motion than had been anticipated. Consequently, American
scientists evaluating the data concluded that:
. . . the first motion must exceed the background noise
of natural unrest of the earth, by at least a factor of 3 to
1 instead of the previous estimate of 2 to 1 if the direction of first motion is to be reliably determined. 5
PSAC also approved this conclusion. In other words, if a factor of
only 2 to 1 were used, which had been the basis on which the
Conference of Experts had estimated the probability of detecting
first motion, the compression or the upmotion caused by a nuclear
explosion might be confused with background noise and only the
subsequent swing of the seismogram, the rarefaction or downmotion
might be noticed. Interestingly some scientists had always felt that
the factor of 2 to 1 was too small.
Baldly, the implication of the new conclusions was that the
detection of nuclear explosions deep underground would not be as
easy as it had been thought and that the conclusions of the Conference of Experts concerning the size of explosion which could
be detected were much too optimistic.
How much the effectiveness of the control system was denigrated
by these new conclusions was not clear. The Working Paper which
the United States submitted to the Geneva Conference on January
5, 1959, stated that:
5U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, January 16, 1959.
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the annual number of unidentified continental earthquakes equivalent to 5 KT or larger will be greater than
that previously estimated by a factor of 10 or more. 6
The statement released by PSAC the same day contained a similar
estimate. Thus the conclusion of the Conference of Experts that
there would be from 20 to 100 earthquakes which would be indistinguishable on the basis of their seismic signals from nuclear
explosions of about 5 kiloton yield, would have to be raised to
from 200 to 1,000. However, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament on January 28, 1959, Dr. Carl Romney,
an Air Force seismologist, who had headed the panel which had
evaluated both the Hardtack II data and the original Rainier data
stated that it was niore nearly a factor of 15, and that the number
of unidentified events equivalent to a nuclear explosion of 5 kiloton
yield would probably be from 700 to 3,000, 100 to 600 of which
would occur within the USSR and mainland China. 7
The evaluations of the data gained in the 1958 test series
began to be available in late November 1958 and were analyzed
first by government scientists. The last stages of the initial analysis
were actually completed shortly after Thanksgiving Day in Geneva
and the results of this preliminary analysis were presented to Messrs.
Ormsby-Gore and Wadsworth in a one-hour briefing session. At
that stage, neither the two diplomats nor the scientists making
the presentation felt that the information was very significant. The
scientists regarded the new conclusions as being within the realm of
experimental error.
This estimate would soon change, however, or at least others
would take a different view. The next step in the evaluation was
the convocation of a special panel and then the review by PSAC.
As the evaluation proceeded, the implications for the test ban negotiations seemed to be increasingly ominous, and it was decided
that another special panel should be appointed to consider whether
or not there was any way in which the capability of the control
system recommended by the Conference of Experts could be improved and hopefully restored to the original estimate. The panel was
6GEN/DNT/25.
7U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, 86th
Congress, 2d Session (1959), p. 29.
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to consider whether or not this could be done, first within the framework of existing technology, and secondly through a program of
research in seismology. On December 28, 1958, the President's
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, James R. Killian,
appointed Lloyd Berkner, the President of Associated Universities,
Inc., as Chairman of the Panel on Seismic Improvement. 8 Although
the Working Paper which the United States submitted to the Geneva
Conference and the PSAC statement mentioned that the data from
the 1958 test series was still being evaluated, neither mentioned
the appointment of the Berkner Panel. The first public mention of
this Panel occurred February 11, 1959. 9
Decoupling: A New Theory
During this same period another technological development
occurred which would have an even more profound effect on the
course of the Geneva negotiations, the discovery of the decoupling
theory. Edward Teller, who after the death of Ernest 0. Lawrence
had become Director of the University of California Radiation
Laboratory at Livermore, had always had grave doubts about the
wisdom of a test ban. He felt that the further development of nuclear weapons would significantly and principally benefit the West.
He also deeply distrusted the Soviet Union. The book, Our Nuclear
Future, which he had written with Albert Latter and which was
published in early 1958, contained the following passage:
If an agreement were made to discontinue the tests, the

United States would surely keep such an agreement. The
very social and political structure of our country excludes
8The other members of the Panel were Professor Hugo Benioff,
California Institute of Technology; Professor Hans Bethe, Cornell University;
Professor W. Maurice Ewing, Columbia University; Dr. John Gerrard, Texas
Instruments, Inc.; Professor David T. Griggs, University of California at
Los Angeles; Mr. Jack H. Hamilton, The Geotechnical Corporation; Dr.
Julius P. Molnar, Sandia Corporation; Dr. Walter H. Munk, Scripps Institute of Oceanography; Dr. Jack E. Oliver, Columbia University; Professor
Frank Press, California Institute of Technology; Dr. Carl F. Romney, Department of Defense; Dr. Kenneth Street, Jr., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Professor John W. Tukey, Princeton University. The group included eight geophysicists, three physicists, one nuclear
chemist, one mechanical engineer, and one mathematician, specializing in
statistics.
9New York Times, February 12, 1959, pp. 1, 3.

152

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

the possibility that many people would collaborate in
breaking an international undertaking. Whether Russia
would or would not keep such an agreement would depend on the ingenuity of the Russians, on their willingness
to make economic sacrifices, and on their honesty. Of
these three factors we can have a firm opinion about the
first. The Russians are certainly ingenious enough to devise secret methods of testing. As to the other questions,
whether the Russians will want to invest the effort and
whether they will be bound by their word, we feel that
each man is entitled to his own opinion. According to past
experience, an agreement to stop tests may well be followed by secret and successful tests behind the iron curtain.10
In addition, Dr. Teller was convinced that no control system
could give absolute assurance against violations, and that it would
be especially difficult to devise an effective control system in an
area such as that of nuclear weaponry where technological change
was occurring at such a rapid pace. Both in Our Nuclear Future
and in an article which he had published in Foreign Affairs in
January 1958, he had expressed the opinion:
In a more general way we may ask the question: Is it
wise to make agreements which honesty will respect, but
dishonesty can circumvent? Shall we put a free, democratic government at a disadvantage compared to the
absolute power of a dictatorship? Shall we introduce prohibition in a new form, just to give rise to bootlegging on
a much greater scale? It is almost certain that in the competition between prohibition and bootlegging, the bootlegger will win. 11
These attitudes-having little to do with science or technology,
it should be noted-made him a firmly convinced opponent of
efforts to draft a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union.
After the conclusion of the Conference of Experts, Dr. Teller
began to speculate about the effectiveness of the control system
which had been recommended, and he asked some of the scientists
at the University of California Livermore Laboratory-now named
lOOur Nuclear Future, Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities (New York:
Criterion Books 1958), p. 140.
11Jbid., pp. 140-41; and "Alternatives for Security," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (January 1958), p. 204.
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the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory-and at the RAND Corporation to consider whether or not there might be ways in which a
clever violator could evade detection. The President's Science
Advisory Committee was scheduled to visit the Lawrence Laboratory in January 1959, and Dr. Teller hoped to be able to present
to them a convincing case that the recommended control system
was unsatisfactory. The scientists developed a number of ideas
involving such possibilities as exploding a nuclear device in a mountain, in a large porous container resembling an egg shell, or in an
expandable container fashioned like a lung. There were also other
schemes, some quite fanciful. None of the ideas seemed very practical, or to be more than mere possibilities. Nevertheless, Dr.
Teller had decided to present them to the members of PSAC.
Shortly before the PSAC meeting, Albert Latter of the RAND
Corporation reexamined a possible means of concealing explosions which had been considered at the Conference of Experts,
setting them off in large cavities. Hans Bethe had presented a
paper on this subject at the Conference and had concluded that it
would be impossible to muffle the seismic signals from nuclear
explosions in this manner. Doing paper and pencil theoretical
analysis, Latter concluded, not that Bethe's calculations had been
wrong, but that in certain instances they were irrelevant. Latter's
conclusion (without going into technical details) was that if the
cavity were sufficiently large in relation to the size of the explosion so that the medium surrounding the hole would remain elastic
under pressure, it would be possible to decouple or muffle nuclear
explosions. His estimate was that it would be possible to decouple
by a factor of several hundred, however, by January 1959 he had
not completed all of his work, and his argument could be presented only in semi-quantitative terms.
Albert Latter's theory was technically so convincing that Dr.
Teller and his colleagues decided that it would be the only paper
on concealment presented to the President's Science Advisory
Committee. The members of PSAC, including Hans Bethe, recognized the importance of the theory, and in general terms immediately accepted its validity. 12 Now it appeared that the conclusions
12Edward Teller & Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (1962), p.
196.
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of the Conference of Experts might be obsolete for another reason
beyond the new empirical data which had been gained from the
1958 test series.
After Albert Latter's presentation, some scientists, especially
Professor David T. Griggs, of the University of California at Los
Angeles, began to argue that the mandate of the Berkner Panel
should be expanded to include consideration of the possibility
of the concealment of tests as well as the implications of the
new data. Eventually, in the latter part of February 1959, at the
decision of Drs. Fisk and Killian, this was done. At this stage,
only the scientists who were involved knew about the possibility of
decoupling. Dr. Latter's first paper on the subject was not published
for circulation within the government until March 30, 1959, and it
was not declassified until October 20, 1959. 13 It was only given
public release on December 22, 1959. One of the reasons for not
making the theory public sooner was the fear that to do so would
in effect tell the Soviet Union how to evade the control system.
However, as a consequence of this secrecy, the public debate in
the United States about the wisdom of a test ban treaty suffered.
Scientists and politicians who were worried about the effectiveness
of the control system had to base their public arguments on the
data gained from the 1958 test series, even though they were actually much more concerned about the possible degrading effect
of the decoupling theory. Since this argument could not be stated,
their opponents conversely could not attempt to meet it.
II

Confusion and Controversy
Within the United States
"Betrayal by Science?"
The immediate result in the United States of the revelation--or
for most Americans, the partial revelation-that the technological
assumptions on which the recommendations of the Conference of
Experts had been based were no longer valid, was first to engender
considerable confusion and perhaps a feeling of having been betrayed by science, and secondly to reopen the debate, which had
13A. L. Latter, A Method of Concealing Underground Nuclear Explosions (RAND Corp. RM-2347-AFT, 1959).
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been relatively quiescent during the opening days of the diplomatic
negotiations, concerning the wisdom of a test ban.
One account has it that when President Eisenhower was informed of the evaluation of the 1958 test series he "was furious,
and 'blew his stack.' " 14 Others were also bitterly disappointed.
Yet it was not at all inconsistent with the history of science that
subsequent experiments should modify earlier conclusions and hypotheses.
As has already been mentioned, President Eisenhower's more
reflective reaction to the new data was that scientific facts could
not and should not be hidden, and that the government must tell
the American people and the other states participating in the test
ban negotiations what the scientific facts were. Eventually he came
to feel that being confronted with the new data would be a good
test of the USSR's intentions, since Soviet scientists could check
on their validity. Thus the President dismissed the argument, raised
by some individuals within the Administration, that to introduce the
new data into the negotiations would open the ·United States to
charges of duplicity.
Since the matter was relatively technical, it is far from certain
how many nonscientists fully understood the significance of the
new data, and its limitations. For example, President Eisenhower's
attitude indicated a certain lack of understanding on his part. While
it is true that formulae based on three cases are probably more
reliable than those based on one, there could be no certainty that
with more experiments the conclusions would not have to be modified further. Moreover, as has been seen, the new conclusions were
based on a rather complicated and-it will emerge-somewhat
debatable process of reasoning. Actually, later, after having conducted further deep underground nuclear tests, the United States
would again revise its conclusions concerning these matters. Moreover, the Rainier, Logan, and Blanca shots were all conducted in
the same location and in the same geological medium, tuff, or
volcanic rock. Whether or not the formula constructed on the basis
of these shots would be applicable to nuclear explosions in other
media was an open question.
HC. J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspections: A Near Miss," Fortune, Vol.
LIX, No. 3 (March 1959), p. 122 at 155.
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Hans Bethe, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Disarmament on February 2, 1959, repeated the point that he had
made before the same forum the previous April, that the scientists
badly needed more information. 15 For the moment, however, because of the moratorium on testing, it would be impossible to
gain further information, and it was uncertain whether any nuclear
detonations would be allowed if and when a test ban treaty went
into effect. Although Foreign Minister Gromyko had stated in a
speech delivered before the Supreme Soviet on December 25, 1958,
that it might be possible for a test ban treaty to contain a provision
allowing nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, the conditions
which he set-inter alia parity between East and West in the number of detonations, and complete internal and external examination
of the device to be detonated-were quite rigorous and possibly
unacceptable to the West. 16 Therefore, temporarily at least, scientists would have to work with the data that they had. But to regard
these as incontrovertible facts was too simple a view.
Obviously it was even more difficult for those outside the Administration to interpret the new data. After the publication of the
PSAC statement of January 5, 1959, the public press was filled
with conflicting estimates by politicians, scientists and military
figures. To clarify the situation--or to reinforce their members'
predispositions-two Congressional committees began hearings on
the matter. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held closed
hearings and the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament open hearings. Perhaps the earliest comprehensive exposition was the speech
which Senator Hubert Humphrey gave on the Senate floor on January
20, 1959, seven days-it is interesting to note-before his Subcommittee opened its hearings. 17
There was also disagreement about what effect the new conclusions would have on the test ban negotiations. Appearing before
the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, on January 28, 1959,
Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Disarmament and Atomic Energy, asserted in a prepared statement that:
15Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, at 167.
I6Pravda, December 26, 1958, pp. 9-10. See also the proposal which
the USSR tabled on February 23, 1959: GEN/DNT/32.
17Congressional Record, (1959), Vol. CV, Part 1, pp. 929-34.
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This new information on the problem of detecting and
identifying underground nuclear explosions has not had a
significant impact on the negotiations as yet. It bears, of
course, only on a limited part of the control system described last summer by the Geneva experts, and prospects
are encouraging that ways will be found to maintain the
full effectiveness of that system.
There has been an understandable initial Soviet suspicion of U.S. motives in transmitting and subsequently
publishing the new data . . . . When our continuing
studies of possible ways of overcoming these technical
difficulties have reached the stage when they can be communicated in their tum to the Soviet Union, this may help
persuade them of the probity of our intentions.
In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union finds this U.S.
action a convenient progaganda weapon to replace the
one we have just deprived them of by our recent decision
not to insist on a treaty link between disarmament progress and nuclear testing. 18
Others took a much more pessimistic view, and subsequent events
would uphold their interpretation.
The Battle Rejoined
It was in this atmosphere of confusion that the controversy
about the wisdom of a test ban flared again. Shortly after the
release of the PSAC statement, Senator Gore pronounced that
"events have sustained my position." To him the new seismic data
indicated that an effective control system for all environments was
impractical, at least at that point, and he repeated his suggestion
for a partial test ban limited to atmospheric tests. 19 Other Congressmen rallied to his side.
In a speech delivered on January 21, AEC Chairman John
A. McCone denied that the Commission was opposed to the Administration's policy of seeking a test ban with the Soviet Union.
He then went on to say that the Commission supported any test
suspension which could be "properly" policed, and which would
give reasonable assurance against cheating. 20 Of course, the conlBHearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, pp. 33-34.
l9New York Times, January 12, 1959, p. 14.
20Jbid., January 22, 1959, p. 11.
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troversy was whether or not a test ban could and would be "properly" policed. In the same speech, Mr. McCone indicated that the
Commission was considering conducting tests late in the summer
of 1959 relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It was his
interpretation that the current East-West moratorium was "no
injunction against the Commission going ahead with such tests."
Four days later the New York Times contained a story stating that
the ABC had recommended to the President that a test ban be
limited to atmospheric explosions. 21
Somewhat later, Senator Frank Church, a member of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, also made a similar proposal to
the Acting Secretary of State. 22 He was supported on the Senate
floor by Senators Dodd, Fulbright, Gore, and Groening.
Partisans of different persuasions also raised their voices. In
a public statement Hans Bethe asserted that it would still be
possible to devise an effective control system,23 and Senator Humphrey's exposition of January 20 had a fundamentally optimistic
tone. A few days later, twenty-two prominent Americans, including
Mrs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Norman Thomas, Norman
Cousins, James B. Carey, Ralph Lapp, and Robert R. Nathan, sent
a letter to President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev, and Prime
Minister Macmillan asking them to take steps to conclude a test
ban treaty despite the fact that there might be a risk of cheating. 24
They averred that nations which could mobilize scientific talent
and resources to develop hydrogen bombs and intercontinental
ballistic missiles ought also to be able to devise "a workable inspection system to satisfy all reasonable requirements." After Mr.
McCone's speech, a number of American scientists let it be known
that they felt that plans for nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes should be postponed so as not to disrupt the Geneva negotiations. 25
During this period, American policy seemed to lack certainty.
When questions were raised concerning the implications of the new
21Jbid., January 25, 1959, p. 1.

22See his letter of February 25, 1959, Congressional Reccrd (1959),
Vol. CV, Part 3, p. 3134.
23New York Times, January 14, 1959, p. 5.
24Jbid., February 2, 1959, p. 22.
25Jbid., March 4, 1959, p. 14.
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data at Secretary of State Dulles' news conference on January 13,
1959, he replied that technical studies were in process; but, if
necessary, alternatives such as that advocated by Senator Gore
would be considered. 26 Other Department of State officials asserted
that official American policy continued to be to seek an accord
covering all tests. There were no comments from the White House.
Clearly this vagueness was partly attributable to the uncertainty concerning the technological facts. It was also the result of
the reopening of the debate within the Administration concerning
the wisdom of a test ban. Furthermore, at this crucial juncture,
the voice of the Department of State in intra-administration counsels was severely weakened. In early 1959 Secretary of State
Dulles' illness took a sharp turn for the worse, and on February
9, 1959, he went on medical leave. Christian Herter was appointed
Acting Secretary of State. During his last days in office, Mr. Dulles
was not as effective as he had been previously. One source has
reported that he showed himself to be "impatient and changeable"
with respect to a test ban and disarmament. 2 7 Some of his closest
associates even felt that he wanted to break off the test ban negotiations. As an Acting Secretary, Mr. Herter did not have quite
the same authority, and he was not appointed Secretary until
April 22, 1959. Moreover, Mr. Dulles had had a particularly close
relationship with the President, which few men could hope to
duplicate.
The Report of the Berkner Panel: The Need for Further Research
Finally, on March 16, 1959, the findings of the Berkner
Panel on Seismic Improvement were submitted to the President,
and on March 31 the complete report was filed. 28 The two documents were not publicly released until June 12, 1959, the day that
they were submitted to the Geneva Conference. However, fairly
extensive accounts of the Panel's conclusions appeared in the New
26U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, No. 1023 (February 2,
1959), pp. 161-62.
27Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify: An Explanation of the
Central Difficulties and of National Policies (1964), p. 119. Sir Michael
was a member of the United Kingdom delegation in the nuclear test ban
negotiations from 1959 through 1961.
28Geneva Conference, pp. 335-39, 340-54.
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York Times on March 8, 1959, and in an article in the March issue
of Fortune. 29
In the summary of its findings, the Berkner Panel first affirmed the substantial correctness of the original evaluation of
the new data. However, it produced a new figure for the total
number of unidentified earthquakes which would generate a seismic
signal equivalent to that of a 5-kiloton explosion (see Table 1).
TABLE

po

Estimated Annual Number of Unidentified
Worldwide Continental Earthquakes
5KT
and
greater

Estimate-Geneva Conference
of Experts-August 1958

10KT
and
greater

20KT
and
greater

20-100

Estimate--Geneva network and
equipment on basis of Hardtack
data-January 1959

1500

400

60

Estimate--Geneva network with
improvements within the present
state of technology on basis of
Hardtack data-April 1959

300

40

15

This figure was greater than that suggested by the PSAC statement, but within the range mentioned by Dr. Carl Romney in his
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament. The
Berkner report stated that within the framework of existing technology it would be possible partially to restore the capability of
the control system recommended by the Conference of Experts
by increasing the number of seismometers at each control station
from 10 to 100 and by using other criteria than first motion for
identifying earthquakes. It also stated that with the advance of
29New York Times, March 8, 1959, p. 32; C. J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear
Inspection: A Near Miss," supra note 14 at 162.
30From the "Findings of the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement,"
Geneva Conference, p. 337.

Formulating A New Western Position

161

technology it would probably be possible to improve the capability
of the Geneva system even more. Interestingly, this paralleled the
claim of Soviet diplomats and scientists. The Panel emphasized
the tentative nature of its estimates, the scanty data on which they
were based, and the need for further research. The later report of
the Berkner Panel was exclusively devoted to this last topic.
The Berkner Panel had invited Albert Latter to present his
theories. By the time of his presentation he had made a firm estimate that by detonating a nuclear device in a large cavity it would
be possible to reduce the seismic signal by a factor of 300. During
the Panel's discussion, Hans Bethe estimated that the factor would
be 700. However, the findings of the Berkner Panel merely stated
"that decoupling techniques existed which could reduce the seismic
signal by a factor of ten or more." 31 Perhaps the reason for this
caution was the theoretical nature of Dr. Latter's calculations. The
report emphasized the need for high explosive and nuclear shots
to test these calculations empirically. Although Dr. Latter's theories
seemed to be incontrovertible, even at this stage many scientists
doubted that they actually could be applied. They questioned
whether or not it would be possible to create a large spherical hole
deep underground in which to detonate a nuclear device. For example, according to the theory, to decouple a tO-kiloton shot by a
factor of 300, the shot would have to be detonated in a spherical
hole 3,000 feet underground with a diameter of 360 feet. To many,
this seemed like a formidable engineering feat, and even if feasible, an incredibly expensive task. Until there was some experimental evidence, however, neither side could prove its case. But
whatever the reason for the discrepancy between the private governmental estimate of decoupling and public estimate in the Berkner
report, the latter was such an understatement as to be grossly misleading.
As mentioned earlier, the "Report of the Berkner Panel on
Seismic Improvement" was essentially a detailed statement of the
need for a research program in this area. It stressed how little was
known about the propagation of seismic waves and the limited
amount of funds available for research. It also stated that: "The
USSR in recent years has emphasized seismological research to
31Jbid., p. 338.
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such extent that the Soviets enjoy a position superior in many respects to our own." 32 Similar statements appeared in other places
in the report. The report oulined a number of hypotheses and areas
for research and recommended an initial program involving expenditures of more than $52,825,000 over a two-year period. For
the moment, however, American policy-makers would have to act
on the basis of the available data.
III

The British Seek the Lead
The Soviet Reaction
In formulating a new negotiating position, interpretations of the
opponent state's behavior in the negotiations and estimates of its
probable response to alternative courses are important factorsor should be if the task is conducted rationally-therefore it is
necessary to consider the USSR's reaction to the presentation of
the new data on January 5, 1959. As has already been mentioned,
Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate response was violently negative. 33 He
attacked the motives of the Western powers in submitting the new
data, asserting that their real purpose was either to undermine the
Conference or to open opportunities for Western intelligence operations. He ignored Mr. Ormsby-Gore's and Ambassador Wadsworth's rather candid replies that if the Western delegations attempted to suppress the information and it nevertheless became
known, their positions would be untenable before Parliament, Congress, and public opinion, and that this would have an unfavorable
impact on the Conference and on the possibility of a treaty being
ratified. 34 Beyond casting aspersions on the motives of the Western
powers, the Soviet position as espoused by Mr. Tsarapkin consisted of several assertions. He held that the negotiations had an
agreed base in the report of the Conference of Experts and they
must not depart from this base. He acknowledged that new technological developments would always occur, but that these would
have to be handled by the Control Organization, not the Conference
32Jbid., p. 341.

33Mr. Tsarapkin's comments may be found in GEN/DNT/PV. 29,
pp. 14-15; PV. 31, pp. 20-28; PV. 32, pp. 22-24; PV. 41, pp. 8-10.
34See GEN/DNT/PV. 32, p. 24; and PV. 50, p. 16.
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drafting the treaty. Finally, he maintained strongly that the progress
of science would always result in greater rather than lesser capacity
for detection.
Never once during the session of the Conference from January
5 to March 19, 1959, did Mr. Tsarapkin deal with the technical
matters connected with the new data. The closest that he came to
touching technical issues was on January 23, 1959, when he denied
that the relevant sections of the report of the Conference of Experts
had been based solely on one case, the Rainier shot. He claimed
that the experience with high explosive detonations had also been
taken into account. This was true, but the Rainier shot had been
the point from which the effectiveness of the recommended control
system had been calculated. Mr. Tsarapkin continually rejected the
suggestion that a technical working group should be convened to
consider the new data. His greatest concession was contained in a
formal statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry which he read on February 9 and which had appeared in the Soviet press the previous day.
The statement declared that as soon as the Western powers completed their evaluation of the new data and submitted their conclusions to the Conference, the USSR would have its scientists make
a "careful study" of those conclusions. 35 It then asserted that in any
case this ought not to affect the course of the negotiations.
The only Soviet comment on the technical issues involved in
the dispute was an article which appeared in Pravda January 20,
1959, signed by Y. V. Riznichenko and L. Brekhovski, two corresponding members of the USSR's Academy of Sciences, who had
served as advisers to the Eastern delegation at the Conference of
Experts. 36 They attempted to refute the American Working Paper
submitted in Geneva on January 5, 1959.
First, like Mr. Tsarapkin, they denied that the calculations of
the Conference of Experts had been based on the Rainier shot
alone. Secondly, they pointed out that the seismographs used to
measure the Logan and Blanca shots did not conform to the recommendations of the Conference of Experts. This was true, but at
that date no existing or permanent station had seismographs which
35GEN/DNT/PV. 51, p. 4.
36Pravda, January 20, 1959, p. 6. A condensed version is printed in
The Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. XI, No. 3 (February 25, 1959),
pp. 23-24.
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did conform to those specifications. Among other things, the Berkner Panel recommended that a station conforming to the Geneva
standards should be established so that its capabilities could be
properly understood.
The two Soviet scientists also asserted that the new estimates
gave undue weight to the findings of the seven temporary stations
which had been specially established to measure the Hardtack II
series, and that these stations were less effective than the permanent
ones. It will be recalled that the 1958 estimate of the magnitude of the
Rainier shot had been based on the average of the signals received
at seven permanent stations near the event and that three permanent stations within the same radius from the event did not receive
any signal. The signals received at the latter three stations and the
seven temporary stations from the Logan and Blanca shots led the
American scientists to conclude that the estimate for Rainier was
incorrect.
It was difficult for a nonscientist to judge whether or not the
temporary stations were less effective than the permanent stations.
Scientists presented conflicting 'Views in the public debate. For
example, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, Dr. Carl Romney said that the temporary stations "on
the average gave better results" than the permanent stations because "the temporary stations had better equipment than the average
of the permanent stations at the same distances," while a few days
later Professor Bethe stated that the temporary stations "were not
as good in general as the permanent stations. " 37
The Soviet statement criticized the American Working Paper
for not taking into account the recordings of other stations in the
United States, of which there were ninety, or of stations outside of
the United States, in such areas as Sweden. At the time that the
American Working Paper was composed, these recordings were not
taken into account. They were not available. They were, however,
considered by the American scientists at a later date. In addition,
the American scientists sought to obtain recordings from the stations in the USSR, but their requests were spurned for almost a
year. The Soviet scientists claimed that the data from the Blanca
37Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, pp. 18,
184.
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shot were not relevant, since the cavity had blown out, thus releasing some of the energy. In fact, the cavity had caved in several
seconds after the seismic effect had passed. Apparently the Soviet
scientists were not aware of this.
Finally, the Soviet scientists asserted that the new estimate of the
magnitude of the Rainier shot was "within the limits of experimental
accuracy." This was true. It will be recalled that in the range of the
signal resulting from the Rainier shot, estimates of seismic magnitude were usually qualified as being accurate -+- .4. The change was
within this range.
The Soviet scientists concluded that there was no need to revise
the conclusions of the Conference of Experts. Since Albert Latter's
work with respect to decoupling was not public knowledge, the
statement naturally contained no reference to it.
On January 28, 1959, Carl Romney, in an appearance before
the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, criticized the statement
of the two Soviet scientists and defended the American Working
Paper. Ambassador Wadsworth echoed many of his statements in
the Geneva Conference on February 11, 1959. Thus, a scientific
controversy was touched off which remained a feature of the Geneva
Conference throughout its course.
To be fully understood, the Soviet position needs to be seen in
the light of a proposal, mentioned in Chapter IV, which the Western
delegations had tabled shortly before the Christmas recess in December 1958. On December 16, the Western delegations tabled a
draft version of Annex I of the treaty, dealing with the detection
and identification system. 38 Among other things the Annex included
provision for on-site inspection of all unidentified seismic events
with an estimated yield of five kilotons or more and of twenty percent (selected on a random basis) of all unidentified seismic events
with an estimated yield of less than five kilotons. In addition, any
unidentified seismic event with an estimated equivalent yield of less
than five kilotons which the data from the system indicated had an
unusually high probability of being of nuclear origin would be
inspected. In another section the Annex provided for the creation
of a number of "inspection groups," personnel who would have
the sole duty of carrying out on-site inspections.
3BGEN/DNT/22.
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On the basis of the figures in the summary of the findings of the
Berkner Panel, the new data would have meant that the worldwide
total of probable on-site inspections required by these provisions
would have increased from 20 to 100 to more than 1500. Even
with the improvements recommended by the Panel, the number
still would have been more than 300. If the estimate which Dr.
Carl Romney had expressed before the Senate Subcommittee on
Disarmament were correct, and the Berkner Panel had accepted
a figure for the gross total inside the range that he had mentioned,
without improvements in the control system the new data would
have meant that there would have to be at least from 100 to 600
on-site inspections annually on the territory of the USSR and mainland China. Whatever Soviet motivation may have been at this stage
of the negotiations and regardless of the Soviet understanding of
the technical validity of the new data, it is clear that acceptance of
the Western interpretation would have involved opening up the
USSR considerably more than had been envisaged under the original assumptions.
On January 30, 1959, the USSR submitted a list of actions by
the Control Organization which would require unanimity of the
three nuclear powers. The adoption of a decision to dispatch an
on-site inspection group was included in this list, as was the "adoption of a decision . . . on the basis of the results of such investigations." Thus both questions relating to obtaining evidence of a
violation by means of on-site inspections and those relating to the
action to be taken if an on-site inspection yielded evidence of a
violation would be subject to the veto. 39 It is probable that the
USSR would have demanded a veto in these matters even if no
new data had been discovered and submitted to the Conference.
The USSR's desire to maintain absolute control over access to its
territory is long-standing and well known. However, the implications of the new data must at least have strengthened Soviet reluctance to allow on-site inspections to occur on a more or less automatic basis. On the other hand, the Soviet demand for a veto was
clearly unacceptable to the West on the ground that it might
block the Control Organization from obtaining incontrovertible evidence that a violation had occurred.
39GEN/DNT/PV. 46, p. 32.
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Macmillan's Proposal for a Political Compromise: A Quota of OnSite Inspections
Dr. Fedorov, who continued to be a member of the Soviet delegation at this stage of the negotiations, discussed these problems
with Mr. Ormsby-Gore during a private conversation sometime in
early 1959. He intimated that it would be difficult for the Soviet
Union to accept a treaty under which it could be subjected to
an unlimited number of on-site inspections, and suggested that
it would be easier for the USSR if it knew how many such inspections there might be each year. 40 He also suggested that one
way of circumventing these difficulties would be to establish an
annual quota for on-site inspections, and mentioned a range of
figures that went from three or so to more than twenty. Mr.
Ormsby-Gore reported this conversation to London, where it was
studied and considered in detail.
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited the USSR from
February 21 through March 3, 1959, and had extensive talks with
Chairman Khrushchev. During the course of these conversations,
either without having discussed the matter with the United States
or despite American opposition, 41 the Prime Minister repeated Dr.
Fedorov's suggestion for an annual quota of on-site inspections,
mentioning a range of figures from three or five to more than
twenty. This was the first' of a series of British initiatives designed
to keep the negotiations alive and to stimulate progress in them.
At that time, Chairman Khrushchev apparently neither accepted
nor rejected the proposal, although he clearly found it attractive.
Because of its implications for later developments, it is worth
noting that the joint Anglo-Soviet communique issued at the conclusion of the talks between Prime Minister Macmillan and Chairman Khrushchev mentioned among other things the possibility of
an agreement being reached on a limitation of both conventional
and nuclear forces and weapons, under an appropriate inspection
system, in an agreed area of Europe. 42 This concept was strongly
40See Ormsby-Gore's account, GEN/DNT/PV. 293, p. 10.
41For the conflicting reports see respectively T. E. Murray, Nuclear
Policy for War and Peace, p. 104, and Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and
Verify, p. 137.
42New York Times, March 4, 1959, p. 1.
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opposed by NATO Headquarters, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the United States.
On March 5, two days after Prime Minister Macmillan had
left Moscow, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey sent a memorandum
to President Eisenhower, in which he advanced a proposal for a
quota of on-site inspections very siinilar to that which had been
discussed in Moscow. 43 President Eisenhower agreed that the proposal should be studied but refused to commit himself beyond that.

The Western Summit
By late March 1959, the stage was set for a major review of
Western policy concerning the test ban negotiations. The Berkner
Panel had completed its work, domestic opinion had had some time
to congeal, and policy-makers had some sense of the Soviet reaction and position. On March 19, Ambassador Wadsworth proposed
that the Conference be recessed until April 13, and Mr. Tsarapkin,
though stating that the USSR was opposed to the suggestion,
agreed. 44 That same day, Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign
Minister Selwyn Lloyd arrived in Washington for consultations with
President Eisenhower and other American officials.
During the next five days many issues were discussed, including broader arms control and disarmament proposals, the Berlin
crisis, and the prospects for a summit conference. With respect
to these broader issues, it was agreed that a meeting of the foreign
ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United
States should be convened in Geneva on May 11, 1959.
The two Western leaders also spent considerable time discussing
the flagging Geneva negotiations. Prime Minister Macmillan mentioned his suggestion to Chairman Khrushchev for an annual quota
of on-site inspections. In explaining his suggestion, the Prime
Minister used a golfing analogy, as Selwyn Lloyd did later in discussing the matter before the House of Commons. 45 The Prime
Minister said the quota would be like a bisque, a stroke or strokes
which can be used when desired by the opponent of the person
against whom it is given. Despite this reference to the President's
43Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 291-92.
44GEN/DNT/72, p. 17.
4 5U.K. House of Commons, Debates, April 27, 1959.
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favorite sport, as in Moscow, Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestion was neither approved nor rejected.
Many of the discussions were held at Camp David and they
ultimately included most of the Committee of Principals and their
British counterparts. Mr. Dulles attended some of the conversations, but by that time he was greatly weakened. Ambassador
Wadsworth, however, was not included in these meetings. Nor
were Congressmen. In fact, it emerged in Mr. Wadsworth's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament on March
25 that at that point neither he nor the Senators had had access
to the conclusions of the Berkner Panel, although they had been
submitted to the President nine days earlier. 46 The Camp David
talks, though, settled the course of future Western policy.
While the talks were in process pressures for and against a
test ban continued to rage in the United States and abroad. Since
Prime Minister Macmillan faced the prospect of a general election
in the not too distant future, he no doubt was sensitive to the
pressures in the United Kingdom. Unlike the situation in the United
States, in the United Kingdom these pressures almost without exception favored efforts to achieve a test ban. 4 7 An important
explanation for this is that British public opinion was much more
fearful of nuclear war than was opinion within the United States,
and rightly so, since the United Kingdom was much more vulnerable. A pointed example of the pressure exerted on the British
government occurred immediately after the conclusion of the Prime
Minister's trip to Washington. On March 30, some fifteen thousand
British citizens rallied in London to urge British unilateral nuclear
disarmament. 48

The Senate Resolution
In an effort to put the debate within the United States in a proper
context, and to strengthen the American negotiating position, and
perhaps for other reasons as well, on March 27, Senator Humphrey
4 6U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearing: Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, 86th Congress, 1st Session ( 1959), p. 20.
4 7For confirmation of this point by a British negotiator see Sir Michael
Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 131, 135.
4BNew York Times, March 31, 1959, p. 8.

170

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

introduced a resolution supporting the United States efforts to negotiate a test ban including "an adequate inspection and control
system." 49 Two days earlier, in explaining the purpose of the resolution to Ambassador Wadsworth, Senator Humphrey said:
The idea behind this is that as the Soviet works its propaganda apparatus, it tries to make it seem every time we
bring up another consideration that we are out either to
delay this agreement, or to wreck the conference, or to
precipitate some kind of crisis that will produce a stalemate.
It would seem to me that since the policy of our Government is what you are attempting to do, namely, to negotiate an agreement, that it might be well to give some
consideration to expressing as the sense of the Senate our
genuine intent and good intentions. 50
In keeping with this concept, the original resolution asked the
President to request the Soviet government to transmit the resolution to the Soviet people, a provision which was subsequently
dropped at the suggestion of the Department of State.
Whether or not Senator Humphrey's resolution served to nullify
Soviet propaganda is questionable. It is true that after it was
unanimously adopted on April 30, 1959, Ambassador Wadsworth
could refer to it as indicating the sense of the Senate. However, the
debate in the United States was really about what constituted "an
adequate inspection and control system," and whether or not such a
system was even possible. Those who had always questioned the
wisdom of a test ban treaty for the United States now focused
their criticisms on these issues.
A more important effect of the resolution may well have been
that in the context of the domestic debate, its adoption made it
more difficult for the Administration to break off the negotiations. 51
To do so might have seemed to defy the sense of the Senate.
Establishing this inhibition may well have been Senator Humphrey's main motivation.
49Congressional Record, Vol. CV, Part 4 (1959), p. 5347.
1i0Hearing: Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 46, at 30.
1i 1 See Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 298.
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IV

The New Western Position
Eisenhower to Khrushchev: An Atmospheric Ban?
The tensions in American opinion were amply evident in the new
Western position which emerged from the Camp David talks. The
new Western position was expressed in a letter which President
Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev on April 13, 1959, the
day that the Geneva Conference reconvened. That same day Prime
Minister Macmillan also sent a letter to Chairman Khrushchev endorsing the President's letter, and Ambassador Wadsworth introduced and expounded the President's proposals in Geneva.
The essence of the new Western position was to offer the
Soviet Union two alternative courses. The President put it this way:
If you are prepared to change your present position on the

veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early
discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly in the hope of
concluding the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement
for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not
yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the
first and readily attainable step of an agreed suspension
of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers while the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer space tests
are being resolved. If we could agree to such initial implementation of the first-and I must add the most important-phase of a test suspension agreement, our negotiators could continue to explore with new hope the
political and technical problems involved in extending the
agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear
weapons tests. 52
In other words, the new Western position was that to obtain a
comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments, the Soviet Union would have to agree to a variety of
Western conditions, otherwise the West would only agree to an
atmospheric test ban, which hopefully, however, would be the first
phase of a more far-reaching agreement. The basis for the proposal
for a phased treaty was a suggestion formally submitted to Sec52Geneva Conference, p. 355.
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retary of State Dulles by AEC Chairman McCone on behalf of
the members of the Commission in late January. 53 That it became
an alternative choice offered to the Soviet Union rather than the
single American position reflected the process of consensus-building
within the Administration and between the Western allies. The
Department of State and the British insisted on keeping open the
possibility of a comprehensive test ban. For the moment, Prime
Minister Macmillan's quota proposal was ignored.
It is interesting how the President's letter underplayed the problem of the new data. In Geneva, in Salle IX of the Palais des
Nations, Ambassador Wadsworth was less reticent. He explicitly
mentioned "technical discussion of . . . improvements which might
be made in the system of underground detection," as a condition
for continuing efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement. 54
Ambassador Wadsworth also defined the alternative course
of a phased treaty more precisely. The first phase agreement, as he
outlined it, would prohibit atmospheric, and if the USSR were
willing, underwater nuclear tests. It would be monitored by stationary control posts in the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the Pacific area, spaced in accordance with the recommendations of the Conference of Experts for nonseismic areas; that
is, at distances of 1,700 kilometers. The system would also include
routine and special aircraft sampling flights.
It will be recalled that several months earlier Senator Gore
had asserted that an atmospheric test ban could be monitored by
existing national detection systems. It is not clear why the United
States was unwilling to adopt such a position at this point. Probably the principal reason was that no one within the Administration
was willing to argue for it. The Department of State saw experience
in operating a control system as one of the main benefits of a test
ban agreement. The Central Intelligence Agency wanted to penetrate
the veil of Soviet secrecy. And the Department of Defense and the
Atomic Energy Commission sought as much assurance as they could
get that an agreement would not be violated. Naturally the possibility of detecting clandestine explosions in the USSR would be
greater with some control posts on Soviet territory than without any
53Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 290.
54GEN/DNT/PV. 73, p. 5.
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there, but how significant this difference would be is debatable.
The Western proposal for a phased agreement, as outlined by
Ambassador Wadsworth also envisaged continuing negotiations
within the framework of the Geneva Conference, or the Control
Commission, toward extending the test ban to other environments
and "joint" studies, research and possibly experiments concerning
the technical problems which had arisen. The Preparatory Commission for the Control Organization might also be given responsibility
for these activities.
Finally, Ambassador Wadsworth presented a fairly precise
summary of the conclusions of the Berkner Panel.
Both within and outside the Geneva Conference the new
Western position was widely interpreted as a victory for the position
advocated by such individuals as AEC Chairman McCone, Senator
Gore, and Thomas E. Murray. Depending on one's persuasion, the
West had either finally awakened to the difficulties of control, or
had at last revealed its underlying desire to continue developing
nuclear weapons through testing in some environments. To a degree,
both interpretations were accurate. Mr. Murray, in commenting on
the proposal in his book in 1960, called it "one of the most sensible
moves the Administration made," on the ground that it represented
a "turning away from the chimera of an absolute fully policed test
ban." He then went on to say that Chairman Khrushchev, recognizing the fact that the proposal "left an opening for the United States
to acquire much-needed weapons capabilities in the tactical nuclear
field, quickly rejected it. "5 5
Both views, however, probably overestimated the importance
of the Eisenhower and Macmillan letters. They represented only a
new position, not a new policy, a limited move rather than a thoughtout plan. The West still lacked a clear conception of where it was
going, or indeed where it wanted to go. However, the new Western
position did have the merit of forcing the participants in the negotiations and the onlookers to consider more seriously than they had
previously the importance of the objective of reducing the hazards of
radioactive fallout. It soon became apparent that the possibility of
achieving this objective alone would not immediately be sufficient
to induce an agreement.
55Nucle~r Policy for War and Peace, p. 102.

Chapter VI

The Search for Technical Agreement

I

Some Initial Compromises
President Eisenhower's letter, or more properly the formulation of
a new Western negotiating position and its communication to the
Soviet Union, touched off a process best described as a search
between East and West for agreement on the technical issues in
dispute, which lasted throughout 19 59, finally ending in seeming
futility. A variety of issues were at stake: whether or not the test
ban treaty would be comprehensive; the extent to which the new
data and the changing technological base would be taken into
account; eventually, the fate of the moratorium on testing; and, to
some extent, the diffusion of nuclear capabilities. President Eisenhower's letter and Ambassador Wadsworth's presentation on April
13 raised the first two issues. Given the public debate on these
matters in the United States, the moratorium was obviously an
important element in the background, and since one of the putative
objectives of the Conference was prevention of the spread of nuclear
weapons capability, this issue was inevitably involved.
The USSR Protests NATO's Nuclear Plans
The first Soviet move after the communication of the new
Western position concerned the last problem. On April 21, 1959,
the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the American
Embassy in Moscow protesting against plans, reported in the Western press, for the provision of missiles to NATO countries and
the stockpiling of nuclear warheads there .I As was described earlier,
in December 1957 the NATO Council had decided that selected
NATO countries were to be furnished missiles to which nuclear
lDocuments on

Di~armament,

1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1393-96.

174

The Search for Technical Agreement

175

warheads might be attached. Then the Atomic Energy Act had been
amended in July 1958 to allow the transfer of nuclear warheads
under certain specified conditions. These warheads were to remain
in American custody until the President had decided that they could
be used.
Under these terms an agreement was signed with the United
Kingdom in 1958, and work was begun on the installation of bases
in that country for Thor intermediate range rockets. A similar
agreement was reached with Italy in March 1959, for the installation
of Jupiter rockets, although in this case both the missiles and the
warheads would remain under American control. The Western
press was full of speculation that the NATO Command also had
plans to establish similar bases in other NATO countries.
The Soviet note singled out Greece, Turkey, and the Federal
Republic of Germany, and warned against the establishment of
bases in these countries, especially in West Germany. It argued
that no action should be taken in this sphere prior to the Foreign
Ministers' meeting, since to do so would constrict and perhaps foreclose the possibility of agreement.
The West replied through a statement of the NATO Council
issued on May 7, 1959, and a note from the American Embassy in
Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry dated the following day. 2
The essence of the Western position was to reiterate the public
rationale of the December 1957 decisions; that is, that the USSR
had prevented disarmament, and at the same time had introduced
modern weapons into its armed forces, therefore, the West had no
alternative but to take similar action.
On May 5 and 6, bilateral agreements were signed by the
United States with Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, and Turkey under the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1958 for the transfer to the latter countries of the
non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons systems and knowledge
about their use. 3 A similar agreement was signed with Canada on
May 22, 1959. 4 At that time it was envisaged that intermediate
range ballistic bases might be established in all of the countries
2Jbid., pp. 1405-9.
3See U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts,
Nos. 4292, 4267, 4277, and 4278 (1959).
4Jbid., No. 4271.
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except West Germany, which according to the NATO plans then
in effect was only slated to receive Matador rockets with a range
of approximately six hundred miles. Eventually, only Turkey received IRBM's, under an arrangement agreed to in October 1959.
Nonetheless, the May agreements established the legal framework
for the transfer of nuclear weapon systems within the limitations of
the 1958 Atomic Energy Act.
To a certain extent the signing of these agreements at this
time merely represented the elaboration of previously agreed decisions. It may also have been an attempt by those who had strong
feelings in the matter, especially the United States Department of
Defense, the NATO Command, and policy-makers in the Federal
Republic of Germany, to make it difficult for the Foreign Ministers
of the four powers to adopt a plan for nuclear or general disengagement in Central Europe at their forthcoming meeting. These
issues were relevant to the Geneva Conference since they dealt with
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, one of the issues supposedly at
stake in the Conference.
Chairman Khrushchev's Formal Reply: "No" to Eisenhower, "Yes"
to Macmillan
The first direct Soviet reply to the new Western position came
on April 23, 1959, in letters from Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. 5 First, Khrushchev
rejected the possibility of an atmospheric test ban. He argued that
the aim of a test ban should be "to halt the nuclear arms race, or
at the very least, to prevent the creation of new and ever more
destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons." Since an
atmospheric ban would allow testing in other environments, in his
view, it would not achieve this goal. Although they evaluated it
differently, in the United States, the opponents of a test ban treaty
also clearly recognized this possibility. Khrushchev further asserted
that nuclear weapons tests in the high atmosphere would cause fallout. He claimed that the purpose of the Conference should continue
to be "to conclude an agreement providing for a cessation of all
forms of nuclear weapon tests-in the atmosphere, underground,
under water, and at high altitudes."
5Geneva Conference, pp. 356-60.
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Khrushchev then suggested that it might be possible to surmount the difficulties in which the test ban negotiations were currently enmeshed by adopting Prime Minister Macmillan's proposal
for an annual quota of on-site inspections. He elaborated that not
many on-site inspections would be required and that they would
have to be "founded . . . on objective instrument readings." It was
his view that the mere possibility that an on-site inspection would
be conducted would be sufficient to deter a potential violator.
Four days later, in the Geneva Conference, Mr. Tsarapkin
submitted a formal proposal embodying Chairman Khrushchev's
proposal, 6 and in the next few sessions he elaborated its meaning
and ramifications. He stated that if the instruments registered a
suspicious event in a given location according to predetermined
criteria, the opposite side could request an on-site inspection and
an inspection group would be dispatched: there would be no
question of voting in the Control Commission. 7 Thus he seemed to
say that the Soviet demand for a veto on on-site inspections would
be dropped, if the quota proposal were accepted. Mr. Tsarapkin
also stated that the size of the quota-which would have to be a
"small number"-for the territories of each of the three nuclear
powers would have to be fixed by agreement among them. He ruled
out the possibility of fixing the quota as a set percentage of the
number of unidentified events registered on seismographs. 8 Or, as
he put it to his partners in the Conference, agreement will be
impossible "if you are going to talk of thousands of earth tremors
a year and fix a certain percentage." Later, he asserted that it
would not be necessary to consider the new seismic data prior to
the adoption of the quota proposaJ.9
Toward More Scientific Data: Projects Vela and Cowboy

Meanwhile, the United States moved to consider more seriously
than it previously had the technical problems involved in detecting
and identifying nuclear explosions. On April 23, 1959, the same
day that Chairman Khrushchev dispatched his letters to President
6GEN/DNT/PV.
7GEN/DNT/PV.
BGEN/DNT/PV.
9GEN/DNT/PV.

83,
84,
84,
85,

pp. 3-11.
pp. 10-11; PV. 85, p. 4.
p. 8.
p. 6.
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Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, Dr. Killian, Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Chairman
McCone of the AEC, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles met
to discuss the reports of the Panofsky Panel, which had considered
problems of high altitude detection, and the Berkner Panel, which
had examined problems of seismic detection. 10 They decided that
the Department of Defense should assume overall responsibility for
implementing the research programs recommended by these two
panels and that it should receive support from the Atomic Energy
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
In the next few months various advisory groups within the
Department of Defense began a number of preliminary studies,
and then the Air Force Technical Applications Center prepared
specific proposals for research. In August various supervisory
committees were established. Finally, on September 2, 1959, the
Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility for overseeing the
research-subsequently named Project Vela-to the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, and the
first work order was issued one month later.
During the next two years the project was expanded to full
dimensions. It was divided into three aspects: Vela Uniform,
dealing with underground nuclear tests; Vela Sierra, relating to
monitoring nuclear tests in space from ground bases; and Vela
Hotel, concerning monitoring nuclear tests in space by satelliteborne instrumentation. Various governmental and nongovernmental
organizations were involved under contracts let in 1960 and 1961,
and $10,000,000 was made available for the project during fiscal
year 1960. From the outset it was envisaged that both conventional
and nuclear explosions would be involved, and because of this the
AEC was given a prominent role. Nuclear explosions were obviously desirable from a technical standpoint: without them, theories
relating to detection could not be completely tested, and since it
would be some time before the project would advance to the stage
in which nuclear explosions would be crucial, the planners of Vela
lOU.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, SummaryAnalysis of Hearings: Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test. Ban
Negotiations, 87th Congress, 2nd Session ( Comm. Print. 1962), p. 12.
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simply ignored the question of whether or not such explosions
would be politically feasible.
Curiously, the first public announcement of Project Vela was
made May 7, 1960, well after the program was underway.U
A second project, concerning decoupling, was inaugurated
somewhat earlier. As soon as they were presented, Albert Latter's
theoretical calculations invited empirical testing. The Atomic Energy
Commission agreed to fund such work and assigned operational
responsibility to the University of California's Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory at Livermore. The RAND Corporation would also
participate in the analysis of the data. These arrangements were
discussed before Congressional Committees in June 1959. A series
of ten or more underground chemical explosions was planned
under the code name Project Cowboy and the first of these was
conducted in a salt mine in Winnfield, Louisiana, on December 17,
1959, before Project Vela was even seriously under way. Thus the
United States moved faster to examine through empirical tests
whether or not the seismic effects of underground nuclear explosions could be muffled than it did to consider in the same way
whether or not the effectiveness of the control system recommended
by the Conference of Experts could be improved.
An important reason for the difference in the speed with which
the two projects got underway was the fact that several policymakers felt that if the decoupling theory proved valid a ban on
testing nuclear weapons underground would probably be out of the
question. In addition, Project Vela was much more complicated
than Project Cowboy and required considerably larger expenditures
of funds. Further, most aspects of Project Vela would be executed
by nongovernmental agencies, often universities. Drafting and letting
contracts is time consuming, and the rhythm of academic life seldom
allows the rapid commitment of large scale resources to meet
external requirements. Finally, housing Project Vela within the
Department of Defense meant that the responsibility for proving
that a test ban could be adequately monitored was given to an
agency which was less than enthusiastic about the wisdom of a test
ban and which had as its basic responsibility the overwhelming
llSee President Eisenhower's Statement: U.S. Department of State,
Documents on Disarmament, 1960 (1961), pp. 86-87.
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and pressing task of developing and maintaining the military capacity of the United States. When priorities were established, as they
inevitably were, the latter fact was especially important.
Many Senators and scientists complained about the slowness
with which Project Vela was implemented. Even Earl H. Voss, who
was not among the most enthusiastic supporters of the test ban
negotiations, commented in his book Nuclear Ambush that the
project "obviously was not being pushed full speed ahead." 12

Divided Counsel: A "Political" or "Scientific" Question?
Regardless of the West's state of technical preparedness, negotiations were in progress and Chairman Khrushchev's missives
called for a reply. Among other things, the USSR appeared to be
gaining propaganda benefits from the seeming shift in the Western
position from advocacy of a comprehensive test ban to support for
an atmospheric ban, a point stressed in Chairman Khrushchev's
letters. In an attempt to counter this, the White House issued a
statement on April 27, 1959, asserting that the United States continued to desire a complete test ban, but the Soviet Union thus far
had "been unwilling to accept the control which would make such
agreement possible." 13 If the statement had any effect at all, however, it altered the situation only slightly.
Thus on the one hand there was continued pressure by public
opinion for a comprehensive test ban. Opposed to this were the
arguments that such a ban could not be enforced. These contradictory pressures clashed in the formulation of the next Western
move. Chairman Khrushchev's proposal for a predetermined quota
of on-site inspections caused deep divisions within the United
States Administration. The Atomic Energy Commission, and especially its Chairman, John A. McCone, strongly opposed the
concept, arguing that a test ban including such a provision would
not provide adequate safeguards for American security. The Department of State, on the other hand, gave the proposal a qualified
endorsement. In addition, the British favored it; indeed, they in a
sense had originated it.
In the Committee of Principals, Mr. McCone took the attitude
12Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 445.
13Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 1402.
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that this issue was "technical," not "political," and therefore the
judgment of the technically qualified experts ought to prevail. The
Department of State, on the other hand, took the opposite view. In
reality, both technical and political judgments were intertwined.
The crucial issues involved the size of detonation which one wished
to detect and the degree of assurance which one sought that such
detonations were detected; in other words the old threshold problem,
which had never been resolved. Such issues were partly "technical"
in that they involved estimates of the capability of the proposed
control network, but they were also political, in that they involved
judgments about the level of acceptable risk, and weighing the
risks of a less than perfect test ban against the risks of a world
without a test ban. Varying estimates of the trustworthiness of the
Soviet Union also entered the picture. As in the past, these issues
were not settled, but a new Western position was formulated which
was more or less acceptable to all of the parties involved.

The Western Response to Khrushchev: Further on the Inspection
Quota
The formal Western response was expressed in letters from
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman
Khrushchev dated May 5, 1959.1 4 The letters narrowed the differences between East and West to a slight degree. Both Western
leaders agreed to "explore," through their representatives in Geneva,
the Soviet proposal for an annual quota of on-site inspections on
the territories of the three nuclear powers. In particular, the Western
leaders argued that questions relating to the criteria for initiating
on-site inspections, timely access to areas where unidentified events
occurred, and the relationship between the detection capability of
the control system and the size of the quota, needed clarification.
President Eisenhower also mentioned his feeling that broader problems concerning the operation of the Control Organization and system should be settled. Both Western leaders reiterated their desire
for a comprehensive test ban, but went on to say that this was
dependent upon the USSR's agreeing to the appropriate control
measures, and both repeated the earlier suggestion for a phased
agreement starting with an atmospheric ban. President Eisenhower
14Geneva Conference, pp. 360-63.
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wrote that the West would welcome a technical discussion by scientists to consider the feasibility of immediately extending the atmospheric ban to high altitudes and outer space.
Since the report of the Conference of Experts contained no
recommendations for control measures at high altitudes and in
outer space, obviously some technical decisions would have to be
made for these environments. How well prepared the West was to
embark on such decisions was debatable. For experimental data,
there were the results of the 1958 Johnston Island and Argus shots.
These data had been analyzed by the Panofsky Panel and certain
tentative conclusions had been drawn. However, the first contract
under Project Vela Sierra and Vela Hotel was not let until September 1960, and it would be at least another year before concrete
results would be available. Apparently, though, no one on the
Committee of Principals within the United States or in the West
generally seriously questioned the wisdom of calling for technical
talks at this time.
Interestingly neither President Eisenhower nor Prime Minister
Macmillan mentioned the new seismic data in their letters to
Chairman Khrushchev, bringing it in only inferentially, by requiring
that the quota have some relationship to the detection capability of
the control system. In the Geneva Conference the Western negotiators
were again more explicit on this point, and openly insisted that the
new data had to be considered.l 5 Mr. Tsarapkin, on the other hand,
was equally adamant, maintaining that the technical basis of the
negotiations had been established by the Conference of Experts and
that these questions could not be reopened. He argued that:
There can be no doubt that either side could, if it wanted,
submit at any time endless so-called new scientific data,
which might differ widely in their nature according to the
purpose pursued by the experimental scientists in that
field. Those who wanted to prove at any cost how difficult
it is to detect and identify nuclear explosions would prepare their experiments correspondingly. There are
scientists who support this kind of view. We all know that
there are certain such scientists in the United States also.
It is sufficient to mention, for instance, Dr. Teller. 16
15See GEN/DNT/PV. 88 and PV. 89, passim.
l6GEN/DNT/PV. 89, p. 19.
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The USSR's position continued to be that the Treaty had to be
negotiated on the basis of the recommendations of the Conference
of Experts, which it held the three governments had "accepted";
that the Control Commission could consider new technical developments; and that the Periodic Review Article amply provided for
revisions in the control system.
The USSR also took the same attitude with respect to control
measures for the detection of nuclear tests at high altitudes and in
outer space. Mr. Tsarapkin maintained that the report of the
Conference of Experts did contain certain conclusions and that
these were sufficient. He also repeated and elaborated his statement
made January 8, 1959, that the USSR would be willing to launch
artificial earth satellites and to establish ground stations to receive
signals from the satellites for purposes of control in these environments. 17 The technical details, he argued, could be worked out by
the Preparatory Commission or the Control Commission. In his
view, it would be diversionary to become enmeshed in a discussion
of such technical details during the course of the political negotiations. It might also set a precedent in terms of going beyond the
work of the Conference of Experts prior to the signature of a test
ban treaty.
This was where matters stood on May 8, 1959, when the
Geneva Conference recessed. The West requested the recess on the
ground that the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were scheduled to meet the
following Monday, May 11, 1959, and they might hopefulJy resolve some of the issues which divided the Conference in the course
of their meeting.
II

Technical Working Group I
From Diplomats to Scientists: Getting Ready for Technical Working
Group I
Certain of these issues were indeed resolved at the Foreign Ministers' meeting-or it would be more accurate to say during the
Foreign Ministers' meeting. On May 14, 1959, three days after
17GEN/DNT/PV. 89, pp. 25-26.
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the meeting opened, Chairman Khrushchev replied to President
Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. 18 Basically the letters
were restatements of the Soviet position; however, there was one
important exception. The Chairman agreed that there should be a
brief "technical discussion of concrete measures as to methods of
detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes on the basis of the
conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts, for the purpose of
including such methods in the system of control." The Foreign
Ministers confirmed this agreement.
The terms of reference of the technical discussion--or of
Technical Working Group I (TWG I) as it ultimately was called
-were left to be worked out at the Geneva Conference after it
reconvened on June 8, 1959. This proved to be a disputatious task,
and one which took the better part of six meetings. The terms of
reference were not finally approved until June 15, 1959. Several
issues were involved; all probably more important in terms of their
implications with respect to the controversial and still unresolved
problem of detecting and identifying underground tests and the
American new seismic data than in their own right.
Chairman Khrushchev implicitly, and Foreign Minister Gromyko
directly, both again refused to consider the new data and insisted
that the negotiations had to be based on the conclusions of the
Conference of Experts. The West on the other hand continued to
insist that the new data had to be considered. On June 12, 1959,
the United States finally introduced the findings and report of the
Berkner Panel into the Geneva Conference. 19 Having failed to
obtain agreement through the Foreign Ministers, the United States
now apparently hoped to force a modification in the Soviet position
through a more open confrontation. Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate
response was that the conclusions of the Berkner Panel had been
"broadly known" to the USSR "since last March from the magazine
Fortune." 20
The dispute about the terms of reference of Technical Working
Group I should be viewed in the light of this continuing controversy.
First, the two sides were divided as to whether or not the report of
lSGeneva Conference, pp. 363-67.
19GEN/DNT/PV. 94, pp. 24-31.
20Jbid., p. 32.
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the Conference of Experts should be mentioned. The Western
powers finally reluctantly agreed that it should be. Secondly, there
was a controversy concerning whether TWG I should discuss only
which instruments should be used for detection, as the USSR argued,
or more broadly evaluate the possible techniques of detection and
identification, as the West insisted. In this case the Western position
was accepted. Thirdly, the two sides differed about whether or not
the tentative theoretical evaluations concerning the effectiveness of
various techniques contained in the report of the Conference of
Experts could be changed; the Soviet Union argued that they could
not, and the Western powers that they could. A related issue was
whether or not the data from the United States 1958 tests could
be considered. Mr. Tsarapkin eventually agreed that the new
material could be considered, and the larger issue was solved in a
compromise fashion, as can be seen from the terms of reference:
The technical working group should assess the capabilities
and limitations of possible techniques for the detection and
identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes (more
than 30 to 50 kilometers) above the earth and, on the
basis of discussions and conclusions of the Geneva conference of experts, recommend techniques and instrumentation for consideration by the Conference for
incorporation in the Detection and Identification System. 21
Fifthly, the Soviet Union sought to expand the terms of reference
of Technical Working Group I so that it would also be directed to
consider the problem of determining criteria for on-site inspections
in the case of suspected underground nuclear explosions. The
Western powers refused this proposal on the ground that different
technical specialties were involved and, more importantly, they felt
that the question of criteria could not be examined without considering the new seismic data. Finally, the Soviet Union won
Western agreement that the Technical Working Group should report
to the Conference on June 29, 1959, one week after it was convened, which proved to be an impossibly short time. Even though
TWG I extended beyond this deadline, the scientists had an incredible,
almost around the clock, working day during the Conference, as they
did each time that they met during the test ban negotiations.
21GEN/DNT/PV. 95, p. 13.
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Once agreement had been reached on the terms of reference,
it was necessary to assemble delegations to participate in the
technical discussions. A British delegation of three scientists in
government employ was quickly assembled. 22 None of the three
had attended the Conference previously. The Soviet delegation was
headed by Dr. Fedorov, who had chaired the Eastern panel at the
Conference of Experts and had stayed in Geneva for the opening
stages of the political negotiations. Two others of the seven-member
Soviet delegation had also served on the Eastern panel at the
Conference of Experts, M. A. Sadovsky and 0. I. Leypunsky. 23
In the United States, several scientists had been approached
on a tentative basis earlier. PSAC and the Office of the Science
Adviser served as the bodies which recommended nominations to
the President and the Department of State. On Tuesday the sixteenth, those selected were informed that they should fly to Geneva
that Thursday and be ready for the opening of the discussions the
following Monday. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director of the High
Energy Physics Laboratory at Stanford University, who had headed
the Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee which had
examined this subject, was chosen as the Chairman of the American
delegation. 24 In creating the delegation, an attempt was made-as it
had been with respect to the Conference of Experts-to maintain
balance between the conflicting points of view among scientists
concerning the wisdom of a test ban, and those with extreme
positions were not included. Of the nine men appointed to the
delegation, only two, Richard Latter and Spurgeon Keeny had at.

22H. R. Hulme, I. Maddock, and R. Press.
23The other members of the Soviet delegation were J. L. Alpert, A. I.
Ustyumenko, 0. A. Grinevsky, and S. N. Vernov. There is reason for believing that Grinevsky was not a scientist but a political representative.
24The other members of the delegation were: Sterling Colgate, Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Allen F. Donovan, Director,
Astrovehicles Laboratory, Space Technology Laboratory, Los Angeles, California; Allen Graves, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., Technical Assistant, Office of Special Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology; Richard Latter, Chief, Physics
Division, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California; Col. Dent L. Lay,
Assistant Director, Technical Operations Division, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense; Allen M. Petersen, Head, Propagation
Laboratory, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California; and Kenneth M. Watson, Professor of Physics, University of California at Berkeley.
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tended the Conference of Experts. The former (like his brother
Albert) was a RAND Corporation physicist and the latter, a
technical assistant in the Office of the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. In addition, the delegation
included Allen Graves, a physicist on leave from the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, who had been attending the political negotiations as the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Professor Panofsky was actually intercepted in the midst of a
cross-country trip with his wife and five children. His destination,
though, was Geneva, where he planned to spend a year at CERN, the
Organisation europeenne pour la recherche nucleaire. He left his
family, hurried to Washington-he was the only nonofficial member
of the delegation to go there prior to departure for Europe-where
he had a fifteen-minute conference with the Secretary of State, and
then went on to Geneva, arriving somewhat later than the rest of the
American delegation, and after the first meeting of Technical Working
Group I.
Many of the members of the American delegation had been
members of Professor Panofsky's Panel on the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes and in outer space, and this was
the only preparation that the group had to work with. The Panel
had met about eight or nine times in the winter of 1958-59. Each
meeting lasted about a day, and the Panel members did various
pieces of work in the interim periods. Dr. Killian had attended
most of the meetings, and representatives of the Department of
Defense and Atomic Energy Commission were members of the
Panel. The Department of State, however, was not represented, and
generally speaking the group had very little politicial guidance.
Again, the scientists were not told what threshold of detection would
be the maximum risk that the United States could accept. In this
instance, in contrast to the Conference of Experts and a later
technical working group, the questions of identification; and
"objective criteria" were carefully avoided. The scientists were not
told how much money the United States would be willing to invest
in a detection and identification_ system, nor were they told how
much to as~ume that an evader would be willing to spend to mask
his action. Thus there were no cost figures. This was the case
despite the fact that the report of the Panofsky Panel had contained an approximate assessment of the cost of conducting clandes-
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tine nuclear explosions in space using various methods, and of the
cost of various detection systems. The scientists were not given any
guidance concerning the basis for choice between various alternative
techniques. They were merely given the data from the 1958 test
series and asked to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of
various techniques for detection and identification and to elaborate
a possible system. Secretary of State Herter did not expand these
instructions very much in his brief conference with Professor Panofsky. Just as in the case of the Conference of Experts various
crucial problems were left for the scientists to decide.
Nor were these matters settled when the American delegation
assembled in Geneva. The scientists spent most of the weekend
brushing up on their technical preparation. Ambassador Wadsworth
was reluctant to become involved in technical discussions, and in
any case, could not make fundamental politicial decisions. A junior
State Department member of the American delegation at the Geneva
Conference was assigned to the scientists, but he did not fully
understand the technical issues, nor did he attend all of the meetings
of Technical Working Group I. During the course of the negotiations the scientists found it completely impossible to obtain political
guidance. In other words, the United States treated Technical Working Group I, as it had the Conference of Experts, as a purely
technical session which the scientists should work at by themselves.
TWG 1: Toward an Adjustment in the Scientific Base
Technical Working Group I began with an argument between
East and West concerning the agenda, which in several respects
repeated the controversy about its terms of reference. Dr. Fedorov
proposed a draft agenda which virtually would have limited the
discussion to the elaboration of matters treated by the Conference
of Experts. 25 The West on the other hand preferred a broader
definition of TWG I's tasks, and eventually won its point. However,
the controversy continued to plague the technical discussions.
Throughout TWG I the Soviet scientists tended to take the report
of the Conference of Experts as a fixed document, binding the
various states. They were willing to accept only evaluations which
confirmed or upgraded the assessments arrived at then, and fought
25GEN/DNT/TWG I, PV.1, pp. 12-15.
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any attempts to demonstrate that these assessments were too optimistic.
As in the Conference of Experts, the burden of proof tended
to rest with the West since it was the Western powers which had
demanded that the technical discussion be held. The Western scientists presented the bulk of the data, and it seems fairly clear that
the Soviet scientists withheld considerable data which would have
been useful to the discussions. This is not to say that the West
made all of the data which it had available, but merely to say that
it made considerably more available. Throughout the discussions,
the Western scientists pressed for quantitative assessments. The
Soviet scientists preferred more general formulations. The Western
scientists sought to point out how violators might attempt to avoid
detection. The Soviet scientists made light of these suggestions and
often appeared not to have previously considered the possibilities.
The Western scientists sought to indicate that although something
was known about the signals of nuclear explosions at high altitudes
and in outer space, very little was known about the natural background with which such signals had to compete. None of the devices which were discussed as instruments of detection existed at
that time, although some of their component parts were technically
proved. The Western scientists introduced data from the United
States 1958 test series but argued that only the Teak and Orange
shots were directly relevant and that these were conducted at
relatively low altitudes. They maintained that further empirical
data might invalidate their theoretical conclusions, making them
appear either too optimistic or too pessimistic. The Soviet scientists argued as they had in the past that the progress of science as
a whole could only result in improvements in the ability to detect
and identify nuclear explosions at high altitudes.
In testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
about a year later, Professor Panofsky summed up the position and
difficulties of the Western scientists.
We all realize that the Russians have very little interest
in the technical reliability of control procedures because
clandestine testing is essentially impossible in any of the
Western countries. They do, however, have a very substantial interest in maintaining the secrecy of their country,
and therefore in reducing the degree of access demanded
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by the control system. Hence, it is always in their interest
to minimize the extent of the control system; in order to
do this the tendency is to view the performance of the
control system in the best possible light. Any critical
evaluation of the performance of the system, therefore,
always rests upon the shoulders of the Western delegations. In turn, this makes the performance of the negotiations very arduous for the Western technical delegates
since in many cases the facts which have to form the
basis for a critical assessment have not been developed
prior to negotiations. 26
The differences between the Western and Soviet scientists in these
matters were even more acute during the sessions of Technical
Working Group I than they had been during the Conference of
Experts. No doubt, both sides, and especially the Western scientists, constantly had the controversial history of the report produced
in that meeting in mind.
Following the pattern of the Conference of Experts, and the
agenda, the report of Technical Working Group I was divided into
two basic sections. The first section contained a general discussion
of techniques for detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes.
It was divided into two ~mbsections; the first, dealing with detection
by means of apparatus installed in artificial earth and solar satellites; and the second, dealing with detection by means of apparatus
installed at ground-based control posts. The second half of the
report contained recommendations for consideration by the political
Conference concerning the techniques and instruments which rP.ight
be incorporated in the Detection and Identification System. In this
section, in contrast to the report of the Conference of Experts,
alternatives were spelled out in certain areas and the choices left
to others.
Other than the problems which arose from the broad differences of approach mentioned above, drafting the first part of the
report was relatively noncontroversial. The only deep difference appeared to be caused by differing technical experiences; the orbit
2 6U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development,
Hearings: Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear
Weapons Test Ban, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960), pp. 38-39.
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of Soviet satellites had been such as to gather little information on
the Van Allen radiation belt, and as a consequence the Soviet scientists were less inclined to take this feature of the atmosphere into
account than the Western scientists. In general, both sides had very
little empirical data on the level of background radiation in the
atmosphere.
Not surprisingly it proved less easy to agree on recommendations for control systems, which was after all the core of the issue.
Indeed, it is difficult to see why the attempt to arrive at joint
assessments was necessary, except as an effort to erect an agreed
point of departure for the recommendations. In formulating the
recommendations, the scientists were in effect engaging in political
negotiations, though the subject matter was technical and scientific.
The American scientists were clearly considerably more aware of
this than they had been a year earlier at the Conference of Experts.27 However, their political instructions were not any more
complete than they had been in the previous instance. In the absence
of instructions on such vital matters as threshold and cost, the
American scientists tended to push for the maximum. For example,
one of the problems of detection of nuclear explosions at high
altitudes was the danger of false alarms; the danger that the control
system might indicate that a nuclear explosion had occurred when
actually none had. The Americans sought to minimize this possibility as much as possible through redundancy (having overlapping
systems) and other methods; their target was a system that would
not produce more than one false alarm every one hundred years.
The Soviet scientists on the other hand were inclined to make more
modest demands on the recot!llllended system, but ultimately generally agreed to the American position.
The same pressure to provide for all possible contingencies led
the American scientists to argue the need for a system of satellites
in orbit around the sun, so that there would be no blind spots
behind the sun or the moon. This recommendation, to which the
27For example, during the Conference Panofsky said to Fedorov: "I
am more than happy to negotiate on matters of recommendations where political judgment is involved, where we must reach an agreement in order to
have an agreed report concerning what steps are to be taken, but I cannot
negotiate on the question of the modification of scientific facts." GEN/DNT/HAT/PV. 16, p. 46.
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Soviet scientists were opposed and which would have involved substantial cost, was phrased in optional terms. Interestingly, after
the conclusion of Technical Working Group I, with the advantage
of further research, the American scientists also became less interested in the system of solar satellites. 28 They eventually concluded
that the costs and difficulties of conducting clandestine nuclear
explosions behind the sun or the moon would be so great that it
was highly unlikely that any violator would take such action.
In all, ten methods of detection were considered, and techniques involving all but one of these were recommended for inclusion in the Detection and Identification System. The one which
was not recommended was a ground-based technique, backscatter
radar. After over a week of irrelevant, and at times spurious
technical argument, Dr. Fedorov stated that the Soviet scientists
could not agree to recommend backscatter radar because it could
"also be used for purposes having nothing to do with the control of
high-altitude explosions. " 29 Although the American scientists were
reluctant to admit that backscatter radar is an effective means of
observing the launching of missiles, nevertheless, on the basis of
the Argus experiments, the American scientists believed it to be an
extremely useful means of detecting nuclear explosions at high
altitudes. Failure to include it in the Detection and Identification
System would result in an uncovered "hole" in the system under
certain conditions in the area from 50 to 100 kilometers and a "halfcovered hole" from 100 to 1,000 kilometers. The report merely
stated that the Technical Working Group had been unable to come
to an accord on this matter. That under certain circumstances there
would be a "hole" in the system was not mentioned in the report.
This provides an example of the difficulty which the scientists
had in obtaining political guidance. When it appeared certain that
there would be an impasse on the question of whether or not to
recommend backscatter radar in the control system, the American
scientists felt that the most constructive move would be to agree
to disagree. This being a political decision, the delegation sought
guidance, but found it extremely difficult to convey the nature of the
2 8See Panofsky's comments before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,
supra note 26, p. 47.
29GEN/DNT/HAT/PV. 17, p. 81.
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problem to the diplomats and politicians in Geneva and Washington. In the end, the scientists had to take the decision on their
own responsibility.
In formulating the recommendations the Western scientists
sought to be as specific as possible, for instance listing the exact
number of satellites required and their orbits. The Soviet scientists
preferred more general formulations, and at one point suggested that
matters involving a choice between various alternatives should be
left to the Control Commission. Professor Panofsky refused to
do this, on the ground that decisions on such issues should be the
prerogative of the diplomatic Conference. 30 In some instances
he was willing to leave the choice between alternatives for subsequent decision, although in more specific terms than the Soviet
scientists preferred, but he argued that the diplomatic Conference had to decide how the decisions should be made. The reason
for the insistence of the American scientists on being specific was
their awareness of the tentative agreement reached in the Geneva
Conference that major changes in the detection and identification
system would require the unanimity of the three nuclear powers. 31
The problem of identifying the violator after a nuclear explosion at high altitudes had been detected by the control system was
not discussed in Technical Working Group I. Nor did the group
discuss criteria for establishing evidence of detection. As had been
mentioned, these issues had been carefully avoided by the politicians
and diplomats in their discussions with the scientists. Technically,
there is no way the violator could be identified unless the control
system also had available to it information on missile launchings.
Had the system been established, either some agreement would have
had to have been reached on this point, or in the case of a detection of a nuclear explosion, states would have had to base their
decision concerning what action to take on their unilateral intelligence systems. Since the duration article provided that the
treaty could be terminated by unilateral action, this would be
feasible. However, in all of the other environments the Western
powers demanded incontrovertible evidence identifying the violator.
One might ask if such evidence was necessary in other ensooEN/DNT/HAT/PV. 14, p. 71.
SlSee Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test
Ban, supra note 26, p. 40.
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vironments, why not at high altitudes? Or, if not necessary at high
altitudes, then why was it necessary for atmospheric, underwater,
and underground explosions? Presumably the reason was that for
identification it would have been necessary to have controls over
another element of weaponry, the launching of missiles. But, to
establish positive identification in the case of underground explosions, on-site inspections are required, which might also reveal
other aspects of military strength.
Whether or not the system recommended by Technical Working
Group I would have provided sufficient safeguards against the
possibility of clandestine nuclear explosions in outer space was a
matter of judgment. First, there was the "hole" in the system at low
altitudes under certain conditions caused by the failure to recommend the backscatter radar technique. Secondly, there was the
problem of identification. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
at extremely high altitudes-above 5,000,000 miles-it would only
be possible to detect nuclear explosions through the soft or thermal
X-ray technique, and shielding would appreciably reduce the effectiveness of this technique. Thus, if a violator were willing to
spend sufficient resources to put a nuclear device, the necessary
instrumentation, and a shield into outer space, and were patient
enough to wait some time for the results, he could conduct undetected nuclear weapon tests.
Whether or not the possibility that a state might conduct undetected clandestine nuclear explosions in outer space constituted
a serious risk was subject to debate. Professor Panofsky, in testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed this
opinion:
From the purely technical point of view, it appears likely
that, given arbitrarily high incentives on the part of the
violator, it will always be possible to devise an essentially
undetectable means of carrying out the violation. I believe,
however, that before that point is reached, there is the
question of whether there really is sufficient incentive
either for the violator to carry out tests under these extreme conditions or for the detecting system to be expanded to the maximum possible degree. 32
32Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,
supra note 26, p. 37.
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On the other hand, Dr. Byron P. Leonard, of the Space Technology
Laboratory, during the same hearing asserted, "It is really no trick
at all to run tests outside of the X-ray detection circle ... " 33 Edward
Teller expressed the same view in a syndicated newspaper article,
"Testing in space provides a loophole through which one could
drive a herd of wild elephants. " 34 Again, all three scientists used
the same technical data; where they differed was in their estimate
of the necessary degree of security or in the threshold of detectability below which American security interests would be endangered. This was a political judgment involving an assessment of the
intentions of other states, one's willingness to bear monetary and
other costs involved in any type of detection system, and one's willingness to accept risks. Yet these were decisions on which the
American scientists at Technical Working Group I, as their predecessors at the Conference of Experts, received little guidance
from either United States politicians or diplomats.

TWG I Reports to the Diplomatic Conference
Technical Working Group I adopted its report on the morning
of Friday, July 10, 1959. That afternoon the report was presented
to the diplomatic Conference. Both sides argued that the results
of the Technical Working Group supported their position with
respect to the report of the Conference of Experts. 35 In the Soviet
view, the report of TWG I confirmed the findings of the earlier
report, and proved that the progress of science made detection
easier, while in the Western view it was conclusive evidence of the
importance of looking at new data, and also proved that the demand
to do this was not grounded on obstructionist motives.
The Conference agreed to release the report of Technical
Working Group I immediately. This was in contrast to the situation
with respect to the report of the Conference of Experts, which had
first been submitted to the governments concerned and then released.
The next move with respect to the problems discussed by
Technical Working Group I came one month later, on August 10,
33Jbid., p. 345.
84Houston Post, August 16, 1960.
35See GEN/DNT/PV. 109, passim.
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1959, when Mr. Tsarapkin announced that the USSR agreed to
"the inclusion of the methods and instrumentation recommended
. . . for the detection of high-altitude nuclear explosions in the
system of control over the cessation of nuclear tests." 36 That
same day, the British delegate, Sir Michael Wright, stated that his
government accepted the report "as a correct technical assessment
of possible techniques for the detection and identification of highaltitude nuclear explosions in the light of scientific knowledge
available at the time of the Working Group's session." 37 He added
that his government was prepared to take part in discussions regarding the embodiment in the treaty of provisions on high-altitude
controls, in the light of the recommendations contained in the
report."
It was obvious that Ambassador Wadsworth, at this point, had
no instructions on the issue. On August 26, 1959, however, following Sir Michael Wright's phraseology, he stated that the United
States accepted "the report as a correct technical assessment of the
capabilities and limitations of possible techniques for the detection
and identification of high-altitude nuclear explosions in the light of
presently available scientific knowledge." 38 He also said that the
United States was studying the "complex problems of timing and
scope" that would be involved in preparing treaty language for a
high-altitude detection system "that would be established" on the
basis of "the report of TWG 1." However, the United States did
not discuss its proposals concerning this matter in broad outline until
March 29, 1961,39 nearly two years later, and it did not submit
specific treaty language until April 18, 1961.40
The basic reason for the delay was the inability of the United
States Administration to agree on the degree of risk that the United
States could reasonably accept; again, it was the threshold problem.
The demands of the Atomic Energy Commission and, to a lesser
extent, of the Department of Defense, were considerably higher than
those of the Department of State or the President's Science Advisory
36GEN/DNT/PV. 121, p. 10.
31Jbid., p. 13.

38GEN/DNT/PV. 127, p. 4.
39See GEN/DNT/PV. 280, pp. 3-7.
40Geneva Conference, pp. 508-9.
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Committee. A related reason was the high cost of the complete
high altitude system. Few were willing to countenance this cost.
Thus the United States put itself in the uncomfortable position of
insisting on the one hand that the "loophole" associated with the
lack of high altitude coverage was sufficient reason to be an impediment toward concluding a nuclear test ban treaty, while on the
other hand it did not appear to regard the "loophole" as being of
sufficient importance to be willing to pay the money to plug it.
Significantly, when treaty language was finally proposed, with the
advantage of data gained from Vela Sierra and Vela Hotel, the
United States asked for a system which was somewhat more modest
and consequently considerably less expensive than that which had
been recommended by Technical Working Group I. Eventually,
when the United States signed the Moscow Treaty, which relied on
national detection systems, it agreed to a ban on testing at high
altitudes and in outer space before basic elements in its own national
control system were operative.
The subsequent history of the action with respect to the report
of Technical Working Group I, raises again the question of why the
Western powers insisted on calling the meeting. Certainly the Western governments did not learn anything from the discussions that
they could not have learned from private consultations with their
own scientists. The extent of knowledge was limited, and there were
risks in doing anything such as making formal recommendations
for a control system that might tend to "freeze" the situation.
Formulating recommendations involved political choices, which the
United States government was unprepared or unable or unwilling to
make at that time and for more than a year and a half after the
report of TWG I was filed. Perhaps some American officials hoped
that the technical discussions would in some way solve the problem
for them. If they did, they both overestimated and misunderstood
the qualities and powers of science. In fact, however, the Technical
Working Group I did set a precedent for reconsidering matters
discussed by the Conference of Experts, and perhaps this was its
principal function for the West. In addition, of course, when the
United States eventually decided to accept some of the recommendations of TWG I, the Soviet Union was already on record as having
done so.
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The Diplomatic Conference Inches Along
The Geneva Conference had been in session during the meetings of Technical Working Group I and it continued in session until
August 26, 1959. The meetings, however, appeared to be mainly
exercises in marking time. Neither side substantially modified its
position. The Western powers continued to insist that the new data
had to be considered, and the USSR continued to refuse to take this
action. Mr. Tsarapkin constantly referred to the report of the Conference of Experts as "the basis" for the negotiations, while Ambassador Wadsworth held that it was merely "an agreed statement of
the best scientific opinion available as of mid-1958." 41
The USSR's position, though, w2s clarified somewhat when
on June 19, 1959, Mr. Tsarapkin gave a more detailed response
to the findings of the Berkner Panel.4 2 It was essentially negative.
First of all, he alleged that to act on the recommendations of the
Berkner Panel would mean that a test ban would be delayed for
many years. He pointed out that no one could confidently predict
how the suggestion for putting seismographs in deep holes would
work out, since this technique was largely unexplored. He also
objected to the suggestion of unmanned stations placed at considerably closer intervals than had been recommended at the Conference
of Experts. He alleged that they would create opportunities for
espionage since men would have to install the stations and check
their operation.
The Soviet position was further clarified on July 9, 1959, when
Mr. Tsarapkin submitted a draft article on on-site inspection. 43 As
he had asserted previously in response to Western questioning, the
terms of the article did not require the unanimous agreement of the
three nuclear powers for the dispatch of an inspection team and the
inspection teams could go anywhere that the instruments indicated
that an unidentified event had occurred. From the Western point of
view, an unexpected feature of the proposal was that the three
nuclear powers would each be subject to an equal number of inspections. Actually the proposal advanced the negotiations very little,
for the most crucial element, the number of on-site inspections that
41GEN/DNT/PV. 99, p. 10.
42fbid., pp. 14-16.

43GEN/DNT/PV. 108, pp. 3-4.
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would be allowed annually, was not specified; the draft merely
contained a blank space. The USSR did not formally submit a
definite figure until more than a year later. Hcwever, the day before
Ambassador Tsarapkin submitted the draft article, Soviet First
Deputy Premier Frol R. Koslov told Michigan's Governor G. Mennen Williams that the USSR might accept as many as three on-site
inspections each year, 44 which is the figure that the Soviet Union
ultimately proposed on July 26, 1960. Soviet representatives also
mentioned the figure three in informal conversations in Geneva in
the summer of 1959.
The West assumed that a much larger number would be
needed, and the ensuing argument between East and West concerning whether the quota should be "politically determined," as
the USSR insisted, or "scientifically determined," as the United
States and the United Kingdom insisted, was in reality principally
an argument about numbers. At the time very little was known
about the frequency of small earthquakes and the knowledge about
the relationship between the seismological signals transmitted by underground nuclear ·explosions and earthquakes was at best sketchy.
If one accepted the estimate of unidentified events contained in the
report of the Conference of Experts, the figure of three on-site inspections annually in the USSR would not be completely unreasonable even though such a small figure would pose practical difficulties. However, the West felt that in view of the new data such
a figure would be clearly insufficient. At the same time, the West
was not prepared to submit a specific figure, and actually did not
make a definite proposal until February 11, 1960. Then it merely
suggested that a fixed percentage of unidentified events should be
eligible for inspection. In fact, no one knew how many unidentified
events there would be. In these terms, the Western demand that the
Conference consider the new data and agree that the quota of on-site
inspections should be scientifically determined were really demands
to get pegs on which to base claims for a larger number of inspections. The United States position also reflected the Atomic Energy
Commission's insistence that this was a "technical" matter on which
its views should have precedence. In somewhat different terms, the
question of the number of on-site inspections again raised the
44New York Times, July 9, 1959, p. 3.
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troublesome problem of the threshold. What risk could and should
the United States take?
The debate on these matters continued throughout this phase
of the Conference. Perhaps the most lively session occurred on
July 1, when the American delegation was accompanied by the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, John A. McCone,
and a group of Congressional observers. 45 Both sides were at
their belligerent best. Exactly what purpose this episode served is
difficult to fathom.
The Ending of Soviet Nuclear Assistance to Communist China
Actually, the most important events for the course of the
negotiations at this stage occurred elsewhere. Perhaps the most
important of these was that the USSR appears to have decided to
discontinue assisting Communist China develop a nuclear capacity.
The Chinese have charged that on June 20, 1959, "The Soviet
Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology
for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union
on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample
of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture." 46
If this charge is true, and the USSR has not denied it, such a decision on the part of the Soviet Union had important implications
for the prospects of a test ban. Like the United States, the Soviet
Union apparently found it impossible to engage in a complete
transfer of nuclear weapons to other states. One can only speculate
about the reasons for this, but it seems plausible to assume that
the USSR wanted to avoid creation of situations which might
allow it to become involved in nuclear war by the actions· of an
ally. No doubt the USSR was also concerned about its present and
potential relationship with the ally in question. China's acquisition
of a nuclear capability would strengthen that state in relation to the
USSR. If these were the Soviet concerns, at this point a test ban
may well have assumed greater importance for the USSR.
45GEN/DNT/PV. 106.
of the Chinese Government, July 31, 1963," len-min
Jih-pao, July 31, 1963, as quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet
Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, No. 2
(June 1964), pp. 99-115, at 111.
4 6"Statement
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The American Decision to Continue the Moratorium
At that time, however, the West was ignorant of these developments. For the United States, the most crucial decision that had to
be taken during this period was whether or not, in the light of the
impasse in the negotiations, the one-year moratorium on testing of
nuclear weapons offered by President Eisenhower in his initial
proposal for the Conference should be continued. Although this was
related to the question of whether or not the negotiations should be
continued, the two issues were considered to be separable. That the
issue of the moratorium had to be decided shows the limited significance of President Eisenhower's statement, made in November 1958
when he revealed that the Soviet Union had continued to test after
the opening of the diplomatic conference, that the United States
would no longer consider itself bound by its pledge to forego testing.
Even though there was a specific point at which a decision in
this matter supposedly was made, like so many important decisions
in the course of these negotiations-and perhaps generally-by that
time prior decisions and other events almost forced the choice. Alternatives were first narrowed in the discussions and decisions relating to the Federal Budget for fiscal year 1960. As has already
been mentioned, the Administration decided not to ask for funds
for the testing of nuclear weapons during that period. Chairman
McCone and General Starbird of the Atomic Energy Commission
explained the nature and ramifications of the decisions within the
Administration-which Congress in due course confirmed-in testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations on June 23,
1959. They stated that the Administration had decided to request
only sufficient funds to maintain the test sites on a standby basis
"except for limited tunnel construction at the Nevada test site to
provide an underground test readiness capability should weapons
tests be resumed. " 47 In the Pacific Test area, the AEC envisaged
employing fewer people and spending less money than was normally
spent in periods between test series; the objective was only to retard
and prevent the inevitable deterioration resulting from the climate.
The work on the tunnels in Nevada was in part designed to obtain
47U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Hearings: Atomic Energy Commission Appropriations for 1960, 86th
Congress, 1st Session (1959), p. 72.
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information from past tests. In addition, the program was designed
to give decision-makers some flexibility. If no construction were
undertaken, it would take nearly a year from the time that a decision
was taken to resume testing until it could be executed. 48 As it was,
because of the extensive nature of the 1958 test series and the
budgetary decisions for fiscal 1960, the United States probably could
not have resumed testing nuclear weapons on a significant and
meaningful scale in 1959, and probably not even in the first half
of 1960.
A second factor narrowing the range of alternatives was that
in the summer of 1959 a new round of East-West negotiations
came into prospect. The Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR,
the United Kingdom and the United States resumed their negotiations in Geneva on July 13 and continued in session until August
5. Among other things they agreed that a Ten-Nation Disarmament
Committee should be established outside the framework of the
United Nations and on the basis of parity between East and West.
Thus, they finally conceded what the Soviet Union had demanded at
the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957. They agreed
that the Committee should meet sometime in 1960 and that it should
report to the UN Disarmament Commission. In anticipation of this
development, the Administration established a committee under the
chairmanship of Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston attorney and a
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, to reexamine and reevaluate
the American position with respect to disarmament. The Administration again chose to rely on an "outsider" and a generalist for
a reexamination and reformulation of its basic disarmament position.
A related development was that in mid-July, President Eisenhower
decided that he would invite Chairman Khrushchev to visit the
United States and that he would agree to return the visit. Khrushchev's trip was scheduled to coincide with the opening of the
fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in September.
Prior to his trip, Khrushchev made two important pronouncements with respect to the test ban negotiations. On August 11 he
stated that the USSR would accept a pledge not to be the first
nation to resume testing nuclear weapons. 49 At about the same time,
4BSee ibid., p. 168.

49New York Times, August 11, 1959, p. 1.
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an article was submitted under his name for publication in Foreign
Affairs. Although it was not published until early September, decision-makers were aware of its contents somewhat earlier. In
the article he stated that the progress in the test ban negotiations
justified "the hope that an agreement on the discontinuation of
nuclear weapon tests will shortly be reached. " 50 He went on to state
that such an agreement "would be an important step on the way
to the solution of the disarmament problem and the banning of
nuclear weapons in general." Among other things, the statement
revealed the verbal constancy of the Soviet objective of eliminating
nuclear weapons.
Thus when the Committee of Principals discussed whether or
not to continue the moratorium there was really little choice. The
United States was not in a position to inaugurate a significant test
series. To end the moratorium might jeopardize the test ban talks
and might also foreclose the possibility of fruitful negotiations on
broader issues. In any case, the United States would be subjected
to criticism on these grounds, and since the General Assembly was
about to open, critics would have ample access to a worldwide
forum. In the light of Chairman Khrushchev's pronouncement about
the Soviet position, the United States could be particularly vulnerable.
The advice of the Committee of Principals and the decision
of the President was first that the United States should ask for a
six-week recess in the Geneva negotiations which would coincide
with Chairman Khrushchev's visit to the United States and the
opening of the General Assembly, and secondly that the United
States should continue its unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons
tests through the current calendar year. The latter aspect of this
decision was made public in a statement released by the Department
of State on August 26, the day the Conference recessed. 51
The United Kingdom took a somewhat different line. On
August 27 the Foreign Office announced that the United Kingdom
would not resume nuclear weapons tests as long as "useful discussions" were under way looking toward an agreement.
50"0n Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1
(October 1959), pp. 1-18, at 10.
51Geneva Conference, p. 375.
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The following day the Soviet Government released its statement on the matter. The statement was in accord with Chairman
Khrushchev's earlier pronouncement. It stated that the Council of
Ministers had resolved:
Not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the
Western Powers do not resume testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Only in the case of resumption by them
of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet Union be free
from this pledge. 52
If all three governments acted according to their pledges, the mora-

torium would continue through 1959, and in view of the Soviet
and British positions, there would be strong pressure to continue it
even longer. At this point, the Soviet Union had in reality what it
had always asked for, an unpoliced test ban.
On the East River and at Camp David
Actually, because of the British election, the Geneva Conference did not resume until October 27. Meanwhile, the question
of a test ban was considered and debated in other forums, both as
a separate issue and in the context of broader measures of disarmament. In particular, the matter was discussed in private meetings
between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev and their
advisers at Camp David and in public on the bank of the East
River in the General Assembly of the United Nations. On the
surface, none of the discussions appeared to advance the negotiations.
Chairman Khrushchev stole the headlines on September 19
when, during the course of his appearance before the United Nations, he offered a proposal for General and Complete Disarmament."53 By the terms of this proposal all states "should divest themselves of the means of waging war" within a period of four years;
they would be permitted to retain only those forces required for internal security. If the Western powers were not prepared to accept
this, Khrushchev offered an alternative proposal for partial measures
52Jbid., p. 377.
53UN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (14th
Session), pp. 31-38. See also UN Document A/4219.
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of disarmament. Interestingly, a test ban was not included in either
suggestion. However, during the course of his address, he stated
that the question of a test ban was "acute and eminently ripe for solution," and asserted that negotiations on broader measures of disarmament should not delay progress on this matter. He also repeated the
pledge that the USSR would not "resume nuclear explosions in its
country if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic
and hydrogen weapons."
Actually, British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had outlined
a comprehensive plan for disarmament the previous day, but because it was phrased in less dramatic terms, it received much less
public attention. 54 His was a gradual scheme, which included a
test ban as an integral first step.
The General Assembly did not begin to consider either proposal in detail or other matters relating to disarmament until
October 9. In the interim, Chairman Khrushchev and President
Eisenhower held their tete a tete at Camp David. The two leaders
discussed the test ban talks fleetingly and Secretary of State Herter
and Foreign Minister Gromyko also considered the matter. 55 Apparently all that happened was that both sides expounded their
positions. In retrospect, however, it appears that the Soviet leadership became convinced of the American determination that the new
seismic data would have to be considered before the United States
would agree to a comprehensive test ban.
Back in the General Assembly both the Soviet and British
disarmament schemes were mooted, and eventually a resolution was
unanimously adopted which referred both, as well as other suggestions, to the new Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee. 56
In addition, the Assembly discussed the questions of banning
nuclear tests and preventing the dispersion of nuclear weapons both
in general terms and specifically with respect to the proposed French
tests in the Sahara. In contrast to the previous session, neither the
USSR nor the United States submitted draft resolutions. The pre54UN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records, (14th
Session), pp. 21-26. See also UN Document A/C. 1/820.
55See Secretary of State Herter's comment at his news conference of
October 6, 1959: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1061
(October 26, 1959), p. 578.
56UN General .Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV).
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vious year each protagonist had submitted draft resolutions with the
obvious motivation of gaining support for their respective positions
and strengthening their hands at the negotiating table. Now, however,
the two superpowers seemed content to leave the matter for private
talks, and it was the smaller powers who were attempting to use
the Assembly. They felt strongly about the general issue and were
particularly concerned about the proposed French nuclear tests.
The strength of their sentiment can be explained in various terms.
For one thing, nuclear weapons were glaring evidence of the disparity between their power and that of the superpowers. Th~s the
issue became mixed with the traditional small state-large state controversy. For another, they regarded testing, with the resultant contamination of the atmosphere all over the world, as a flagrant violation of their moral and legal rights. Their ire at the French plans
stemmed from general concern about the "nth country" problem,
and also from specific concern about the implications of the dispersion of nuclear weapons for their own relative strength and
future plans. In addition, the fact that the French planned to test
nuclear weapons in a colonial territory which was in the midst of an
active revolt joined the issue with anticolonial sentiments and the
anticolonial movement.
In August, India had requested that the issue of the suspension
of nuclear and thermonuclear tests be included in the agenda, and
after the Assembly opened it submitted a draft resolution. Subsequently, twenty-three other states, all of which except Cuba and
Yugoslavia were from Africa and Asia, joined in sponsoring a
version of India's proposal. Austria, Japan, and Sweden also submitted a draft resolution. Both resolutions expressed the hope that
the states participating in the Geneva Conference would soon reach
an agreement and that they would continue the present voluntary
moratorium. 57 In addition, the twenty-four power resolution appealed to other states to desist from testing. In explaining the United
States position, Ambassador Lodge asserted that the American objective was "the ending of nuclear weapons tests under an agreement providing effective international control," and he argued that
57See UN General Assembly Resolutions 1402 A (XIV) and 1402 B
(XIV).
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"an indefinite continuation of a voluntary uncontrolled suspension
of tests would not contribute to that objective." 58
Both resolutions were enthusiastically supported by the Soviet
bloc. The United States and the United Kingdom voted for the
resolution which had been submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden,
which was adopted by a vote of 76 to 0, with 2 abstentions, but
abstained on the twenty-four-power resolution, which was adopted
by a vote of 60 to 1, with 20 abstentions. The representatives of
the United States and the United Kingdom never explained specifically why they took different action in the two instances, but clearly
the position of France and the way that state was affected was a
factor.
France abstained from voting on the three-power resolution
and opposed the twenty-four-power draft. Its opposition was even
more pronounced in the case of those resolutions which dealt with
the dispersion of nuclear weapons. One, submitted by Ireland,
asked the newly created Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to
examine the feasibility of an international agreement including
appropriate inspection and control provisions which would provide
that the nuclear powers would refrain from giving control of nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear powers, and tltat the latter would refrain
from manufacturing nuclear weapons. 59 In other words, what was
envisaged was a freezing of the nuclear club. The resolution probably did not contravene the NATO stockpile concept then in effect.
It was adopted by a vote of 70 to 0, with 12 abstentions. The
Soviet block, Peru, the Republic of China, and France abstained.
Interestingly, all those states which abstained argued, basically, that
the resolution was not sufficiently comprehensive, that this problem could only be h:mdled in the context of other measures of
arms control. The Soviet Union argued that the resolution was
meaningless as long as states could station nuclear weapons outside
of their territory, an obvious reference to United States policy in
NATO and elsewhere. 6 ° France argued that it would only be just to
5BUN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th
Session), p. 178.
59UN General Assembly Resolution 1380 (XIV).
60UN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th
Session), pp. 161-62.
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take action against the dispersion of nuclear weapons in the context
of broader measures leading to nuclear disarmament. 61 Their positions had interesting implications for the Geneva Conference, since
easing the "nth country" problem was one of the putative advantages of the test ban.
The other resolutions considered by the Assembly on the subject of the dispersion of nuclear weapons dealt with France directly. In August, Morocco had asked that the question of the
proposed French tests in the Sahara be inscribed on the agenda,
and the day that the debate on this item opened twenty-two African
and Asian states submitted a draft resolution specifically asking
France to refrain from conducting its planned tests. 62 During the
course of the debate Italy and the United Kingdom submitted a
substitute resolution, which merely would have requested France to
take account of the views expressed in the debate and expressed
the hope that France would associate itself with whatever arrangements were worked out in Geneva for the discontinuance of nuclear
weapons tests. 63 Although the Western powers generally supported
this resolution, the Mrican and Asian group and the Soviet bloc
did not, and it was rejected in the First Committee by a vote of 24
to 38 with 20 abstentions. Both the First Committee and the Assembly adopted a slightly modified version of the twenty-two-power
draft. In the plenary session the vote was 51 to 16 with 15 abstentions. The United Kingdom and the United States both voted
against the resolution, as did France.
During the course of the debate Ambassador Lodge emphasized
that the United States "had no technical information about the
French experiment."64 The French delegate, Jules Mach, stated in
extremely clear terms that France would abandon its planned tests
only if the three original nuclear powers "agreed to halt, under
international control, the production of fissionable materials for
military purposes, to begin the reconversion of their stockpiles and
6lUN General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (14th
Session), pp. 581-82.
6 2 UN Document A/C. 1/L. 238 and Add. 1 and Rev. 1.
63UN Document A/C. 1/L. 239 and Add. 1.
64UN General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (14th
Session), p. 110.
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to do away with nuclear weapons carriers-in short, to give up
their de facto monopoly."6 5
In the same debate, the Soviet delegate asserted that "the
French nuclear test would not contribute to the success of the
Geneva talks. " 66 This statement was made immediately after he had
repeated Khrushchev's pledge that:
Only in the event of the resumption of nuclear weapons
tests by the Western Powers, would the USSR be released
from the obligation which it had taken upon itself.
The point that he did not clarify was whether or not the USSR
would regard nuclear tests by France as the resumption of tests by
the Western Powers. The debate indicated clearly how difficult the
"nth country" problem would be, and the serious implications that
the problem had for the test ban negotiations.
Presidential Politics
At the same time that these events were occurring, the entire
test ban issue was becoming involved in the political maneuverings
associated with the forthcoming Presidential election in the United
States. On October 25, in a radio interview, Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller, a prominent aspirant for the Republican nomination,
stated that he felt that the United States should resume testing
nuclear weapons underground. 67 Five days later, Senator Hubert
H. Humphrey, a Democratic hopeful, in a speech in Pontiac, Michigan, announced his position on the issue. 68 He favored extending
the moratorium for one year. He advocated trying to negotiate a
controlled agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, at high altitudes, and underwater, and tests of weapons
of five kilotons yield or more underground. He also proposed that
a two-year moratorium should be established on tests of weapons
of lesser yields. This period would be used to test Soviet good
faith on inspection and for research to improve detection capabilities relating to low yield underground explosions.
65Jbid., p. 93.
66[ bid., p. 113.

67New York Times, October 26, 1959, p. 1.
68Jbid., October 31, 1959, p. 3.
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III

Technical Working Group II
The Resumption of the Geneva Conference: Another Mission for
the Scientists
The Geneva Conference resumed on October 27. For a week
there was no change in the position of either side. The United
States continued to insist that the new seismic data had to be considered, and the USSR, with equal adamancy, continued to refuse.
Tones were moderate, but that was the only evidence of the spirit
of Camp David. On November 2, Ambassador Wadsworth indicated that, if there were no change in the Soviet position, the
United States would begin a unilateral presentation of the technical
situation, as Americans understood it. 69
Mr. Tsarapkin-at least for the record-interpreted this as a
threat to deadlock and possibly terminate the conference. Nevertheless (or perhaps, as a result), the following day, he proposed that
the conference convene a technical working group to draft agreed
criteria for the dispatch of on-site inspection terms and allowed
that the "new seismic data" could be examined and considered
within this context. 70 In making his proposal he pointed out that
the Foreign Ministers had agreed some time ago that the question
of criteria would have to be considered. He also proclaimed that
the USSR could not agree to any revision of the Geneva Experts'
report, which it viewed as the "agreed scientific and technical basis
for drafting the treaty." 71 Finally, he questioned what the objectives of the Western powers were, if, as they claimed, they did not
seek to increase the number of control posts or inspections.
Although the shift in the Soviet position, publicly announced
as a concession to the spirit of Camp David, meant that the
deadlock was broken, three weeks elapsed before the Conference
could agree on terms of reference for Technical Working Group II
(TWG II). Agreement was finally achieved on November 24, the
day that most of the experts arrived in Geneva, and the day before
they formally began their work. The central controversies 'concerned the status of the report of the Conference of Experts and
69GEN/DNT/PV. 131, passim.
70GEN/DNT/PV. 132, pp. 16-18.
11Jbid., p. 13.
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the freedom to be given the scientists in considering the new seismic
data. Although the compromise formulation did not mention the
new seismic data, the United States felt that it was worded so that
they could be considered. 72
The Technical Working Group of Experts shall consider
the question of the use of objective instrument readings
in connexion with the selection of an event which cannot
be identified by the international control organ and which
could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order
to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections. As
part of their work, the experts, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of
Experts, shall consider all data and studies relevant to
the detection and identification of seismic events and shall
consider possible improvements of the techniques and instrumentation. 73
In addition, at Soviet insistence, the terms of reference included
the requirement that the Group should report to the Conference by
December 11; that is, in about two and a half weeks.
The note of optimism generated by this agreement was furthered by an event which occurred at about the same time outside
of the framework of the Geneva Conference. After many years of
disputation, on December 1, 1959, twelve states including France,
the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, after a brief
negotiation of less than seven weeks, signed the Antarctica Treaty. 74
Among other things, the Treaty provided for the demilitarization
of Antarctica, with full unilateral rights of inspection, and for a
ban on nuclear explosions and the dumping of radioactive wastes
there. During this same period the United States and the USSR
also reached agreement on the composition of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Previously, the
Soviet bloc had boycotted the Committee because of disagreement
on this issue. Observers began to proclaim that perhaps the meeting a deux between Chairman Khrushchev and President Eisen72See GEN/DNT/PV. 137, p. 14.
73GEN/DNT/PV. 137, p. 14.
7 4 For a brief account of the negotiations and the issues involved see
Howard J. Taubenfeld, "A Treaty for Antarctica," International Conciliation, Vol. 531 (January 1961), pp. 245-322.
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bower had significantly altered the climate and atmosphere of international politics.
TWG II: Differences of Motivation and Expectation
Even within the Geneva negotiations significant progress was
made. On November 30 the three powers reached agreement on
Annex III to the draft treaty, setting forth the functions of the
Preparatory Commission, and on December 14 the Soviet Union
tabled a major compromise package proposal concerning a number
of unresolved issues relating to the Control Organization.
Whether or not the Western participants in Technical Working Group II were optimistic concerning their tasks, though, was
another matter. In fact, it is far from certain that they, or the
Western politicians and diplomats to whom they were responsible,
had a very clear concept of what the optimum or even expected
outcome of this meeting would be. No one seriously expected the
Soviet Union to accept the new Western assessment of the capabilities of the control system proposed by the Conference of Experts. Yet the basic instruction given to the American delegation,
which was headed by James B. Fisk and included a number of
other scientists who had previously been involved in one way or
another in the negotiations, 75 was to attempt to straighten out the
technical situation.
In a press conference on November 12, Secretary of State
Herter said that the United States sought the meeting "so that from
the scientific point of view we would have a common understanding
75 The United States delegation consisted of: James B. Fisk, chairman,
Executive Vice President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Hans A. Bethe, Professor, Cornell University; Harold Brown, Associate Director, Livermore
Laboratory; Richard Foose, Stanford Research Institute; Richard L. Garwin,
International Business Machines Corporation; Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., Technical Assistant, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology; Albert Latter, Physics Division, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California; J. Carson Mark, Director, Theoretical Division, Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory; Jack E. Oliver, Lamont Geological Observatory; Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director, High Energy Physics Laboratory,
Stanford University; Frank Press, Director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology; Carl F. Romney, Assistant Technical Director,
Office of Atomic Energy, Department of Defense; John Tukey, Princeton
University; Anthony L. Turkevich, Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear
Studies, University of Chicago.
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as to what existing instruments were capable of doing from the
point of view of detecting. " 76 Twelve days later, in another press
conference, he described the purpose of the technical working group
as being to examine all available data and "to determine whether
or not existing technological instrumentation is adequate to detect
all types of underground tests or only some underground tests,
and what kind, and what improvements are likely to be made in
the instrumentation itself." 77 He allowed that the scientists might
not agree and even envisaged the possibility of separate reports.
Secretary Herter then went on to say that it would be difficult for
the United States to agree to a comprehensive test ban "if our
scientists, in their objective judgment, felt that the instrumentation
that might be available was not good enough to be an effective deterrent from the point of view of inspection." 78 His comments
indicate the range of expectations which was possible for one
individual. Given the different perspectives of other individuals,
one can easily see the melange of views which was involved in
any discussion of this issue by the Committee of Principals.
In a sense, the American insistence on holding Technical
Working Group II was a product of the divergence of opinion
within the United States government and of the inability of the
government to reach a decision on the basic political issues of what
risks it would be willing to accept. Those who questioned the wisdom of attempting to negotiate a comprehensive test ban could see
the working group as an opportunity to embarrass the Soviet
Union; the disagreement which they expected to result would serve
as a justification for shifting to an attempt to negotiate a partial
test ban or even as a rationale for breaking off the negotiations.
On the other hand, the proponents of a comprehensive test ban
could see the technical working group as a device for keeping the
negotiations going and could hope that some solutions to the technical problems would emerge, either from the meeting with the
Eastern scientists or from time and research. Somewhat later, in
describing his expectations before the Subcommittee on Disarmament, Philip J. Farley of the Department of State said: "It was,
76U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1066 (November
30, 1959), p. 785.
77Jbid., Vol. XLI, No. 1068 (December 14, 1959), p. 863.
78Jbid., p. 865.
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of course, our hope that the facts would be looked at there, that
answers would be found that would provide a technical basis for
concluding a comprehensive agreement." 79 For both groups and for
those who were not strongly identified with either, the technical
working group could serve as an excuse for avoiding decisions on
the basic issue concerning the degree of risk that the United States
could tolerate.
The Soviet Union viewed its agreement to hold Technical Working Group II as a fundamental concession to the West. Thus the
Soviet scientists, who were again headed by Dr. Fedorov, 80 apparently had no firm instructions in a positive sense as to what
should emerge from the discussions. They did, however, as will
become apparent, have firm instructions as to what should not
emerge. In essence, they could not agree to any joint report which
would make the problem of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions appear to be more difficult than it had seemed at the time
of the Conference of Experts in 1958.
As in the case of the previous technical negotiations, there
was no special preparation for the American delegation. The Chairman was briefed by the Secretary of State, but the other scientists
went directly to Geneva. Their technical preparation consisted of
the knowledge which they had as a result of their individual work
and their past experience in matters relating to the negotiations.
The Vela Project was just getting underway, and so far as the data
gained from Hardtack II was concerned, there had been little
further analysis of it during 1959, after the preparation of the
document which the United States submitted to the Conference on
January 5. 81
Again, following the pattern of other sessions, Technical Working Group II opened with a disagreement about the agenda. The
70 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban
Negotiations, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960), p. 19.
BOThe other Soviet scientists were K. Y. Gubkin, V. I. Keilis-Borok,
D. R. Pashchnik, Y. V. Riznichenko, M. A. Sadovsky, V. Shustov, and A. I.
Ustyumenko.
StSee the testimony of Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear
Weapons Test Ban, supra note 26, p. 69.
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controversy really derived from the ambiguity of the terms of
reference. The central issue, although it was not stated this baldly
at that time, was whether or not TWG II should reevaluate the
capability of the control system recommended by the Conference
of Experts. In the Western view this was the essential function of
the discussions. On the other hand, this was one of the things to
which the Soviet scientists could not agree. Although a compromise
formulation for the agenda was achieved in an informal meeting,
it essentially glossed over the problem, and this fundamental disagreement continued to plague the discussions. 82
Where Science Ends and Politics Begin
Although the basic reason for the Soviet refusal to agree to a
reevaluation of the Experts' control system was to avoid undercutting the USSR's negotiating posture, the Soviet scientists adduced
technical and philosophical reasons to support their position. Dr.
Fedorov argued that even with the data gained from the Hardtack
II experiments, because the data were still extremely limited, any
estimate of the capability of the control system would be, as it had
been in 1958, conjectural in nature; th:Jt the capability could only
be properly assessed when the control system was in operation. 83
He also, as will be shown, attacked the validity of the new data.
The Western position, on the other hand, was that the assessment
had to be as up-to-date as possible. This position was advanced as
having no political motivation; as being simply a demand that the
Working Group should provide the gowrnments concerned with, as
Dr. Fisk put it, "a sound basis for taking the decision which they
must take." 84 In the discussions, Dr. Fisk repeatedly asserted, at
times almost plaintively:
S2See the agenda GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 2, p. 3. For the different
way in which this agenda was interpreted by the two sides see: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, p. 37; GEN/DNT/PV. 11, p, 77; GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp.
58-60; GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 16, pp. 93-95. Panofsky commented on
this problem in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, supra
note 26, p. 64.
S3He made this point in several of the exchanges cited above. See also
GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 10, p. 42, and GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 18, p. 31.
84GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 13, pp. 58-60.
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I assure Mr. Fedorov once again that our sole purpose in
these meetings is to set the scientific and technical facts
straight. . . . Our motives are purely technical, and the
spirit of our proposals is scientific. 85
But regardless of how the Western scientists perceived their motivations, their position had fundamental political ramifications. This
was particularly true in that the majority among them at that time
thought that the decoupling theory involved a much more serious
degradation of the control system recommended by the Conference
of Experts than the new seismic data and a degradation for which
they could see no effective remedy. The implications of this were
ominous when coupled with such statements as that made by Secretary of State Herter at his press conference the day before the
Working Group began its sessions. Both in the discussions in the
Working Group and in the Conference, Soviet delegates alleged
that the West was motivated by a desire to prove that a comprehensive test ban could not be adequately monitored. 86 The fact
that after the discussions were over the United States sent the
USSR part of the terms of reference of the American delegation to
TWG II may or may not have convinced Soviet leaders that this
was not the American goal.
From their actions, it is easy to infer that the Soviet delegation had political instructions and guidance. They apparently could
not agree to: anything that would indicate that the control system
recommended by the Conference of Experts was less effective than
the original estimate; anything that would imply that control over a
comprehensive test ban would be impossible; or anything that
would imply that there should be a greater number of control posts
or on-site inspections in the USSR than originally had been thought
necessary.
While the United States scientists did not have political instructions in the same sense, there were clearly political limits on
their actions, although these may well have been self-imposed. 87
85GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, pp. 36, 37-40.
86See for example, Fedorov's statement in the Working Group and
Tsarapkin's statement later in the Conference: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV.
19, p. 92, and GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 7.
87Gilpin puts it even more bluntly, "Uttle did the American scientists
realize, however, that the Russian scientists were actually no more political
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The American scientists were clearly aware of how important the
concept and issue of control over arms control agreements were to
the United States. As a group, they were also much more aware
of the legal and political ramifications of any document that might
emerge from their discussions than the American delegation to the
Conference of Experts had been. The American scientists also now
had a conception of Soviet behavior which led them to believe that
in formulating any joint document everything should be developed
in as much detail as possible. They felt that if it were not, there
would be disputes subsequently and, moreover, once an agreement
was signed, nothing new could be added. As a consequence of
these factors, in evaluating and analyzing data, the American scientists felt that they had to be, as Dr. Fisk told the Conference,
"as careful and as conservative as we could. " 88
At times, as a result of these factors the American posture
became almost grotesque. For example, in a discussion of instrumentation Hans Bethe made this statement:
We believe that the experts in 1958 knew quite well about
instruments, but we believe that we now know even better about them. We do not believe that the experts of the
control commission will know any better than we know. 89
To argue in abutting sentences that knowledge had changed, but
would not change again, posed certain logical complications, at the
least.
On the other hand, because of the political position of their
state, the Soviet scientists had to be as optimistic as they could.
Dr. Fedorov typified their attitude at one of the final meetings,
during a discussion of formulating criteria for the initiation of onsite inspections, when he asked, "What kind of scientists are we if
we cannot find a solution for such a problem?" 90
There was also another difference between the nature of the
than they." (American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 243). Although this may be true in terms of the end effect of the action of each
group, there were important differences in method and style, which should
not be ignored.
SSGEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 20, p. 4.
89QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, p. 16.
90QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 19, p. 91.
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participation of the American and Soviet scientists in the Technical Working Group. The United States delegation presented by far
the bulk of the empirical data which was considered. The Soviet
contribution was principally in the nature of critical analysis. 91
There is no way of knowing how open either side was in terms of
presenting data, or whether or not all of the available data were
put before the Group. During the course of the discussions the
United States did submit a vast quantity of data, and the USSR
did make available seismograms with signals recorded during the
Hardtack series. Dr. Fedorov stated that the USSR had not carried
out any underground nuclear explosions and thus could not supply
data beyond that which it had gathered on American tests. 92
In terms of formal participation, the British scientists, who
were again headed by Sir William Penney, 93 played only a nominal
role. Because of their limited experience, they could not add much
empirical data. At that time the United Kingdom had not detonated
a nuclear device underground. On the few occasions on which he
spoke, Sir William Penney emphasized the importance of a test ban
and, consequently, of attempting to reach agreement within the
Working Group. This reflected both his personal preferences and
the official attitude of the United Kingdom.
On the Hardtack II Data: An Uncomfortable Uncertainty
Carl Romney, a seismologist with the United States Air Force,
made the first technical presentation in Working Group 11. 94 In it,
he expounded the American analysis of the Hardtack II data. Although he presented more technical details, his basic conclusions
were identical with those contained in the January 5 Working
Paper; that is, that the magnitude of Rainier had been estimated incorrectly and consequently that there were many more earthquakes
of equivalent size, and that first motion was more difficult to detect
than it had previously been thought. The decoupling theory was
91 See Panofsky's comment, Hearing: Technical Problems and the
Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 35-36.
92GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 3, pp. 103-5.
93The other British delegates were H. R. Hulme, I. Maddock, F. Panton,
and J. W. Wright.
94GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 1., pp. 22-56.
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not presented until a week later, at the seventh meeting of the
Working Group. 95
The immediate Soviet response to both presentations was of
a legalistic character. With respect to the Hardtack II data, the
Soviet scientists argued that since the instrumentation used was not
identical with that which had been recommended in the report of
the Conference of Experts, no implications could be drawn for the
recommended control system. With respect to the decoupling theory,
Dr. Fedorov questioned whether it could be considered under any
item of the agenda. 96 After Hans Bethe and Albert Latter had
presented the theory, he caustically commented that:
... the contribution to our work which Dr. Latter tried
to make in his report is quite similar to the contribution
that he made previously to this problem; I mean the book
that he published on the subject along with Dr. Teller. 97
Later in the conference, he would mention the book, Our Nuclear
Future, in even more bitter terms.
When the Soviet scientists began to comment on the substance
of the issues, they did so by way of the presentation of formal
papers which countered and contradicted the American findings.
The American scientists professed to be puzzled and upset by the
disagreement. At the tenth meeting Wolfgang Panofsky commented:
It just should not occur that objective examination and a
full exchange of seismic data should lead our Soviet colleagues to one conclusion while the conclusions of our
own seismologists are different. 98

At the following meeting Frank Press repeated the same sentiment
and then offered the explanation and recommended solution which
most of the American scientists seemed to favor:
As scientists we know that given the same basic data we
should be able to arrive at similar conclusions, and yet
911GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 7, pp. 58-110.
96[bid., pp. 55-56.
97[bid., p. 111.

98QEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 10, p. 4.
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we have not been able to. This can only be because the
communication and interchange between us has been imperfect. The only way to make progress, to resolve these
differences, is to improve the communication, to study the
data jointly step by step. 99
The solution, the American scientists thought, would be small informal meetings, and they began arguing for such meetings at an
early stage in the conference. The Soviet scientists, however, did
not agree to this procedure until the final week of the meetings.
Even after the informal sessions, several fundamental disagreements remained, although some differences were eliminated and
others narrowed. With respect to the Hardtack II data, the Soviet
scientists tended to concentrate their attention and criticisms on
the problem of measuring seismic magnitude. They made a number
of what can be termed procedural criticisms. They were critical of
the fact that less than thirty of the seismological stations in the
United States which had recorded Logan and Blanca had had
seismographs which were sufficiently calibrated so that magnitude
could be measured. They also criticized the fact that the American
scientists gave them one relevant seismogram for study as late as
December 14, during the sixteenth meeting of the Working Group.
Their more fundamental substantive criticisms centered on the
statistical methods used in the computation of seismic magnitudes
and on the use of magnitude scales. To deal with the issue of
statistical methods first, the relevant empirical data were widely
scattered. The question was whether in the computation of averages all of the figures should be used, as the Americans insisted,
or whether the extremes and certain other figures should be excluded as the Russians argued. The second issue involved the
question of how to relate two different scales of measurement.
Some American scientists felt that what their Soviet counterparts
did in this matter was unscientific and dishonest. 1 oo
There is evidence, however, that a number of American scientists felt rather uncomfortable with respect to the whole problem
of measuring the seismic magnitude of nuclear explosions because
99GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 11, pp. 87-90.
lOOSee Romney's comment before the Disarmament Subcommittee,
Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra
note 79, p. 38.
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of the great uncertainties involved. Wolfgang Panofsky put it succinctly in testimony in April 1960 before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy when he stated that:
. . . the matter is greatly beclouded by the inaccuracy of
our seismic information concerning earthwide occurrence
of small earthquakes. Specifically, a body of information
on the frequency of occurrence of small earthquakes
exists only for California and New Zealand, and going
from this information to worldwide estimates, and particularly to estimates for the Soviet Union, involves many uncertainties; these uncertainties are in fact considerably
larger than change in the situation created by the new
data of the Hardtack series. This issue is, therefore, not an
important new consideration, and it now appears that
probably its importance has been overemphasized in the
United States. 101
Because of these facts, many of the American scientists participating in TWG II concluded that the question of the number of onsite inspections required was essentially a political issue, as the ·
USSR maintained. During the meetings of the Working Group,
on several occasions Dr. Fisk sought to emphasize that the American delegation did not consider this aspect of the Hardtack II
data the most important element.
Nevertheless, the differences between the Soviet scientists and
the American scientists with respect to the problem of measuring
seismic magnitude led the former to interpret the Hardtack II
data as indicating that there would be fewer earthquakes which
would give signals equivalent to any given size nuclear explosion
rather than more, as the Americans felt would be the case. 102
Rather than their revised estimate of the seismic magnitude
of the Rainier shot, the American scientists tended to stress instead
the fact that the Hardtack II data indicated that because of background noise it would be much more difficult than had been thought
to detect the sign of first motion. They now estimated that the
ratio of signal to noise would have to be greater than had previously been thought for the compressional first motion to be
101Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,
supra note 26, p. 65.
102See Geneva Conference, pp. 392-93.
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detected, that is, for it not to appear as a rarefaction. In other
words, first motion would only be useful for detecting substantially
higher yields than had been estimated at the Conference of Experts. Here, the principal Soviet criticism was that the instrumentation used in the Hardtack II test series was not identical with that
recommended by the Conference of Experts. The Americans countered by arguing that, although the Soviet charge was true, valid
extrapolations could be made.
In the course of the argument, in the second week of the
meeting it was discovered that the Russian and English versions
of the report of the Conference of Experts were different, and that
the differences would allow different interpretations of what instrumental characteristics with respect to magnification and response
the Experts had recommended. 103 The differing interpretations led
the scientists from the two sides to feel that the Conference of
.Experts had recommended instruments which would conform to
those that they had used in their national stations. This episode
underscores the importance of proper translation in negotiations.
The American scientists were nonetheless convinced that their
interpretation was the correct one; that instruments constructed on
the basis of their interpretation would be the most efficacious in
detecting first motion; and that the instruments used during the
Hardtack II test series fell within the category recommended by
the Experts. To prove their point, as soon as the difference was
discovered they designed a seismograph based on the Soviet interpretation of the specifications and had it built. On December 9
it was installed on a pier at a location in Oklahoma alongside an
instrument similar to those used in the Hardtack II series. In the
first eight hours of operation there was a small earthquake, and a
comparison of the signals received on the two instruments clearly
indicated that the instrument based on the Soviet interpretation was
considerably less effective in detecting the sign of the first motion. 104
Despite this evidence, however, the Soviet scientists continued to
103See Panofsky's comment before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects . .. of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, supra
note 26, pp. 67-68. The only American scientist fluent in Russian at the
Conference of Experts, Turkevich, left the meeting before the final texts of
the report were prepared.
104See Romney's presentation, GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 17, pp. 91-96.
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maintain that because the instruments used in the Hardtack II
series did not conform exactly to those recommended by the Conference of Experts, the data recorded by them were not relevant. 105
On Decoupling: "Deeply Embarrassed"
Hans Bethe and Albert Latter presented the decoupling theory
during the second week of the meeting. Later, Professor Bethe
referred to the task as a "doubtful honor" and said that he felt
"deeply embarrassed in so doing because it implied that we considered the Russians capable of cheating on such a massive
scale." 106 His views of the Russian character provide an interesting
contrast with those expressed by Edward Teller and Albert Latter
in their book. For a variety of reasons, Professor Bethe was a
logical person to be involved in the task. He had presented the
relevant material at the Conference of Experts, and in the course
of the discussion he had to admit that his original calculations were
"not correct." 107 It was also tactically expedient to have him share
in the presentation, since he, in contrast to Albert Latter, was
known as a proponent of a test ban.
Most American scientists who participated in the Working
Group agreed with Professor Bethe's comment that "the Russians
seemed stunned by the theory of the big hole."tos At first they
attempted to develop counter theoretical arguments, but after various
formal confrontations and informal meetings, they admitted the
theoretical validity of Albert Latter's calculations concerning decoupling. They maintained, however, that there was no proof that
the theory would work in practice, and, of course, at that time
there was very little empirical proof. The British, who had been
informed of the theory of decoupling in the summer, had conducted a limited series of experiments involving detonating small
charges of TNT in cavities, and they presented the results of these
experiments, which tended to confirm the theory, to the Working
Group. 109 The first explosion in Project Cowboy was detonated on
105See Geneva Conference, pp. 393-94.
106"The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests," Headline Series, No. 145
(January-February 1961), p. 17.
107GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, p. 47.
I08"The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests," supra note 106, p. 17.
109GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 11, pp. 32-37.
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December 17, 1959, the day before the Working Group recessed,
and the project was not discussed during the session.
The question of the feasibility of constructing cavities of sufficient size to allow the decoupled detonation of fairly large sized
weapons was not discussed either, although the United States was
prepared to go into this matter in some detail. In the fall of 1959
the Atomic Energy Commission had become concerned with this
issue and had discovered that petroleum companies used large
underground cavities for storing their materials. In October the
Philips Petroleum Company had been commissioned to undertake
certain feasibility studies, and the individual responsible for this
work was brought to Geneva for the week of December 7. His
work, however, was confined to assisting Albert Latter and others.

On the On-Site Inspection: a Quoi Bon?
During the course of 1959 another element of doubt, in addition to the implications of the Hardtack II data and the decoupling
theory, had arisen in the American scientific community. Starting
in April 1958 scientists at the University of California Radiation
Laboratory at Livermore had become concerned about the matter
of on-site inspection, and after preliminary discussions with geologists and geophysicists, and exploratory studies, the Laboratory let
a contract to the Stanford Research Institute for the conduct of
studies of the problem of on-site inspection during the Hardtack II
test series. These studies indicated that the problem of conducting
an on-site inspection would be quite difficult, and that the chance
of actually obtaining radioactive debris and thus identifying a
clandestine underground explosion would be relatively small. The
American delegation was given freedom to introduce or to withhold
this issue. Eventually, the delegation decided to introduce the issue,
but not to stress it, and perhaps thereby detract from what they
considered the more important degradations of the control system
caused by the Hardtack II data and the decoupling theory. 11 o Dr.
Fisk mentioned the problem in the plenary session, 111 the reports
11 0Earl H. Voss has interpreted this, we think wrongly, as a deliberate
attempt to gloss over the difficult problem of on-site inspection (Nuclear
Ambush, p. 347). In his book he virtually accuses American scientists of
attempting to mislead the American public on the issue of on-site inspections.
lllGEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, pp. 76-77.
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on the work were introduced as an annex to the records of the
conference, 112 and the project director from the Stanford Research
Institute communicated his findings to Dr. Fedorov in a private
meeting. The only Soviet response was a brief denial of the American analysis and interpretation. 113 The issue was not mentioned in
any of the formal reports of Technical Working Group II.
On Improving the Control System: What Conclusions from Scientific
Data?
Along with their presentation of the Hardtack II data, the decoupling theory and the information relating to on-site inspection,
the American scientists also presented their thoughts concerning
possible improvements in the control system recommended by the
Conference of Experts. They concerned both instrumental matters
and improved diagnostic techniques. Interestingly, one of the more
significant of these improvements was discovered by Albert Latter
during the meetings of the Technical Working Group and was immediately presented at the next-to-the-last meeting. 114 On these
matters, there was considerable agreement between the Soviet and
Western scientists.
What disagreement there was, concerned what practical conclusions to draw from the technical facts. This was illustrated by
the attempts of Dr. Fedorov at the conclusion of each American
presentation to elicit a formal proposal or recommendation for the
use of new instruments or techniques. The American response was
invariably that the state of knowledge was not sufficient to allow
definite formulations, but that the presentations indicated lines of
further inquiry. After one such exchange, Dr. Fedorov exclaimed,
". . . this is not a congress of seismologists. . . . What we are
interested in here . . . is how this scientific contribution can be
used in practice to improve the control system. . . ." 115 The American scientists, however, were determined not to become involved
in the elaboration of any forma] texts which their scientific data
and understandings could not fully support.
112GEN/DNT/TWG.
113GEN/DNT/TWG.
114GEN/DNT/TWG.
115GEN/DNT/TWG.

2/PV.
2/PV.
2/PV.
2/PV.

9/ Add. 1.
11, pp. 51-61.
20, pp. 31-36.
4, p. 82.
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Despite this disagreement, the Technical Working Group was
able to produce an agreed report regarding possible improvements
of techniques and instrumentation. 116 In keeping with their general
positions, in the preparation of this report the American scientists
sought to be much more specific than the Soviet scientists.
On Criteria for On-Site Inspection: Can One Agree Without
Agreement on Data?
The .final substantive item on the agenda of Technical Working Group II was the formulation of objective criteria which could
serve as a basis for the initiation of on-site inspections. From the
outset, the American position was that there was no point in attempting to discuss this matter until there was agreement on the
technical data; for example, on the effectiveness of first motion as
a diagnostic technique. As it developed, the discussion of criteria
began without agreement on the technical data. Indeed, there was
no agreement on the data at the time that the conference adjourned:
The Soviet scientists led off at the eighth meeting on December
3 by tabling a draft proposal relating to criteria. 117 The Americans
objected to this proposal, first because they felt that it contained a
number of judgments which were concerned with matters beyond the
purview of the technical working group. 118 For example, it assumed that there would be a quota of on-site inspections and that
data from national seismic stations would play an important role.
Moreover, it also contained stipulations on the circumstances under
which on-site inspections should be discontinued. Among other
things, the Soviet draft provided that if the epicenter of an unidentified event were located in a densely populated area, or if its
depth of focus were beyond technological possibilities, it would
be considered to be an earthquake. The American scientists felt
that both of these involved political, rather than technical, considerations. However, the more important American objections to
the Soviet criteria were of a technical nature. The American scientists felt that the Soviet criteria would have resulted in clandestine nuclear explosions being categorized as earthquakes: in par116Geneva Conference, pp. 386-88.
117GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 8, pp. 87-92.
llBSee Fisk's comments: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 13, p. 22.
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ticular, they argued that the Blanca and Logan experiments would
have been so classified. 119
The American proposal on criteria was introduced on December 11. 120 Soviet objections to this proposal were equally as strong
as the American objections to the Soviet draft. Dr. Fedorov commented that the criteria proposed by the United States scientists
turned the principle of selection "topsy turvy," the result would be
"that from the total number of recorded events the greater part
of them will remain open to suspicion [and thus eligible for onsite inspection] and the smaller part would be free from suspicion. " 121 He asserted that this was contrary to the conclusions of
the Conference of Experts. The Americans agreed with his conclusions, but argued that with the present state of knowledge, they
could not go farther. In the context of this debate, Dr. Fedorov
remarked that science had solved more complicated problems and
ought to be able to solve this one. He went on to assert that
". . . the purpose we have as scientists is to try to help our political
officers to identify suspicious events." 122 Dr. Fisk rejoined, " ... science is not the servant of political expediency. " 123
The American draft did list various types of auxiliary information, which it was stated might develop into criteria "to establish
an event as natural in origin" at some later time after further research. Wolfgang Panofsky again summed up this problem a few
months later in his testimony before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy:
The principal problem is that these methods are potentially useful, but within the present state of knowledge
there is no way of evaluating quantitatively how useful
they could be nor is it possible to write specific recommendations under which they could be used by unskilled
operators. In the hands of skilled seismologists, even at
119See Fisk's comments: GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, pp. 57-66; and
Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra
note 79, p. 7. See also Panofsky's comments before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy: Hearings: Technical Aspects ... of a Nuclear Weapons Test
Ban, supra note 26, p. 72.
120GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 14, pp. 3-21.
121GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 15, pp. 27-30.
122GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 19, p. 76.
123[bid., p. 81.
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the present the use of some of these methods might very
well improve the judgment which can be exercised in
distinguishing earthquakes from explosions. 124
As his comments indicate, in addition to being worried about the
state of knowledge and the legal and political status of their report, the American scientists were concerned about the technical
competence of the personnel that would staff the control posts,
and they tended to assume, probably rightly, a relatively low level
of competence. 125
Although both sides made some compromises, the differences
in approach proved irreconcilable, and Technical Working Group
II failed to agree on criteria for initiating on-site inspections. Interestingly, the Soviet scientists did not include their proposed
criteria in their report to the Conference. Whether or not the Soviet
criteria were intended as a serious proposal or as a bargaining
position was moot. The Soviet proposal was logically defensible
only in the light of the Soviet criticisms of the measurements of
the Hardtack II series, and especially the criticism of the instruments which had been used.
Although submission of an agreed report to the Geneva Conference seemed to be out of the question in view of the basic
divisions between the Eastern and Western scientists, all three
groups of scientists, for their own reasons, strongly wanted an
agreed report, and an attempt was made. Dr. Fisk even suggested
the possibility of reconvening the Working Group in January 1960
after a Christmas recess, 126 but in the last analysis the scientists
recognized that their differences could not be resolved by further
meetings.
The attempt to write an agreed report was complicated by the
fact that the scientists knew that the report of Technical Working
Group I had been given immediate public release and they were
concerned about the effect of any report on public opinion. In
124Hearings: Technical Aspects . . . of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban,
supra note 26, p. 70.
12 5See also Panofsky's comments before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test
Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 9-10.
126GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 20, p. 62.
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addition, neither side wanted to have a report prejudge issues which
were still in contention in the Conference. The American objections
to the Soviet proposals on criteria have already been mentioned.
Similarly, the Soviet scientists objected to American proposals relating to experimental explosions designed to yield data that would
be helpful in improving the control system. 127
In the end, the many divisions proved insurmountable. The
scientists could agree only on a brief procedural report to which
four annexes were attached. 128 The first of these contained the agreed
recommendations on improvements, and the remaining three, the
separate views of the three delegations. The British report basically
agreed with the American conclusions, except in the matter of
magnitude and the number of equivalent earthquakes.
IV

Deadlock
Scientists Disagree: Back to the Diplomats
Technical Working Group II recessed after twenty-one meetings
at 9:20 p.m. on Friday, December 18. The following afternoon
the report and the annexes were presented to the diplomatic
Conference. 129 The meeting was acrimonious. Dr. Fedorov's statement, which Dr. Fisk subsequently labeled "incorrect, distorted,
and misleading," 130 attacked the scientific integrity of the American delegation, among other things. The American scientists were
deeply distressed by this, 131 and by the general denouement. In
addition to the substantive issues at stake, many of them felt that
in the process of the discussion personal relationships with Soviet
scientists, carefully built up over a number of years, had been
jeopardized.
The outcome of Technical Working Group II meant that the
search for agreement between East and West on a technical level
had failed. The closing speeches of the diplomatic representatives
127GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 21, p. 6.
128See Geneva Conference, pp. 384-413.
129GEN/ DNT /PV. 150.
130Jbid., p. 16.
131See the comments by Panofsky and Fisk, Hearing: Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, supra note 79, pp. 13, 35.
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in the Conference, indicated that each side saw the other's action as
precluding agreement and revealed the prevailing mutual suspicions
concerning motivations. Mr. Tsarapkin went so far as to charge
that there were forces trying to prevent the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. The West clearly felt that the USSR was
evading the issue of control.
Perhaps the British delegate, Sir Michael Wright, sounded the
most optimistic note. He argued that the principal difficulties were
caused "by the comparative scarcity of firm experimental data
and by the lack of time thus far for research directed to our special problems. " 132 He expressed the opinion that a solution might
well be found through research, "jointly undertaken." For the
moment, however, the negotiations had reached an impasse.

132Jbid., p. 22.

Chapter VII

The Search for Political Compromise

I

Revamping the Western Position
The failure of Technical Working Group II to achieve agreement
marked the conclusion of one phase in the Geneva Conference.
The attempt to restore the agreed basis for the negotiations through
the mechanism of technical talks had failed. If the negotiations
were to be advanced, new mechanisms would have to be tried.
Thus the failure of TWG II touched off an effort to by-pass the
technical disagreement, which continued until the Geneva Conference adjourned sine die on January 29, 1962.
Although this effort was principally diplomatic in nature and
was pursued mainly on a diplomatic level, it continued to have a
large technical component. This was inevitable since the dispute
concerned technical issues, but it was also a product of the Western
attraction for the concept that political agreements could be achieved
through efforts at the technical level. Rather than technical talks,
hopes came to be pinned on technical research, conducted by the
individual governments themselves and perhaps jointly. Research
might yield ways of satisfying both the Soviet demand for a comprehensive treaty and the Western demand for "adequate control."
Moreover, research was a neutral device. One could be for research,
just as one could be for technical talks, regardless of one's position
on the wisdom of a test ban treaty. By stressing research one could
avoid political disputes and decisions. Signs of this developing
attitude were already evident in the speeches of the Western delegates-especially Sir Michael Wright's-at the session of the Geneva
Conference when Technical Working Group II reported. However,
research would take time. Meanwhile, compromises would be necessary on the political level.
231
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The Decision to Continue the Moratorium
The first decision that the United States had to take related to
the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. As will be recalled, in
August the United States had announced that it would continue the
voluntary suspension until December 31, 1959. The British had
taken a different position; they had declared that they would continue the moratorium as long as the negotiations continued; therefore this issue did not arise for them.
In late December, President Eisenhower summoned a group of
advisers to Augusta, Georgia, to discuss what action the United
States should take. The failure of TWG II had strengthened the
convictions and the case of those who questioned the wisdom of
continuing the moratorium. They were now even more convinced
that it would be difficult to detect and identify clandestine explosions of small nuclear weapons. The experience of TWG II had also
served to underscore the reservations which many had about Soviet
intentions. No one, however, went farther than to argue for a
resumption of testing underground and possibly in outer space.
That no one urged resuming atmospheric testing reflected both the
extent to which public opinion, or fear of an adverse public reaction,
could inhibit United States policy, and the conscience of American
policy-makers.
On the other side, it was argued that broad East-West relationships were moving gradually toward a detente. General disarmament talks were to be resumed again for the first time since
1957 when the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee would meet
in Geneva in March 1960. Even though the Coolidge Committee
had been unable to formulate a new American negotiating position,
the United States looked forward to these talks. There were prospects for a summit meeting later in the spring or early summer, and
it seemed likely that President Eisenhower would make a trip to the
USSR sometime thereafter. Moreover, more progress had been made
in the Geneva Conference than in any other arms control negotiation
since the Second World War. By this time the three states had
agreed to a preamble, seventeen articles, and an annex to a treaty,
an unprecedented achievement.
To compound the matter, it was not at all clear what the effects
of any given American policy would be on the Soviet Union; for
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example, whether continuing the moratorium would make the USSR
more or less willing to negotiate.
The result was a compromise embodied in a declaration and
inaction with regard to the substantive issues at stake. On December
29, 1959, President Eisenhower issued the following statement:
Although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons testing, we shall not resume nuclear
weapons tests without announcing our intention in advance
of any resumption. During the period of voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons tests the United States will
continue its active program of weapon research, development, and laboratory-type experimentation. 1
He prefaced this statement by saying that the prospects for a test
ban agreement had been injured by "the recent unwillingness of
the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection
of underground nuclear explosions," and he characterized the Soviet
annex to the Technical Working Group II report as "intemperate
and technically unsupportable." On the other hand, no decision was
made to ready test sites, nor were budgetary allocations for such
activities increased. Administration officials explained the President's
statement to the press as a "bargaining maneuver." 2
In his account of the negotiations, Sir Michael Wright has
argued that by choosing the course that it did, the "Eisenhower
Administration got the worst of both worlds." 3 He maintains that
while the United States did not in fact resume testing, "the statement
enabled the Russians to claim that the West had been the first to
speak of resuming."
It is difficult to know how the Soviet Union interpreted the
American decision. Although the Eisenhower statement was
criticized in the Soviet press and in statements by Soviet officials,
the criticism was relatively restrained, and on January 3, 1960,
Chairman Khrushchev reiterated his pledge that the USSR would
not resume testing nuclear weapons unless the West did. He repeated this pledge eleven days later in a speech before the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, and in so doing pointed out that any state
lGeneva Conference, p. 413.
2New York Times, December 30, 1959, p. 1.
3Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, p. 126.
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that resumed testing nuclear weapons would find it difficult to
reconcile its decision with the decisions of the United Nations. 4 In
the same speech he acknowledged that it might be possible to
camouflage some underground nuclear explosions and that others
would be difficult to detect. Regardless of these difficulties though,
he argued that if an agreement were signed, it would be fulfilled:
"Should any side violate the obligations to which it has committed
itself, the instigators of such violations will cover themselves with
shame, and they will be condemned by people of the world."
Curiously, a few days earlier, on December 30, 1959, Pravda
charged that the United States had already violated the moratorium
by setting off underground atomic explosions.
Chairman Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech also contained
other elements of some significance for the test ban negotiations.
Most notably, he gave figures on Soviet troop strength over the
years, and proposed that the current total of 3,623,000 be reduced
by a third. The Supreme Soviet promptly enacted legislation to
implement this suggestion. In the West this move was alternatively
interpreted as indicating either a desire for detente, or the modernization of the Soviet armed forces. To a certain extent, probably
both interpretations had elements of validity. In any case, the move
would mean that as their conventional capacity lessened, Soviet
forces would become increasingly reliant on nuclear weapons. In
a certain sense, Khrushchev's speech paralleled Dulles' massive retaliation pronouncement six years earlier. Indeed, Khrushchev spoke
of the Soviet Union having sufficient modern weapons:
. . . that should any madman launch an attack on our
state or on other socialist states we would be able to
literally wipe the country or countries which attack us off
the face of the earth. 5
Clearly, the Soviet Union was moving in the direction of adopting
a doctrine of deterrence.
The United States' Proposal for a Phased Treaty
The decision about the moratorium was a relatively simple one.
Formulating a new Western negotiating position in view of the
4Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 4-15.
5Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 14.
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outcome of Technical Working Group II was a more complex issue
and one which required more time. In fact, the United States was
unable to present a new position until February 11, 1960, over
four weeks after the Geneva Conference had resumed. Meanwhile,
the Conference lagged. Ambassador Wadsworth pointed out that the
United States' position would have to be based on the conclusions
of the American expert delegation to TWG II; any treaty which was
not so based would clearly be rejected by the Senate. 6 Mr. Tsarapkin countered by pointing out that the scientific position advanced
by the Western scientists would leave large numbers of events
eligible for inspection, and then went on to say that the USSR
might ease its concept of criteria defining events eligible for onsite inspection if the West would accept the Soviet proposal for an
annual quota of on-site inspections. 7 The West would have to agree
to the quota concept, however, before the criteria could be formulated. He pointed out that the Control Commission would be able
to conduct research, and that improvements in the capability of the
detection and identification system presumably would result. He also
argued that in any case there would be no on-site inspections until .
the control system was completely installed; that is, for a year or
two after the treaty entered into force. Several days later, though,
Mr. Tsarapkin allowed that the real problem with violations, if
indeed there would . be a problem, would relate to underground
explosions, that a violator would not attempt to test in other less
covert environments. 8
Finally, on February 11, the United States tabled a new
negotiating position. Although the terms of the American proposal
were not publicly released until after their presentation in Geneva,
they were in large measure revealed and discussed in the press
and other mass media long before their presentation to the Conference. In part, this was inevitable, since the new American
proposal was derived rather logically from past American positions,
particularly President Eisenhower's suggestions of April 13, 1959,
and from the outcome of Technical Working Group II. That the
new proposal was telegraphed in advance was also the result,
though, of the American decentralized processes of decision-making.
6GEN/DNT/PV. 152, pp. 4-5, 20.
1Jbid., pp. 8, 12, 19.
BGEN/DNT/PV. 168, p. 19.

236

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

The American proposal was presented verbally; no treaty
language was tabled. 9 In essence, it provided for a phased treaty,
testing nuclear weapons would be prohibited in those environments
where in the American view control was feasible, and the prohibition would be extended as control could be extended. The
proposal provided for the immediate prohibition of testing in the
atmosphere, underwater, "in outer space up to the greatest height
with respect to which agreement can be reached on the installation
of effective controls," and underground "down to the lowest limit
of size or threshold" which the United States felt could be adequately controlled. As an illustration, and as a proposal, the United
States suggested a threshold of magnitude 4.75 on the unified
magnitude scale. With respect to on-site inspection, the United
States presented two alternative schemes, depending on whether or
not agreement could be reached on criteria. Both, however, envisaged actual inspection of only a fraction of the unidentified
events, the choice to be determined by the "other side." Thus the
proposal involved acceptance in principle of the concept of a
numerical quota of on-site inspections. If agreement were reached
on the criteria proposed by the American delegation to Technical
Working Group II, thirty percent of all unidentified events would
be subject to inspection, otherwise twenty percent of all events
located by the system would be eligible. The United States estimated that with a threshold of magnitude 4.75 and with control
posts initially only on the territories of the three nuclear powers,
the application of either formula would result in about twenty onsite inspections in the Soviet Union in an average year. The United
States also estimated that the number of comparable events in the
United States and the United Kingdom together would be approximately the same. A higher threshold would result in fewer inspections, and a lower one in more. Ambassador Wadsworth stated
that the United States would be willing to have the quota fixed
in numerical rather than percentage terms, but in that instance the
quota would have to be subject to revision at least annually and
it should be determined by applying "the agreed percentage to the
number of events which has actually occurred in the previous
period." In presenting the new American position, Ambassador
9See GEN/DNT/PV. 170, pp. 3-9.

The Search for Political Compromise

237

Wadsworth stressed the dynamic nature of the phasing concept,
and proposed that the three countries institute a "program of joint
research," with the aim of moving toward a comprehensive treaty
as rapidly as possible. The results of the research would be introduced into the control system as rapidly as "they had reached a
technologically useful state." This would allow the parties to the
treaty to consider the extent to which each advance might permit
moves toward a comprehensive treaty.
The new American proposal was an attempt to reset the
requirement of "adequate" control, but at the same time to satisfy
the Soviet demand that the number of on-site inspections be
limited. In addition, since it implicitly allowed the possibility of
testing some nuclear weapons, at least temporarily, it was satisfactory to those who had always felt, or had come to feel, that
American security interests demanded this.
It was this last aspect which drew the most critical questions
from Mr. Tsarapkin. He immediately asked whether or not the
treaty would prohibit nuclear tests underground that would register
below the 4. 75 seismic magnitude threshold, and if it would not, if
there would be a moratorium on such tests. 10 He also asked if all
tests in outer space would be prohibited. After receiving Ambassador Wadsworth's negative replies, and hearing his admission of
lack of full instructions concerning outer space, Mr. Tsarapkin
charged that the new American proposal was an invitation to renew
the nuclear arms race; that the nuclear powers would strive to
improve their capabilities and that non-nuclear powers would
attempt to gain nuclear status. Ambassador Wadsworth denied the
second point by arguing that only the countries that were already
nuclear powers had sufficiently advanced technology to create
devices or weapons with low enough yields so as not to violate the
threshold. Mr. Tsarapkin also criticized the concept of expressing
the threshold in terms of seismic magnitude, arguing that, as Technical Working Group II had indicated, determination of magnitude was
a controversial issue. Finally, he alleged that, American assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding, an international control system was
not necessary to detect those tests covered by the American proposal, but only for a comprehensive test ban. Although his remarks
10Jbid., pp. 9-10.
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were impromptu and did not constitute a formal Soviet reaction,
they certainly presaged a less than warm reception for the American
proposal.
II

Differences Narrow
The French Nuclear Tests
The formal Soviet reply did not come until several days later;
meanwhile an event ocurred which had significant implications for
the test ban negotiations, although its immediate effect was imperceptible. On February 13, 1960, refusing to heed the General
Assembly's recommendations, France detonated an atomic device
with an estimated yield of from 60 to 70 kilotons. Interestingly,
this development was not mentioned in the Geneva Conference until
March 2, and then only implicitly when Ambassador Wadsworth
referred to what had previously always been called the "4th country
problem," or the "nth country problem," as the "5th country
problem." The Soviet Union did not mention the fact that France
had tested a nuclear device until September 29.U By that time,
France had detonated a second nuclear device, and it would detonate a third before the year was out. Clearly, with each passing
day the "nth country" problem would become more difficult, and
for that reason, the question of a test ban more complicated.
The Soviet Proposal for Temporary Criteria
On February 16, Mr. Tsarapkin presented the USSR's formal
response to the American suggestion for a phased treaty. 12 In a
rather moderate speech he labeled the suggestion "unacceptable"
because the USSR favored a comprehensive treaty; but he went on
to suggest that it might be possible to surmount the difficulties in
which the Conference was enmeshed by exploring a concept which
had been advanced by the United Kingdom on January 15, that
is, to have temporary criteria for the initiation of on-site inspections.
He then proposed temporary criteria which would apply for an
initial period of from two to three years. These provided that an
event would be eligible for inspection if it were localized on the
llGEN/DNT/PV. 248, p. 13.
I2GEN/DNT/PV. 172, pp. 3-7.
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basis of data from several surrounding stations within an area of
approximately 200 square kilometers. If the control posts were
situated only on one side of the event, as for example an event in
a coastal area, a larger area would be allowed. An event would be
ineligible for inspection if ( 1 ) its depth of focus were established
as below 60 kilometers, (2) its epicentral location were established
to be in the deep ocean and· it were not accompanied by a hydroacoustic signal, ( 3) it were established within 48 hours as the foreshock of an earthquake, or ( 4) if it were established as the aftershock
of an earthquake. Mr. Tsarapkin claimed that these criteria represented the area of agreement between the Western and Soviet
scientists, and in large measure they did, except that the concept of
first motion was completely omitted. All events regardless of their
seismic magnitude would be eligible for inspection, the actual
number of inspections to be fixed according to the Soviet quota
proposal, but the USSR continued to be unwilling to indicate any
specific figure for a quota. During the period that the temporary
criteria were in effect, Mr. Tsarapkin envisaged that the Soviet and
Western scientists "would continue the joint study of the question
of criteria" with the aim of agreeing upon a complete and more
rigid set of criteria which would replace the temporary criteria. Thus
the Soviet Union accepted the principle of "joint research," and this
was confirmed in subsequent questioning. The following day Mr.
Tsarapkin stated that the research program could begin immediately
after the signature of the treaty-that is, before its coming into force
-and that nuclear devices would not be required in the program,
that chemical explosives would be sufficient.l 3
Even though Mr. Tsarapkin denied it, the Soviet proposal
seemed to acknowledge some of the technical difficulties which the
Western scientists had striven so painfully to present in Technical
Working Group II. In any case, the two sides appeared to be
moving closer to agreement, and on March 2, Ambassador Wadsworth pronounced the proposed Soviet criteria "generally acceptable
technically." 14 The American reservation applied principally to the
area of localization, which Ambassador Wadsworth argued was too
small, but also to the identification of foreshock. In addition, he
13GEN/DNT/PV. 173, p. 8.
14GEN/DNT/PV. 180, p. 5.
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maintained that the proposal would only be acceptable if some
arrangement could be worked out so that if agreement were not
reached on more rigid criteria during the initial period, the organization would not be left without criteria. However the divergence between East and West on broader issues was still great, and the
greatest portion of Ambassador Wadsworth's speech was actually
devoted to pointing these out. In sum, the United States continued
to believe that with existing technology it would be impossible adequately to control low yield underground explosions, and thus that
for the time being a comprehensive treaty was out of the question.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to insist on a
comprehensive treaty, and held to its position that on-site inspections
could occur only within such a context.
The Soviet Proposal for a Phased Treaty and a Moratorium
The next attempt to narrow the gap between the two sides
was also advanced by the Soviet Union, although its origins were
more diffuse. On Saturday, March 19-just in time for the Sunday
editions-Ambassador Tsarapkin announced that the USSR would
be willing to conclude a treaty "on the cessation of all nuclear
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer space,
and of all underground tests which produce seismic oscillations of
magnitude 4. 75 conventional units or above. " 15 He stated that the
Soviet government would also agree to the American proposal
"to institute a programme of joint experiments by the Soviet Union,
the United States, and the United Kingdom," with respect to unidentified events below magnitude 4. 7 5 conventional units, "on the
understanding that all parties to the treaty assume at the same time
the obligation not to carry out during that period any nuclear
weapons tests producing seismic oscillations of magnitude 4. 75
conventional units or below." In other words, the partial treaty
would have to be accompanied by a moratorium covering the tests
which were not banned. Apparently the USSR felt that the moratorium should be part of the treaty. Senator Humphrey had made
a similar suggestion several months previously in a speech in Pontiac, Michigan, and the idea was explored verbally in guarded
fashion by the principal delegates to the Geneva Conference several
l5GEN/DNT/PV. 188, p. 13.
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days prior to the Soviet proposal.1 6 Sir Michael Wright had
indicated that he would advance the concept to the United Kingdom
government.
The Soviet proposal was widely regarded as a major move.
Coming as it did a few days after the opening session of the TenNation Disarmament Committee, and with a summit meeting
scheduled within two months, it could be interpreted as an attempt
to secure a detente. On the other hand, it involved a continuation
of the unpoliced moratorium.
Formulating a Western Response
The first Western response was to probe the precise meaning
and implications of the Soviet proposal. Some questions were put
to Mr. Tsarapkin immediately after he made the proposal. These
were repeated in a more formal fashion and others were added at
the next session of the Geneva Conference on Monday, March 21.17
The first group of questions related to the "joint research programme" and the obligation to refrain from testing. They concerned
the length of the program and whether or not the two aspects would
be concurrent. Ambassador Wadsworth also asked what would
happen at the end of the period, and specifically, "if, in the opinion
of the scientists, the controls were still not completely effective,
would the obligation not to test nevertheless persist?" Ambassador
Wadsworth was also concerned about the scope of the research
program, particularly whether it would be limited to the problem of
criteria or would be broader.
A second group of questions concerned the number of on-site
inspections and the threshold of magnitude. Ambassador Wadsworth
asked if the Soviet Union accepted the Western proposal to use the
unified magnitude scale. He also asked if the Soviet Union accepted
the threshold of magnitude 4.75 and if there would be a quota for
inspections above the threshold, below the threshold, or for the
entire range. A related query concerned the Soviet attitude toward
the American proposal for simplified criteria.
A third area of questions concerned high altitude and outer
16See the interchanges between Tsarapkin and Popper (US), GEN/DNT/PV. 183, pp. 11-13; GEN/DNT/PV. 184, pp. 10-18; and the remarks
by Wright, GEN/DNT/PV. 185, p. 3.
17GEN/DNT/PV. 189, pp. 5-8.
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space. Since the Soviet proposal envisaged a complete prohibition
on testing in these environments-which the United States phased
treaty proposal of February 11 did not necessarily-Ambassador
Wadsworth inquired about what type of a control system was
"proposed for the installation in the high-altitude environment, what
elements it would contain and at what intervals such elements of the
high-altitude system would be installed." He also wanted to learn
what "would be done about high-altitude or cosmic space tests
which could not be identified by the initially installed system." Thus
he raised a question which American policy-makers themselves had
previously evaded.
Finally, Ambassador Wadsworth asked:
As regards the underground environment, in the event that
effective control of small underground explosions proved
impossible and if the proposed temporary prohibition
against such explosions lapsed, would the remainder of the
treaty continue in effect?
Given the ideas which many in the American scientific community
held about the difficulty of detecting underground nuclear explosions this was perhaps the most crucial question. The last of the
non-nuclear blasts in the Cowboy series had been fired on March
4 and the evaluation of the series substantially confirmed Albert
Latter's theories concerning decoupling.
Mr. Tsarapkin's responses followed the same order as Ambassador Wadsworth's questions. He repeated his previous statements that the "joint research programme" could begin immediately
after the signature of the treaty. In the Soviet view the program
should be drafted by the Preparatory Commission. Mr. Tsarapkin
stated that the USSR felt that, although research would be a
continuing aspect of the Control Organization, a suitable length for
the specific program aimed at events below the threshold of magnitude 4.75 would be four or five years, and that the question of
the moratorium and the research program were "closely interrelated." Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that the Soviet government did not
admit the possibility that the research program might not be
successful, but if it did take the most pessimistic view, it felt that
the failure of the program "should not automatically release the
parties to the treaty from their obligations regarding the moratorium
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and should not mean that the treaty would terminate or be liquidated." The governments concerned would have to discuss the
situation and agree on further measures. With respect to the scope
and nature of the research program, Mr. Tsarapkin asserted that
experiments in the program should be conducted with "conventional
chemical detonations, not nuclear weapons."
Concerning the second group of questions, the Soviet view was
that the quota of on-site inspections, which would have to be
determined on the basis of a political compromise, would apply
both to events above and below the threshold; thus the issues of
determining the magnitude of specific events would not arise. The
quota would be revised in the light of the experience of the Control
Organization in accordance with the periodic review article, therefore, for the first time, two years after the entry into force of the
treaty, and subsequently on an annual basis.
With respect to high altitude and outer space, Mr. Tsarapkin
asserted that there should be a total prohibition on testing regardless of the number or the schedule of installation of control techniques.
The answer to the last question had been given implicitly in
the answers to the first group. In essence, it was that the prohibition on testing nuclear weapons should be permanent regardless of
the outcome of the research program.
Simultaneously, discussion and debate began within the United
States and the Western alliance about what the Western response
should be. The extent to which the detailed questions raised by
Ambassador Wadsworth and the responses given by Mr. Tsarapkin
entered into the decision-making process is not clear. Many of the
arguments were those which had been visible throughout the negotiations. Moreover, at his news conference on Friday, March 25four days after the interchange between Wadsworth and Tsarapkin
and two days after the Committee of Principals framed its recommendation-Secretary of State Herter stated that the Department
had not received all of Mr. Tsarapkin's answers. 18 Of course their
general nature had been reported in the press.
On Tuesday, March 22, Senator Clinton P. Anderson, then
ISU.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1085 (April ll,
1960), p. 548.
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Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, declared that
the Soviet proposal "has the appearance of a phony. " 19 It was his
view that the Soviet proposal was an attempt to secure a prohibition
against all testing, regardless of whether or not the agreement could
be controlled. In his picturesque terms:
Again the United States is asked to buy a "pig in
the poke." We are asked to forego testing and to accept a
totally inadequate inspection system. We are asked again
to agree to a system based largely on trust of the Soviets
rather than real controls.
John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
was known to hold similar views. 20 To these men, the acceptance
of the Soviet proposal would endanger American security because
of its failure to provide adequate control.
Another force acting as an undercurrent, but in tandem with
this interpretation, was the increasing pressure in the United States
to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. Perhaps Freeman J.
Dyson, a physicist and professor at the Institute for Advanced
Study at Princeton, articulated the case most clearly. His views
were advanced in an article entitled "The Future Development of
Nuclear Weapons," published in the April 1960 issue of Foreign
AfjairsP which was released in mid-March. In his article, Professor
Dyson stressed particularly the importance and possibility of a
fission-free weapon, or a neutron bomb, which would not produce
fallout. He also asserted that complete control over a ban on testing
nuclear weapons would be impossible without almost unlimited
inspection rights.
The adverse reaction in the United States to the Soviet proposal so alarmed Prime Minister Macmillan that he hastily arranged
to fly to the United States to confer with President Eisenhower
about the Western response. He regarded the Soviet proposal as
an extremely favorable action. Many in the United States also
inclined toward this position. The day after Senator Anderson
19Congressional

Record, Vol. CVI, Part 5 (1960), pp. 6219-20.
20New York Times, March 23, 1960, p. 12.
21 Freeman J. Dyson, "The Future Development of Nuclear Weapons,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (April 1960), pp. 457-64.
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issued his pronouncement, Hans Bethe released a statement in
which he viewed the Soviet proposal favorably. 22 Senator Hubert
H. Humphrey also made a lengthy speech in the Senate that day
describing in detail the progress of the Geneva Conference and
relating the Soviet proposal to his Pontiac speech and the United
States suggestion for a phased treaty. 23 He was well informed,
among other reasons because his Subcommittee on Disarmament
had held a hearing on the technical problems involved in the
negotiations on February 4, 1960. He pointed out that the Soviet
proposal differed from his suggestion in that the number of on-site
inspections was not specified and the proposed moratorium was four
to five years instead of two. He also read into the record a detailed
statement of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology
of the Democratic Advisory Council, which emphasized the
importance of a test ban agreement. In view of all of these factors,
his conclusion was that the Soviet proposal should be regarded
"as a significant indication that the USSR may be willing to accept
the necessary number of inspections to monitor a test-ban treaty
and to work for the improvement of the control system."
Following his speech, Senators Humphrey, Anderson, and Case
engaged in a low-keyed debate about the progress of the test ban
talks. Perhaps the most interesting point was Senator Humphrey's
insistence that from twenty to thirty on-site inspections would be
necessary annually in the USSR, and Senator Anderson's reply
that in informal conversations Soviet delegates had mentioned the
possibility of two or three. 24 The Soviet Union still had not presented a concrete figure for the quota in the Geneva Conference,
and it would not until July 26, 1960. Clearly, this issue was a
factor which had to be considered in viewing the Soviet proposal.
A closed debate raged within the Administration, although the
views and positions were not significantly different from those
expressed in the public arena. The Committee of Principals held
meetings on March 22 and 23. 25 Chairman McCone argued force22New York Times, March 24, 1960, p. 1.
23Congressional Record, Vol. CVI, Part 5 (1960), pp. 6356-63.
24Jbid., p. 6362.
25See the account of these two meetings in Chalmers M. Roberts,
"The Hopes and Fears of an Atomic Test Ban," The Reporter, Vol. XXII,
No. 9, pp. 20-23.
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fully against accepting the Soviet proposal. James H. Douglas, who
had recently been promoted from the Secretaryship of the Air Force
to Deputy Secretary of Defense, and who was sitting in for Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., made the strongest case for
a favorable response. He argued that any agreement which would
"open up" the Soviet Union by stationing international inspectors
within the USSR, and thus break down Soviet secrecy and insularity,
would be more valuable to the United States than any gains from
continued testing, and he felt that the proposal seemed to offer the
possibility of such an agreement. Mr. Douglas' arguments represented a considerable shift in thinking in the Department of Defem;e.
Although he was perhaps the most articulate exponent of the new
views, they were apparently subscribed to in varying degrees by
the Secretary and other senior officials. George Kistiakowsky, the
President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, supported
his stand. Allen Dulles made the point that current intelligence
estimates continued to indicate that the United States held a lead
in nuclear weaponry, and thus that a freeze on development would
be to its advantage. By the end of the second meeting a recommendation urging a conditional favorable response to the USSR was
framed. Messrs. Douglas, Kistiakowsky, Dulles, and Herter supparted this recommendation; Chairman McCone opposed it. The
President accepted and approved the recommendation. At this point,
he strongly favored attempting to achieve a nuclear test ban. 26
Thus by March 26 when Prime Minister Macmillan arrived in
the United States, his trip was rather redundant. Nonetheless, it
allowed joint consultation, which had not occurred prior to this
point, and a display of Western unanimity.
The Eisenhower-Macmillan Joint Declaration
On March 29, after meetings in Washington and Camp David,
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan issued a joint
declaration. The most important part of this declaration, and the
Western response to the Soviet proposal, was the statement that the
President and the Prime Minister had agreed that as soon as a test
ban treaty was signed:
2 6Robert Gilpin feels that the President's desire was the strongest
factor in the decision. See American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy,
pp. 249-50.
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. . . and arrangements made for a coordinated research
program for the purpose of progressively improving control methods for events below a seismic magnitude of
4.75, they will be ready to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below
that threshold, to be accomplished by unilateral declaration of each of the three powers. In order to expedite
progress, the President and the Prime Minister have
agreed to invite the Soviet Government to join at once
with their two Governments in making arrangements for
such a coordinated research program and putting it into
operation. 27
Several features of the statement are worthy of note. First, this was
the first mention of a "coordinated research program." Previously
the adjective "joint" had always been used. The developing differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers concerning
whether chemical or nuclear explosions would be required were
responsible for this shift in terminology. American scientists of
almost all persuasions were convinced that nuclear detonations
were necessary for the research program, and the Administration
was determined not to be put in a position whereby the Soviet
Union could block this. Secondly, the statement implied that the
research program should begin immediately, not after the signature
of the treaty. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the moratorium
would be voluntary and accomplished by unilateral declaration.
This would retain an element of freedom of action, and also meet
the constitutional problem posed by President Eisenhower's departure from office in January 1961 (actually the uncertainty that this
involved was soon removed by pledges from the major Presidential
candidates that they would honor a moratorium commitment).
Also, the duration of the moratorium was left to be determined,
which implied, as various statements by officials had, that the West
would not accept a period as long as from four to five years.
With the issuance of this statement the positions of the three
parties to the Geneva negotiations moved significantly closer together, and the prospects for a test ban treaty appeared to rise
sharply. In th~ .following days the world press contained numerous
speculations that the remaining unresolved issues could be solved
21Geneva Conference, p. 424.
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at the forthcoming meeting of heads of governments, now scheduled
to open May 16.
The diplomats at the conference table seem to have shared
these expectations. 28 In the fifteen meetings that were held between
March 29, the date on which the statement was issued and May
12, the day the Conference recessed for the summit meeting, they
worked hard, as Ambassador Wadsworth put it, "to clear away as
much underbrush as possible." 29 This consisted mainly of attempting
to settle minor issues and clarify major ones. Significant progress
was made on achieving agreement concerning the Annex on Privileges and Immunities, and the differences with respect to other
aspects of the Control Organization were defined as precisely as
possible. Of course, major effort was devoted to clarifying the
Eisenhower-Macmillan statement and its exact relationship to the
Soviet proposal of March 19. It was not until May 3 that the USSR
conditionally accepted most aspects of the Western position. 30
Meanwhile, on April 6, Ambassador Wadsworth had discussed
in general terms the type of "coordinated research programme"
that the United States felt should be carried out, and six days
later he had proposed that scientists from the three states be brought
to Geneva to advise the Conference on the technical aspects of the
proposed research program. 31 This suggestion had been accepted
by the Soviet Union on April 14, and on May 3 when the USSR
broadly accepted the new Western position, it also agreed that
the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group, as it came to be
called, should hold its first session May 11. Ultimate responsibility
for the research program was to rest with the Geneva Conference.
A Basic Consensus?
By May 12, when the Conference recessed, it can fairly be
said that there was a mutually acceptable framework for a test
ban treaty. Leaving aside issues affecting the nature of the control
organization, which will be treated in a later chapter, the differences
stemming from technical aspects of the matter appeared not to be
insurmountable, and scientists from the three sides were already
28See Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify, pp. 127, 137.
29GEN/DNT/PV. 198, p. 8.
30GEN/DNT/PV. 202, pp. 3-6.
31GEN/DNT/PV. 196, pp. 3-4.

The Search for Political Compromise

249

at work on the research problems. Seemingly in recognition of this,
on April 1 the Conference agreed that its verbatim records through
February 29, 1960, and adopted portions of the draft treaty should
be released on April 19 and that thereafter verbatim records would
be released monthly with a one-month time lag. 32 This move also
satisfied a long-standing complaint of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy about the secrecy of the negotiations.
The Soviet Union had agreed that the moratorium could be
accomplished by a series of unilateral declarations by the three
governments and that as a part of the planned research there might
be "a strictly limited number of joint underground nuclear explosions."33 The Western powers had agreed that the quota of onsite inspections should apply to events both above and below the
magnitude 4.75 threshold. The unresolved issues related to the size
of the quota-(the Soviet Union had not yet tabled a specific
proposal),-the duration of the moratorium, and what obligation
the parties to the treaty would have at the end of the moratorium
if the research program were not completely successful in improving
the capability of the control network. The Soviet Union continued
to argue that the moratorium should be from four to five years, and
cited an October 29, 1959, statement of John A. McCone in which
he had said that it would take from four to five years to create a
reliable control system. In any case, Mr. Tsarapkin insisted that
the research program and the moratorium should be coterminous.
The Western representative on the other hand argued that four to
five years was too long a period for the moratorium. On the other
issue, the USSR also maintained its position that at the expiration
of the moratorium the parties to it should not be "automatically
released" from their obligations. The Western powers on the other
hand felt that at the end of the moratorium each of the three powers
should be "free to take any position that it deems necessary." Also,
the Soviet Union continued to talk about and insist on a "joint
research programme" while the Western representatives used the
phrase "coordinated research programme."
However, even though the unresolved issues of a technical
nature may have seemed relatively minor, some involved fairly
32GEN/DNT/PV. 192, p. 6.
33GEN/DNT/PV. 202, p. 6.
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deep-rooted disagreements. The West was determined not to agree to
permanent measures of arms control unless they could be policed
with a high degree of assurance. Thus the length of the moratorium
and what happened at its expiration were crucial issues for Western
policy-makers. So too was the question of the adequacy of the
research program, and consequently the desire not to allow the
other side to have veto powers. The USSR had other fears. Mr.
Tsarapkin expressed some of these in explaining the Soviet argument
that at the expiration of the moratorium the parties to the treaty
should meet to consider the situation.
The meaning of this proposal is perfectly obvious. It is
meant to preclude obstruction by any party who, in the
absence of such a provision in the treaty, might under
various pretexts prevent positive results from being
achieved by the research and then, on the ground that the
agreed time-limit for carrying out the research programme
had expired, declare its freedom of action and resume
testing. 34
If the USSR assumed that within the limits of a politically
acceptable control system there would always be some threshold
of detectability, and that it might be extremely difficult and perhaps
even impossible to compensate for such degradations in control as
posed by decoupling, the Soviet fears could be well founded. In any
case, the USSR had the development of the theory of decoupling
as a backdrop of immediate history. The desire to exercise a high
degree of control over the research work would fit with this interpretation, as would pressure for a lengthy moratorium.

Dissents From Interested Parties
These divergencies, however, remained undercurrents. The
most salient signs seemed to indicate rapid and swift progress
toward a test ban. As a result, those interested parties which might
be affected by a test ban began to raise their voices. On April 7,
President de Gaulle reiterated the position that France would only
abandon its nuclear weapons development program if the three
nuclear powers destroyed their nuclear weapons. 3 5 He repeated this
34GEN/DNT/PV. 192, p. 9.
35New York Times, April 8, 1960, p. 1.
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several days later during a trip to the United States in an address
before a Joint Session of Congress. 36 His position was underlined
by the detonation of a second French nuclear device on April 1.
Another "nth country" also made its position known. On April 10,
Premier Chou En-lai stated that Communist China would not be
bound by any accord which it did not sign. 37 At a news conference
about a month later, he stated that the People's Republic of China
would only take part in a disarmament conference if it were
recognized by the other participating states. 38 These statements had
ominous implications for the prospects of a general test ban and
also for the Sino-Soviet alliance, coming as they did in the midst
of the developing controversy between Communist China and the
USSR in which differences concerning disarmament figured prominently.39

Joint Committee Hearings: The Bethe-Teller Debate
There were stirrings within the United States too. On April
11, Senator Clinton Anderson announced that two subcommittees
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, meeting jointly, would
hold public hearings, starting April 19, on the technical aspects of
the detection and inspection controls of a nuclear weapons test ban.
The hearings were carried on for four days and most of the
scientists who had participated in one way or another in the test
ban negotiations and others as well testified. 40 Although the Chairman of the hearings, Representative Chet Holifield, strove valiantly
to confine the discussion to technical matters, questions concerning
the wisdom of past and possible future negotiating positions were
inevitably raised. On these occasions, the positions which were by
then well known were repeated. Perhaps Edward Teller and Hans
Bethe portrayed best the two extremes among the scientists that
testified, the former displaying great caution concerning the wisdom
of a test ban and the latter controlled enthusiasm. A variety of
36U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960 (1961),
p. 81.
31New York Times, April 11, 1960, p. 7.
3BDocuments on Disarmament, 1960, p. 87.
39See Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (1962),
especially pp. 290-94.
40For an extensive analysis of these hearings see Earl H. Voss, Nuclear
Ambush, pp. 395-456.
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estimates and judgments were involved. For Teller, the development
of tactical nuclear weapons was important and promising, while
Bethe viewed it as of marginal utility and as possibly being technically difficult. Teller was pessimistic about the possibility of
improving the control system, while Bethe was optimistic. Teller
regarded the decoupling theory as a degradation of great importance
for which compensations were unlikely. Bethe, on the other hand,
questioned the practicability of decoupling, particularly for large
detonations in the range of tens of kilotons, and also felt that the
problem could be conquered. Despite this disagreement, however,
there was consensus among these two scientists and others on the
capabilities of the system recommended by the Conference of
Experts; they all estimated it at roughly 19 kilotons for an underground shot which had not been decoupled.

And Some New Suggestions
Other than the Bethe-Teller debate, which was framed more
neatly than it had been previously, three elements stand out most
in the hearings. The first of these occurred the second day when
Richard Latter of the RAND Corporation testified. In the period
after Technical Working Group II he analyzed the control system
proposed by the Conference of Experts in more detail than anyone
previously had, and in the process he experimented with some of
its parameters. 41 He presented the results of this work to the
Committee. No one yet knew how many control posts there would
be in the Soviet Union-the issue had not been discussed in the
Geneva Conference-but Dr. Latter assumed on the basis of inferences and calculations that there would be 21. If there were control
posts only on the territory of the three nuclear powers-21 in the
Soviet Union, 14 in the United States, and 1 in the United Kingdom
-and assuming a magnitude 4. 7 5 threshold, using earthquake
tables, he estimated that this would result in about 173 unidentified
events per year in the United States and 53 in the Soviet Union.
If 30 percent of these were eligible for on-site inspection, there
could be 52 inspections per year in the United States and 16 in the
41See his testimony: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and
Development, Hearings: Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1960),
pp. 38-39.
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Soviet Union. If control posts were established throughout the
world, as recommended in the report of the Conference of Experts,
he calculated that the number of unidentified earthquakes in the
United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced to 143 and
28 respectively, and again assuming that 30 percent of these would
be eligible for on-site inspection, the maximum number of on-site
inspections would correspondingly be reduced to 43 and 8. He
also calculated that by modestly increasing the number of control
posts within the Soviet Union, especially in the seismic areas, the
number of unidentified earthquakes could be reduced even farther.
Thus, assuming control posts only in the USSR, the United States,
and the United Kingdom, but increasing the number of control
posts within the Soviet Union from 21 to 25 would result in there
being only 20 unidentified earthquakes each year on Soviet territory. Using the 30 percent figure again, only 6 events there would
be eligible for on-site inspection.
The second novel element appeared in Hans Bethe's testimony.42 He argued that with a large number of control posts and
with feasible improvements in seismological instruments, it might
be possible to detect even decoupled detonations of as little yield as
20 kilotons. In his estimate, with foreseeable improvements, some
600 control posts would be required in the Soviet Union to achieve
this capability. Both of these features are interesting chiefly because
they indicate how the technical parameters of the control system
could be changed if one were willing to alter the elements of the
system. Dr. Latter's testimony illustrated the same point and was
also significant because of the low number of on-site inspections
involved and the differential between the number required in the
United States and the Soviet Union. His figures varied greatly from
those being used by the American delegates in the negotiations.
Finally, the Joint Committee hearings were interesting because
they brought out in vivid detail how difficult it would actually be
to conduct an on-site inspection. On the basis of this a number of
Congressmen concluded that the probability of an on-site inspection's detecting evidence of a violation was very close to zero. Their
conclusion had ominous implications for the possibility of Senatorial
consent to ratification of a comprehensive test ban.
42See ibid., pp. 171-86.
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III

The Seismic Research Program Advisory Group
The Opening Atmosphere
The early meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory
Group, which convened on Wednesday, May 11, 1960, seemed to
sustain the general air of optimism. The excitement and tension
following Premier Khrushchev's announcement on May 7 that the
USSR had captured an American pilot whose U-2 aircraft had been
shot down over Soviet territory six days previously seemed to have
no effect on the work going on inside the Paiais des Nations.
The technical representatives of the three states were generally
younger and of lower rank than their counterparts at previous meetings. The American delegation was headed by Frank Press, a seismologist at the California Institute of Technology, and Carl Romney of
the Air Force served as Associate Chairman. 43 M. A. Sadovsky, who
had attended the Conference of Experts and the two technical working groups, headed the Soviet delegation, 44 and H. R. Hulme, the
British delegation. 45 Although the American delegation had not had
any special preparation, several members had previously participated
in the negotiations at one time or another, and all were deeply
involved in Project Vela, the United States research program, final
approval of which had been announced on May 7. Since the purpose
of SRPAG was to discuss research, this background was probably
sufficient preparation. They were, however, instructed to avoid
"political" issues, to refer such matters to the diplomatic conference,
and to avoid anything that might give the USSR veto power over
the United States research program.
The task of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group
seemed fairly clear cut, and since it involved research, this con4 3The other members of the American delegation were: Carlton M.
Boyer, Department of Defense; Gerald W. Johnson, Department of Defense;
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology; Richard Latter, RAND Corporation; Robert C.
Scheid, Department of Defense; and M. Carl Walske, Atomic Energy Commission.
44 The other members of the Soviet delegation were Y. V. Riznichenko,
0. A. Grinevsky, V. I. Keilis-Borok, I. P. Pasechnik, G. L. Schnierman, and
A. I. Ustyumenko.
4 5The other members of the British delegation were M. Hill, H. T.
Morgan, J. W. Wright, F. Panton, and R. M. Evans.
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ference probably elicited more professional enthusiasm from the
participating scientists than had any of the others. Also, the meeting
appeared to offer the opportunity of proving the contribution of
scientific research to the solution of political problems. Dr. Press's
opening comments, when he spoke of the procedures and language
of science as being universal and recalled the fruitful results of
international scientific cooperation in the research involved in the
International Geophysical Year, 46 symbolized the general tone that
characterized the participation of the Western delegates in the early
meetings. The Soviet scientists also seemed to be somewhat more
candid in these sessions than they had been in the past and appeared
to share the Western enthusiasm for the scientific character of their
task. For example, in a discussion about the American plan to
offer improved seismological equipment to seismological stations
throughout the world, Mr. Sadovsky said: "We shall also try to
use the political situation for the improvement of seismology in
general. " 47 The conference could conceivably allow the scientists
both to further their own professional interests and to contribute
to the reduction of East-West tensions.
At the first meeting, the American scientists gave a comprehensive and detailed exposition of the United States research program. The plans then in effect envisaged various theoretical and
empirical studies, including the detonation of approximately 11
nuclear and chemical explosions, some of which would be designed
to test Albert Latter's decoupling theory. Another aspect of the
program was the scheme, mentioned above, to re-equip the seismic
stations of the world. There was also a plan to establish certain
model stations, some equipped according to the recommendations
of the Conference of Experts. This would provide the first practical
test of a so-called Geneva-type station. The next two meetings were
devoted to the presentation of the much more modest British research program and to discussion of the Western plans.
At the fourth meeting, on Saturday, May 14, Y. V. Riznichenko presented a paper on the Soviet research program. Since it
was not presented as the American program was in terms of cost
or man-years of activity, it was rather difficult to grasp its exact
magnitude. It appeared to be an extensive program, although it
46GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 1, p. 3.
47GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 5, pp. 62-65.
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was clearly not as elaborate as that of the United States. Certain
aspects of Mr. Riznichenko's presentation were moreover rather
ambiguous. He stated that for the experiments two of the seismological stations in the USSR would be "equipped with the full set
of equipment, bearing in mind the recommendations of the Geneva
Conference of Experts in 1958 and 1959."48 Was this or was it not
a commitment to construct two Geneva-type stations? His presentation was even more ambiguous on the subject of underground nuclear
explosions. At one point he stated: "The systematic recording of
seismic waves produced by earthquakes and also by underground
chemical and nuclear explosions carried out under different conditions and in different areas of the profile will take place during the
years 1960-1963."49 Later, he said, " . . . it seems obvious to us
at the present time that a certain number of co-ordinated nuclear
explosions of definite magnitude or energy will have to be carried
out by us," 50 and referred to an earlier statement on this subject
by Mr. Tsarapkin. However, in response to questioning on this
point, Mr. Sadovsky said that he could not give an answer until
the following meeting. It was clear from Mr. Riznichenko's presentation, that the Soviet scientists planned to utilize a number of large
industrial chemical explosions as sources of data, and that they
would generalize from this data. The Soviet scientists also planned
to make extensive use of models. Again in response to questioning,
Mr. Sadovsky stated that there would be no experiments in the
Soviet Union to test the theory of decoupling. 51 The reasons that
he gave were avowedly political, and his statement was almost
apologetic. At the following meeting on Monday, May 16, he
announced that there would be no nuclear explosions in the USSR
and that the references in the Soviet paper were to nuclear explosions envisaged in American program. 52
What Conclusion?
Although the atmosphere of these early sessions was quite
technical and cordial, it was not immediately clear what the out48GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 4, p. 12.
49fbid., pp. 13-15.
50fbid., pp. 27-30.
51/bid., p. 56.

52GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 5, p. 21.
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come would be. Of course, the joint discussion and criticism of the
three programs yielded certain results in itself. As a consequence of
Soviet criticisms, the American scientists agreed that some aspects
of the United States program should be altered; for example, they
thought that the number of temporary stations should be increased
and the recording times-that is, the time which a temporary
station would occupy a site-lengthened. 53 In addition, there were
various informal meetings where problems of methodology were
discussed and some agreements reached on matters of technique.
However, it was not obvious what the meeting as a collective body
could or would recommend. On May 17, the British suggested
various forms of cooperation, involving such matters as exchanges
of data and personnel and the elaboration of uniform methodology,
and these were incorporated into a draft which was submitted by
the United States the following day. The principles involved and
the documents elaborating these principles were discussed in SRPAG
sporadically through May 24.
The Collapse of the Summit Meeting: The Changing Soviet Posture
Meanwhile, events had transpired which would seriously affect
SRPAG, and indeed the entire course of the Geneva negotiations.
The heads of government of France, the Soviet Union, the United
States, and the United Kingdom had agreed to meet in Paris on
May 16 to discuss world problems. When the four leaders gathered
in Paris, Chairman Khrushchev refused to proceed farther unless
President Eisenhower condemned and cancelled all U-2 flights
and arranged to have those "guilty" of perpetrating such flights
brought to strict account. Since President Eisenhower refused to
take such action, the summit meeting collapsed. Whether the
Soviet move was attributable to conflicts within the Soviet ruling
group among Chairman Khrushchev and his associates, to increasing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations, or to President Eisenhower's assumption of personal responsibility for the U-2 flights
and unabashed assertion at his news conference of May 11 that
such activities were a "distasteful but vital necessity" when dealing
with a closed society such as the USSR, 54 are matters clearly
53GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 7, p. 36.
54U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1092 (May 30,
1960), p. 851.
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beyond the scope of this study. 55 For our purposes the significant
issue is that from that point on the attitude of the Soviet Union
toward the test ban negotiations appears to have been markedly
different from what it had been previously. Annex II on Privileges
and Immunities was formally adopted on October 14, 1960, but
this was the only treaty language that was adopted after the collapse of the summit. Through the summer of 1960 the USSR made
what could be interpreted as a few concessions on other issues,
but as early as the fall of 1960, it began to retract positions which
it had previously tabled.
The End of Another Try by Scientists

The sharpest indication that the Soviet posture had changed
and that this would have an impact on the test ban negotiations
came on Friday, May 27, eleven days after the date on which the
summit conference was scheduled to begin. At the first meeting of
the diplomatic conference to be convened after the recess on May 12,
Mr. Tsarapkin, after a long review of the history of the negotiations, stated that, "since the Soviet Union has no doubts regarding
the validity of the report of the Geneva experts of 1958, it sees
no need for undertaking any research or experiments on its own
territory." 56 In other words, there would be no Soviet research
program. In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin demanded that Soviet scientists be allowed to participate fully in all steps of any experiments
that might be carried on in the West.
This shift caused considerable embarrassment for the Soviet
scientists participating in the Seismic Research Program Advisory
Group. SRPAG had been meeting on a daily basis through May
25. Then several days elapsed before the final meeting on May
30. At that session, in response to questioning about the Soviet
research program, Mr. Sadovsky would only say:
65For a good summary of the speculation which was rampant soon
after the event se-e Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs,
1960 (1961), pp. 83-88.
56GEN/DNT/PV. 206, p. 8. Wadsworth mentions this reversal of the
Soviet position in his book, The Price of Peace, p. 27, but he somewhat
unfairly fails to put it in the context of the collapse of the summit conference.
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the programme of test explosions, not only nuclear
but also chemical explosions, is, in our view, linked to
the control system. Our view is that if we do not have
definite indications that such a system will be set up in
the near future, then the programme of test explosions is
unnecessary and should not be carried out. We are conducting seismological research in the USSR and apparently
this seismological research will continue. 57
Obviously, in this atmosphere an agreed report was out of the
question. Dr. Press, in particular, argued against separate reports
on the ground that "it broadcasts to the world that the scientists
have disagreed." 58 SRPAG therefore agreed on the expediency of
individual private reports by each of the three technical delegations
to their own diplomatic delegations.
IV

How Near an Agreement?
Remaining Differences
One can only speculate about whether or not the outcome would
have been different had not the broader context of East-West
relations altered so radically. It is significant though that there were
important disagreements from the outset. Eastern and Western
scientists had different conceptions concerning the length of the
research program, an issue which had important implications for
the duration of the moratorium on nuclear testing below the 4.75
seismic magnitude threshold. Also, the American scientists in particular were insistent that there had to be experiments concerning
decoupling, while the Soviet scientists were adamantly opposed to
this. As early as May 18, it was apparent that the Soviet scientists
had serious objections to the American plans for low-yield nuclear
explosions. 59 The United States program included four nuclear
explosions of less than 5 kilotons, one of 500 tons and two of 100
tons, and possibly one of 2 kilotons. The first specific objection
that the Soviet scientists raised to these shots was to assert they
might appear "suspicious" because of the American interest in the
li7GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 13, p. 16.
liSGEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 12, pp. 7-10.
59GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 7, pp. 17-20.
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development of tactical nuclear weapons. 60 The American response
was that the USSR was certainly entitled to assurance that the
shots would not be used for weapons development, but that the
precise arrangements for this were beyond the scope of a technical
group. The Soviet scientists then argued that with the current state
of technology, the prospects of recording seismic signals "at distances which might be of interest for the purpose of the control
system" were extremely remote. 61 The views of Western scientists
were cited to support this contention. The balance of Mr. Sadovsky's
statement is extremely interesting. He went on to say:
Frankly speaking, nothing has changed so far in this
respect, and we are still in a situation whereby we would
be completely satisfied if we were to succeed in a relatively
short time-succeed in carrying out the views which had
been stated with regard to the detection and identification
of five-kiloton explosions. We still believe that five-kiloton
explosions can be detected and identified, but it seems to
us that we should begin precisely by tackling this task.
If from the outset we begin to try to tackle not only this
task but alongside a second task, that of detecting and
identifying much smaller explosions, I am afraid that we
shall meet considerable difficulties, and we may fail in the
solution of both tasks.
This was perhaps the most candid public recognition on the part
of any official Soviet representative in the test ban negotiations of
the technical difficulties involved in the detection and identification
of underground nuclear explosions. By implication the statement
recognized that the technical situation had deteriorated since the
summer of 1958 and the Conference of Experts. The statement
also clearly implied that there would be a threshold below which
nuclear explosions could not be detected.
If the attitude of the Soviet scientists with respect to low-yield
nuclear explosions is put alongside their position on decoupling,
what they seemed to be saying is that they could not contemplate
any experiments which might give proof that certain nuclear explosions could not be controlled without radically altering the
60GEN/DNT/PV. 10, pp. 17-20.
61GEN/DNT/SRPAG/PV. 10, p. 47.
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The Collapse of the Conference

I

The Diplomats Resume
Although there were sixty-eight meetings of the Geneva Conference
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests between May 27,
when it reconvened after the collapse of the summit meeting, and
December 5, 1960, when it recessed for the final time that year,
and aiso for the final time during the Eisenhower Administration,
little progress was made. The attempt to solve the differences between East and West relating to. the technical aspects of a control
system for a test ban had failed. Agreement had not been achieved,
and the attempt to bridge the disagreement through political compromise and scientific research had collapsed.
American Policy: A Fixed Course
President Eisenhower-like many Americans-was greatly disheartened by the collapse of the summit meeting, and the obvious
stalemate in the nuclear test ban talks. He virtually gave up hope
of achieving a test ban treaty, and his views were shared by a
number of American policy-makers. Nevertheless, Western, and
more particularly American, policy seemed almost to have achieved
a momentum of its own, and the policies established earlier in the
negotiations were pursued with very little modification.
There were several reasons for this. The manner in which the
United States, at the end of 1959, had phrased its decision to
continue the moratorium meant that a positive decision would be
required to resume testing, and that in the absence of such a
decision, the moratorium would continue. There were a number of
inhibitions against taking a positive decision to resume testing
nuclear weapons. On May 28, Chairman Khrushchev warned that
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the USSR would resume nuclear testing if the United States did. 1
Moreover, during the late spring and early summer the Administration wanted to avoid having the matter become involved in the
politics of the presidential election. That it very nearly did become
involved could be seen in the debate on the Republican platform in
July. 2 The Administration felt that to do anything other than maintain the status quo would affect, and perhaps in a disadvantageous
way, the chances of the Republican presidential candidate.
President Eisenhower decided, however, that if Richard Nixon
won the presidential election, he, Eisenhower, would announce that
the United States would resume nuclear testing. His purpose in
doing this would be to spare his Republican successor the burden
of taking this-in his view-unpopular step. When John F. Kennedy
won the election, President Eisenhower felt that the decision should
be left to him, particularly since Kennedy had stated on several
occasions during the election that he favored continuing and intensifying the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban.
Another factor inhibiting the possibility of changing American
policy concerning the nuclear test ban negotiations was that as the
year went on East-West tension rose. On June 27, the USSR walked
out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks. The following month
the Congo crisis erupted, and despite early unanimity, by late
August the USSR and the United States were at loggerheads over
their own and the UN's roles in these events. To take action such
as resuming nuclear tests might jeopardize a remaining point of
East-West contact and also further exacerbate relations between the
two powers. Furthermore, these events tended to push other matters
into the background and the attention of policy-makers was focused
on them rather than on the test ban negotiations.
In another way also, American policy had a momentum which
carried it ahead in the previously set direction. Project Vela was
now underway, and it represented a large and continuing effort.
Not only were funds and people committed at this point, but also
the promise that scientific research might yield means of circumventing the perceived technical difficulties remained. For all of these
reasons then, American policy continued virtually without change.
lNew York Times, May 29, 1960, p. 1.
New York Times, July 24, 1960, p. 38; July 26, 1960, p. 21; and
July 27, 1960, p. 17.
2 See
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Safeguards: Some Revolutionary Concepts
There were, however, some slight modifications in American
policy. The original plan for the Vela Program had called for a
series of underground nuclear explosions starting in the fall of 1960.
As early as May 27, the USSR demanded precise information on
the safeguards which would be established so that it could be certain
that the experiments were not being used for weapons development
purposes. 3 The initial American proposal merely provided for:
observation of the detonations; limitations on the instrumentation
which could be used at the time of the detonation; and prior placement of the devices which were to be detonated in a depository
which would be guarded jointly. 4 Representatives of the other side
could examine only the exterior of the devices.
The Soviet Union argued that this was insufficient and maintained that unless the Vela shots were carried out with appropriate
safeguards, it would regard them as parts of a weapons development
program, would consider that the moratorium had been broken,
and would feel free to resume weapons testing itself. 5 As Mr.
Tsarapkin explained it, appropriate safeguards would involve full
Soviet participation in the detonations, the right to inspect the internal structure of the devices used and to have a veto over the
type of shots to be fired. He made it clear that the Soviet Union
would not allow decoupled shots.
This was where matters stood in mid-summer, 1960. Meanwhile the United States had gone ahead with its plans for chemical
explosions and had invited the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to send observers for a shot planned for July 14, with the
stipulation that American scientists should receive reciprocal privileges to observe chemical explosions in those two countries. On
June 27, the USSR refu&ed to agree to this in the absence of agreement on the overall research program, including the matter of
safeguards, and Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the question of reciprocity therefore did not arise. 6 The United States conducted the
explosion with observers only from the United Kingdom.
On July 12, the United States introduced a new proposal on
3GEN/DNT/PV.
4GEN/DNT/PV.
5GEN/DNT/PV.
6GEN/DNT/PV.

206,
208,
214,
220,

pp. 8-9.
pp. 3-9.
p. 7.
p. 12.
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safeguards. It suggested that all three powers should put a number
of outmoded weapons in a pool which would be under joint surveillance and from which devices could be drawn for experimental
detonations. 7 All three parties could inspect the internal structures
of these devices. The United States Administration promised to seek
changes in the Atomic Energy legislation so that this would be
possible. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been consulted before the offer was made, and had given its tentative consent.
Had the offer been accepted, and appropriate legislation adopted, a
most interesting situation would have resulted, for the United
States would have willingly revealed to its chief adversary in the
Cold War secrets regarding nuclear weapons which it would not
reveal to most of its allies. That policy-makers would even consider
such action is an interesting commentary on the impact of nuclear
weapons on international politics.
Although Mr. Tsarapkin allowed that the new American
position was a step forward, he asserted that as the USSR did
not plan to conduct any nuclear explosions, it would not contribute
any devices to the pool and thus would not reveal any of its nuclear
weapons to the United States. Since the United States would not
create a pool unilaterally, an impasse resulted, and consequently
the proposed nuclear explosions in the Vela Program were postponed.

One Agreement-Continuing Disagreements
Soviet policy also was rather static during this period. Some
of the same factors that were operative in the American case may
have affected the USSR too. To some degree both sides were
reluctant to act during the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration. In addition, during this period Sino-Soviet tensions deepened, 8 and opposition to Chairman Khrushchev's policies may well
have increased within the Soviet elite. Khrushchev's views on
security policy, particularly those which he expressed in his January
1960 speech concerning the composition of the Soviet armed forces,
are known to have occasioned some controversy among Soviet
7GEN/DNT/PV. 227, pp. 3 ff.
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961.

8 See
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policy-makers. 9 It is also possible that the Soviet leadership had
already decided to resume nuclear testing, once preparations could
be completed.
One technical matter was resolved by the Geneva Conference
during 1960: on July 2 7 the three parties agreed on a precise
definition of 4.75 seismic magnitude. 10 In view of the previous
disputes on this issue, and if 4.75 were to be a threshold in a
treaty, this agreement was relatively important, but little other
progress was made. There continued to be disagreement on the
size of the q~wta of on-site inspections, although on July 26 the
Soviet Union finally advanced a concrete figure, 3. 11 The criteria
to be used for the initiation of on-site inspections and the degree
of localization required were also in dispute.
In addition, it became apparent that East and West had quite
different conceptions of how many control posts would be required
on each other's territories. On May 12, the United States had
submitted a proposal which provided that the network of control
posts would be established in three overlapping phases, each lasting
four years, so that within six years the entire system would be in
operation.l 2 The first phase provided for 21 posts in the Soviet
Union, 1 in the United Kingdom, 11 in the United States, and 2
on ships and 12 on islands in the northern hemisphere.
The Soviet Union responded to this proposal on August 11.
It protested that the proposal did not provide in the first phase for
control posts in the southern hemisphere, where it was known that
the Western powers had carried out weapon tests. The USSR also
complained that the proposal provided for too many posts in the
Soviet Union and too few in the United States. 13 The Soviet counterproposal envisaged the establishment in the first phase of 15 control
posts in the Soviet Union, 11 in the United States, 1 in the United
Kingdom, 7 in Australia, 20 on oceanic islands belonging to the
United States and the United Kingdom, 2 in North America ex9 See Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (1964),
especially pp. 31-37.
IOGEN/DNT/PV. 235.
llGEN/DNT/PV. 234, p. 15.
I2GEN/DNT/22/ Add. 1.
13GEN/DNT/PV. 241, pp. 12-19.
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elusive of the United States, 2 in Africa, and 10 on ships. 14 In total,
there would be 68 control posts, rather than 4 7 as in the American
proposal. With a touch of irony, Mr. Tsarapkin supported the
Soviet proposal by citing portions of Richard Latter's testimony
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in April 1960, and
pointed out that Dr. Latter had assumed that there would be 14
control posts in the United States, rather than 11 as the United
States proposed. 15 No progress was made toward resolving these
difficulties during 1960.
In the discussion of the installation of the control· posts, another
related difference became apparent. In November, Mr. Tsarapkin
made it known that the Soviet Union would not allow any on-site
inspections until the conclusion of the first phase in the installation
of control posts, a process which in its view would take four
years. 16 The Western powers, on the other hand, envisaged the first
phase as being divided into two two-year periods, and maintained
that on-site inspections could and should begin at the end of the
first period. This difference also remained unresolved.

The Acrimonious Fifteenth General Assembly
The deteriorating atmosphere of the Geneva Conference was
evident in the conduct of the United States and the USSR in the
fifteenth session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1960. Both
gave detailed expositions and justifications of their positions. 11 The
debate was acrimonious. Poland submitted a resolution which would
have placed the question of the cessation of nuclear tests before a
special session of the General Assembly if agreement were not
reached by April 1, 1961, and which would have requested the
nuclear powers to maintain the moratorium on testing until an
agreement had been achieved. 18 The resolution also contained
several provisions aimed at preventing the dispersion of nuclear
weapons capability, some of which might have been construed as
directed against NATO programs then in effect. Because of a pro14GEN/DNT/104.
15GEN/DNT/PV. 256, p. 10.
16GEN/DNT/PV. 270, pp. 11-12.
1 7UN, General Assembly, First Committee, Official Records (15th
Session), pp. 190-92, 193-95.
lBUN Document A/C. 1/L. 252.
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cedural decision, this resolution was not put to the vote; however,
three other resolutions relating more or less directly to the Geneva
Conference were.
The first of these was a resolution submitted by Ireland concerning the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The second was a resolution offered by Austria, India, and
Sweden urging the states which were engaged in the test ban
negotiations to press toward agreement and to continue their
voluntary moratorium on testing. The third, sponsored by twenty-five
African and Asian states and Venezuela, also made these same
requests. 19
The three resolutions were all adopted by large majorities: 68
to 9, with 26 abstentions; 72 to 0, with 5 abstentions; and 67 to
11, with 11 abstentions, respectively. The Soviet Union voted for
all three resolutions, the United Kingdom abstained on the first,
but voted for the second and third, and the United States abstained
on all three. The position of the Western powers on the first resolution was determined by the French attitude. The French remained
adamant in their determination to acquire a nuclear capability and
detonated their third nuclear explosion on December 27, 1960.
The United States abstained on the last two resolutions because
it felt that the language of the three power draft implied that the
unresolved issues in the Geneva Conference were unimportant, and
because both asked for a continuation of the moratorium. As the
votes indicate, the United States was as distant from the main-stream
of majority sentiment in the United Nations concerning this issue
as it ever had been, or would be, during the test ban negotiations.
Matters relating to these negotiations, however, were largely
submerged in the broader issues that gripped the Assembly. The
Soviet proposal for General and Complete Disarmament, a followup to Chairman Khrushchev's suggestion at the previous session of
the Assembly, was debated heatedly and at length, but without
resolution. Chairman Khrushchev's attack on Secretary General
Hammarskjold and demand for a reorganization of the upper levels
of the Secretariat, a product of the Congo crisis, was also in the
forefront, and this controversy carried over into the Geneva Conference.
1 9See General Assembly Resolutions 1576 {XV), 1577 {XV), and
1578 {XV).
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II

The Kennedy Administration: A Renewed Effort
Reappraising of the American Position
On January 20, 1961, when the Kennedy Administration assumed
power, American policy in the test ban negotiations seemed to
have reached a dead end. The Geneva talks were clearly deadlocked, and, as evidenced by the voting on these issues in the
fifteenth General Assembly, United States policy obviously commanded little worldwide support. Even the United Kingdom,
America's partner in the Geneva negotiations, did not vote with
the United States. These facts alone would have made a new
administration reappraise past policies. Further, as a Senator and
a presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy had been highly critical
of the Eisenhower Administration's policies relating to disarmament
and arms control. 20 During the presidential campaign, he had
written a letter to Thomas E. Murray in which he had pledged that
if he were elected, the United States would not be the first to begin
atmospheric tests, and that if the Geneva Conference were still in
progress when he assumed office, he would direct "vigorous negotiation . . . in the hope of concluding a realistic and effective
agreement." 21 He had also stated that he would direct the Atomic
Energy Commission to prepare for underground testing, and if
agreement were not reached within a reasonable period, he would
order the resumption of underground testing.
Even before his inauguration, President Kennedy appointed
John J. McCloy-a prominent Republican-as his adviser on
disarmament. Five days after the inauguration, the United States
Disarmament Administration, a unit within the Department of State
created in September 1960, and the forerunner of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, announced the appointment of a panel headed by Dr. James B. Fisk, to study and review
the technical aspects of the test ban negotiations. 22 A few days
20See, for example, his remarks at the University of New Hampshire,
Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 58-65. See also John F. Kennedy
(Allan Nevins, ed.), The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper, 1960), pp.
19-30.
21Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 289.
22The other members of the panel were Dr. Hans A. Bethe; General
Austin W. Betts, Division of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commis-
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later, the President named Arthur Dean-usually considered a
Republican-as United States Representative to the Geneva Conference. Other personnel changes also resulted from the inauguration of the new Administration. From the point of view of the
nuclear test ban negotiations, the most important of the new officials
were: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission; and Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology. Dr. Wiesner, in particular, was deeply worried about the nuclear arms race and committed
to making every possible effort to obtain measures of arms control
and disarmament. He had also been critical of past American
policy. In an article published in the fall of 1960 he had stated
that " ... the West has always been suspicious of Soviet proposals,
and furthermore has generally been ultraconservative in the inspection requirements it places upon any system."23
On balance, the new policy-makers probably contributed
more to the reformulation of American policy than the technical
review, which was after all conducted by the same scientists who
had been active in the Eisenhower Administration. Moreover, at
this date, early 1961, Project Vela had produced very little. Various
close observers have noted how important the change in personnel
at the top policy-making echelons was. Sir Michael Wright, the
sometime British representative in the negotiations has asserted
that President Kennedy took decisions on issues ". . . over which
the previous administration had been hesitating, in some cases for
sion; Dr. Harold Brown, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology; Dr. Richard Latter, the RAND Corporation;
General Herbert B. Loper, Office of Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense; Dr. J. Carson Mark, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories; Doyle
Northrup, Air Force Technical Application Center, Department of Defense;
Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford
University; Dr. Frank Press, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute
of Technology, Pasadena, California; General Alfred D. Starbird, Division
of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commission; and Dr. Herbert F.
York, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense. In addition, there were observers from interested government agencies and departments.
23Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems,"
Daedalus (Fall 1960), pp. 915-50, at 917-18.
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a year or even two years." 24 And Earl H. Voss has written that
with the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration, for the first
time a United States administration " . . . agreed within its own
house on a complete program for ending nuclear tests. " 25
To facilitate the review of American policy, President Kennedy
requested that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations be delayed.
The new American position was approved by the President and
discussed with the United Kingdom toward the end of February.
When the Geneva Conference resumed on March 21, Ambassador
Dean presented the broad outlines of the new position,26 and, on
April 18, jointly with the United Kingdom representative, he
tabled a draft treaty embodying the new proposals. 27 This was the
first time that the United States had tabled a complete treaty. As
in the past, prior to their formal presentation, several aspects of
the new American position were discussed in the Western press.
So far as technical matters were concerned, the changes in
the United States position were not major. The United States still
envisaged a threshold treaty which would not cover events of less
than 4.75 seismic magnitude. It was, however, willing to ban all
tests at high altitudes and in outer space. The United States urged
the Soviet Union to reconsider its opposition to backscatter radar,
but it proposed a control system based on the principal recommendations of Technical Working Group I. The United States'
views on the length of the moratorium and on events not covered
by the treaty were modified somewhat. It now proposed that the
research program and the moratorium should be coterminous, each
lasting three years from the date of the signature of the Treaty. The
United States was also willing to accept the Soviet position on
safeguards on research explosions; that is, it was willing to agree
that, if the United States alone conducted nuclear explosions, Soviet
scientists could examine American nuclear devices without the
USSR's giving American scientists reciprocal privileges. Ambassador
Dean stated that the President would request that the Atomic Energy Act be amended so that this could be implemented. In terms
24Disarm and Verify, p. 127.
25Nuclear Ambush, p. 459.
26QEN/DNT/PV. 274, pp. 16-27.
27QEN/DNT/110 and corr. 1.

272

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

of implications for traditional friend-foe relationships in world
politics, this change made the American proposal even more extraordinary, and underscored again the impact of nuclear weapons on
the nature of politics and relations among states. The American
position continued to be that a quota of 20 on-site inspections
would be necessary for the Soviet Union, but it was willing for
quotas of 20 to be assigned to both of the Western powers. The
United States was also willing to alter the proposed distribution of
control posts in Asia, so that there would be a total of 19 control
posts in the Soviet Union, rather than 21.
In sum, the United States sought to meet the Soviet position
by offering various compromises on points to which the USSR had
objected in the past. Much of this was the result of a careful study
of the record of the negotiations through 1960 by Ambassador
Dean and others. With respect to the basic technical issues which
had divided the Conference, however, little modification was made
in the Western position. The new Administration, like its predecessor, felt bound by the "facts" as they were then understood.
Soviet Disengagement: "Troika" and France
Much to the disappointment of the new Administration, the
changes in the American position were without effect in terms of
advancing the negotiations. Though it did little to soften the blow,
this result was predicted even before the Geneva Conference resumed. 28 The Soviet attitude toward the test ban negotiations appears to have shifted significantly by this time, and apparently
Chairman Khrushchev forecast this on March 9 in a lengthy interview with the American Ambassador in the USSR, Llewelyn E.
Thompson.
Mr. Tsarapkin's opening speech in the Conference on March
21 dramatically demonstrated how much the Soviet position had
changed. 29 After a bitter ex parte account of the negotiations, he
stated that on the basis of the Soviet Union's experience in "other
international organizations" the USSR now felt that "the single
administrator of the control system should be replaced by a collective executive organ, in which the three main groups of States would
28See New York Times, March 20, 1961, p. 1.
29GEN/DNT/PV. 274, pp. 3-16.
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be equally represented and invested with equal rights. " 30 In other
words, Chairman Khrushchev's suggestion for the reorganization
of the upper levels of the Secretariat of the United Nations was
now applied to the proposed control system. This was the first
time that this issue had permeated the Geneva Conference.
In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin raised the question of the French
tests of nuclear weapons. His exact words bear analysis, for they
were certainly scrutinized with care by American policy-makers.
In conducting nuclear weapons tests, the French Government is actively spurring on the nuclear armaments
race. If this development of events is not checked, the
number of States possessing nuclear weapons will rapidly
grow. In that case, it will be much more difficult to reach
agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and all
the more difficult to reach agreement on disarmament.
At the same time the French nuclear explosions reveal the true meaning of the position which the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have
taken up at our Conference, namely, by endlessly dragging
out the discussions on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, they, that is the United States and the United
Kingdom, have provided their NATO ally-France-with
time in which to conduct further nuclear weapon tests.
All this looks very much like what one might term a
"division of labour" among the allies. We cannot ignore
in our negotiations the fact that in conducting nuclear
weapon tests, France as a member of NATO can, in line
with her commitments to her allies within the NATO
framework, carry out for other members of this military
group--in other words on behalf of the United States and
the United Kingdom-definite work in connexion with the
improvement of nuclear weapons and perhaps even the
creation of new types of weapons. Such activity by the
Western countries, while the Soviet Union is honestly fulfilling its commitment not to conduct nuclear tests, cannot
be viewed in any other way except as a desire by the
Western Powers to obtain for themselves one-sided advantages. All this threatens to nullify the possibility of
concluding a treaty and to render it pointless. 3 1
30fbid., p. 14.
Sl[bid., pp. 15-16.
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It was difficult to know whether the USSR interjected this issue as
a pretext to justify actions taken for other reasons or because of
genuine concern. In one sense, the innuendo contained in the statement, that France was conducting nuclear weapons tests for the
United Kingdom and the United States-which was subsequently
turned into an outright allegation-was blatantly false and the
Soviet Government clearly must have been aware of this. The
French explosions were caused by technically simple devices, not
the sophisticated mechanisms that the United Kingdom and the
United States would be interested in testing, and the Soviet national
monitoring system must have given Soviet leaders data that would
indicate this fact.
If the statement were approached somewhat less literally, and
a good case could be made for searching for allegorical meanings
in Soviet statements, it perhaps had more significance. Even without elaborate inference, the meaning of the first paragraph is fairly
clear and the proposition which it contains is almost axiomatic.
Moreover, the development of a nuclear capability by France
probably had implications for the dispersion of nuclear weapons
capabilities within the Soviet bloc, and especially it may have fanned
the desire of Communist China to acquire a nuclear capability. By
this time, the USSR had refused to assist the Chinese in gaining an
independent nuclear capability, and in mid-1960 all Soviet economic
and military advisers and technicians had been withdrawn from
China. 32
With respect to the second paragraph, although it was true
that the Soviet Union should have been able to tell that the devices
that France had detonated were unsophisticated, and therefore of
little or no interest to the United Kingdom and the United States,
as the French weapons program progressed, at some future point,
such discrimination might not be as easy. Moreover, the mere fact
that France was developing a nuclear weapons capability had implications for the overall strength of NATO in relation to the Warsaw Pact, regardless of the initial lack of sophistication of these
weapons.
32Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue, 1963,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1964), pp. 99-115, at
p. 113.
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Thus it was quite plausible that the continued testing of nuclear
weapons by France might be a matter of serious concern to the
Soviet Union. If stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to "nth"
countries was a motivating factor in Soviet policy with respect to
the Geneva negotiations, the French action probably decreased the
attractiveness of the negotiations, or of a test ban, for it indicated
how weak an instrument these devices were and might be for controlling the spread. If the USSR were genuinely concerned about
the French nuclear weapons development program, the fourth detonation in the program on April 25, 1961, probably served to heighten
Soviet fears and to dramatize the fact that the United Kingdom and
the United States could not or would not restrain the French.
Mr. Tsarapkin's speech signaled a sharp change in the Soviet
conduct in the negotiations. From that point on the USSR was
increasingly intransigent. The stalemate was obvious, but at this
point the motivations for Soviet behavior were not. Were the concerns which Mr. Tsarapkin mentioned the explanation for Soviet
conduct, or merely pretexts to cover courses chosen for other
reasons? Did the USSR expect still further concessions, or was it
seeking to provoke the West into breaking off the negotiations?33
Within the United States, pressures to resume nuclear testing
mounted. 34
For the time being, however, the Kennedy Administration
stuck to its determination to try to achieve a test ban, and refused
to accept the most pessimistic interpretations of Soviet behavior..
On May 29, Ambassador Dean suggested a new approach to the
problem of the quota for on-site inspections. 85 He proposed that
the quota should be established on the basis of a sliding scale,
and that the quota for the USSR should range from 12 to 20. The
lower number would prevail if there were not more than sixty
located seismic events of magnitude 4.75 or above during the year.
The quota would rise by one for each five located seismic events of
magnitude 4.75 or above; beyond 60, however, no more than 20
on-site inspections would be authorized under any circumstances.
Even with the personnel of the new Administration, achieving conS3Earl H. Voss favors the latter interpretation; see Nuclear Ambush,
p. 460.
S4See ibid., pp. 462-63.
85QEN/DNT/PV. 311, pp. 3-11.
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sensus on this new position had been difficult, yet it and other
Western concessions were ignored.
When President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in
Vienna on June 3 and 4 for a general discussion of critical world
problems, the test ban negotiations seemed to be completely deadlocked. The talks between the two leaders did not change this
situation, in fact, at the conclusion of the discussions the chances
of a test ban treaty seemed even more remote than they had previously. Khrushchev insisted that any more than three on-site
inspections per year would constitute espionage and argued that the
Congo crisis had demonstrated the necessity for a "troika" arrangement in the control organization. 35a Kennedy attempted to counter
these points and stressed the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Khrushchev in return depreciated the importance of a test ban as an isolated
measure of arms control. He did tell Kennedy, however, that the
USSR would not resume nuclear testing until the United States did,
and Gromyko said the same thing to Rusk. 35 b
During the course of the conversations, Chairman Khrushchev handed President Kennedy an aide memoire which reiterated the general Soviet position as enunciated in the Geneva Conference. It went on to suggest that the difficulties facing the negotiators could be eased, and implied that the Soviet proposal for a
"troika" would be dropped, if the problems of a test ban and
general and complete disarmament were solved simultaneously. 36
The Soviet Union seemed to be saying that the West could only
obtain the controls which it argued were necessary for a test ban
treaty in the context of general and complete disarmament. Subsequent questioning in Geneva and diplomatic correspondence brought
out that this was indeed the Soviet position. In Geneva, the questions
led to an acrimonious exchange. Now, in contrast to the situation
prior to January 1959, it was the Soviet Union rather than the West
which insisted that a test ban could only be considered in combination
35aDetailed accounts of the Vienna meeting can be found in Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(1965), pp. 369-72, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (1965), pp. 549 and
617-18.
35bArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 398, and Theodore
C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 617-18.
36Geneva Conference, pp. 538-42.
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with other measures of disarmament. The circle was closed! As the
talks dragged on in Geneva through the summer of 1961, Ambassador Dean became increasingly convinced that they were fruitless and
that the USSR was preparing to resume nuclear testing. He cabled his
views to the Department of State. Several policy-makers and observers
shared his opinion.
To Test or Not To Test
In this atmosphere, further darkened by the developing Berlin
crisis, the pressure in the United States for ending the moratorium on
nuclear testing mounted, and this pressure was alluded to in the
various exchanges. As early as February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
urged the President to resume testing if agreement were not reached
within sixty days of negotiations. 36a The Joint Chiefs favored atmospheric testing. The Department of Defense, though, would have
limited the resumption to underground testing. There were also
pressures from Congress, especially from the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, from the press and from public opinion. A Gallup
Poll in July 1961 showed more than two-to-one public support for
the United States unilaterally resuming testing.
As a response to the pressure, and also to gain advice, on
June 28, President Kennedy announced the formation through the
President's Science Advisory Committee of an eleven-man ad hoc
panel, headed by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, to review technical
questions connected with the problem of nuclear testing. 37 Their
mandate was to consider whether or not the Soviet Union could be
conducting clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium, and
what progress the USSR could make through such tests. The group
36aFor accounts of these pressures see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A
Thousand Days, pp. 454-58, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 618.
37The other members of the panel were William 0. Baker, Vice President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Hans A. Bethe, Professor of Physics,
Cornell University; Norris E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory; James B. Fisk, President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; John S.
Foster, Director, University of California Radiation Laboratory; George B.
Kistiakowsky, Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University; Frank Press,
Director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California; Louis H. Roddis, President, Pennsylvania Electric Co.;
John W. Tukey, Professor of Mathematics, Princeton University; Walter H.
Zinn, Vice-President, Nuclear Division, Combustion Engineering, Inc.
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was also asked to consider what progress the United States could
make if it resumed nuclear testing, and what would happen if both
sides resumed testing. In connection with the last question the panel
was specifically asked to estimate the possibility of the Soviet Union's
overcoming the United States' lead in nuclear weapons.
This panel did not complete its work until early August 1961.
Meanwhile, no decision was taken to resume nuclear testing, nor
were large-scale preparations made for such a contingency. When
the Panofsky Panel reported to the President and the National Security Council it concluded that " ... it was feasible for the Soviet Union
to have conducted secret tests, that there was no evidence that it had
done so (or had not done so), and that there was no urgent technical
need for immediate resumption by the United States." 37 a The Joint
Chiefs of Staff filed a paper questioning the premises and the conclusions of the Panel's report. In the ensuing discussion, they and
certain scientists, such as JohnS. Foster, the Director of the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory, argued for at least a limited resumption of
nuclear testing underground. However, the President rejected their
advice. During this period the Western position in the test ban
negotiations seemed to enjoy considerable support among the governments of the world and in the world press, and the Administration decided that it should continue to attempt to capitalize
on this. On July 15, the Western powers had requested that an
item entitled "The Urgent Need for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests Under Effective International Control" be inscribed on
the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. 38 For
the United States to resume testing would obviously hamper Western efforts to muster support in the forthcoming Assembly. Moreover, the heads of state or government of twenty-five nonaligned
states were scheduled to meet in Belgrade from September 1 through
September 6. For the United States to decide to resume testing
would risk condemnation by this group.
The United States not only did not decide to resume nuclear
weapons testing, it did not even make preparations to do so. President Kennedy decided that in the relatively open conditions in
which policy is formulated in the United States, one must decide
37aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 456.
3SUN Document A/4799.
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either to test or not to test. Preparations as extensive as those
which would be required for a major test series could probably
not be kept secret, and if they became known, he reasoned, they
would surely be interpreted as indicating a decision to test, and the
United States would suffer from all of the adverse consequences
that it would have faced had it actually decided to resume nuclear
testing. However, in mid-August, President Kennedy concluded that
sometime later in the fall, the Atomic Energy Commission might
announce contingency preparations for underground testing, although
this would not mean that the United States had decided to resume
tests. ssa
It is true that as a part of the Vela and peaceful uses programs some preparations were made for underground nuclear testing in Nevada. This work consisted principally of readying tunnels,
and in Geneva the United States sought to negotiate safeguards
to assure the Soviet Union that the projected detonations would
not involve weapons development.
To prove that the United States was not preparing a weapons
testing program, in the summer of 1961 Ambassador Dean and
Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Advisor to the President on Disarmament, offered to allow a team of Soviet or neutral experts to examine
American testing sites to determine the extent of American preparations for the resumption of testing, if any, provided that the USSR
would give the United States reciprocal privileges. 39 On several
occasions, the proposal was rejected as "impractical." The reasons
for the suggestion's impracticality soon emerged.
Actually Chairman Khrushchev hinted at these reasons in his
meeting with Mr. McCloy. He told Mr. McCloy "that Soviet scientists and military leaders were urging the testing of a 100-megaton
bomb that could be carried in a rocket." 40 Mr. McCloy, of course,
cabled these words to the President. They were another forewarning.
The only action that was taken in response to the warnings
of Mr. McCloy, Ambassador Dean, and others was to step up
38aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 458-59.
3 9 See GEN/DNT/PV. 341, p. 75, and John J. McCloy, "Balance Sheet
on Disarmament," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XL, No. 3 (April 1962), pp. 33959, at 342, note 2.
40Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 467.
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American surveillance of the Soviet Union, to the extent that this
could be done.
In Geneva, at the negotiating table, the United States even
offered new concessions. Ambassador Dean presented these to the
Conference on August 28. 41 He offered to eliminate the 4.75
seismic magnitude threshold in the treaty, if the Soviet Union
would agree to increasing the number of manned or unmanned
control posts or of on-site inspections. Alternatively, if the threshold
were kept, he proposed that six months prior to the expiration of
the moratorium, a panel composed of one scientist from each of
the countries on the Control Commission should be convened to
propose recommendations on improved instrumentation, and on
lowering the threshold. As was no doubt expected, the USSR rebuffed these suggestions, arguing that the problems could only be
solved in the context of general and complete disarmament.
III

The Coup de Grace
The USSR Breaks the Moratorium
At 12:30 p.m. on Thursday, August 30, 1961, the three-hundredand-thirty-eighth session of the Geneva Conference adjourned. Like
countless meetings before it, it had produced no resolution of the
stalemate. On the other hand, the three delegates gave no indication
that their governments were about to break off or in any way disrupt
the negotiations. The next meeting was scheduled for Friday,
September 1. Thursday evening, however, the torporific atmosphere
of the negotiations was broken when Moscow radio announced that
the USSR had decided to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. 42
The statement denigrated the importance of a test ban as a sole
measure of arms control, and it cited the French nuclear tests and
the tension surrounding the German and Berlin problems as the
reasons for the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. It disclosed
that the USSR had worked out designs for creating a series of
"superpowerful nuclear bombs" of from 20 to 100 megatons.
On September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union tested the first
41GEN/DNT/PV. 337, pp. 3-14.
42U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1961 (1962), pp. 337-43.
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nuclear device in what was to become its most extensive series of
tests, a series which would involve the largest nuclear detonations
ever conducted, and which experts estimate must have taken a
minimum of six months, and more likely a year or more to prepare. It is possible that the USSR began preparing for this test
series shortly after the collapse of the summit meeting in late May
1960. Clearly preparations must have been underway by the time
that the Kennedy Administration completed its reappraisal of the
American position and tabled the new Western proposals, that is,
by March 21, 1961. This is not to say, however, that the decision
to conduct the test series must have been taken by then. That decision could well have been delayed until shortly before the first
detonation in the series. Meanwhile, in sharp contrast to the situation in the United States, the preparations could be conducted in
secret.
Little mention was made of the tests in the Soviet press. Significantly, the USSR also tested several intercontinental ballistic
missiles during September 1961, which roused the suspicion that
the two developments were related, that they were designed to
perfect a new series of ballistic missiles and their warheads as
Chairman Khrushchev's talk with Mr. McCloy had forewarned.
The Western Riposte
The Western response was swift. Shortly after the Soviet
statement, the White House issued a statement condemning the
USSR's decision to break the moratorium.
Although he was bitterly disappointed, and felt personally
deceived, President Kennedy chose this course, and did not follow the
advice of those, including apparently Secretary of State Rusk, who
argued that the United States should immediately announce its intention to resume testing. 42 a The rationale for the decision taken was
that the United States should not do anything that might deflect the
opprobrium of public opinion from the Soviet deed. Edward R.
Murrow was the most articulate spokesman against precipitate action.
Kennedy, and Vice-President Johnson too, felt that they could with42aSee Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, pp. 449-50, 459,
and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 619-20.
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stand for a while the pressure of those in the Senate and elsewhere
who demanded a more belligerent course.
On September 3, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
USSR immediately agree not to conduct nuclear tests "which take
place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout." 43 This
agreement would require no international control measures, and the
Western leaders proposed that representatives of the three states meet
in Geneva not later than September 9 to sign the agreement. This proposal was almost revolutionary in terms of past Western positions. For
the first time, the West announced its willingness to accept a ban
on testing in some environments, without the establishment of any
international control machinery. Never before had the Western powers admitted that national detection systems would be sufficient.
Whenever the Western powers discussed a partial ban previously,
they always maintained that at least some international control
machinery would be necessary. Some in the West, Senator Gore for
instance, had argued against this position from the outset. While
the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal won some immediate sympathy,
it also served to undermine past Western positions, and would
make it difficult for the Western powers to return-as they subsequently did-to the claim that international machinery would
be necessary to control atmospheric testing. The proposal also
meant that the Western powers were willing to allow the USSR to
realize whatever gains it might achieve from its tests without attempting to match them through a counter-series.
The Kennedy-Macmillan proposal was formulated in Secretary
of State Rusk's office by a small group of British and American
policy-makers al}d advisers. Their prime objective was to embarrass
the USSR. The proposal was a serious offer, which the participants in
the sessions were willing to implement. Indeed, somewhat earlier, the
American ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, had suggested that the West should try again for a limited ban, prohibiting
tests in the atmosphere and under water, and President Kennedy had
relayed this suggestion to Prime Minister Macmillan in a letter in
early August. 43" On the other hand, none of those who formulated
43Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 351.
43aArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 459.
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the September 3 proposal seriously expected the USSR to accept it.
Nor did any among them see much prospect for fruitful negotiation
in the future. Although the effects of the proposal on past and possible future Western positions were discussed, because of the immediate
objective and the expectations about the future, such effects were
accorded little weight in the final decision.
Chairman Khrushchev scornfully rejected the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal on September 9. Following this, the Western powers asked for a recess in the Geneva Conference until the decisions
of the sixteenth General Assembly were known.
On September 5, President Kennedy announced that he had
"ordered the resumption of nuclear tests in the laboratory and
underground, with no fallout. " 44 The first American test since
1958 took place on September 15. The test series which followed
was minor. The United States was not prepared to conduct major
experiments! Indeed, it was not until November 2 that President
Kennedy announced that atmospheric tests might be necessary and
that preparations were being made. On April 24, 1962, after the
Geneva Conference had ended, he announced that he had authorized atmospheric tests, and the first American atmospheric test
was conducted the following day. The British did not resume
nuclear tests until their underground shot on March 1, 1962.
Whether because of the quick United States decision to resume
underground nuclear tests, or because of a feeling that the United
States bore an equal or greater share of the blame for the fact that
a test ban agreement had not been achieved (a feeling to which
the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal for a nationally monitored atmospheric ban contributed in a curious way), or because of a more
general reluctance to condemn one side, and especially the Soviet
side in the Cold War, the neutral nations in Belgrade, while bemoaning the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, were almost
equally critical of the United States. This behavior angered President
Kennedy. 4411
The Sixteenth General Assembly
The West was somewhat more successful in mustering support
in the General Assembly of the United Nations. On October 27
44Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 355.
44aTheodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 538.
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the Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the USSR to refrain
from conducting a proposed atmospheric test of a nuclear device
of 50 megatons or more. 45 Only the Soviet bloc and Cuba opposed
this resolution, and Mali abstained, but all other UN Member
States voted for it. Despite this, on October 30, the USSR carried
out its test of the "superpowerful" bomb. Subsequent evaluations
estimated its yield as 58 megatons, but Hans Bethe, who headed the
ABC panel which evaluated the Soviet test series pointed out that
had the fusion materials been encased in uranium rather than lead,
its yield would have been 100 megatons or more. 46
The Assembly also adopted, by a vote of 71 to 11 (Soviet bloc
and Cuba) with 15 abstentions, a resolution submitted by the
United Kingdom and the United States entitled "The Urgent Need
for a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests Under Effective International Control."47 This resolution, in a sense, gave the Assembly's
sanction to the Western position in the test ban negotiations. This
was the first time that this had happened.
The United States and the United Kingdom voted for a resolution submitted by Ireland on the prevention of the dissemination
of nuclear weapons. 48 This resolution was very similar to that
which Ireland had submitted and which the Assembly had adopted
the previous year, and on which the United States had abstained.
The affirmative American vote at the sixteenth Assembly was another sign of the way in which the position of the Kennedy Administration on these matters differed from that of its predecessor.
Some of the Assembly's other actions in this general area
were not as pleasing to the West, however. The two Western powers
abstained from voting on a resolution which was submitted by
several African states urging that states consider and respect the
continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone, 49 since to favor such
a resolution would implicitly condemn the French for their nuclear
tests in the Sahara. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 55
to 0 with 44 abstentions.
45Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1632 (XVI).
46Speech delivered at Cornell University January 5, 1962. Reprinted in
the Congressional Record (1962), pp. A1397-99. See also Ralph E. Lapp,
Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation ( 1962), pp. 36-37.
47Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1649 (XVI).
48General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI).
49Qeneral Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI).
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The United Kingdom and the United States also voted against
a resolution which had originally been submitted by India, but
which was ultimately sponsored by several states, urging the states
concerned to resume the moratorium on nuclear testing and to
maintain it until the adoption of a test ban treaty. 50 The 20 states
which voted against this resolution were a curious combination of
the Soviet bloc and the West; 71 states voted for the resolution,
while 8 abstained.
Finally, the United States and the United Kingdom voted
against a far-reaching resolution which declared inter alia that:
(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is
contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United
Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter
of the United Nations.
(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons
is to be considered as violating the Charter of the
United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of
humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. 51
The resolution, which had been submitted by several neutralist
states, garnered 60 favorable votes, including those of the Soviet
bloc. Sixteen states voted against it, and 25 abstained. In a sense,
this resolution could be interpreted as a broad attack on the basic
concepts underlying Western military policy.
Whether on balance the United States could be said to have
achieved important gains in terms of mustering world support for
its position and against that of the Soviet Union is difficult to say.
Certainly the United States fared better in the sixteenth session
than it had the year before in the fifteenth, but it was far from
an unblemished victory. And it is worth noting that President Kennedy rejected the advice of Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland, who argued that the United States should bring the Soviet
resumption of testing before the Security Council. His reasoning was
that it would look hypocritical for the United States to take such
action if it had already decided to resume testing itself. 518
50General Assembly Resolution 1648 (XVI).
51General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI).
5laArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 481.
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The End of the Conference
After the passage of the Assembly resolutions on the test ban
negotiations, the United States proposed that the Geneva negotiations be resumed, and the Soviet Union in due course agreed. The
Conference therefore reconvened on November 28, 1961. Thirteen
meetings were held between then and January 29, 1962, when the
Geneva Conference finally recessed sine die.
The day before the Conference reconvened, the Soviet Government issued a statement, which was published in the world press
and which Mr. Tsarapkin subsequently read into the record. 52 The
essence of this statement was that the situation had changed radically since the test ban negotiations had begun, and that if the
negotiations were to continue, they would have to do so on a new
basis. Consequently, the USSR proposed the immediate conclusion
of an agreement "for the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the
atmosphere, under water and in outer space," to be monitored by
national detection systems. The statement cited the Western proposal of September 3 as evidence that national systems were adequate. In addition, the USSR proposed that there should be a
moratorium on underground tests, "pending agreement on a system
of control over underground explosions as a constituent part of
an international system of control over the implementation of a
programme of general and complete disarmament." The Soviet
Union also insisted that France should be brought into the negotiations. The USSR proposed a treaty embodying these provisions.
By implication the Soviet Union no longer accepted the report of
the Conference of Experts as the basis for the negotiations. In
fact, in arguing that an international control system was not necessary, the USSR reverted to the position that it had held prior to
1957 London negotiations.
The Western powers implicitly rejected the new Soviet proposal
immediately, and after joint British-American consultations formally
rejected it on January 16, 1962. They were willing to negotiate
on the basis of the proposals which they had tabled previously,
including the draft treaty of April 18, 1961, and subsequent modifications, but they insisted that an international control system was
necessary. With respect to the Western proposal of September 3,
52GEN/DNT/PV. 341, pp. 21-30.
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Ambassador Dean pointed out that it was confined to the atmosphere, that it had been made in the hope of forestalling imminent
Soviet tests which had been carried out, and that by its own terms
it had expired on September 9, 1961. 53 At this point, among other
things and perhaps above all, the Western powers wanted to retain
the freedom to C()nduct their own nuclear tests if their evaluations
of the current Soviet test series indicated that the relative military
strength of the two sides had been significantly altered.
Because of this new shift in the Soviet position, the test ban
talks were even more deeply deadlocked than they had been previously. Consequently, the Western powers proposed that the Conference should adjourn, and that the problem of a test ban should
be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, a
body which had been created by agreement between the Soviet
Union and the United States during the sixteenth session of the
General Assembly to consider the plans for general and complete
disarmament and which was scheduled to have its first meeting on
March 14, 1962. Since the Soviet Union would not agree to this,
the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
simply adjourned on January 29, 1962. It even proved impossible
to agree on a communique. When the Geneva Conference ended,
the technical controversies which had divided it since January 1959
remained unsolved. The attempts both of a technical and a political
nature to resolve these had been futile.

113QEN/DNT/PV. 342, pp. 13-14.

Chapter IX

Controversies Concerning the
Control Organization

I

An Overview
Even though they were somewhat overshadowed by the dispute
about technical matters and the coverage of the treaty, controversies
concerning the nature of the organization which would oversee
compliance with the proposed nuclear test ban were a prominent
feature of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests throughout its course. These controversies too were
unresolved when the Conference held its final meeting on January
29, 1962.
The controversies began in the early days of the negotiations
when the parties broadly outlined t.lteir positions. The positions
were developed in detail and probed, and several compromises
were arranged in the succeeding two years so that by mid-1960 the
gap between the positions of East and West had been narrowed
considerably. In 1961, however, this agreement evaporated.
Despite the fact that there is no provision for a control organization in the partial test ban treaty which was concluded in 1963,
the negotiations on these issues are of considerable interest. To
some extent these negotiations explain the absence of control
machinery from the Moscow Treaty. Moreover, they are one of the
few detailed discussions among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States about an international organization
which might have significant functions with respect to these powers
themselves as well as to other parties. Viewed more narrowly, the
Geneva negotiations represent the first concrete discussion among
the three nuclear powers of an arms control or disarmament organization since the late nineteen-forties. Although it is true that
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related issues were raised in the talks concerning the creation of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there was little
real negotiation in this instance as the Soviet Union largely accepted
the United States' draft proposal (which however had been prepared with an eye to Soviet sensibilities), and in any case, IAEA's
control mechanism was not designed to apply to the nuclear
powers. 1
The positions concerning the control organization advanced by
the participants in the Geneva Conference were a product of several
factors. They stemmed partially from each party's understanding of
the technical properties of the control mechanisms recommended
by the Conference of Experts and the subsequent technical meetings. Such matters as their estimate of the reliability of the instmments, whether or not the instmments could be made tamperproof,
and the clarity or ambiguity of the evidence that could be obtained
of possible violations, affected their attitude toward the human
elements of the control system. A related consideration involved
estimates about the technical proficiency, reliability, and impartiality
of personnel who might be recmited to staff the control system.
Their positions also implicitly reflected their basic assumptions about the societies which would be affected. Notions about
the degree of openness of a given society and the degree of access
that would be required to assure effective control and about the
need for taking institutional action, for instance in the event of a
violation, conditioned the concepts of a control organization which
the participants advanced. Then too, their confidence in their
unilateral means of obtaining information was also a factor.
In addition, each of the parties had had experience in functioning international organizations, especially the United Nations,
and this affected their approach toward the constitution of a new
organization. The West wanted to avoid a deadlock such as had
occurred in the UN Security Council as a result of the Cold War.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, obviously had in mind the
curtailment of its power in the United Nations when the center of
activities shifted from the Security Council to the "veto-less" GenlFor an excellent account of the establishment of IAEA, see Bernhard
G. Bechhoefer, "Negotiating the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency," International Organization, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Winter 1959), pp.
38-59.
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eral Assembly, and the Secretary General assumed important functions far beyond those originally contemplated. All parties to the
Conference wanted to avoid, if at all possible, problems which they
had encountered in the past.
Finally, each of the parties viewed a control organization for
a nuclear test ban as a possible precedent for other organizations in
the field of arms control and disarmament, and this too had an
impact on their positions. In the broadest sense, the Western powers
on the one hand and the Soviet Uniou on the other pressed for an
organization that would conform as closely as possible to their
ideology and image of world order.
Because so many of the questions relating to the control
organization involved both scientific and political aspects, United
States proposals relating to these matters had to pass through the
same process of interagency agreement as did broad policy positions concerning such matters as the continuation of the moratorium and the negotiations, and the threshold problem. This meant
that all of the American positions had to be approved either by the
Committee of Principals or by interagency working groups at a
lower level. Since it proved impossible in practice to determine precisely whether a given question was essentially political, scientific,
or military, and thus to identify the agency primarily concerned,
for all practical purposes each agency involved had power to block
the formulation of a position on almost any issue, or to insist that
its concepts should prevail. Not only was this procedure of achieving agreement within the American government a time-consuming
process, it also meant that the American negotiator was quite
tightly bound to rather rigid instructions.
The two Western powers tended to move in unison on issues
relating to the control organization, as they did in all aspects of
the negotiations. Many proposals were advanced jointly. A submission of a separate proposal by one or the other Western power
usually reflected a prearranged division of responsibility for the
presentation of material, rather than unilateral action, and in most
cases, joint approval could be assumed.
The United Kingdom felt a greater sense of independence on
these matters, however, than it did on the broader questions relating to the coverage of the treaty. It often attempted to play a
leading role on these issues within Western councils, and from
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time to time even acted unilaterally in the Conference. British
negotiators were particularly active during 1960, both before and
after the collapse of the summit meeting. Occasionally, the British
delegate even advanced proposals ad referendum, and Her Majesty's Government always ultimately accepted them and supported
its delegate. In early 1960, the United Kingdom hoped to make
it possible to consummate an agreement at the summit meeting.
After the collapse of the summit meeting, the United Kingdom's
primary objective apparently was to perpetuate the talks. The fact
that the United States was in the midst of an election campaign,
while the United Kingdom was not, having just completed a general
election the previous year, may also explain why the latter was
somewhat more active and flexible during 1960.
The Soviet Union generally left to the Western powers the
task of presenting detailed proposals on the organizational aspects
of the prospective treaty and expounded its position through comments and criticisms. It is true that the USSR tabled a "complete"
draft treaty on the opening day of the Conference, but this was a
bare skeleton. 2 Thereafter it occasionally submitted memoranda
on specific points, and very infrequently, formal treaty language.
However, until mid-1960, the Soviet delegate was often able to
respond more quickly to new suggestions than his American counterpart.
Discussions of a control organization were interspersed
throughout the 353 meetings of the Geneva Conference. Only for
a few days during this period was the possibility even mooted that
a test ban treaty need not provide for any control organization.
As recorded in Chapter VIII, on September 3, 1961, in an
effort to stave off further Soviet testing, President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Macmillan proposed that a treaty banning the
testing in the atmosphere of nuclear weapons which created radioactive fallout should be signed immediately and stated that such a
treaty could be monitored adequately by national systems. The
USSR refused this offer, and it expired on September 9, 1961. On
November 28, 1961, the Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty which
would rely exclusively on national detection systems, and it maintained this proposal until the end of the Conference. With the
2For the text, see supra pp. 122-23.
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exception of those two periods, all three parties to the negotiations
always acted on the assumption that any treaty would require the
creation of some control organization. Even the phased treaty
proposed by the United States on February 11, 1960, envisaged an
extensive control organization and system from the outset.
While the discussions concerning a control organization went
on continually throughout the Conference, there were certain periods when greater attention was devoted to these matters. The most
notable of these were ( 1) the opening period of the Conference
from October 31, 1958, through March 19, 1959; (2) the period
immediately prior to the convocation of Technical Working Group
II and during the early sessions of that body in late November
and December 1959; (3) the period immediately prior to the summit meeting in the spring of 1960; and ( 4) the period from March
21 through May 31, 1961, when, following the Kennedy Administration's accession to power, the Western states advanced a series
of compromise proposals. Bargaining, or the exchange of concessions, occurred only in the first three periods. These were the
three periods in which the prospects for agreement appeared to be
highest. Activity in the last period, that is in the spring of 1961,
was confined to an exposition of positions, although it was not
until this time that the West tabled an entire draft treaty.
II

The Initial Opposing Concepts of the Control Organization
The Western Blueprint
An analysis of the controversies during the Geneva Conference
concerning the proposed control organization can appropriately
begin by outlining the broad concepts which the two sides advanced
initially. The basic Western ideas were set forth in a memorandum
tabled by the British on November 13, 1958,3 a working paper
presented by the United States on November 13, 1958,4 four draft
articles tabled by the United States on December 15, 1958,5 and a
draft annex I, concerning the Detection and Identification System
4GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8.
SGEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5.
liGEN/DNT/21.
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introduced by the United States the following day. 6 Oral presentations elaborated the points made in these documents and added
others.
The Western blueprint was extensive. It was an amalgam of
traditional concepts of international organization prevalent in the
West and the technical system proposed in the report of the Conference of Experts. It provided for a Conference, a Commission,
and an Administrator. All treaty signatories would be represented
in the Conference, which would hold annual meetings and could
convene in special sessions. The functions of the Conference would
be to approve budgets recommended by the Commission, consider
and approve reports, consider amendments to the treaty, and propose matters for consideration by the Commission. The Commission would consist of the Original Parties (the three nuclear powers in the Geneva Conference) as permanent members and an
unspecified number of states elected by the Conference. It would
be organized, like the Security Council of the United Nations, so
that it could function continuously. It would oversee the installation and operation of the Detection and Identification System, appoint and direct the activities of the Administrator of the system,
authorize nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes, and prepare
findings with respect to violations of the treaty. Although at an
early stage the Western powers allowed that some decisions of the
Commission would require the unanimous agreement of the Original Parties, these were not specified. For most decisions, only some
form of majority would be required. According to the Western
plans, the Administrator would be responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the detection system, most aspects of which would
function automatically on the basis of predetermined criteria. Thus,
although the Administrator would oversee on-site inspections,
decisions concerning their dispatch would depend solely on whether
or not certain criteria had been met.
Following the recommendation of the Conference of Experts,
the Western plan envisaged the ultimate establishment of from
160 to 170 control posts. It went no farther than the Experts had
in specifying the locations of these posts, merely repeating the
specifications which the Experts had outlined concerning the maxi6GEN/DNT/22.
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mum permissible spacing between the posts and their distribution
by continents and oceanic islands. The Western plan endorsed the
Experts' recommendations concerning instrumentation. The initial
Western position was that each control post should be operated
by an international staff, which would consist of 32 individuals
(the Experts had specified "about 30"), none of whom would be
nationals of the host country. Roughly one-third of this staff would
have to have relatively high-level technical qualifications, the equivalent of a British university degree, or an American master's degree.
In addition to this technical staff, each post would require a communications staff of 8, who would also be recruited on an international basis, and an administrative and supporting staff of 21,
who could be host country nationals. In sum, each control post
would require a staff of 61, and the system of posts, depending on
whether there were 160 or 170, a total of from 9,760 to 10,370,
roughly one-sixth of whom would have to be highly qualified. In
addition, the Western plan provided for "a sufficient number" (the
Experts had recommended "about 10") of ships to maintain control
over ocean areas which did not contain islands suitable for the
establishment of fixed-base control posts. Presumably, these would
be staffed in the same manner as the land-based control posts.
Although the Western powers agreed that a time schedule would
have to be elaborated for the establishment of control posts, they
did not give any indication of its nature. The Western plan also
included provisions for daily routine aircraft sampling flights and
special aircraft sampling flights.
The Western powers envisaged that on-site inspections of events
which could not be identified as natural should occur on a routine
basis, and that if a state attempted to block such an investigation
it would be in violation of the treaty. The Western proposals provided for the establishment of several permanent groups whose sole
function would be to conduct on-site inspections. The precise number and location of these groups would be determined by the Administrator with the approval of the Commission. Nationals of the
country being investigated were to be excluded from the inspection
team.
The Western proposals contained provision for a headquarters,
consisting of (1) a data analysis and research center, (2) a central
radiochemical laboratory, and (3) a central inspection office.

Controversies Concerning Control

295

Among its other responsibilities, the headquarters would conduct
research relevant to the concerns of the control system. The
Administrator could also, with the approval of the Commission,
let contracts so that research could be done by external agencies.
The Western proposals envisaged the creation of "about 10" regional offices which would provide administrative and logistical
support to the elements of the control system operating in their
regions.
Although the Western powers thought that a control organization for a nuclear test ban treaty should be autonomous, they felt
that it should have a relationship with the United Nations similar to
that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that it should
also have some relationship with any other organizations which
might be established with functions relating to arms control and
disarmament. 7
Had the Western proposals for a control organization been
implemented, the staff of the organization would have been considerably larger than that of any international organization in
existence. The UN Secretariat has a staff of somewhat more than
4,000; over twice that number would have been required to man
the land-based control posts alone. Moreover, the control organization would have had more extensive powers with respect to the
original parties than any other extant international organization.
It would have been able to order an investigation on the territory
of the superpowers against their wishes and to adopt a report concerning a possible violation on their part despite their opposition.
The Soviet Concept
In contrast, the concept of a control organization which the
Soviet Union advanced initially was extremely limited. The draft
treaty which the Soviet Union tabled on the opening day of the
Geneva Conference merely stated that the parties to the agreement
"shall institute machinery for control," and that this machinery
"shall have at its disposal a network of control posts set up in
7For an interesting and thoughtful analysis of the problem of the relationship between the UN and a control organization for arms control
measures, see Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The United Nations and Organizations for the Control of Armaments," International Organization, Vol. XVI,
No. 1 (Winter 1962), pp. 1-19.
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accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference
of Experts."8 The treaty would commit the three nuclear powers
to agree to the establishment on their territories of "an agreed
number of control posts." These were the only provisions for
control machinery contained in the draft treaty; the Soviet view
was that the details should be spelled out in a separate agreement.
The similarity between this and earlier Soviet proposals concerning arms control and disarmament has already been noted. The
Soviet proposal contained no provision for signature or accession
by parties other than the three participating in the Conference.
Before long the Soviet Union agreed that detailed provisions
concerning a control organization as well as the obligation to cease
testing nuclear weapons should be contained in a single treaty, and
on December 8, 1958, it tabled a draft outlining its view of the
basic provisions of a control system. 9 Although this moved the
USSR's position much closer to that of the Western powers, there
was still a great distance between the two.
The role of states other than the three original nuclear
powers was obscure in the Soviet concept. They were mentioned
only implicitly in the draft in a discussion of control posts. In
his oral exposition, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that after the control
system had been established among the three original parties, the
question of the cooperation of other states in the control system
would have to be considered, and that the discussion of these
matters could be entrusted to a conference of the states parties to
the treaty. 10 There was no mention of a conference as a regular
organ of the Control Organization in the Soviet draft.
In the Soviet concept, a Commission would be the central
body in the Control Organization. Although the draft did not
specify the composition :>f the Commission, Mr. Tsarapkin stated
that the British suggestion that the Commission should consist of
the three original parties as permanent members and four other
states would be acceptable "provided that all major issues are
settled by agreement among the three permanent members of the
Commission." 11 The Commission would "direct the entire activity
BGEN!DNT/1.
DGEN/DNT/19.
10GEN/DNT/PV. 21, p. 37.
llfbid., p. 29.
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of the Control Organization." It would review evidence concerning
events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions and
after reviewing additional data, including material from existing
seismic stations, would inform the government concerned and request its opinion. After considering the reply of that government,
the Commission would determine whether or not an on-site inspection was required. In the event of disagreement, the Commission would so inform the parties to the treaty and the Security
Council of the United Nations. The Soviet draft contained no
mention of an administrator or executive officer.
The Soviet draft contained provisions for land-based control
posts, although no specific number was mentioned, and stated that
they should be equipped in accordance with the recommendations
of the Conference of Experts. In the Soviet view, the staff of
each control post should consist of not more than thirty specialists
and several supporting personnel. Of the thirty, four or five would
be required to have a higher education and the remainder, a secondary technical education. All of these individuals would be
nationals of the host country. In addition, one or two foreign control officers representing the side interested in carrying out control
in the area concerned would be stationed at each control post. In
the cases of control posts situated on the territories of states which
were not members of either alliance system, there would be control
officers from both sides. The control officers would place their seals
on all instruments and would be present when data was removed
and processed. They would countersign all reports to the control
commission, and, when they disagreed with the chief of the control
post, they would have the right to express their dissent. The control
officers would have the right and the abilit: · to check all instruments
at any time, and they would enjoy diplomatic immunity. The host
country would be responsible for providing appropriate means of
communication for each control post so that around-the-clock
transmission of information would be insured. The basic communication of each control post would be a daily coded telegraphic
report. The Soviet plan called for control posts on ships, but
did not specify how many. These would be staffed by personnel
from the state which owned the vessel. In addition, there would be
one or two control officers, including one who was a navigation
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specialist. The draft also contained provision for regular air sampling flights.
In contrast to the Western view, on-site inspections were to
be regarded as exceptional rather than routine. This difference was
symbolized by the fact that while the Western plan provided for
the inspection of "unidentified events," the Soviet proposal provided for the inspection only of "suspicious events." In the Soviet
scheme inspection teams would be constituted on an ad hoc basis.
The supporting and technical personnel would be nationals of the
country involved, but the inspection team would also include "a
very small number of control officers, whose duties would include
checking all the team's work to ensure that it was being properly
carried out." 12
The Soviet plan envisaged that the Commission would have
at its disposal a technical apparatus-not a headquarters-which
would consist of appropriate departments for processing and analyzing data and for providing .the control organization with logistical and technical support and personnel. The Soviet draft held
that the personnel of the technical apparatus should be recruited
and approved by the Cominission on the basis of equal representation of the two sides among the original parties. Among other
things, this implied that the consent of the original parties would be
required for all appointments. There was no provision for the conduct of research by the control organization. Nor was there any
provision for regional offices.
The Soviet draft stated that the right of extraterritoriality should
not extend to the territory and the preinises of control posts and
that the movements of personnel on the posts "must take place on
regular terms and conditions and in accordance with the procedures
existing for foreigners." : >ersonnel for guarding the posts would be
supplied by the host country. These points were not covered in the
initial Western presentations.

The peep-Seated Differences Between the Concepts
Obviously neither East nor West expected its initial position
to be accepted in toto. They and the world had had ample evidence
of their differing approaches toward international organization, and
if agreement were to be reached some compromises would clearly
12/bid.,

p. 34.
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be required. The foreknowledge of the disagreement and the expectation of bargaining probably led both sides to overstate their
initial positions. This is not to suggest, however, that each side
did not, rightly or wrongly, conceive its scheme of a control organization as being optimally designed to satisfy its interests, andaccording to its own interpretation-perhaps also those of the
world. It therefore is worth considering the implications of the two
positions and their rationale, both as explicitly stated and implied.
In formal constitutional terms, the Western proposals represented what can be termed the vertical or hierarchical approach to
international organization, while the Soviet proposals represented
the horizontal approach. The Western proposals implied some-although not much--diminution of state sovereignty and transfer
of authority to an international body. The Soviet proposal, in contrast, was designed with state sovereignty as its most basic assumption. It could almost be characterized as a plan for legitimizing by
mutual agreement certain national intelligence activities. Mr. Tsarapkin repeatedly put this quite directly by saying, under our plan
you will "control" us and we will "control" you. He meant this in
the French sense of the word "control," that is in terms of gathering information. The Soviet plan went little beyond this, and
in no case could the control organization take action against the
wishes of one of the original parties.
Some analysts have distinguished between two approaches to
the control of disarmament agreements by calling one the "impartial" approach, and the other the "reciprocal" or "adversary" approach. 13 In the first as the name implies the emphasis is on gaining
control through devices and personnel disassociated from the
principal parties, while in the second the principal parties themselves exercise control. In general terms, the Western proposals
were in the spirit of the first approach, and the Soviet, the second.
The differences between the Soviet and Western proposals
represented first of all deep-seated philosophical differences. The
1 3See Fred C. Ilde and others, Alternative Approaches to the International Organization of Disarmament (RAND Corp., 1962, R-391-ARPA),
especially, pp. 3-4; Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ''The Use of Reciprocal Inspection," pp. 82-98 in Seymour Melman (ed.) Disarmament: Its Politics and
Economics (1962); and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Arms Inspection," International Conciliation, No. 540 (November 1962), pp. 5-89.
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West, and particularly the United States, has been committed for
some time, at least on the level of declaratory policy, to the ultimate goal of an ordered and peaceful world, regulated by enforceable legal norms and powerful international institutions. In terms
of this perspective, national defense forces are regarded as a
temporary expedient, to be maintained and utilized only as long as
this ultimate goal remains unachieved. At the time of the First
World War when these concepts were originally formulated, the
growth of democracy was viewed as an important means of achieving the ultimate goal as well as a basic component of it; but over
the years as a result of increasing sophistication, or despair, or
both, less emphasis came to be placed on this feature. Though
subject to disagreement, the prevalent attitude in the West seems
to be that the international goal can be achieved despite diverse
domestic regimes. Being constantly exposed to and immersed in
these views, and repeating them in public presentations, Western,
and particularly American, policy-makers have tended to take
them into account in formulating new positions. The gains of past
experience are accepted and each new situation viewed as an
opportunity for incremental advances. This applies a fortiori in
situations which might involve the reduction of national armaments,
given the rationale for the maintenance of national defense forces
mentioned earlier. Thus the Western concept of a control organization was modeled after the United Nations and other existing international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency, with the addition of certain new features.
The Soviet Union's ultimate goal, again at least on the level of
declaratory policy, has been a world of Communist societies. In
its view, non-Communist states and organizations dominated by
these states have been hostile, or potentially hostile, to this goal.
Thus, its view of international organization has been considerably
different from that of the West and, given its long-run goals, it
cannot have the same commitment to international organization as
the West. 14 For the USSR, cooperation in international organizations has been at best a temporary expedient, not a goal in itself.
14For a detailed elaboration of the Soviet attitudes toward international organization, see Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United
Nations (1962); and also, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Academy of
Sciences, Institute of State and Law, International Law ( 1960).

Controversies Concerning Control

301

According to its doctrine, the fundamental problems of society
could only be solved through transformation to Communist regimes. Moreover, distrusting all non-Communists, it could not
conceive an impartial or neutral international organization. In the
Soviet view, therefore, international organizations including nonCommunist states ought to be instruments designed to facilitate
temporary cooperation between opposing sides, and consequently
ought to involve only minimal indispensible limitations upon sovereignty.
Of course the two sides had also had differing experiences
in existing international organizations. Particularly during the early
years of the UN and its affiiliated agencies, the United States and
the United Kingdom were usually in a controlling position, able
to command a majority for positive action and to block proposals
deemed undesirable. During the same period, the Soviet Union
on the other hand was a permanent minority in these institutions
and frequently saw them take action against its wishes.
Initial Compromises
Despite these deep-seated differences, it was possible to effect
compromises between East and West in a number of instances, and
by the time of the 1959 Easter recess, several agreements had been
reached which narrowed the gap somewhat. Six articles of a draft
treaty had actually been adopted. One of these was purely formal,
stating that the treaty and major agreements concluded by the
Control Organization would be registered with the United Nations in
accordance with the requirements of Article 102 of the Charter.
The others, however, had greater substance. One specified that the
treaty would be of indefinite duration, subject to the inherent right
of the parties to withdraw if the provisions of the treaty were not
being fulfilled and observed. Another provided for the periodic
review of the control system.
The remaining three articles, which had been adopted by
mid-March 1959, specified the obligations of the parties to the
treaty and the composition of the Commission. Each signatory
would undertake:

(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear
weapons test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
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(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapons
test explosions anywhere. 15
The meaning of the first of these obligations was clear; that of
the second, less obvious, and the debate did not clarify it. Nor
was there ever any discussion of how compliance with the second
obligation would be verified. The signatories would also agree
"to cooperate promptly and fully with the Control Organization
. . . and to assist the Control Organization in the discharge of its
responsibilities . . . ." 16
In accepting the article on the Commission the negotiating
states had implicitly agreed that other states would have a role
in the Control Organization, for it provided that four other states
would be members of the Commission. According to this article
the four nonpermanent members of the Commission were to be
chosen by a Conference in which all states would participate and
which would have regular annual sessions.
The two sides also moved closer together in several other
areas. The West agreed that control posts should be established
first in the territories of the three nuclear powers. The Soviet Union
allowed that there might have to be an administrator to oversee
the operation of the control system. It also agreed that there could
be from four to five "controllers" at a control post, rather than
merely one or two.
Despite these compromises, there were still wide differences
between the two sides. Although they agreed that the Commission
should consist of seven states including the three Original Parties,
they could not agree on the political distribution of the other four
states. The West held that these four states should consist of one
from each side and two neutrals. The Soviet Union on the other
hand maintained that--considering the two-to-one preponderance
of the West among permanent members-this formula would not
yield a balanced Commission. It argued that the four nonpermanent
members should consist of one from the Western side, two from
the Soviet side, and one neutral. There continued to be differences
with respect to the staffing of control posts. The West also con15GEN/DNTI 14.
16GEN/DNTI 151 Add. 1.
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tinued to insist on the necessity of permanent inspection groups,
while the Soviet Union denied this. To buttress his case, Mr. Tsarapkin held that this concept had been rejected at the Conference
of Experts. 17 Although this was true, it was also true that the Soviet
position that permanent inspection groups were unnecessary had
been rejected.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference related to voting
in the Control Commission. On January 30, 1959, evidently drawing upon its experience in the United Nations Security Council, the
Soviet Union submitted a comprehensive list of decisions which
would require four affirmative votes, including those of the three
Original Parties. This was the USSR's strongest assertion that it
would not agree to the proposed Control Organization's being able
to take any significant action against its wishes. Or, as Mr. Tsarapkin put it, claiming the familiar defense of the veto in the Security
Council, this would insure the cooperation of the Original Parties.
Prior to the March 19 recess, the Western powers agreed that
unanimity among the Original Parties should be required for:
amendments to the treaty, revision of the detection methods, and
appointment of the Administrator. They also agreed that it might
be required, if appropriate safeguards could be worked out, for
the determination of sites of control posts and routes for control
aircraft flights. However, they would not go beyond that. They
adamantly argued that the veto could not apply to the other decisions named in the Soviet list, especially those relating to on-site
inspections and violations of the Treaty. This represented the most
fundamental difference between the approaches of the two sides,
and it was unresolved by the time of the Easter recess in 1959.
In considering these issues, it is necessary to recall that the socalled "new seismic data" was introduced by the West prior to the
submission of the Soviet veto list. Perhaps the Soviet Union would
'have taken the same position in any case, but the new data appeared
to increase vastly the number of prospective on-site inspections and
thus pro'vided a further incentive for the Soviet Union to seek ironclad protection against imposed decisions.

17GEN/DNT/PV. 18, p. 16.
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III

Further Compromises and Continuing Controversies,

1959-60
So far as concepts of the control organization are concerned,
the period of the negotiations from the time that the Geneva
Conference resumed on April 13, 1959, through the final meeting
in 1960 on December 5 can be considered as a unit. Although the
positions of the two sides shifted somewhat during this period,
these shifts did not involve departures from the framework established in the initial phase of the Conference. Further compromises
of course brought additional agreements, but some controversies
remained unsolved. Since there was a basic unity to this period,
the negotiations during it can be treated topically rather than
chronologically. It is important to emphasize though that both
sides constantly viewed the control organization as a whole and
that each aspect was inextricably linked to the others. While this
meant that trade offs were possible, it also meant that on important
matters, piecemeal settlements were ruled out.
Areas of Agreement
During this period the three parties agreed to a preamble,
eleven more articles, and two annexes for the prospective treaty. 18
The preamble and ten of the articles were adopted during the
seventeen meetings held from April 13 to May 8, 1959. This
achievement was in large measure the result of the momentum
established in the initial phase of the negotiations. In many instances the adoption of an article merely represented ratification
of a tentative understanding achieved earlier. Several of the articles
adopted during this period were of a formal character, and few
fundamental issues were involved.
18The text of the preamble, the seventeen articles, and Annex III
adopted by the Conference is contained in the appendix to William J.
Gehron, "Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests: History of Political and Technical Developments of the Negotiations
From October 31, 1958, to August 22, 1960," Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. XLIII, No. 1109 (September 26, 1960), pp. 482-97, at pp. 494-97.
Annex II, dealing with privileges and immunities, was adopted October 13,
1960, after this article was written. It may be found in GEN/DNT/52/Rev.
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( 1) "Formal" Articles

One article concerned authentic texts. It followed the standard
form in international agreements. Another article provided that the
annexes should form an integral part of the treaty. Since it was
envisaged that the detailed specifications for the Detection and
Identification System would be contained in an annex, this met
the Western insistence that these provisions should have treaty
force. A third article concerned amendments to the treaty and its
annexes. It provided that amendments would enter into effect
when they had been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Conference and ratified by two-thirds of the parties
to the treaty, including the Original Parties. This procedure was
patterned after that specified in the UN Charter, and gave the
Original Parties veto power.
(2) "Other States"

Two of the articles touched on the question of how other
states should be brought into the Control Organization. The first
of these defined the parties to the treaty. The USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were specified as the Original
Parties. It was also agreed that this article should contain a second
paragraph allowing other states to become parties, but no treaty
language was worked out during this period. Actually, none was
even proposed until mid-1960. The Western powers nevertheless
felt satisfied that they had won their point that states other than
the three nuclear powers should be allowed to become members
of the Control Organization.
The second article relating to this matter concerned the signature, ratification, and entry into force of the treaty. According
to this article, the treaty would enter into force as soon as the instruments of ratification of the Original Parties had been deposited,
thus meeting the Soviet argument that bringing other states into
the Control Organization should not be allowed to delay the implementation of the treaty; other states were given a period of six
months in which to sign the treaty, but no time limit was set
for the deposit of instruments of ratification or acceptance.
The article on the Conference also dealt with states other
than the three nuclear powers which might become parties, in
that it spelled out certain powers that they would have within the
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Control Organization. These were minimal. The Conference would
meet annually, and could be convened in special sessions. As has
already been mentioned, it would have a role in the procedure for
amending the treaty. Beyond that, its powers would be to elect
the nonpermanent members of the Commission~ approve the budget
(although the way in which this would be accomplished and
the majority required were left for later specification), consider
the annual report of the Commission, approve reports to the UN,
and approve agreements with other international organizations.
In addition, the Conference could discuss any matter within the
scope of the treaty, a provision reminiscent of Article 10 of the
UN Charter relating to the powers of the General Assembly. It
could also make decisions on matters specifically referred to it by
the Commission, propose matters for consideration by the Commission, and request reports from the Commission. All decisions,
except those on budgetary matters and on amendments, would be
by a simple majority of parties to the treaty present and voting,
unless the Conference itself decided that a two-thirds majority
would be required. It was clear from these terms of reference that
the Commission and not the Conference would be the dominant
body in the Control Organization, and that states other than the
Original Parties would have only limited rights and responsibilities.
(3) Obligations of the Parties Concerning the Control System
Three of the articles which were adopted dealt with obligations of the parties to the treaty with respect to the control system.
The first committed them to accept the placement on territory under
their jurisdiction of the control components which would be established on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts and
installed and operated in accordance with the treaty and its annexes.
The second spelled out specific obligations of cooperation.
These included: giving inspection groups "immediate and undisputed access" and refraining from any interference with them; providing "adequate and expeditious transportation" for on-site inspections; entering into arrangements for the utilization of existing
aircraft flights for routine air sampling purposes; entering into arrangements for making aircraft available for special aircraft flights
or permitting special flights by aircraft belonging to the control
system; and, entering into arrangements for the utilization of ex-
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isting weather and geophysical exploration vessels. It was agreed
that another paragraph concerning the cooperation required for the
high altitude detection system would be added to this article.
The third article of this group provided that representatives to
the Conference and the Commission and the Administrator and
other executive personnel, should enjoy such privileges and immunities as would be necessary for the exercise of their functions.
The precise terms of the legal capacity of the Organization and
the privileges and immunities of associated personnel were to be
spelled out in an annex. This meant that these matters would have
treaty force. Except for this feature, which is also found in the
Rome treaties establishing the European Common Market and
Euratom, the article paralleled those usually found in the charters
of international organizations. Since the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities has been ratified by the USSR and the United
Kingdom, but not the United States, it is interesting that the United
States readily agreed to this formulation, which was proposed by
the United Kingdom. Perhaps all parties saw it as a way of circumventing the hurdle of Congressional ratification of a separate
convention.
( 4) "External" Relations
The final article on which agreement was reached in the four
weeks from April 13 to May 8, 1959, concerned relationships with
other international organizations. Its terms were simple. It merely
stated that the Commission, with the approval of the Conference,
could enter into an agreement establishing "an appropriate relationship" between the Control Organization and the United Nations,
and that the same action could be taken with respect to "any
international organization which may in the future be established
among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament
and arms control measures."
The implkations of the article, however, are interesting. First,
it signified that the Control Organization would not be a part of the
United Nations. Secondly, it also implied that the functions of this
complicated mechanism would be limited to the control of nuclear
explosions; that further measures of arms control and disarmament would require the creation of additional international organizations. Despite popular speculation that the underlying Western am-
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bition was to establish a control organization whose functions
gradually could be expanded, 19 this possibility was never discussed
in the Geneva Conference, and on several occasions it was implicitly
rejected.
The only controversy surrounding the adoption of this article
involved phraseology. The second paragraph of the original British
proposal allowed appropriate relationships to be established with:
. . . any international arms regulation organization which
may in the future be established among any of the Parties
to this Treaty to supervise arms control measures. 20
Consistent with its general position in the disarmament debate, the
USSR objected to control without disarmament and proposed that
the paragraph read "international disarmament organization . . .
to supervise disarmament control."21 The final formulation mentioning both arms control and disarmament was a compromise between
the Soviet and Western positions.
(5) How Much Emotion in the Preamble?
Related issues arose in the discussion of the preamble. Although the Western powers basically accepted a Soviet proposal,
they insisted on changing the opening two paragraphs. The original
draft read:

Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear armaments race and to the further improvement and creation
of new, even more destructive tYPes of these weapons of
mass destruction;
Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and eliminating them from national armaments, as indicated by the
United Nations. 2 2
The formulation which was adopted was:
Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in
armaments and in the development of new weapons of
war;
19For example, see The Observer, February 15, 1959, p. 14.
20GEN/DNT/39.
21GEN/DNT/PV. 76, pp. 10-11.
22GEN/ DNTI 46.
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Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the
achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the
field of disarmament including the eventual elimination
and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes only.
The change did little to alter the meaning of the preamble. Its
principal effect was to eliminate some of the emotionalism directed
against nuclear weapons, a constant component of Soviet policy
until the nineteen-sixties. In addition to these paragraphs the preamble mentioned the desire of the signatories to bring about a
permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; recognized that
permanent, effective and continuous control was essential to achieve
this objective; expressed the hope that other countries would join
in the undertakings spelled out in the treaty; and asserted that a
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would make possible "progress toward agreement on measures of disarmament." A more cautious
way of expressing the last sentiment could hardly be found.
(6) The Organization, Its Headquarters, Transitional

Arrangements
Beyond these achievements of the period from April 13 to
May 8, 1959, agreement on three other matters was reached during the course of the Geneva Conference. On August 11, 1959, the
three states adopted an article specifying the elements of the Control
Organization. According to this article, the Control Organization
would consist of: the Commission, the Detection and Identification
System, the Administrator, and the Conference. The headquarters
of the Organization would be in Vienna, which is also the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet
Union would not agree to this article until the Western powers had
given assurances that the Administrator's powers would be limited
and that he would be clearly subordinate to the Commission. As
will be recalled, early Soviet formulations contained no mention of
a chief executive officer.
Annex III dealing with the Preparatory Commission was
adopted November 30, 1959. The provisions in this Annex are
reminiscent of the Preparatory Commission which was established
by the International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty. The Prepara-
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tory Commisison would come into existence on the day that the
treaty was signed by the Original Parties, and would consist of one
representative from each of the Original Parties. At this stage, the
Preparatory Commission would plan and oversee the preliminary
installation of the control system. Once the treaty came into force,
the three Original Parties by unanimous agreement would co-opt
four additional states from those that had signed the treaty, and the
Preparatory Commission would then assume the functions of the
Control Commission, until the latter could be formally constituted.
It would also exercise the functions of the Administrator, until he
was appointed. During this stage, the voting procedures would be
those specified in the Treaty for the Commission. The Soviet Union
accepted the draft for this annex, which the United States had
tabled on July 27, 1959, almost in its entirety. The USSR insisted
on only two changes: first, that the requirement for unanimity
among the Original Parties be specified, rejecting Ambassador Wadsworth's contention that it was assumed23 ; and second, that the
task of recommending the location of regional offices be omitted,
since it was not agreed that there should be such offices.
(7) Privileges and Immunities

The final section of the proposed treaty to be adopted was
Annex II, dealing with privileges and immunities, which was accepted October 17, 1960. As this section developed in detail some
of the conditions under which the Control Organization would operate on the territories of each of the parties, it was among the more
important to be adopted.
The Soviet Union included a proposal on this matter in the
draft basic provisions which it tabled on December 8, 1958, shortly
after the negotiations began. 24 This proposal merely stated that the
foreign control officers should "enjoy diplomatic immunity equal to
that of the staff of foreign embassies, legations and missions." In
addition, as was mentioned earlier, the proposal made it clear that
"the right of extraterritoriality" would not extend to the premises
of control posts and that movement of foreign personnel of the posts
in the territory of the state must take place in accordance with
23GEN/DNT/PV. 115, pp. 4, 10, II.
24GEN/DNT/ 19.
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the procedures existing for foreigners. This proposal was consistent
with the modest Soviet concept of the Control Organization.
In keeping with the Western concept of an elaborate control
system, Western ideas called for much more specific provisions
which would ensure that the Control Organization and its personnel
would receive all the privileges and immunities they might require
for the performance of their novel task. This approach led to the
conclusion that the privileges and immunities would have to embrace
those generally granted to international organizations such as the
United Nations and NATO, and also include certain special features.
However, not until a year later did the United States submit a
proposal reflecting this line of reasoning. The delay in tabling a
Western draft for this section of the treaty was due chiefly to the
necessity of working out an agreed text between the two Western
partners, with the United Kingdom favoring more detail and specificity than the United States. Furthermore, Western policy-makers
saw no cause for according this matter priority over other proposals
on which agreement was considered more urgent. The flagging pace
of the negotiations and the technical complexity of the subject may
also have contributed to the delay.
The draft as finally submitted by the United States on December 7, 1959,25 was modeled after the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,
the 1959 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and, last but not least, the 1951
Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
National Representatives and International Staff. That the Soviet
Union offered no serious objection to this draft can be explained
in part by the fact that it had previously agreed to substantially
similar privileges and immunities in other contexts by having ratified the first and the third of these three agreements. 26
The discussion that preceded the acceptance by the USSR of
the American draft was much less extensive than the Western dele25GEN/DNT/74.
26The United Kingdom has ratified all four of these agreements while
the United States has ratified the last only. The United States has also
ratified the 1947 Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations, which
contains provisions on several topics covered in the other agreements.
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gations expected. The section that occasioned the most argument
involved the right of the Control Organization to exchange currency,
but this disagreement was not very serious. The American proposal
was that the organization should be entitled to the most favorable
rate of exchange. After considerable verbal sparring, Ambassador
Wadsworth explained that this provision was designed to prevent
countries with completely managed currencies from hampering the
work of the Control Organization by establishing discriminatory rates
of exchange. 27 He stated that this would be important because of
the magnitude of the expenditures which would be involved. It was
apparent that the provision was formulated principally because at
that time the USSR maintained two rates of exchange: one of ten
rubles to the dollar for tourists; and the other of four rubles to the
dollar for other expenditures. The USSR strongly objected to this
provision. Mr. Tsarapkin argued that the passage should follow the
pattern of the UN Convention and that of the Specialized Agencies
and merely give the Control Organization the right to convert currency. Although he argued generally that a country could not be
forced to grant to the Control Organization an exchange rate which
it had established for some special purpose, he actually seemed to
be objecting more to the fact that the provision appeared on the
surface to discriminate against the USSR, since in practice it was
the only one of the Original Parties to which it would apply. 28 The
compromise finally worked out was to delete the provision, but to
agree to include in the eventual financial regulations of the Control
Organization-following the example of the United Nations-the
requirement that all contributions must be assessed and paid in
United States dollars unless the Administrator approved another
currency.
Although the Soviet Union proposed certain other amendments
to the United States draft, they either concerned matters of style, or
involved making explicit matters which the Western powers agreed
were implicit. For example, one Soviet amendment specified that
diplomatic pouch privileges should be limited to official business.
As accepted by the three powers, Annex II closely resembled,
both in general structure and in substance, the four international
27GEN/DNT/PV. 222, p. 9.
28Jbid., p. 14.
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agreements which set the pattern for the original American proposal. All these documents have substantially identical provisions
concerning the organization's legal personality and the privileges
and immunities with respect to its funds, assets, and communications. However, unlike the other agreements, the Annex contains
no general provision for the settlement of disputes concerning its
interpretation or application. In an early paper describing the outlines of the treaty, the United States delegation indicated that it
would propose an article dealing with settlements of disputes arising
out of the treaty. 29 However, such an article was the subject of
disagreement within the Western councils and was never proposed.
According to the Annex, representatives of parties on the Control Commission, defined to include all members of the official staffs
except those whose duties were exclusively clerical, would be given
both in the country of the Organization's headquarters, and, when
performing Commission duties, on the territory of another party to
the treaty, the same privileges and immunities that were accorded
by the respective governments to accredited diplomatic envoys. In
addition, representatives of parties on any organ of the Organization
together with the members of their official staffs, including clerks,
would enjoy under the same circumstances (and also en route to
and from meetings) enumerated privileges and immunities closely
resembling those accorded to representatives of the parties in the
agreements that served as models for the American proposal. Since
these privileges and immunities would be accorded not for the personal benefit of the individuals but to assure their independence as
officials, a party would have the duty to waive the immunity of its
representatives where "in its opinion" the immunity would impede
justice and could be waived without prejudice to the purposes for
which it was granted. Moreover, the parties would not be required
to extend privileged treatment to their own nationals or to aliens
acting as their representatives.
As for the staff and experts employed by the Control Organization itself (as distinguished from the representatives of the parties
and their national staffs), the top echelon, that is the Administrator
and his deputies, would be given privileges and immunities "normally accorded" to diplomatic envoys. All other staff members
29GEN/DNT/9, par. 8.
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would be accorded enumerated privileges and immunities with respect to currency facilities, personal baggage, immigration restrictions, repatriation, import duties, taxes, as well as
Immunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned to a
control post, an inspection group, or a routine or special
flight; and at all times immunity from arrest, detention, or
any legal processes with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in the performance of their
official functions. so
Here, also, since the immunities would be granted in the interest
of the Organization, the Administrator would be obligated to waive
the immunity of any staff member or expert where it would impede
justice and the waiver would not prejudice the working of the
Organization.
A party's right to refuse privileges and immunities to its own
nationals, unrestricted, as was seen earlier, with respect to its representatives on the Organization's organs, would be qualified in this
section in two ways. A party would be required to grant to its
own national serving as a staff member or an expert of the Organization only one immunity and one privilege: first, the immunity for
his official acts, and second, the privilege of access to facilities with
respect to currency and exchange restrictions so far as necessary
for the effective exercise of his functions. With only one exception,
which will be noted, the international agreements upon which the
Annex is patterned contain no such restriction upon the immunities
of international staff personnel vis-a-vis their own country; by
implication, these agreements require the parties to make available
to their own nationals on the international staff the full range of
privileges and immunities. The reason for this is that the purpose
3 0The novel phrase "at all times" in the Annex provision quoted in the
main text was probably not intended to indicate that a staff member would
retain his immunity with respect to past official acts even after his relationship with the Organization was terminated. A more likely interpretation is
that this phrase was intended as a juxtaposition to the clause "whenever
assigned . . ." in the first part of the paragraph. However, even if this was
the purpose of the phrase the better view would be that immunity with
respect to official acts would continue after the termination of the official
position.
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of international immunities is to protect the international responsibilities of international staff personnel and as one authority has
written "they require protection against the State of which the official
is a national as fully as, and perhaps more fully than, against any
other State. " 31 It is interesting to note that the limiting provision of
Annex II was strikingly similar to Article 23 of the Agreement on
the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National
Representatives, and International Staff, 32 and one can speculate that
it was inserted in the American proposal with an eye on the United
States Senate. As far as the Annex was concerned, this right of a
party to refuse privileges and immunities to its own nationals was
an important point as the negotiations made it clear that the control
posts would be staffed in part by local nationals and that local
nationals would be stationed on the territory of their own state,
possibly also in other official capacities.
The exact extent to which an individual would be free from
action by his government in other respects was not quite clear. There
could be some question, for instance, whether the individual would
remain immune from his government's action with respect to his
official acts after his relationship with the Organization had come to
an end, although the better view would require continuation of such
immunity. Again, in the discussion of the laissez passer arrangements, Ambassador Wadsworth stated that they would have to
include provision for enabling individuals to return either to their
country of origin or to the country where the headquarters of the
Organization was located. 33 Then he went on in the next sentence to
state that the laissez passer regulations should in no way prejudice
the right of a government to prescribe whatever regulations it chose
with respect to its own citizens.
In considering generally the extent of the limitations imposed
by the Annex upon a party's control over access to and activities
on its territory, it is pertinent that the Administrator would have
31C. Wilfred Jenks, International Immunities (London: Stevens & Sons,
1961), p. 112. Jenks concludes that while the principle of enforcing stipulated privileges and immunities of international staff personnel against their
own States is clear, practice has always tended to lag behind it.
32U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts
Series, No. 2992.
33GEN/DNT/PV. 193, p. 7.
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been obliged to inform the party concerned in advance of any proposed assignment of staff members or experts to its territory, and
that party would have had an "opportunity to comment" on the
proposed assignment of any particular individual. This proved to be
perhaps the most controversial issue of the Annex, but all three
parties agreed that the opportunity to object to any individual should
not be used often. 34 In this context the Annex also provided that, if
in a party's view a staff member or expert posted on its territory
had abused his privileges, the party would ultimately have the right
to require that the Administrator arrange for an immediate replacement. A similar provision would apply mutatis mutandis in case of
abuse of privileges by a representative of a party present in the
territory of another party.
It is difficult to speculate whether the privileges and immunities
defined in the Annex and fashioned after the patterns evolved for
other international agencies would have met adequately the special
needs and novel features of the Control Organization, particularly
if applied to a large number of personnel at control posts and on
inspection teams. Again, caution is in order if one desires to
evaluate the significance of the Soviet acceptance of the American
proposal, considering the lack of detailed Soviet comment and the
limited discussion. The Soviet Union may have been content to
concentrate its effort upon the important and controversial staffing
provisions of the treaty on the assumption that, if these provisions
were formulated to its satisfaction, it could probably agree to a
standard grant of privileges and immunities in the Annex.
After the three states agreed to the Annex, they also agreed
to a new and briefer article on privileges and immunities to replace
that which they had already adopted in the text of the treaty. This
article merely stated that the privileges and immunities which the
Organization, its staff, and the representatives of parties shall enjoy,
34
See GEN/DNT/PV. 146, p. 5; GEN/DNT/PV. 167, p. 13; and
GEN/DNT/PV. 177, p. 5. There is no comparable provision for advance
notification and opportunity to comment in the Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN or the Specialized Agencies or in the
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. But there are comparable provisions in Article XI, Section
D and Article XII, Section A of the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
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and the legal capacity of the Organization "shall be as set forth in
Annex II of this Treaty."
These were the last agreements achieved during the Geneva
Conference, and the only ones achieved after the collapse of the
summit meeting.
The Remaining Disagreements
Although the parts of the treaty which were adopted represented a significant measure of agreement, several disagreements
remained. They centered on four principal issues: the staffing of
control posts; the composition of the Control Commission; voting
in the Control Commission, especially the privileges to be given to
the Original Parties; and the role and structure of executive authority.
(1) National or International Control Post Staffs?

As stated earlier, at the outset the Soviet Union took the position the control posts should be completely staffed by nationals of
the host country except for one or two foreign controllers. The
Western powers, on the other hand, had held that host country nationals should be barred from serving on the staff of control posts.
Each side took the position that the view advanced by the other
would not provide a sufficient guarantee of its security. The West
argued that in the event of a suspected violation host country personnel would be torn between loyalty to their own state and to the
Control Organization and could not be counted on to choose the
latter. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, argued that under a
system of international staffing, it would have no assurance that
Soviet nationals would in practice be given positions which would
enable them effectively to exercise control over the other side, and
cited the predominantly Western character of the secretariats of the
major international organizations. To buttress their position, each
side developed elaborate technical arguments about the possibility
of mufHing and fabricating seismic signals. These then called for
equally elaborate rebuttals. One slightly ironic aspect of this debate
was that at the time when the Western representatives in Geneva
were arguing that the only way in which the proper operation of
instruments could be assured was through an international staff,
the Berkner Panel suggested the introduction of large numbers of
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unmanned stations as one possible way around the difficulties with
respect to technical issues which plagued the Conference. To put
it more sharply, while Ambassador Wadsworth was arguing in
Geneva that instruments could not be made tamperproof, American
scientists in the United States were asserting that they could. Mr.
Tsarapkin made the most of this contradiction. 35
By the time of the recess on March 19, 1959, the Soviet
Union had agreed that there might be as many as four or five foreign
controllers stationed at control posts. On May 8, 1959, the Western
powers met this compromise by agreeing that it might be possible
for a limited number of host country nationals to serve on the
staffs of control posts. 36
Next, in mid-July, the West proposed that the staff of each
control post could be divided into thirds: one third would consist
of nationals of the USSR, another third nationals of the United
Kingdom and the United States, and the final third nationals of
other parties to the treaty. 37 This same formula had already been
suggested by the West for the headquarters of the Control Organization.38
The Soviet Union's immediate reaction, in both instances, was
to question how the final third would be apportioned. It argued
that there must be some way of maintaining a balance among
countries allied with the United Kingdom and the United States,
countries allied with the Soviet Union, and uncommitted countries.
The West, on the other hand, maintained that it would be both
politically and administratively difficult to elaborate a rigid formula
to define eligibility for the third third. The Western powers argued
that some countries would not easily fit into the three-fold categorization proposed by the Soviet Union, that international alignments of states were subject to change, and that too rigid restrictions should not be imposed on the Administrator, whose judgment
in such matters should be trusted. The Soviet rebuttal was that
without a rigid formula there would be nothing to prevent the
Administrator from recruiting the third third solely from Western
states, thus assuring the West two-thirds of the staff at control posts.
35GEN/DNT/PV. 100, p. 12.
86Jbid., p. 7.

37GEN/DNT/PV. 113, p. 5.
SSGEN/DNT/PV. 68, p. 6.
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On December 14, 1959, the USSR accepted the broad principle that the staff of control posts should be divided into thirds,
subject to agreement on the third third, and proposed that the
third third be divided equally among Western allies, Soviet allies
and uncommitted countries. 39 The Western powers were unwilling to
accept this rigid formula. They did, however, propose various compromises. On May 9, 1960, they tabled detailed staffing regulations
which would have required the Administrator to give preference to
nationals of the host country in recruiting the third third if the
control post happened to be on the territory of a state other than
the Original Parties to the treaty, and to take into account the
"legitimate interests" of the Original Parties. 40 On June 29, 1960,
the United Kingdom went even farther and suggested that personnel appointments to the third third should "be made in such manner and proportions as to maintain an equal balance between the
interests of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the United
Kingdom and the United States on the other." 41 Since these compromises were not acceptable to the Soviet Union, and the West
would not go further, an impasse resulted. That was where matters
stood at the end of 1960.
The differences between the two sides were not very great, but
they nevertheless continued to exist. The two sides also disagreed on
the nationality of the head of the staff of the control posts. The
West maintained that he could not be a host country national
while the Soviet Union maintained that he must be a host country
national.
(2) Power Balance in the Commission
A second major difference concerned the composition of the
Control Commission. Agreement had been reached fairly early that
this body should consist of seven states, and that the three Original
Parties should have permanent membership. The disagreement
concerned the four other states. Even before the March 19, 1959
recess the Western powers had suggested that these four might
consist of one state from the East and one from the West and two
39GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 11.
40GEN/DNT/89.
41GEN/DNT/PV. 221, p. 10.
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uncommitted states, giving an overall balance of 3 (West), 2
(East), 2 (uncommitted); while the USSR had proposed one
from the West, two from the East and one uncommitted state, giving an overall balance of 3 (West), 3 (East), 1 (uncommitted).
Through 1960, neither side altered its position. The USSR made
acceptance of its formula a part of its package proposal of December 14, 1959. 42 The West countered on August 9, 1960, by raising
the status of its formula of 3-2-2 from that of a suggestion to that
of a formal proposal. 43 The Soviet Union justified its position on
the ground of parity between the two sides; and the West, on the
ground of the necessity of reflecting actual alignments throughout
the world and of avoiding too great a burden of decision on any one
uncommitted state. Each side was in reality attempting to maximize
its influence within the Commission.
( 3) The Reach of the "Veto"
The question of voting rights in the Commission was closely
linked to that of its composition, and in its package proposal of
December 14, 1959, the Soviet Union actually tied the two together. As early as January 30, 1959, the Soviet Union had submitted a comprehensive list of seven categories of decisions which
would require the affirmative votes of four members of the Commission, including the Original Parties, and thus be subject to a
veto by the Original Parties. 44 These included:

(a) revision of the Treaty and its annexes, and adoption
of amendments thereto;
(b) any accusation against a State of a violation of the
Treaty, and other matters relating to violations of the
Treaty;
(c) appointment of the Administrator, definition or alteration of his terms of reference, recruitment of the
main engineering and technical personnel of the Control Organization's headquarters, controllers and inspection groups;
(d) adoption of a decision to despatch inspection groups
for on-site investigation of an event suspected of
42GEN/DNT/PV. 148, pp. 10-11.
43GEN/DNT/PV. 240, p. 6.
44GEN/DNT/29.
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being a nuclear explosion, and adoption of decisions
on the basis of the results of such investigation;
(e) revision of existing methods and approval of new
methods of observation and types of apparatus in the
control system;
(f) determination of location sites of the control posts
and of the routes for control aircraft flights;
(g) budgetary, financial, administrative, and economic
matters connected with the Control Organization's
activities, including matters relating to the recruitment and dismissal of the supporting and auxiliary
personnel.
The Soviet Union was willing to have procedural decisions settled
by a simple majority vote.
In the subsequent negotiations the Western powers sought to
narrow the USSR's "veto list," as they called it, which had been
put forward as an amendment to a paragraph of the proposed article
dealing with the Commission. Two techniques were employed. One
consisted of agreeing that unanimity among the Original Parties
would be required with respect to a specified matter, but placing
the statement of this requirement in the section of the treaty dealing
with that particular matter. For example, the article which the
three states adopted on amendments specified that amendments
would go into effect only when ratified by two-thirds of the parties
to the treaty including the three Original Parties. The other technique was to include substantive provisions which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union and render any specification of the
voting requirement unnecessary. As a case in point, the Soviet
Union agreed to remove the last part of section (g) relating to
administrative personnel from its list when the Western powers
agreed that the auxiliary and supporting personnel would be host
country nationals.
By November 25, 1959, the Soviet Union had agreed or offered to delete all but one· section of subparagraph (g) from the
list. 45 The deletion of subparagraph (a) has already been covered.
The Soviet Union agreed to delete subparagraph (b) when the
Western powers agreed that the Control Organization as such
45See Mr. Tsarapkin's summary of the negotiations on these points:
GEN/DNT/PV. 138, pp. 3-7.
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would not make accusations of violations. The first part of subparagraph (c) was deleted when the Western powers agreed that
the appointment of the Administrator would require the agreement
of the three Original Parties and that his terms of reference could
only be changed by amending the treaty. The USSR offered to
delete the remainder of subparagraph (c) relating to the Control
Organization's staff if the Western powers would agree to the
Soviet proposals on the distribution of the staff. It offered to delete
subparagraph (d) if the Western powers would accept the proposal
for an annual quota of on-site inspections. (The negotiations concerning this point have already been analyzed.) The Soviet Union
agreed to delete subparagraph (e) on revisions in the system, because these would fall under the provisions relating to amendments to the treaty, since the components of the system would be
specified in an annex. It agreed to delete subparagraph (f) when
the Western powers agreed that the location of sites for control
posts and of routes for control aircraft would be determined in
agreement with the interested government. The Western powers protected their position by insisting that if the interested government
rejected a proposal of the Commission it would be obliged to provide an alternative acceptable to the Commission. The Soviet Union
accepted the requirement with respect to control post sites but not
aircraft flights. The deletion of the final section of subparagraph
(g) has already been mentioned.
Thus the principal remaining question related to those issues
covered in the first section of subparagraph (g), namely "budgetary, financial, administrative and economic matters connected with
the Control Organization's activities. . . ." The essential issue in
controversy was whether or not the agreement of all the Original
Parties would be required for the budget. The Soviet Union argued
that this was necessary because of the magnitude of the expenditures which would be involved. The West on the other hand maintained that to allow this would allow one of the Original Parties
effectively to block the operations of the Control Organization, and
argued instead that the budget should only require a two-thirds
majority in the Control Commission and a simple majority in the
Conference.
On December 14, 1959, as a part of its package proposal, the
Soviet Union stated that it would agree to such a provision if its
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proposal for the composition of the Control Commission were
accepted; that is, the 3-3-1 formula. 46 As the Western powers
pointed out, under such arrangements the Soviet Union would have
retained the ability to block the budget and in fact to block any
section of the budget since the Soviet Union insisted that the Commission should not merely vote on the total budget but also on
each individual section. In the December 14 proposal the Soviet
Union also insisted that the share of the contributions to be borne
by each of the Original Parties would have to be specified in the
treaty.
The following year brought no resolution of these differences.
Although the gap between the two sides on voting procedures in
the Commission was narrowed considerably in the first twentyseven months of the Geneva Conference, it nevertheless continued
to exist.
( 4) How Much Independence for the "Executive,?
A final major controversy concerned the Administrator. As
will be recalled, the original Soviet plan made no provision for a
chief executive officer, and appeared to assume that the Commission would oversee the operation of the control system. However,
prior to the March 19, 1959 recess, the USSR had agreed that
an administrator might be required, but only after the West had
affirmed that such an individual would be subordinate to the Control Commission and that his appointment would require the agreement of all the Original Parties. During the remainder of 1959 and
1960, agreement was reached on several aspects of the general
functions and character of the office of the Administrator. It was
agreed that he should view his task in international terms, not as a
representative of any side. This was understood to mean that he
would most likely be a national of an uncommitted country. It
was also agreed that he would be responsible for the general management of the control system, and that in connection with this, he
would prepare budget estimates, forward reports to the Commission, and encourage the staff of the system to participate in basic
research.
Despite this broad area of agreement, there were various dis46GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 11.
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agreements. The two sides could not agree to treaty language
defining the relationship between the Administrator and the Control Commission. The original United States proposal had contained the provision that the Administrator should be "responsible
to the Commission in the performance of his duties," 47 and this was
subsequently modified " . . . for the installation and operation of
the control system." 48 On December 3, 1959, the Soviet Union
sought to establish the dominant role of the Commission even
more clearly, by suggesting that the relevant section should read:
He shall be responsible to the Commission and is directly
subordinated to it in all his acts, and shall provide to the
Commission such advice, reports and assistance as the
Commission may request. 49
Although the distance between the two concepts was narrowed
somewhat in the following month and a half, agreement could not
be achieved. The West proposed as a compromise formulation: "He
shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision,
shall carry out its policy directives" 50 but would go no further. The
USSR, on the other hand, never accepted this formulation.
The essential issue at stake was the freedom to be given the
Administrator, and the position of the two sides was in accord
with that which they have taken with respect to other international
organizations, particularly the United Nations. The same issue arose
in the consideration of various specific powers which the West
proposed to give to the Administrator, such as appointment of his
staff, the authority to determine the location of control posts and
bases for inspection teams, and the authority to despatch special
aircraft sampling flights and on-site inspection teams. The USSR
consistently sought to eliminate these provisions and hedge the
Administrator's freedom. Where it did not succeed, the matters remained in dispute.
The original United States proposal had not specified any
upper level staff other than the Administrator. On December 3,
1959, the Soviet Union proposed that two deputy administrators
47GEN/DNT/PV.
4BGEN!DNT/PV.
49GEN/DNT/PV.
50GEN/DNT/PV.

25, p. 12.
106, p. 15.
142, p. 26.
155, p. 6.
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should be appointed who "shall assist the Administrator in his
day-to-day work and shall be entitled equally to participate in the
preparation of questions for decision by the Administrator."51 In
his oral presentation, Mr. Tsarapkin made it clear that the two
deputy administrators should represent the two sides, and asserted
that their constant presence could do much to prevent friction,
especially between the Control Organization and the Original Parties.52 This appeared to the Western powers to be an attempt to
intrude national elements into what they conceived of as an international staff. At first the Western powers were disinclined to
compromise their concept in this way.
Movement toward agreement was only possible because of the
Western powers' growing concern for another problem, on which the
Soviet Union was willing to make concessions in return for counter
concessions. At about the same time that the Soviet Union raised
the proposal for two deputy administrators, the United States became worried about the problem of continuity in the executive
authority, and proposed that the Administrator should continue to
serve until his successor was appointed. 53 Obviously the United
States had in mind the situation in the United Nations when the
permanent members of the Security Council could not agree to a
successor for Secretary General Trygve Lie, whose term of office
was extended over the most strenuous Soviet opposition until agreement was reached on the new chief executive. Because of that very
situation, however, and because the Western proposal would for the
future "legalize" what the Western powers had done in that instance
in the United Nations, the suggestion was an anathema to the Soviet
Union.
On April 18, 1960, the United States tried a different approach
to assure a measure of continuity in the performance of the administrative function. In January of that year the United States had
agreed that there might be one Deputy Administrator, and that his
appointment would require the concurrence of the Original Parties. 54
It now suggested that while the terms of both the Administrator and
the Deputy Administrator would be three years, the initial term of
olQEN/DNT/73.
52QEN/DNT/PV. 142, p. 16.
53QEN/DNT/PV. 141, p. 18.
54QEN/DNT/PV. 153, pp. 3-4.
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the Deputy Administrator would only be two years, so that the
terms of the two officers would always overlap. 55
On June 21, 1960, the Soviet Union proposed that there should
be three deputy administrators, a first deputy who would be a
national of an uncommitted country, and who could serve as Administrator in his absence, and two representing the two sides. 56 At
the same time, Mr. Tsarapkin stated that the USSR would accept
the Western concept of staggering the terms of the Administrator
and the principal Deputy. After a series of informal meetings, Sir
Michael Wright suggested ad referendum that there should be five
deputy administrators, a first deputy from an uncommitted state,
and two from each side. 57 The Soviet Union accepted this proposal
on July 5, and the United States, the following day. However,
agreement could not be obtained on the manner of appointment of
the Deputy Administrators. The West felt that the Administrator
should have some role in the selection of his principal assistants,
but the Soviet Union insisted that they should all be appointed by
the Control Commission.
Of course there were other differences among the three parties
in the Geneva Conference, relating for example to communications
and regional offices, but these four were the principal ones. Reviewing them, and considering them in conjunction with the agreements
that were achieved, one can only conclude that in mid-1960, when
progress in the negotiations fell sharply, issues relating to the Control Organization were not the principal obstacles to the adoption
of a nuclear test ban treaty. Given the extent of the compromises
which had occurred, it is hard to believe that further agreements
could not have been arranged.
IV

The Renewed Western Effort
The April 18, 1961, Western Draft Treaty
In fact, the West did offer further concessions. When the Kennedy
Administration assumed power in January, along with reconsidering
Western positions on such fundamental issues as the coverage of
55GEN/DNT/PV. 195, p. 4.
56GEN/DNT/PV. 216, p. 6.
57GEN/DNT/PV. 223, pp. 3-7.
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the treaty and the phasing of the installation of the control system,
it also reexamined Western positions relating to the structure of the
Control Organization. New positions were formulated as a consequence. The principal explanations for the changes were two.
First, President Kennedy wanted to make a determined effort to
achieve a treaty, and so instructed his aides. Secondly, the membership of the Committee of Principals was modified. Perhaps the most
crucial change was that Glenn T. Seaborg replaced John A. McCone
as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. McCone was
the strongest personality on the Commission and as a consequence
of his departure the AEC eased its position on several aspects of the
proposed treaty and Control Organization. For example, at one point
the AEC had taken the position that no instrument operated by
Soviet technicians could be considered reliable. After agreement
had been achieved within the United States government, the new
positions were presented to the British, who readily agreed.
The new Western position, several aspects of which have already
been discussed, was advanced in a series of oral presentations by
Ambassador Dean starting March 21, 1961, and in the draft treaty
tabled April 18, 1961. 58 With one exception relating to the number
of states on the Control Commission, this treaty incorporated the
articles which had already been adopted in the Conference. Beyond
that, it was based on previous Western positions, with certain
modifications. Several of the changes were designed to eliminate
outstanding controversies.
So far as staffing was concerned, the Western powers were
willing to specify in the treaty that in all cases where deputies were
appointed, a national of the United Kingdom or the United States
should have a deputy from the USSR and vice versa. They were not,
however, willing to go beyond their previous commitment with
respect to the third third at control posts, and they continued to
insist that the head of a control post could not be a host country
national.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change in the Western position
was with respect to the composition of the Control Commission.
The new proposal was for a Commission consisting of eleven states:
the three parties to the negotiations as permanent members; two
58For the draft treaty, see Geneva Conference, pp. 475-520.
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states associated with the United Kingdom and the United States;
three states associated with the USSR; and three uncommitted
states; thus yielding a 4-4-3 composition with East and West represented equally. Actually Mr. Tsarapkin had casually mentioned this
figure June 14, 1960, but the Western powers had not responded.G 9
As another fairly significant concession, the new Western
proposal provided that decisions in the Commission concerning the
scale of contributions and the total amount of each annual budget
would require the unanimous agreement of the three Original
Parties. By accepting substanfially the Soviet position the Western
powers sought to eliminate the last major point of disagreement
on the scope of the "veto." Thus, contrary to the United Nations
pattern where budgetary decisions are made by the veto-less General
Assembly, the budgetary control in the control organization would
be subject to the veto. Finally, with respect to the four deputy
administrators from the two sides, the new draft treaty provided
that they should be appointed by the Administrator "on the recommendation, or with the approval," of the party or parties concerned.
The new Western position also contained other innovations,
the most important of which related to the accession of other states
to the proposed treaty. Although the three parties had at an early
stage agreed that it should be possible for other states to accede to
the treaty, they had never worked out the procedures for this. On
July 26, 1960, the United States had tabled two draft paragraphs
on this point. 60 The paragraphs had two notable features. First,
others could become parties to the treaty only if the Commission
found that their adherence was "essential in order to achieve the
fundamental Treaty purpose of a permanent discontinuance of
nuclear weapons test explosions on a world-wide basis or that elements of control are required to be installed in territory under" their
jurisdiction. Secondly, the two articles throughout used the phraseology "states or authorities." The obvious purpose of these two
features was to allow the West to insist that certain states should
accede to the treaty, and yet to avoid any impairment of the United
States policy of nonrecognition of these or other states or their
governments. The necessity of the adherence of the People's Repub59GEN/DNT/PV. 213, p. 10.
60GEN/DNT/ 102.
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lie of China was one obvious case which the authors had in mind.
On the other hand, these provisions would enable the West to block
the accession of certain states, for example, the Democratic Republic of Germany. Mr. Wadsworth patiently explained that no one
would ever know whether a party acceded to the treaty as a state
or as an authority. This terminology and the entire procedure,
however, were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
The new Western draft attempted to meet the Soviet objection
by dropping the obnoxious words "or authority." On the other
hand, the West still opposed the Soviet proposal for automatic
adherence of other states and would have the Commission screen
membership applications. The new draft specified that in Commission decisions concerning adherence of new parties to the treaty,
Original Parties "associated" with the candidate must abstain.
The question of the timing of the accession of other states was
also altered in the new proposal. The six months' time limit on signing in the article on signature, ratification, acceptance, and entry into
force was dropped. At the same time, a schedule in the new Annex
I specified a timetable according to which elements of the Detection
and Identification System would have to be installed. Among other
things it specified that within five years of the entry into force of the
treaty twenty-one control posts would have to be established in Asia
outside of the territory of the USSR. If this commitment were not
fulfilled, parties would have the right to invoke the right of withdrawal under the duration article. Thus Communist China's accession would have had to have been achieved within the five-year time
period. Whether or not these arrangements would have insured this
is far from clear.61
One final minor change was that according to the new Western
draft the initial review of the effectiveness of the Detection and
Identification System should occur three rather than two years after
the coming into force of the treaty.
The Soviet Response
To the disappointment of the Western powers, there was little
real negotiation on their new proposals. On March 21, 1961, the
61For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Ciro E. Zoppo with the
collaboration of Alice L. Hsieh, The Accession of Other Nations to the
Nuclear Test Ban (Santa Monica: The RAND Corp., 1961, RM-2730-ARPA).
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day that the Conference resumed, before Ambassador Dean and Mr.
Ormsby-Gore had an opportunity to speak, Mr. Tsarapkin launched
an attack on the concept of a single executive head in international
organizations, often illustrating his point by referring to the activities
of the Secretary General of the UN in the Congo, and proposed that
the Control Organization should have, rather than an Administrator,
an Administrative Council, consisting of three members, representing respectively the USSR and its allies; the United Kingdom, the
United States and their allies; and neutral states. According to Mr.
Tsarapkin, this Administrative Council "would act as a single whole
and would agree amongst themselves on all steps which they would
undertake in the execution of their duties." 62 In subsequent questioning he never went beyond this brief formulation in explaining
how decisions would be taken in the Administrative Council. He
never gave an answer to queries about whether or not voting would
take place and unanimity be required, other than to say that the
members of the Administrative Council would "act in agreement." 63
Mr. Tsarapkin did state, however, that the proposal for the Administrative Council eliminated the necessity for having Deputy Administrators.
The Soviet proposal for an Administrative Council met firm
opposition from Western negotiators, both because they felt that it
would prevent the Control Organization from taking effective action,
and because they feared the implications of any compromise on this
issue, both for the UN and for other international organizations
which mieht be established in the future.
Why the Soviet Union shifted its position is not clear. In breaking the moratorium on nuclear testing slightly over five months
later, the USSR demons1rated that at that point, August 31, 1961,
it was willing seriously to jeopardize the negotiations, and thus presumably had little interest in continuing them. Chairman Khrushchev
had indicated as much in his meeting with President Kennedy in
Vienna on June 3 and 4. Preparations for the extensive test series
which the USSR initiated in the fall must have been well underway
by the time that the Geneva Conference resumed on March 21. Thus
Mr. Tsarapkin's move could be interpreted as designed to block the
62GEN/DNT/PV. 274, p. 14.
63GEN/DNT/PV. 298/Rev. 1, p. 32. See also GEN/DNT/325, p. 21.
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negotiations. At the same time, the Soviet Union was profoundly
unhappy and disturbed with Secretary General HammarskjOld's activities in the Congo. Like the Western powers, it too was interested
in implications of positions taken in the Geneva Conference for
events and institutions elsewhere. Moreover, its fear of giving significant power to a single executive head of a control organization
had been manifest throughout the negotiations, and the proposal for
an Administrative Council was only a slight modification of its earlier
stand on the question of deputy administrators.
The only one of the new Western proposals which the Soviet
Union accepted was that relating to the composition of the Control
Commission. On April 7, 1961, Mr. Tsarapkin agreed to the total
figure of 11 and the 4-4-3 distribution. 64 On the other hand, he
continued to insist that the composition of the third third of the staff
of control posts had to be specified in the treaty, and that the agreement of the original parties would be necessary for individual sections of the budget as well as for the total figure. He also argued
that the contributions of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the
United States would have to be equal. 65 The Western draft treaty
provided for equal contributions only from the United States and the
USSR. Basically, however, Mr. Tsarapkin paid little attention to the
Western proposals.
Despite this rebuff, and the deep impasse on the question of
the Administrator, the Western powers sought to keep the negotiations alive, and on August 30, 1961, the United States tabled further
compromise proposals. The first of these would have given the
Commission the right to dismiss the Administrator. 66 This would
have required only the concurring votes of any seven members.
The second proposal related to the composition of on-site inspection teams. In May 1960, the Western Powers had suggested
that on-site inspection teams in the USSR should be staffed by Western nationals and vice versa. They had always maintained that host
country nationals could not participate, although they were willing
to allow the possibility of "one or more" host country observers.
Originally the Soviet Union had proposed that on-site inspection
64GEN/DNT/PV. 286, p. 8.
65Jbid., p. 6.

66GEN/DNT/ 110/ Add. 2.
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teams should be composed of host country nationals, with one or
two controllers from the other side. Subsequently it modified this
stand and suggested that on-site inspection teams on the territories
of the original parties should be divided equally between nationals
of the USSR on the one hand, and nationals of the United Kingdom
and the United States on the other. On-site inspection teams on the
territories of other parties would be divided into thirds: one third
from the USSR, one third from the United Kingdom and the United
States, and one third from the host country. The draft treaty of
April 18 had continued the previous Western position. Now, however, the United States proposed that in the case of inspections on
the territories of the Original Parties, one half of the staff might
consist of nationals of uncommitted states, the other half and the
leader of the party being nationals of the other side. 67
These proposals were never discussed. During the evening of
the day on which they were presented, the Soviet Union announced
its decision to resume testing nuclear weapons, and on November 28,
1961, it tabled a treaty which would rely solely on national detection systems.

v
Conclusions
It is obviously impossible to analyze fully the postures of East

and West concerning the proposed Control Organization in isolation from their positions on other issues in the negotiations. One
cannot, for example, estimate the significance of the agreements that
were achieved without making some assumptions about the broad
goals of the three states. Many comments and speculations can
therefore best be postponed until a later stage. Some limited conclusions, however, can be drawn at this point.
The negotiations illustrated in detail the differing approaches
of the United States, and to lesser extent of the United Kingdom,
on the one hand, and of the Soviet Union on the other, to the
question of international organization. The Western position seemed
to be dominated by a desire to establish a control organization involving if necessary thousands of personnel, the operations of which

a

67GEN/DNT/110/Add. 3.
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could not be blocked by any one party and which would be capable
of providing incontestable evidence if a treaty violation occurred.
Western policy-makers were haunted by the fear of a situation in
which violations were known to be occurring, but could not be
proved conclusively. Realizing that the main if not the only sanction
in case of a violation would be Western resumption of nuclear
testing, they seemed to feel that they could only take such a step if
they had incontrovertible evidence of a violation.
Whether or not the Control Organization proposed in the Westem draft treaty of April 18, 1961, would have yielded such incontrovertible evidence may be debatable. Some have argued that the
Western powers made so many concessions to the Soviet Union and
in so doing mL'!:ed the "impartial" and the "reciprocal" approaches
with the result that, had an Original Party been interested in violating the treaty, it would have had ample opportunity to block the
effective functioning of the Control Organization. 68 Nevertheless,
there can be no question about the aim of the Western powers.
The Western position implicitly contained several interesting
assumptions, which deserve careful examination. First, it assumed
that the evidence of a violation would most likely be ambiguous.
Given the technical situation as it was understood during this period,
all but underground shots of less than 50 kiloton yield or decoupled
underground shots of larger yield would have been easily detected
by systems independent of the Control Organization and would have
been widely recognized as nuclear detonations. Moreover, single
shots would have escaped detection easier than a series. Of course,
certain categories of shots at high altitudes and in outer space would
have been difficult to detect, but since detection in this environment
relies almost entirely on mechanical means, this problem was hardly
discussed in the negotiations concerning the Control Organization.
The Western position therefore assumed that a violator would be
interested in the kinds of technological developments that could be
gained through testing in the yield ranges and in the environments
where detection would be difficult. Whether or not this was a valid
assumption is at least subject to question. Certainly when the Soviet
68See Fred C. lkle and others, Alternative Approaches to the International Organization of Disarmament (1962), Appendix A, "The Western
Proposal for A Nuclear Test Ban: How Would the Control Organization
Function," pp. 25-37.
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Union broke the moratorium it was equally if not more interested
in very high-yield nuclear weapons, the detonation of which could
not be concealed.
The Western position also assumed that domestic public opinion
within the Western states, and the opinion of the uncommitted states,
would be extremely important in determining the conduct of the
Western governments. The Western position implied that Western
governinents would find it extremely difficult to take so serious a
step as to denounce a nuclear test ban treaty on the basis of private
information. Perhaps this assumption is correct, but it has never been
proved. It also minimizes the ability of Western governments to
influence and shape their domestic public opinion.
Finally, the Western position was based on the assumption,
often explicitly stated, that it would be easier for the Soviet Union
to keep clandestine activities secret than it would be for the Western
powers. The most interesting aspect of this assumption is that during the period under consideration, because of important technological developments especially in the area of space reconnaissance,
it was becoming less and less true. 69
Apart from these specific policy considerations relating to possible treaty violations, the Western attitude seemed to have been
influenced also by the more general philosophy that any progress
toward control and reduction of armaments would require an international organization which would assure a degree of "openness"
throughout the world and guarantee a measure of restraint on national action.
The Soviet position, on the other hand, was based on extreme
reluctance to allow an international organization to be established
which might take action over Soviet opposition. The rationale which
it advanced most often for this position was that it needed to be in a
position to prevent the Western powers from using the organization
for espionage. The Western powers always minimized this argument, disavowing espionage aims and pointing out the limited incursions which would be involved. However, Russian regimes have
traditionally maintained a tight veil of secrecy, and the Soviet gov6 9For an interesting discussion ot some of the techniques involved in
this change see Clark C. Apt, ''The Problems and Possibilities of Space
Arms Control," Journal of Arms Control, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1963), pp.
18-43, at 29-32.
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ernment has frequently used or attempted to use secrecy to its
military and political advantage. 70 The Soviet fears served to confirm, and in a sense were in accord with, the Western belief that
they knew and could know less about the Soviet Union than the
Soviet Union did and could know about them. Thus Soviet secrecy
became a subject of and a factor in the bargaining.
In addition, Mr. Tsarapkin often asserted that the Western
powers might illegitimately use the Control Organization to promote
their interests, and averred that past experience in international
organizations proved this possibility. Clearly this position was based
on a profound distrust of the West and of any international organization in which the West played a major role, and was deeply rooted
in the Soviet Weltanschauung. The Soviet position is perhaps only
understandable in these terms. If one assumes that others are by
nature hostile, one obviously cannot allow them to have important
powers. Thus, even if the USSR had no intention of breaking the
treaty, it might desire to be in position to block any action by the
Control Organization. Soviet policy-makers probably also desired
to limit their freedom of action as little as possible.
Given the different assumptions, fears, and interests of the three
states, it is significant that they achieved as much agreement as they
did, even though this agreement was not lasting. It is also significant
that they agreed to the broad outlines of such an extensive international organization to perform so modest a function. To many of
the participants from both East and West, the Control Organization
envisaged in the Geneva Conference seemed to be greatly out of
proportion to the limited tasks that it would have been assigned.

70For an insightful discussion of Soviet attitudes toward secrecy and
arms control agreements, see Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet
Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament: A Study of Soviet Attitudes
(1964), pp. 142-58.

Appendix

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere , in Outer
Space, and Under Water

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties,"
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achieve
ment of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict
international control in accordance with the objectives of the United
Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate
the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, in
cluding nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nu
clear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this
end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environ
ment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed a� follows:
Article I
1.

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to

prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in
this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without
prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning
of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground,
the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to
this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the
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carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments
described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article II
1 . Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Govern
ments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if
requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary
Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all
the Parties, to consider such amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority
of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of
the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties
upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original
Parties.
Article III
1 . This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State
which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance
with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Original Parties-the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-which are hereby designated
the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the

Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory

and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of
its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences
or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments

pursuant to Article 1 02 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right
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to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, re
lated to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other
Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.
Article V
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Govern
ments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acced
ing States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed
this Treaty.
Done in triplicate at the city of Moscow, the fifth day of August,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.
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323-26; East-West compromises,
3 0 1 -3; financial arrangements
( like those of UN ) , 3 1 2; "for

mittee on Armed Services, Sen
ate, Committee on Foreign Re
lations
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munities of representatives, 3 1 3 ;

UN, 289; legal capacity of, 307;
legal personality and capacity of,

right to dismiss Administrator,
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III, 2 1 2, 309-10; privileges and
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see also Con

248; Annex I (Detection and
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testing in atmosphere, 345
Department of State (US ) , 45, 50,
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386n, 387, 432, 437, 439-4 1 ,
446, 453
Fox, Alfonzo P., 1 1 4n
France, 52, 95, 1 04-5, 1 25, 406,
42 1 -22, 465; abstained from
voting UN General Assembly
( 1 959 ) , 207 ; development of
nuclear capacity and weapons,
1 6, 250-5 1 , 35 1 ; explosions
caused by simple devices, 274;
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476-77; private memorandum to
Eisenhower, 1 26-27
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Control Organization
International Control Commission,
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Johnston Islands, 344
Joint Chiefs of Staff ( US ) , 38 1 ;
Chairman added to Committee
of Principals, 45 1 ; favoring re
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cation Subcommittee, 27; sev
eral members favoring resump
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Eisenhower, 97-99; speech at
ENDC meeting, 360-61
Killian, James R., Jr., 32-33, 47,
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Lloyd, Selwyn, 17-1 8, 1 68, 205
Lodge, John Cabot, 206, 208
Logan shot, 1 48-49, 1 55, 220, 227,
3 5 1 -52
Long, Franklin A., 3 8 1 , 4 1 2 , 446,
452n
Long, Russell B., 462, 463n
Loper, Herbert B., 47n, 270n
Lovett, Robert, 389
Lunik I, January 2, 1 957, 1 46
Luxembourg, 42 1

526

DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

Macmillan, Prime Minister, 3 1 ,
85, 1 58, 1 67-69, 1 73, 1 76-77,
1 8 1 -82, 1 84, 244, 246-47, 282-
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3 7 1 , 4 1 1 , 435, 447, 449-50,
452, 454, 456, 465 ; visit to

Military forces, reduction of in

USSR, February 2 1 -March 3,
1 959, 1 67

Missile controls, 92
Missiles, anti-intercontinental

Macmillan and Kennedy, corre
spondence with Khrushchev,
349, 3 7 1 , 447
Maddock, I., 1 86n, 2 1 8n
Malaya, 4 1 9
Malenkov, G. M., 3 1
Mali, 4 1 9, 42 1 ; vote i n UN, 284
Malinovsky, R. Y. , 96
Mansfield, Mike, 25, 462
Mao, Tse-tung, 96
Margolis, Emanuel, 20
Mark, J. Carson, 47n, 55n, 2 1 2n,
270n
Marshall Islands, 1 9
Matador rockets, 1 76
Matsu, bombardment of, 94-97
Matsushita, Masateshi, 2 1
McCarthy, Eugene, 448n
McClellan, John L., 463n
McCloy, John J., 269, 279, 28 1 ,
389, 460, 474
McCone, John A . , 86, 88n, 1 57-58,
1 73, 1 78, 1 80-8 1 , 200- 1 , 24445, 249, 327, 453, 473
McDougal, Myers S., 20n
McElroy, Neil H., 861
McGee, Gale W., 448n
McGovern, George, 448n
McMillan, W., 35 1 n
McNamara, Robert S., 86, 270,
340n, 345, 382-83, 440, 453,
46 1 ; address at Univer:;ity of
Michigan, 382
McNaughton, John T., vii, 349,
386, 452n
Mechem , Edwin L., 463n
Melman, Seymour, 44n, 59n, 6 1 n,
92n, 299n
Menon, V. K. Krishna, 360, 367,
373, 424
Metcalf, Lee, 448n

Europe, 1 1 2
Mills, Mark M., 28

ballistic, 342; ballistic, 3 8 ; bal
listic Soviet superiority, 3 4 1 ;
controls of, linked to delivery
vehicles, 92; other measures of
arms control, 1 1 2; for selected
NATO countries, 36; intercon
tinental ballistic, 42, 28 1 ;
launching of, 92; long-range
(USSR ) , 341 ; nuclear warheads
for in Europe, 40; operational
long-range, 340; operational
(USSR ) , 340; Redstone, to be
stationed in West Germany, 3 8 ;
Skybolt Polaris, 435; US offer
to Britain to replace Skybolt
with Polaris, 435, in France,
436; Soviet advances, 5 1 ; Thor,
for United Kingdom, 38; to
NATO countries, 1 74-76; USSR
lead in ballistic, 32
Moch, Jules, 208
Molnar, Julius P., 1 5 1 n
Molotov, V . M., 3 1
Moore, Virgil L., 1 1 4n
Moratorium on nuclear testing, 45,
89, 90, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 20, 1 3 5, 1 43,
1 47, 1 74, 247, 267, 290, 495;
broken by USSR, Sept. 1, 1 96 1 ,
280-8 1 , 341 , 356; debate on, in
US, decision on resumption of
atmospheric testing announced
March 2, 1 962, 345; Eisenhower
declaration on voluntary, Dec.
1 959, Khrushchev repeats pledge,
Jan. 1 960, 233 ; Eisenhower de
cision to continue, UK decision
to continue, Soviet statement on,
Aug. 1 959, 201-3; Kennedy
order for test resumption i n
laboratory and underground ,
283; opposition by AEC, 9 1 ;
opposition by Department of
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Defense, 9 1 ; pledges to honor by
Presidential candidates, 247; po
sition of three powers at expir
ation of Spring 1 960, 249 ;

Netherlands, 42 1
Neuberger, Richard L., 448n
Neutral states, 1 25
Neutron bomb, 28, 30, 35, 39, 62,
147, 244, 347, 382

Soviet decision to discontinue
tests, March 3 1 , 1 958, 45; So

Nevins, Allan, 269
New seismic data; see Seismic

viet ends, 1 1 9 ; Soviet proposal

data; Technology
New Zealand, 4 1 8, 42 1

for (with partial treaty) , March
1 9, 1 960, 240; temporary,
urged by USSR, 28; US, con
tinued in summer of 1 9 6 1 , 279;
US, resumes atmospheric test
ing, April 26, 1962, 377; un
policed, 387; USSR for first time
drops as condition to partial
test ban
Morgan, H. T., 254n
Morocco, 208
Morris, Donald, 55
Morse, John H., Jr., viii, 54
Morse, VVayne, 448n
Morton, Louis, 5n
Moscow Treaty; see Treaty Ban
ning Nuclear VVeapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under VVater
Moss, Frank E., 448n
Multilateral Nuclear Force ( MLF ) ,
435-36, 443, 46 1 ; see also
North Atlantic Treaty Or
ganization
Munk, VValter H., 1 5 1 n
Murphy, Charles J . V., 28n, 46n,
48n, 63n, 155n, 1 60n
Murray, Thomas E., 25n, 29, 9 1 n,
1 67n, 1 73, 269
Murrow, Edward R., 86, 2 8 1
Muske, Edmund S., 448n
Myrdal, Aiva, viii, 395-96, 442n
Nagasaki, 1 9
Nathan, Robert R., 1 58
National detection systems, 69,
1 27, 1 72, 36 1 , 363-68; for mon
itoring nuclear testing, 29 1
N ationa! stations , international
supervision of, 434
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 20-2 1 , 40-4 1
Nepal, 4 1 9

Niger, 4 1 9
Nigeria, 42 1 ; ENDC, 357-58
Nitze, Paul H., 408-9, 4 1 2, 459
Nixon, Richard, 263
Nogee, Joseph L., 6n, 1 5n
Nonaggression pact between NATO
and VVarsaw Pact countries,
proposed, 443
Nonaligned states, 4 1 3
Nongovernmental organizations,
hearings granted to, 1 17
Non-nuclear powers, influence of,
1 2; transfer of nuclear weapons
to, 1 6 ; see also Nth country
problem
Nordness, Nedville E., 352n
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion (NATO ) , 1 03, 1 1 0, 1 3 3,
273-74, 357, 383, 42 1 ; Agree
ment for Cooperation, US-UK,
37; Council meeting, 40, 175;
crisis of strategic doctrine, 38;
forces, strength of, 34 1 ; intel
ligence agents, 453; missiles for
NATO countries, 1 74-76; Multi
lateral Nuclear Force ( MLF ) ,
443, 46 1 ; Multilateral Nuclear
Force ( MLF ) , plans for, 43536; nuclear striking force, 1 1 01 1 ; pressure against test ban, 3 8 ;
programs, 267; selected coun
tries of, to receive missiles, 36;
strategy of, i n 1 957, 29-3 1 , 3640; strategy, pressure for "clean"
bomb and dispersal of nuclear
weapons, 30-3 1 ; see also Privi
leges and Immunities
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion and VVarsaw Pact govern
ments, discussion of nonaggres
sion pact between, 455
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Northrup, Doyle L., 47n, 55n,
73-74, 1 1 4n, 270n
Norway, 22, 4 1 8 , 421
Nth country problem, 7, 1 6, 303 1 , 5 1 , 88, 1 03 , 1 1 1 , 1 25, 1 74,
200, 208-9 , 237-38, 267-68,
273-75, 284, 37 1 , 387, 4 1 1 ,
414, 436, 443, 446 , 455, 457,
500; Communist China, 25 1 ;
France, 38; France and Com
munist China, 455
Nuclear detonations for peaceful
purposes, 1 56-58, 405 ; see also
Project Plowshare
Nuclear explosions, at high alti
tudes, in outer space, 1 46, 1 89,
333, 344, 348
Nuclear test ban, linked to other
measures of arms control and
disarmament; see "Link"
Nuclear test ban negotiations, as
case study, 1 1 - 1 3
Nuclear warheads, US, 340
Nuclear weapons, "clean"; cut-off
on production, 1 7; development
of, versus control, 5-7; exist
ing stockpiles, no control pos
sible of, 43-44; high yield, 342;
largest tested ( USSR ) , 342;
new tasks for, 26-29 ; prohibi
tion of, resolution in 1 6th UN
General Assembly, 285; see also
"Clean" nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons control, inter
action with Soviet behavior, 8-9;
link to world order, 7-9
Nuclear weapons tests, as political
issue, 1959 Presidential cam
paign, 209; at high altitudes, 63;
comprehensive agreement for
suspension of, 1 7 1 ; deep under
ground, 58; extremely high alti
tudes, 58; first underground det
onation by USSR, 353; 1 958
US series, Hardtack I (Teak,
Orange, Argus ) ; Hardtack II
( Tamalpais, Logan, Blanca ) ,
1 45-47 ; improved detection of,
368; in atmosphere, resumed by
US, April 26, 1 962, 377; more

extensive in 1 962 than in any
other year, 378; opposition to
resumption of, in US, 3 45-49;
President 's assurances on Mos
cow Treaty, 462; resumption by
USSR, August 5, 1 962, 393;
resumption of, in laboratory and
underground, ordered by Ken
nedy, September 5, 1 96 1 , 343;
underground, 63; under water,
in the atmosphere, in the bio
sphere, detection and identifica
tion of, 366-67; USSR resumed,
September 1 , 1 9 6 1 , 280, 332;
USSR test of "superpowerful"
bomb, 284; see also Morato
rium on nuclear testing
Oliver, Jack E., 1 5 1 n, 21 2n
Olmstead, George B., 55n
On-site inspections, 6 1 , 72, 74,
1 34-35, 1 49, 1 7 1 , 253, 280,
303, 322, 369, 376; annuru
quota of, 1 77, 226; continued
deadlock over quota, 43 3 , 43839; criteria for, 1 8 1 , 1 85 , 22628; criteria in US-UK draft
comprehensive test ban treaty
(Aug. 1 962 ) , 402-5; difficulty
of, 253; discussion in the Con
ference of Experts Report, 78;
in mainland China, 1 66; new
approach suggested by US, 275;
number of, 24 1 ; number of, as
political issue in Technical
Working Group II, 22 1 ; quota
of, 249; quota of three not ac
ceptable to US Senate, 449; re
duction in number of, 363;
Soviet proposal for temporary
criteria for initiation of, 238;
Soviet proposal of three per
year, 1 99; Soviet proposal on
annual quota, 1 99, 235; Soviet
reaction to Western draft of
Aug. 1 962, 4 1 4; still required in
1 962 for comprehensive ban,
3 8 8 ; two schemes proposed by
US, 236-37; of unidentified
events, 352; US insistence on,
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432; US offer to reduce num

454-55; Western draft ( Aug.

ber of, 393; US position on

27, 1 962) , 389, 397, 409- 1 3,

quotas, 272; USSR quota ac

455; Western proposal ( Sept.
3, 1 9 6 1 ) ' 282-83

ceptable to US, 426; veto on,
1 77; Western modification of
process suggested, 44 1 ; West
ern proposal on composition of
inspection teams, 3 3 1 -32; see

also Technical Working Group
II
"Operation Deadline," 99
Opponents of test ban, 1 24, 1 37,
1 39-40, 1 57
Orear, Jay, 44, 59n, 6 1 n
Organization of American States
(OAS ) , 1 03
Original Parties, 305, 3 1 0, 458;
unanimity among, 203, 302-3
Ormsby-Gore, David, 1 1 4, 1 29,
1 32, 1 34, 1 40, 1 50, 1 62, 1 67,
330
"Other States," 305; adherence of,
328-29; role in negotiations ap
praised, 498
Our Nuclear Future, 2 1 9
Outer space, 92; peaceful use of,
1 06-7; reconnaissance of, 334
Overflight for radioactive debris,
dispute over, 70-73
Padilla Nervo, Luis, 360, 379-80,
416
Pakistan, 22, 1 04
Palais des Nations, 363
Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., vii,
viii, 1 46, 1 86-90, 1 9 1 n, 1 92n,
1 93-94, 2 1 2n, 2 1 4n, 2 1 5n,
2 1 8n, 2 1 9, 22 1 , 222n, 227,
228n, 229n, 270n, 277, 480
Panofsky Panel, 1 78, 1 82, 1 87 ;
report, 278
Panton F., 2 1 8n, 254n
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
1 1 5, 1 27, 1 7 1 -77, 286, 4 1 5 ,
454; Soviet proposal ( Mar. 1 9 ,
1 960) , 240-41 ; U S suggestion
for, 1 7 1 ; US verbal proposal
for (Feb. 1 1 , 1 960), 234-38,
and Soviet response, 238-40;

USSR draft ( July 1 5 , 1 963 ) ,

Parties to treaty, 1 30-32
Pasechnik, I. P., 254n
Pashchnik, D. R., 57, 2 1 4n
Pastore, John 0., 446
Pauling, Linus C., 25, 34, 56, 460,
464, 479-80
Peaceful uses of nuclear explo
sions, 463; see also Project Plow
share
Pell, Claiborne, 448n
Peng, Tehhuai, 96
Penney, Sir William, 54, 76-77,
85, 2 1 8, 452n
People's Republic of China, 66,
95, 96, 37 1 ; Condition for par
ticipating in disarmament con
ference, 25; explosions by USSR
on its territory, 1 3 1 ; not bound
by treaty, 25 1 ; see also Com
munist China.
Peru, 207, 4 1 8
Petersen, Allen M . , 1 86n
Phased treaty; see Partial test ban
treaty
Philippines, 4 1 9, 42 1
Piore, Emanuel R., 33n
Poland, 40, 52, 57, 419; resolution
in U.N General Assembly, 267;
Ten-Nation Disarmament Com
mittee, ENDC, 357
Policy-makers, in open and closed
societies, 496; understanding of
detection problems, 62-64
Political compromise, search for,
23 1 -6 1
Political instructions, for Soviet
delegate to TWG II, 2 1 6; for
US delegates to TWG II, 2 1 617
Popper, David H., 1 1 4, 24 1 n
Portugal, 42 1
Power, Thomas S., 459
Pravda 94, 99, 1 63
Preparatory Commission, 2 1 2,
,

242, 309-1 0; Annex III adopted,
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Preparatory Commission (cont.)
309-10; composition of, 309- 1 0;
functions of, 309-10; see also

Project Plowshare, 35, 35 1 , 456

Control Organization
President (US ) , presidential cam
paign and test ban, 24-25, 263
President 's Science Advisory Com

Proliferation;

mittee ( PSAC) , 46-49, 63, 88,
93, 1 49-51 1 53, 1 56, 1 60 ; ad
'
hoc panel appointed by Ken
nedy, 277; appointment of
Panofsky Panel, 1 46, 1 5 3 ; mem
bers, 277n
Press, disclosure to, 1 1 8
Press, Frank, 62, 1 5 1 n , 2 1 2n, 2 1 9 ,
254-55, 259, 277n, 352n, 455
Press, R., 1 86n
Pressure; by public opinion, 80,
91 , 1 80; on public officials, by
insistent press corps, 390-9 1 ;
to resume testing, 275, 279;
against test ban, from NATO,
38, 275; for test ban, 1 9-2 1 ,
25-26; for test ban negotiations,
277; against testing, 37 1 ; see
also Public opinion
Privileges and Immunities, abuse
of, 3 1 6; Agreement on the Priv
ileges and Immunities of the
International Atomic Energy
Agency, 3 1 1 ; Agreement on the
Status of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, National
Representatives and Interna
tional Staff, 3 1 1 ; Annex II, 258,
3 1 0-1 7 ; access of personnel to
party's territory, 3 1 6 ; of Con
trol Organization, 3 1 3- 1 4 ; repre
sentatives on Control Commis
sion, 3 1 3 ; of staff and experts,
3 1 3-14; waiver of immunities,
3 1 3 ; Specialized Agencies, 1947
Convention on, 3 1 1 ; to be
granted by parties to own na
tionals, 3 1 4- 1 6 ; of the UN,
1 946 Convention on, 3 1 1
Production of nuclear weapons,
cut-off, 4 1 , 9 1 -92
Project Cowboy, 223, 3 5 1
Project Gnome, 3 5 1 -52

Projects Vela and Cowboy, 17780; see also Vela Program

see Nth country

problem
Proof testing of existing weapons,
378
Propaganda (by USSR ) , 1 1 3 ;
benefits for USSR, 1 80, on pre
ventive war, 422; victory for
USSR, admitted by Dulles, 46
Prouty, Winston, 448n
Proxmire, William, 448
Public opinion, 95, 1 62; British,
1 69 ; concern of, since 1 954,
1 5 ; domestic, in Western and
uncommitted states, 334; Soviet
control over, 99; Soviet effort to
influence Western and uncom
mitted countries, 1 1 8; in US,
39, 1 69, 470; Western sensi·tiv
ity to, 350; see also Pressure
Pugwash Conference (Tenth) , on
Science and World affairs, 425
Purcell, Edward M., 33n, 46 1
Quarles, Donald A., 48, 146, 1 78
Quemoy, bombardment of, 94-97
Rabi, Isador I., 33n, 460
Radford, Arthur W., 46 1
Radioactive fallout; see Fallout
Rainier, data, 1 48-49; shot, magnitude incorrectly estimated,
2 1 8 ; underground nuclear ex
plosion in Nevada, Sept. 1 957,
58-6 1 ' 72, 1 48 , 1 55, 1 63
RAND Corporation, 36, 179, 252
Randolph, Jennings, 448n
Reciprocal control system, 502
Reciprocal inspection, 446
Reid, Luther, 1 1 4n
Report of the Conference of Ex
perts;

see Conference of Ex

perts
Republican Conference on Nu
clear Testing (early 1 963 ) , 43738
Republican opposition to test ban
negotiations, Jan. 1 963, 436-38
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ordinated, 237-4 1 , 247-49; East

Schweitzer, Albert, 2 1
Science, "betrayal by," 1 54-57

West, agreed by USSR, 249;

Science Adviser;

Research program, East-West, co

joint program, USSR insistence
on, 249; joint Soviet-Western,
of criteria for initiating on-site
inspection, 239; Seismic Re
search Program Advisory Group
( SRPAG ) , 248; in US. reported
at SRPAG meetings, 254-55
Ribicoff, Abraham A., 448n
Rich, A., 425n
Riznichenko, Y. V., 1 63-65, 2 1 4n,
254n, 255-56, 425n
Roberts, Chalmers M., 245n
Robertson, A. W., 463n
Robertson, H. P., 33n
Roberston, Walter S., 66

see Special As-

sistant for Science and Tech
nology
Science Advisory Committee of
the Office of Defense Mobiliza
tion (ODM ) , 32-33, 49;

see also

President's Science Advisory
Committee
Science policy, relation to security
policy (US ) , 477-78
Scientific Committee on Effects
of Atomic Radiation, 20
Scientific literacy, importance for
politicians and diplomats, 48 1 83
Scientists, 1 8 5; a s advisors and

Rocard, Yves, 5 4
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 209

negotiators in international con
ferences, 53, 486-90; conflicting

Roddis, Louis H., 277n
Rome treaties, 307
Romney, Carl F., 55n, 1 50, 1 5 1 n,

advice by, 365, 483; East-West
area of agreement, 225, 239 ;

1 60, 1 64-66, 2 1 2n, 2 1 8 , 220n,
222n, 254, 354n, 444
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, Mrs.,
158
Rumania, 5 2 , 5 7 , 4 1 9 ; Ten-Nation
Disarmament Committee,
ENDC, 357
Rusk, Dean, 80, 270, 276, 28 1 ,
345, 362, 365, 390, 446, 453,
456, 46 1
Russell, Richard B., 444, 463n
Sadovsky, Mikhail A., 56-57, 1 86,
2 1 4n, 254-56, 258-60, 4 1 8n
Sahlou, P., 375-76
Saltonstall, Leverett, 462

Saturday Evening Post, 346
Saudi Arabia, 4 1 9
Scheid, Robert C., 254n
Schelling, Thomas C., 9n
Schilling, Warner R., 6n
Schlei, Norbert A., 20n
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 276n,
277n, 278n, 279n, 28 1 n, 282n,
285n, 346n, 348 and n, 43 1n,
440n, 447n, 448n, 453n, 465n
Schnierman, G. L., 254n

East-West disagreement on need
for international control, 69;
efforts to use for achieving
agreement, 378; employed in
executive agencies, 485; inter
pretation of Hardtack II, 22 1 ;
need for advice from mixture of
scientific disciplines, 484; out
side government, 485; panel of,
proposed, 280; personal rela
tionships of, 489; problems of
communication with nonscien
tists, 1 0, 48 1 -82; proposal for
national scientific institute, 486;
role i n TWG I and II, 1 8 8-95,
2 1 8, 223-25, 489; in Seismic
Research Program Advisory
Group, 254-57, 490; statement
on 1 962 comprehensive draft
treaty, 445; suggested use of
"black boxes," 425; Sweden,
369; use in informal sessions,
490
Scientists, US, ability to detect
underground shots, 386; access
to highest policy-makers, 3 3 ;
ability t o function apolitically
doubted, 392; advice at highest
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Scientists, US ( continued)
level of government, 483-84;
advice within bureaucracy, 48486; arrangements for partici
pation in policy process, 32-3 3 ;
clarifying U S position t o ENDC,
Subcommittee 1 , 368-70; con
tradictory replies to question
naires on test ban control, 6061 ; divided over resumption of
atmospheric tests, 346; en
gaged in political negotiations,
1 9 1 ; in Geneva to explain tech
nical situation in light of Vela
Program data, 392; impact of
Eight-Nations delegates, 394;
interpretation of seismic data,
1 49; lacking political guidance,
1 92-93, 195; as new actors in
policy process, 9-1 1 ; opposition
to acceptance of Soviet pro
posals, 437-38; petition for test
ban by, 25; as policy advisers,

Seismic recording stations, 75,
1 48, 352, 502; automatic, 428,
432, 434
Seismic Research Program Ad
visory Group (SRPAG ) , 248,
254-6 1 , 392; delegations from
UK, US, USSR, 254; disagree
ments, 259-6 1
Seismic signals, 75, 1 60, 1 99, 369;
disagreement on recording meth
od, 72-73; decoupling or muf
fling, 1 5 3 ; effects of various
media on transmission of, 352,
369-70, 385-86; shots tamped
in salt and in tuff, 35 1 ; "Second
Zone," 354; "Third Zone," 354,
384
Seismographs, improved effective
ness of, 385
Seismological stations, 59, 502;
detection of French under
ground shot in Algeria, 384;
existing facilities, 395-96; in

479-8 1 ; political issue in TWG
II, 22 1 ; role in Conference of
Experts, cri·ticism of, 487; role
in consensus-building, 470-72;

strumentation offered by US
Coast and Geodetic Survey, 353;
preliminary lis·ts of, exchanged
by US and USSR, 434; proto

selected for Conference of Ex
perts to balance differing views,
55-56; Western panel at Con
ference of Experts, 54-56;
willing to generalize on basis of

type, established at Fort Sill,

single Rainier experiment, 60
Scott, Hugh, 448n
Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 47n, 55n
Seaborg, Glenn T., 86, 270, 327,
461
Secretary of Defense, 85-86
Secretary of State, 85-86; see

also

Dulles, John Foster; Rusk, Dean
Security Policy ( US ) , ambiguous
and vacillating, 490-9 1 ; relation
to science policy, 477-78
Seismic data (new ) , 2 1 6, 303;
USSR agrees to examine, 2 1 0;
USSR reaction to, 1 62-66; US
insistence on consideration of,
2 1 0 ; see also Technology
Seismic method of detection, 75-77
Seismic research in USSR, 1 6 1-62

Oklahoma, 354
Seismologists, Soviet, unavailable
in Moscow, 455
Semenov, N. N., 56-57
Senate, Committee on Armed Serv
ices, Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, 4 1 2, 450-5 1 ,
459, 462
Senate, Committee on Foreign Re
lations, 26, 445-46, 459, 46 1 -62;
Subcommittee on Disarmament,
26, 35, 43, 45, 60-63, 1 50,
1 56, 2 1 3- 1 4, 245, 475-76
Senate, consent to Moscow Treaty,
463; debate on Moscow Treaty,
462; resolution on partial test
ban, 448
Shepilov, Dimitri T., 3 1
Shulman, Marshall D., viii, 424n
Shustov, V., 2 1 4n
Siberia, on-site inspections in,
363; central, 353
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Signature, ratification, entry into
force of treaty, article on,
adopted, 305
Simp!!on, Milward L., 463n

Strategic doctrine, US, 382; alert
forces, 340;

see also North At

lantic Treaty Organization
Strategy ( US ) , "massive retalia

fighting, 37 1 ; disarmament dif

tion" abandoned, 26
Strauss, Lewis L., 25n, 29, 44,

ferences, 25 1 ; dispute, 424;
ideological differences confer

Street, Kenneth Jr., 1 5 1 n

Sino-Soviet alliance, 66; border

ence, 450; tensions, 265

48, 55, 59n, 86, 88n, 46 1
Stromberg, Roland N . , 7 n

Smith, Margaret Chase, 463n, 464
Solandt, Ormond, 54

Subcommittee ( tripartite ) of

Somalia, 4 1 9
Sorenson, Theodore C., 276n,
277n, 283n, 344n, 345n, 346n,
347n, 348n, 449n, 450n, 452

Summit meeting (Eisenhower and
Soviet leaders ) , 4 1 ; collapse of,

and n, 456n, 463 and n
South Africa, 42 1
Southeast Asia, 339; guerilla ac
tion, 382; SEATO, 1 03
Sovereignty, cooperation among
sovereign states, 1 32
Soviet bloc, 207, 42 1 ; vote in
UN, 284-85
Soviet press, 2 8 1
Soviet Union; see Union o f Soviet
Socialist Republics
Spain, 4 1 9, 42 1
Sparkman, John J., 448n
Special Assistant for Science and
Technology, 32, 86, 88, 93
Special Assistant to the President
for Disarmament, 43
Special Assis·tant to the President

ENDC, 4 1 6, 429, 442

257-58
Summit meeting, Western, May
1 959, 1 68-69
Supreme Soviet, Gromyko's speech
before, 1 56
Surprise attack, 92; agreement on
meeting to consider, 67; Confer
ence, 1 04, 1 1 1 - 1 2 ; safeguards
against, 1 6- 1 7
Sweden, 1 05, 206-7, 268, 372,
379, 42 1 , 427; delegation to
ENDC, 357-60, 395; Gnome
shot recording, 352
Symington, Stuart, 35, 444, 462
Syria, 4 1 9
Tactical nuclear weapons, 30, 62,
1 26, 1 28, 147, 252; demanded
by Germany, 3 1
Talmadge, Herman E., 463n

for National Security Affairs, 8 6
Speier, Hans, 30n

Tamm, I. Ye., 56-57, 425n

Spence, Roderick, 47n
Spiers, Ronald 1., 47, 55
Sputnik I and Sputnik II, 32

Taubenfeld, Howard J., 2 1 1 n

Starbird, Alfred D., 44, 47n,
20 1 , 270n, 344
Stassen, Harold, 1 6- 1 7, 43-44,
58, 9 1 , 93, 460
Stebbins, Richard P., 3 1 n, 96n,
1 1 9n, 258n
Stelle, Charles C., 1 14n
Stennis, John, 463n

Tass, 94
Technical agreement, search for,
1 74-230
Technical experts, 49;

see also

Scientists; Technology; Tech
nical talks
Technical preparation for negoti
ations appraised, 49 1 -92
Technical talks, 472; agreed to by
Khrushchev, 50; conference on

Stevenson, Adlai E., 24-25, 345,
456

surprise attack, 1 04, 1 07, 1 1 1-

Stockholm, Defense Research Or

group o f experts suggested in

ganization, 360

1 1 2; first suggested by UK, 1 7 ;

UN resolution, 22, by Eisen-
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Technical talks ( continued)
bower, 4 1 , 49-53; as a neutral
device, 392; possible USSR op
position to group, 392; proposal
on "black boxes," 429; proposed
working group, 1 39 ; see also
Technical Working Group I
(TWG.I) ; Technical Working
Group II (TWG.II) ; Confer
ence of Experts; Seismic Re
search Program Advisory
Group (SRPAG )
Technical Working Group I, 1 83209, 472; agenda argument, 1 88 ;
bulk o f data from West, 1 89 ;
delegates, 1 86-87; h i gh altitude
testing, and banning of, 1 82;
little political guidance, 1 8 7 ;
recommendations on basis for
control system, proposed by
US, 27 1 ; report to diplomatic
Geneva Conference, 1 90-9 1 ,
1 95; terms of reference, 1 85-85
Technical Working Group II, 2 1 029; agenda for, 2 1 4-1 5 ; agreed
report on improvement of tech
niques and instrumentation, 226;
delegations : Soviet, 2 1 4 , UK,
2 1 8, US 2 1 2 ; deadlock, 229;
failure of, impact on morator
ium, 232; lack of preparation,
US delegation, 2 1 4; report, with
four Annexes, 229; talks end
without agreement, 229-30;
terms of reference, 2 1 0- 1 1
Technological lead, impact of, on
negotiations, 498
Technology, changes in, impact on
test ban negotiations, 497, 501 ;
controlling modern, 50 1 ; mili
tary, impact on vulnerability of
US, 5; military, revolution in,
42; new date, 1 45; Soviet reac
tion to new data, 1 62-68
Teller, Edward, vii, 28, 36, 48,
55-56, 1 5 1 -53, 2 1 9, 223, 25 1 52, 346, 437, 459, 479-80
Ten-Nation Disarmament Com
mittee, 202, 205, 207, 232;
composition of, 357; Soviet sug-

gestion of adding five nonaligned
nations, 357 ; USSR walks out,
263
Testing of nuclear weapons ; see
Moratorium on nuclear testing
Test sites, funds for, 20 1 ; US offer
to allow Soviets to inspect, 279
Thailand, 42 1
Thomas, Norman, 25, 1 58
Thompson, Llewelyn E., 272, 282,
386, 453
Thor intermediate range rockets,
1 75
Threshold, 74-77, 1 38, 1 8 1 , 1 9 1 ,
199-200, 236-37, 24 1 , 290;
failure by Administration to find
acceptable, 62; acceptable risk
disagreement, US, 1 96-97; seis
mic magnitude (4.75) ; elimina
tion of, 27 1 , 280, 362; of detect
ability, 250, 446
Thurmond, Strom, 463n
TNT explosions, data from, 73
Toon, Malcolm, 7 1 4n
Toussaint, Paul, 1 1 4n
Tower, John G., 463n
Treaties; see Comprehensive Nu
clear Test Ban Treaty, drafts
and agreed draft articles; Par
tial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
drafts; Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmos
phere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water ( Moscow Treaty)
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, i n
Outer Space, and Under Water
( Moscow Treaty ) , 3-1 3, 444-66;
assurances on, by Kennedy, 462;
comparison with 1 962 draft,
456-58; consent by US Senate,
463; drafts, 389, 397, 409- 1 3 ,
454-55; effect of Cuban crisis on
signing, 424; effective date, 464;
lack of control machinery, 2 8 8 ;
negotiations opened, 454; nego
tiations in retrospect, 469-503 ;
Original Par·ties as depository
governments, 458; preliminaries
to negotiations, 444-54; ratifica-
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tion, 458-64; refusal to sign by

tabled : October 3 1 , 1958, 1 22-

Communist China, Albania,

286, 454-55; "global" intercon

Cuba, France, 465; signed by

tinental missile, 360; high-yield

more than 1 00 other states, 464;

weapons ( 1962 ) , 423; insistence
on "joint" research program,

text of, 504-6;

see also Partial

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
"Troika" concept, 357-58
Truman, Harry S., 32, 48
Tsarapkin, Semen K., 57, 75, 1 1 5,
1 1 8 , 1 20, 1 22, 1 27-28, 1 32n,
1 35-37, 1 39, 1 62-63, 1 77, 1 82-

24, 454, November 1 8, 1 96 1 ,

249 ; lead in areas of nuclear
weapons development, 343 ; lead
in ballistic missiles, 32; missiles,
long-range, 34 1 ; motivation i n
agreeing t o Conference o f Ex

85, 1 96, 1 98 -99, 2 1 0, 2 1 6n, 230,
235, 237-43, 249, 256, 258,

perts, 5 1 ; 1 9 6 1 nuclear weapons
tests, 341-43; objections to meet
ing of technical experts, 378-79;

264-65, 267, 272-73, 275, 286,
296, 299, 303, 3 1 2, 3 1 8, 3 2 l n,

objections to NATO nuclear
plans, 174-76; position in 1 5th

325-26, 328, 330-3 1 , 335, 36264, 368, 376n, 446

General Assembly, 268; position

Tukey, John, 1 5 l n, 2 1 2n, 277n
Tunisia, 22
Turkevich, Anthony L., 55n, 2 1 2n
Turkey, 1 75, 421
Twining, Nathan F. (General ) ,
46 1
Tyler, William R., 452n
Unilateral intelligence systems, 193
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub
lics (USSR) , Academy of Sci
ences, 1 6 3 ; accepted inspection
in aseismic areas, January 7,
1 963, 433; armed forces, reduc
tion suspended, 340; as nuclear
power, 6; bombers, long-range,
341 ; Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, 450; closed society, im
pact on negotiations, 496; con
cern at China's nuclear cap
ability, 200; delegates to Geneva
Conference, 1 1 5; delegates to
Seismic Research Program Ad
visory Group, 254; derision of
Vela Program results, 393; dis
continuance of nuclear assistance
to Communist China, 200; dis
cussions with Communist China,
agreement on new technology,
October 1 5, 1 957, 95-96; drafts
of comprehensive test ban treaty

on "black boxes," 428; prelim
inary moves at Moscow treaty
negotiations, 453-54; proposal
for control system by, at Con
ference of Experts, 75; proposal
for nonaggression pact, etc. in
ENDC, March 1 963, 443; reac
tion to "new data," 1 62-68; re
action to Western draft treaties
of August 1 962, 4 1 3-14; readi
ness for partial test ban without
unpoliced moratorium, July,
1 963, 453; refusal to assist Com
munist China, 274; reinstatement
of offer of 3 on-site inspections
( 1 962 ) , 426; rejection of offer to
reduce number of on-site inspec
tions and control stations, 394;
response to US suggestion for
phased treaty, Feb. 1 960, 23 8 ;
resumption of atmospheric test
ing, Dec. 1 3 , 1 962, 429; resump
tion of testing, Sept. 1 , 1 96 1 ,
280-81 ; sharp change in conduct
in negotiations, 275; Soviet mem
bers, Conference of Experts, 5658; Soviet sites for "black
boxes," Dec. 1 0, 1 962, 429;
superiority in conventional
forces, 1 6 ; superiority over
US in intermediate and long
range ballistic missiles, 341 ; test
series completed in March 1 958,
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45; troop strength reduced, 234;
underground nuclear explosion,
first

( Feb.

1 9 62 ) , 353 ; unwill

ingness to accept inspection,
245; willingness to establish con
trol system (June 1958 ) , 1 5 ;
viewed as expansionist by US,
6; willingness to consider direct
line of communication with US,
446; see also Khrushchev,
Nikita S.

ties of the Specialized Agencies,
1 947, 3 1 1 ; Economic and Social
Council, 2 1 , 373; expanded
membership, implications, 53;
impact on US position, 1 0 8 ;
role of, in international political
system, 1 2 ; Scientific Commit
tee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, 395; Secretariat, 371 ;
Secretary General, 1 1 7, 290

United Arab Republic, 357, 4202 1 , 427

(see also Hammarskjold ) ; Secu
rity Council, 289, 303; Subcom
mittee of the Disarmament Com
mission, 1 4-24, 9 1 ; see also

United Kingdom ( UK ) , Agree
ment for Cooperation with US

Disarmament Commission; Gen
eral Assembly

( 1 958 ) , 37; agreement with US
on Thor rockets ( 1 958 ) , 1 75;
Atomic Energy Authority, 56;
Bomber Command, 436; decision
to continue moratorium, 203;
delegates to Geneva Conference,
1 1 4- 1 5 ; delegates to Seismic
Research Program Advisory
Group, 254; delegation to TWG
I, 1 86 ; draft treaty ( with US,
April 1 8 , 1 9 6 1 ) , 363-64; Labor
Members of Parliament, 20;
members of Conference of Ex
perts, 56; position in 1 5th Gen
eral Assembly, 268; primary ob
jective to perpetuate negotia

United States , Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA ) ,
38 1 , 474; Army, 340; Coast and
Geodetic Survey, seismological
network, 353; Disarmament Ad
ministration, 269; Information
Agency ( USIA ) , Director of,
86; National Security Council
(NSC) , 46-47, 63; Office of
Defense Mobilization ( ODM) ,
Director of, 3 3 ; President's
Science Advisory Committee
(See President's Science Advi
sory Committee ) , Seismological
stations equipped by, 384; ab
sence of contingency planning,
39; Administration's defense of

tions, 29 1 ; proposed technical
talks on "black boxes," 429;

draft comprehensive treaty, 445-

suggestion for meeting of tech
nical experts, 378-79; technical

46, Agreements of Cooperation
with UK and others ; 1 958, 37;

talks : first suggestion, 1 7, fa
vored again, 392; willingness to
accept partial test ban (July
1 963 ) , 454; see also Macmillan,
Prime Minister
United Nations ( UN ) , agreements
authorized between Control
Organization and UN, 1 4 3 ;
Charter, 305; Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

assurance against misuse of on

site inspections, December 20,
1 962, 43 1 ; assurances by Pres
ident to Congress on Moscow
Treaty, 462; atmospheric testing
resumed, April 26, 1 962, 37778; bilateral agreements with
Greece, Federal Republic of
Germany, Netherlands, Turkey,
Canada (May 1 959 ) , 1 75; Cold

2 1 1 ; Convention on Privileges
and Immunities, 1946, ratified
by USSR and UK, 307; Conven

War attitudes reexamined, July

tion on Privileges and lmmuni-

tion, 1 8-3 3 ; confusion over

1 963, 449; conflicting forces i n
nuclear test ban policy formula

537

Index
U.S. Arms Control

( continued)

tial treaty suggested by (April

necessity of control posts in

1 3, 1 959 ) , 1 7 1 ; policy i n transi

USSR, 389-90; decision not to

tion, April 1 958, 50; position in
1 5th General Assembly, 268;

resume testing ( 1 961 ) , 278;
decision to continue priority for
comprehensive test ban (June
1 963 ) , 452; defense appropria
tions, 27, 339; defense strategy,
339-40; delegates to Geneva

power increasing, 339-4 1 ; proc
esses of decision-making, 23334; proposal (verbal) for partial
test ban, Feb. 1 1 , 1 960, 234-38;

visory Group, 254; delegates to

readiness in 1 962 to accept in
ternationally supervised, nation
ally manned control stations,
390; security policy of, 1 1 - 1 3 ;

TWG I and II, 1 86-87, 2 1 2;
delegation to Geneva political

strategic doctrine, 382; strategic
forces, 436; strategy and nuclear

negotiations, 1 1 3; development

weapons under Kennedy, 499;
( with UK) tabling of draft par

Conference, 1 1 3- 1 4; delegates to
Seismic Research Program Ad

of policy leading to the Con
ference of Experts, 39-53; do
mestic opposition to 1 962 com
prehensive draft treaty, 444;
evolution of policy on nuclear
weapons test ban, 40-4 1 ; formu
lation of security policy, 470-90;
impact of changes in interna
tional system upon, 4; impact of
"new data" on US position, 1 4562; instructions to scientists,
Conference of Experts, 64-66;
integration of scientist into policy
process in, 9; interagency ad
hoc committee (April-July
1 962 ) , 38 1 , 386-89; lead in
nuclear weapons ( 1 96 1 ) , 278;
memorandum on draft treaty

tial test ban treaty (Aug. 27,
1 962 ) , 455; tactical air squad
rons, 340; technical memoranda
for General Assembly ( 1 962 ) ,
4 1 8 ; technical preparation of
delegation to Conference of Ex
perts, 58; technical preparation
for negotiations inadequate, 49 1 93; test ban policies appraised,
494-95; underground tests post
poned (Jan. 26, 1 963 ) , 432;
underground tests (Sept. 1 3 ,
1 963 ) , 463; underground tests
series began ( Feb. 8, 1963 ) ,
438; weapons progress i f tests
resumed, 278; willingness to
accept a partial test ban, July

see also Atomic

changes (April ! , 1 963 ) , 44 1 ;

1 963, 454;

military power, 339-4 1 , 439-4 1 ;

Energy Commission; Committee

need to explain policy changes

of Principals; Comprehensive

( 1 962) to different audiences,

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, West

39; new concessions offered by

ern drafts; Congress

Dean (Aug. 28, 1 9 6 1 ) , 280;

Committee on Atomic Energy;

(also Joint

new negotiating position tabled

Senate, Committee on Armed

( Feb. 1 1 , 1 960 ) , 235; new

Services; Senate, Committee on

policy approved by Kennedy,

Foreign Relations ) ; Department

27 1 ; number of on-site inspec

of Defense; Department of State ;

tion control stations in USSR

Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Eisen

acceptable to ( October 1 962) ,

hower Administration; Kennedy,

426; offer to allow Soviet ex

John F.; Kennedy Administra

perts to examine US testing sites,
279; opposition to resumption of
testing in atmosphere, 354; par-

tion; Senate
University of California Radiation
Laboratory, 179
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Ustyumenko, A. 1., 1 86n, 2 1 4n,
254n
U-2 incident, 7 1
Van Allen radiation belts, 1 9 1
Vela Program, 1 7 8 , 1 82, 197, 2 1 4,
254, 263-65, 279, 353-56, 384,
390-9 1 , 4 1 2, 445
Venezuela, 268
Verification; see Control Organiza
tion; On-site inspection
Vernov, S. N., 1 86n
Veto; see Control Commission;
Control Organization
Vienna meeting, 276
Villard, Henry S., 1 1 4n
Violation of agreement, 1 1 0, 1 2425, 333-34, 367
Violations, alleged by US, of Gen
eral Assembly Resolution 1 762A
(XVII) , 438
Voss, Earl H., 19n, 25n, 49n, 55n,
69n, 1 08n, 1 20n, 1 36n, 1 68n,
1 70n, 172n, 1 80, 224n, 25 1n,
27 1 , 275n, 279n, 352n, 362n,
378n

270 and n., 341, 345, 362, 36869, 393, 426, 43 1 , 439-40, 47 5
Williams, G. Mennen, 1 99
Wilson, Charles E., 29
Wilson, Duncan, 352n
Wilson, Harold, 449, 453
Withdrawal from treaty, 1 42, 4068 ; see also Duration of treaty on
ban on nuclear testing; Control
Organization
Wohlstetter, Albert, 479
Wolfe, Thomas W., 266n
Women's Strike for Peace, 471
Woodward, Lester, 47n
World Council of Churches, 21
World Meteorological Organization, 367, 395
World order, arms control, 493;
link to control of nuclear weap
ons, 7-9; see also International
system and control of modern
technology
Wright, Christopher, viii, 9n, 479n
Wright, J. W., 2 1 8n, 254
Wright, Sir Michael, 1 59n, 1 67n,
1 69n, 1 96, 230-3 3, 24 1 , 248n,
270, 326, 359n, 47 1 n, 473n,

Wadsworth, James J., 1 1 3 - 1 4, 1 3640, 1 42, 1 43n, 1 50, 1 68-74,
1 96, 2 1 0, 235-43, 248, 258n,
3 1 2, 3 1 8, 329, 494n
Walske, M. Carl, 254n
Warsaw Pact, 274, 357, 443;
forces, strength of, 341
Watson, Kenneth M., 1 86n
Weapons development, 462; state
of, impact on negotiations, 498
Wennerstrom, Stig, 360
Western alliance, 42 1
Western press, conflicting views of
scientists reported in, 365
Wiesner, conversations with Fed
orov, 426
Weisner, Jerome B., viii, 33n, 86,

494n, 498n
Yarborough, Ralph W., 448n
Yifru, Ato Ketema, 367
York, Herbert F., 33n, 47, 270n,
460
Yugoslavia, 206, 4 1 9
Zacharias, Jerrold R . , 33n
Zagoria, Donald S., 25 1 n, 265n
Zhukov ( Marshall ) , 3 1
Zinn, Walter H., 277n
Zones of inspection, 1 1 2
Zoppo, Ciro E., viii, 69n, 329n
Zorin, Ambassador, 17n, 1 8n, 376,
393, 428
Zuckerman, Sully, 352n

